


A Princely Affair

The Accession and Integration of the
Princely States of Pakistan, 1947–1955



Yaqoob Khan Bangash

OXFORD



Photograph: Shiraz Aslam

Yaqoob Khan Bangash was born and raised in Lahore, Pakistan. After finishing his initial schooling at Salamat Academy and Lahore College of Arts and Sciences (LACAS), he went to the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA, earning a BA in History in 2004. He worked at the Asia Society and East-West Institute during 2004–5, and then joined the University of Oxford in 2006 to research for a DPhil in Modern History which he completed in 2011. Presently, he is teaching history at Forman Christian College and Information Technology University, Lahore.

Cover image

His Highness Mir George Ali Murad Talpur standing in front of the Khairpur Throne c.1949

Courtesy: Picture taken by Margaret Bourke-White on 1 December 1947 for LIFE Magazine

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Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
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Published in Pakistan by

Ameena Saiyid, Oxford University Press
No.38, Sector 15, Korangi Industrial Area,
PO Box 8214, Karachi-74900, Pakistan

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First Edition published in 2015

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ISBN 978-0-19-906649-0

Typeset in Adobe Garamond Pro
Printed on 80gsm Local Offset Paper

Printed by Maqsood Brothers Binding House, Karachi

In Memoriam Aeternam Patris Mei

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Foreword

The arrival of this book—the first of its kind on the subject of the erstwhile princely states which acceded to Pakistan makes me profoundly happy: not just because I happen to be one of the last ruling princes, but because the story of the princely states after accession to Pakistan needed to be told.

Dr Bangash's book presents a meticulously researched and well-written account of how several princely states acceded to Pakistan in 1947–8 and how they later fared. I commend Dr Bangash for taking on this venture because the creation and consolidation of Pakistan was not the simple story of the Muslim League and British India; several princely states—more than half the landmass of what is now Pakistan, as Dr Bangash shows—gave it vitally needed depth and stability.

The book helps to break various stereotypes about the princely states which for a long time were treated as an anachronism of the past—either relics of the Mughal Empire or creations of the British. However, as Dr Bangash's seminal work exhibits, these states were based on pre-modern concepts of state formation and were a result of decades of unrest on the margins of empires. My state, Khairpur, originally known as Uttar (Upper) Sindh, was itself the result of a lack of centralized rule following the weakening of the Mughal and Durrani empires, and its emergence provided security, peace and a semblance of government for the local population.

Before my reign my state was not very developed, but still we were leaders in several fields. Our contribution to the cause of education still remains unparalleled. We steadfastly supported the All India Muslim Educational Conference. Our representative presented the resolution for the establishment of the first Muslim university in the subcontinent at Aligarh. We also assisted in the formation of

the Dhaka Muslim University, and schools throughout India, even as far as the Madras Presidency. Within the state education was free since the time of my great-great-grandfather—my government then made primary education compulsory. The law and order in the state was exemplary. Prices of food items were controlled and medical facilities were free, even for livestock and transport animals.

After accession to Pakistan Khairpur became a state of 'firsts' in Pakistan. We were the first state to hold elections on the basis of universal adult franchise in 1950, to have an elected assembly after the creation of Pakistan, to provide free and compulsory education to all students, to make education a top priority, and to establish procedures for a true welfare state in the initial years of Pakistan. A great injustice was meted out to the people of the state and to Pakistan in 1955 by the forced merger into the One Unit West Pakistan.

The timing of this book's arrival is very pertinent as it synchronizes with a time when there is a dire need for introspection by the Pakistani nation. Much to the misfortune of our later generations, we have lost knowledge of our history and the current generation is completely unaware of our gloriously rich heritage. The prevailing environment in the country necessitates a process of soul-searching. 'The Princely Affair' can enlighten the readers about our lost legacy and provide us food for thought, and can prove to be an inspiration for scholars to take up the history of the princely states for academic research.

By penning this book, Dr Bangash has done a great service not only to the discipline of history but also to Pakistan in recounting the story of the princely states and how they contributed to the strength and development of the country—something which the dominant narrative of the country ignores completely. Dr Bangash's opus is not only a path breaker but will, I am sure, be one of the most important works in the discipline for a long time to come.

His Highness Mir Ali Murad Khan Talpur II
The Mir of Khairpur

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	ix
<i>List of Images and Maps</i>	xv
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xix
<i>Introduction</i>	1
Chapter One: The Making	26
Chapter Two: Signing the Death Warrant	75
Chapter Three: Father, Son, and the Tribal State	153
Chapter Four: The Raj Resurrected	201
Chapter Five: A Democratic Principedom	273
Chapter Six: Subjects or Citizens?	337
Conclusion	379
 <i>Appendices</i>	
1. Instrument of Accession, Khairpur State, Sind, 3 October 1947	400
2. Instrument of Accession, Kalat State, 27 March 1948	402
3. Bahawalpur State Merger Agreement, 17 December 1954	404

<i>Glossary</i>	407
<i>Bibliography</i>	408
<i>Index</i>	443

Acknowledgements

This thesis has been years in the making and indeed writing! My interest in the princely states of India was sparked when I read Professor Barbara Ramusack's book on the subject in 2003. The book fascinated me and made me wonder about the states which acceded to Pakistan: that was the inception of this project. Since then Professor Ramusack has been a source of inspiration and help at various points, and I am very grateful to her.

When I was still in college, I thought of embarking on a research project on the princes after accession to Pakistan. For this, I won the Kellogg Institute's Summer Fellowship which enabled me to travel to Pakistan and meet all the princes in their former states. These interviews made it obvious that these were not peripheral states and had to be situated in the narrative of Pakistan's creation and early consolidation. In 2003, Notre Dame did not have a South Asian specialist in the history department, and so I took this project, and my subsequent special subject thesis based on this research, to my advisor, Professor Laura A. Crago, who wholeheartedly supported me. Throughout my Notre Dame years, and still, Dr Crago has been a great source of help and encouragement. I simply could not have conducted the summer research, nor written the thesis, or had so much fun doing all this if it were not for Dr Crago—I am deeply indebted to her.

Fate had it that I met Rev. Professor Judith M. Brown in Notre Dame where she was delivering a lecture on Gandhi, and spoke to her about a DPhil project on the accession and integration of

princely states in Pakistan. To my delight, she thought that the topic was worthwhile and encouraged me to apply to Oxford. I am very grateful to her for accepting me as a student and enduring me for five long years—it must have been a challenge! Professor Brown's leave in 2008 led me to be supervised by another great scholar of South Asia—Professor Francis Robinson. I was exuberant that I was moving from one good scholar to another amazing one, and am highly indebted to Professor Robinson for his support and guidance since then—the development of this thesis owes a lot to him. Also in Oxford I was fortunate to have Dr Maria Misra as my college advisor. Our lunch-time chats over the years were a great opportunity for me to brainstorm ideas with such a remarkable mind, and I am very thankful for all that she has done, and continues to do, for me academically and professionally.

For my DPhil studies, the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan graciously funded my research for four years, for which I am immensely grateful. The Beit Fund awarded me a research grant in 2007 to conduct field research, and the Charles Wallace Pakistan Trust gave me support during the last stages of research in 2010: I am very thankful for all their help.

In terms of research, I have a long list of people to thank who were instrumental in facilitating my access, which at times was very difficult to obtain. Chronologically, I want to acknowledge the staff at the Indian Institute Library at Oxford, the India Office Library and Records section at the British Library, and the National Documentation Centre in Islamabad, especially the former director, Mr Saleemullah Khan, who was of immense help; Prince Abbas, the Director General of the National Archives of Pakistan and his staff; the Director of the Sindh Archives in

Karachi; the Director and staff of the NWFP Archives in Peshawar, especially Saeed Khan and Munir Alam; the Director and staff of the Balochistan Archives in Quetta; the staff of the UK National Archives in London, and the staff of the US National Archives in College Park, Maryland.

Several individuals were also indispensable in aiding my research and I am sure that this project would have never been completed without their support. Prince Mehdi of Khairpur and his team were very gracious in helping me access documents and photographs in Khairpur and provided excellent hospitality. In Quetta, Jiand Jamaldini was critical to my work in almost every way: he not only helped me find important documents, he arranged the entire visit and several meetings. Also in Quetta, Nasim Lehri, the Commissioner of Quetta, was most gracious in allowing me free access to government documents, and even facilitated access to documents not under his immediate charge. Dr Adnan Zafar, a former Assistant Commissioner, Mansehra, was also very helpful in finding material on Amb in the maze of the Hazara division. There were several conversations with Miangul Aurangzeb, the present Wali of Swat, Nawab Salahuddin Saeed of Amb, Saiful-Mulk Nasir, the Mehtar of Chitral, and the late Nawabzada Shahabuddin, Khan of Jandul, have been very generous with their time, and especially in providing me documents and photographs from the private collections, which I have gratefully used in this book. Faridullah Khan, a seasoned Pakistani bureaucrat (and actor!), has also kept my hopes up with the bureaucracy in the country.

I have learned a lot from academics over the course of my career and their advice and suggestions have been very helpful in writing this thesis. Over the years, Professor Ayesha Jalal has been

extremely generous with her time and has always provided useful feedback. Also, conversations with several other scholars such as Professors Cynthia Mahmood, John McGreevy, Faisal Devji, Ian Talbot, Ian Archer, and others, have helped me. Aameena Saiyid, Managing Director, Oxford University Press Pakistan, patiently listened to me talking endlessly about Pakistan's problems, and has always been very helpful and encouraging.

Cohorts of friends have also been my sustenance through this arduous journey. From arguing Pakistani politics with a certain chairman of a Pakistani party, to discussions with other friends, my Oxford experience has been illuminating, enriching, and transformative. There are many who have been instrumental academically, but above all I want to thank and appreciate my friends for simply being good friends—a history DPhil is a very lonely sojourn and their companionship certainly made a difference. I would like to thank Razi, my best friend of now over ten years, for his constant support and critical insight, Jonathan, Malini, Alex, Patrick, Emeric, Jocky, Brendan, Will, Josh, Constantin, Richard, Hugh, Fr Maurin, Fr Philip, and Fr Nadeem, as well as several other friends and colleagues.

Finally, and most importantly, I would like to acknowledge my parents, as without their steadfast support and encouragement this work would have never been initiated or completed. My father, the late Nawabzada Sardar Abdul Aziz Khan Bangash, instilled in me the love of history, and the passion for doing something I love. It saddens me immensely that he did not live to see the completion of this thesis. My mother, Nora Muntazir, has also been invaluable in keeping me strong and focused and I can never thank her enough.

Postscript: In the last haul, I am deeply indebted to my examiners, Professors Ian Talbot and Faisal Devji for their comments (and for passing me without corrections!), and Professors Michael Fisher, Iftikhar H. Malik, Yunas Samad, Sarah Ansari, Yasmin Khan, and Pippa Virdee for reading the manuscript and suggesting revisions. I also wish to thank my editor, Samuel Ray, for being so detailed, persistent, and patient—he made me finally let it go to publication!

In the end, this is my own work and I am responsible for any mistakes herein.

List of Images and Maps

IMAGES

1. The Eleven-Year-Old Maharaja Jaswant Singh of Bharatpur holding Court in 1862 39
(Shepard and Robertson, 1862).
2. His Highness Nawab Sadiq Mohammad Khan IV and His Court, circa 1884 44
(E. Reclus, *The Earth and its Inhabitants*, D. Appleton and Co. 1884).
3. His Highness Sir Mir Ali Murad Khan Talpur I, Ruler of Khairpur State, 1842–1894 47
(<http://www.royalark.net/Pakistan/khairpur-Ali%20Murad%20I.jpg>).
4. Faiz Mahal, Khairpur State 49
(Courtesy: Author's personal collection).
5. Mir Nasir Khan I, The Great, Khan of Kalat, 1749–1817 50
(Courtesy: Kalat State Archives).
6. Group Photograph of the Chamber of Princes with the Viceroy, 1932 77
(<https://www.bonhams.com/auctions/14417/lot/248/>).
7. Colonel His Highness Nawab Sir Mahabat Khanji III, GCSI, GCIE, KCVO, Ruler of Junagadh State, 1911–1947 108
(<http://www.royalark.net/India/junagad5.htm>).

8. General His Highness Nawab Sir Sadiq Muhammad Khan Abbasi V, GCSI, GCIE, KCVO, Ruler of Bhawalpur State, 1907–1966
(<http://www.royalark.net/Pakistan/bahawal15.htm>). 120
9. Colonel His Highness Mehtar Haji Muhammad Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, Ruler of Chitral State, 1943–1949 with Nawab Bahadur Sir Muhammad Farid Khan, Nawab of Amb,
(Courtesy: His Highness Saif-ul-Mulk Nasir, Mehtar of Chitral). 128
10. Miangul Sir Abdul Wadud, Wali of Swat State, 1926–1949, signing the Instrument of Accession on 3 November 1947
(Courtesy: Miangul Aurangzeb, Wali of Swat). 131
11. Nawab Sir Muhammad Farid Khan, KCSI, 1936–1971, with Hon. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Begum Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan, and His Excellency Sahibzada Mohammad Khurshid, Governor of NWFP, Darband, and Amb State, 1949
(Courtesy: Salahuddin Saeed, Nawab of Amb). 134
12. His Highness Mir Khudadad, GCSI, Khan of Kalat, 1857–1893 and His Courtiers Imperial Assemblage in Delhi, 1877
(Courtesy: Kalat State Archives). 161
13. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizinjo, Leader of the Kalat State National Party 176
(Courtesy: Author's personal collection).

14. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah with Captain His Highness Beglar Begi Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, Khan of Kalat, 1933–1979 194
(Courtesy: Author's personal collection).
15. The Political Agent of Malakand proclaiming Saif-ur-Rahman as Mehtar of Chitral in 1949 236
(Courtesy: His Highness Saif-ul-Mulk Nasir, Mehtar of Chitral).
16. Mehtar Saif-ul-Mulk Nasir, aged four-and-a-half-years receiving his *Sanad* of Recognition from the Governor-General of Pakistan, 1954 239
(Courtesy: His Highness Saif-ul-Mulk Nasir, Mehtar of Chitral).
17. Members of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan with Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad in 1952 245
(Courtesy: Dr Ghulam Nabi Kazi)
18. Mumtaz Hasan Khizilbash, Chief Minister, Khairpur State, 1947–1955 305
(Courtesy: Khairpur State Archives).
19. The Investiture Ceremony of His Highness The Mir of Khairpur by the Hon. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, 16 September 1951 308
(Courtesy: Khairpur State Archives).
20. Naz Girls High School Building, Khairpur State 347
(Courtesy: Khairpur State Archives).
21. His Highness The Amir of Bahawalpur giving a speech after laying the foundation stone of Sadiq Public School on 14 March 1953 350
(Courtesy: Author's personal collection).

22. The famous Jahanzeb College, Saidu Sharif, Swat State	352
(Courtesy: Author's personal collection).	
23. State Transport Bus Stand, Khairpur State	360
(Courtesy: Khairpur State Archives).	
24. Khairpur Textile Mill, Khairpur State	364
(Courtesy: Khairpur State Archives).	

MAPS

1. Map of the Successor States by 1760	102
(Courtesy: The Imperial Gazetteer of India).	
2. Map of the British Indian Empire in 1947	104
(Courtesy: The Imperial Gazetteer of India).	
3. Map of West Pakistan on 15 August 1947	106
4. Map of Junagadh State	109
(Courtesy: The Imperial Gazetteer of India).	
5. Map of Bahawalpur State	122
(Courtesy: The Imperial Gazetteer of India).	
6. Map of Khairpur State with Sind and Bombay Presidency	125
(Courtesy: The Imperial Gazetteer of India).	
7. Map of Frontier States with Hunza and Nagar	136
(Courtesy: The Imperial Gazetteer of India).	
8. Map of West Pakistan in 1948	145
9. Map of Kalat State and its Feudatories	155
(Courtesy: The Imperial Gazetteer of India).	
10. Map of West Pakistan in 1955	258

List of Abbreviations

In text:

Assistant Political Agent	APA
Agent to the Governor-General	AGG
All India States Peoples Conference	AISPC
All Pakistan States Muslim League	APSML
Amb State Muslim League	ASML
Bahawalpur Muslim League	BML
Bahawalpur State Muslim League	BSML
Baluchistan States Union	BSU
Basic Principles Committee	BPC
Chitral Muslim League	CML
Chitral State Muslim League	CSML
Indian Political Service	IPS
Indian Civil Service	ICS
Kalat State National Party	KSNP
Pakistan Muslim League	PML
Political Agent	PA
States and Frontier Regions Ministry	SAFRON

In Footnotes:

Bahawalpur Central Library	BCL
Balochistan Secretariat Archives	BSA
Baluchistan Agency Administration Report	BAAR
Basta Number	BN
Cambridge South Asia Archive	CSAA
Commissioner of Quetta Archives	CQA

Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates	CAPD
Fortnightly Summary	FNS
India Office Records	IOR
India Office Private Papers	IOPP
Instrument of Accession	IOA
Imperial Gazetteer of India	IGI
Jinnah Papers	JP
Kalat State Archives	KSA
Khairpur Durbar Archives	KDA
Master Location Register, US National Archives	MLR (USNA)
National Archives of Pakistan	NAP
National Documentation Centre, Islamabad	NDC
NWFP Archives	NWFPA
Prime Minister's Secretariat	PMS
Serial Number	SN
States and Frontier Regions Ministry	SAFRON
Transfer of Power	TOP
UK National Archives	UKNA
US National Archives	USNA

Introduction

As long as he imagined he could switch straight from colonized subject to sovereign citizen of an independent nation, as long as he believed in the mirage sustained by his unmediated physical strength, the colonized achieved no real progress along the road to knowledge.

The Wretched of the Earth

Frantz Fanon

In March 2009, a federal cabinet minister in Pakistan put forth a bill in the National Assembly which elicited very little comment when it came up for general discussion. The bill was passed easily, and even in the Senate few parliamentarians questioned its contents, and there too it was passed in October 2009 with only a three minute debate and one question. This bill was The Rulers of the Acceding States (Abolition of Privy Purses and Privileges) Amendment Bill. In it the honourable minister for States and Frontier Regions requested a change in the earlier version of the law which fixed the 'maintenance allowance' of the former rulers in 1972. He stated: 'Maintenance Allowance was sanctioned to the Rules of Acceding States or their dependents in lieu of privy purses at the relevant time but due to inflationary pressure has lost its worth,'¹ and therefore a substantial increase of two hundred per cent was necessary. The easy passage of this bill, and the lack of discussion on it, both merit inquiry.

Just as the period after the end of the Second World War was a time of great change, the 1970s also witnessed a great deal of political and social change throughout the world. The rise

of Third World socialism and nationalism was at its peak and several 'revolutionary' leaders were in government. During this period, leaders were fast trying to do away with the shackles of the past and veer towards a new vision. It was in this world view that the princes of India and Pakistan, who had been enjoying some recognition despite their states being taken over by their respective governments decades (or some years, as in the case of the Frontier States in Pakistan) before, lost their titles, privileges and privy purses. In India, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi brought about the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the Indian Constitution which confidently stated that: 'The concept of rulership, with privy purses and special privileges unrelated to any current functions and social purposes, is incompatible with an egalitarian social order. Government have, therefore, decided to terminate ... expressly the recognition already granted to such Rulers and to abolish privy purses and extinguish all rights, liabilities and obligations. ...'² Thus, within a few months, all Indian princes (with the interesting solitary exception of the Prince of Arcot),³ lost all titles, rights, and privy purses which had been agreed upon between them and the Government of India at the time of the merger or takeover of their states. Just as the princes thought that the British would never leave, they also thought that these privileges would last a long time. In reality, of course, they hardly survived a generation and by the end of 1971, the princes, the scores of Highnesses, Nawabs, and Maharajas, etc. became mere 'mistress' (or in some cases, Mrs). Indira Gandhi was jubilant that she had finally brought about the demise of the princely order. Little did she know, however, that the princely legacy would not go away that easily.⁴

In Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed power as Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1971 after the East Pakistan debacle—the

first, and hopefully the last, civilian to hold that position—decided to move against the princes. He had populist and socialist tendencies, but more so, his recent adversary, Ayub Khan, had married his daughter to the son of the Wali of Swat, and so something had to be done. Therefore, in 1972, using his almost dictatorial powers as president, he abolished the titles, rights, and privileges of the princes through the Abolition of Privy Purses and Privileges Order, 1972. Shortly thereafter, most of the princes were granted what was now called a ‘maintenance allowance’ which was, in fact, the same amount of money they had received as a privy purse. The small, yet in some ways significant, change was that the princes no longer had a ‘right’ to a privy purse, but were given an ‘allowance’ through the generosity of the government.

It is in this context that the 2009 bill was passed without much debate. One reason for the lack of debate could be that the parliamentarians thought that this was not much money in any case. After all, in 2008–09 the princes had only been paid Rs. 4.823 million as allowances.⁵ But now that amount was slated to increase to at least, Rs. 14.469 million, not an insubstantial amount in a poor country. So it cannot be that the parliamentarians did not care about that much money being spent on what others might deem as ‘relics of the past.’ One line of reasoning, which I want to posit, is that the parliamentarians were a) uneasy with the denial of such privileges to the princes, and b) thought that the princes did indeed deserve such support. Therefore, the bill was passed without much comment in Pakistan, whereas a corresponding bill in India would have created uproar in parliament and set off nationwide protests to say the least.

A large part of this book is an exploration of the reasons behind such a discrepancy between India and Pakistan. Broadly speaking,

in both countries the territories of the princely states were largely taken over by the state within the first decade after independence, and in both, the princes lost their titles and privileges around the same time; yet in Pakistan, the princes, in a way, have managed to remain 'princes.' Most ex-rulers in Pakistan still enjoy official perks including diplomatic passports, red car-number plates, tax breaks, etc. in addition to their political clout. Therefore, an understanding of the circumstances in which the princely states which eventually acceded to Pakistan evolved is important, together with the accession process and final integration into the country. Such an assessment will add another layer to the oft-analysed scenarios of weak political leadership, religious influence, ethnic divides, and other reasons which are given for Pakistan's current predicaments. Moreover, it will help us understand the historical evolution of Pakistan as a state.

* * * * *

The end of the Second World War ushered in the era of de-colonization, a long and difficult process during which empires unravelled into complicated modern nation states, often leading to violence. The partition and independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 was in some ways the beginning of the process. Therefore, both India and Pakistan were the first examples of postcolonial state formation, and their example was closely watched, not only by other newly independent states, but also the metropole.

Nowhere was the transition from a colonial to a postcolonial state easy. This was primarily because empires and nation states were two different creatures and one did not easily lead to another. Therefore, state formation at various levels became the bane of most postcolonial states. The transition from an imperial realm to a nation state was a long process, and in some cases, still

continues. The change from being a subject to being a citizen (something this book makes some initial forays into), was not an overnight experience. State formation included consolidation, assertion of sovereignty, questions of legitimacy, and the mediation of differences (be it ethnic, linguistic, or religious), among other things, and none of these factors was easy to handle. Kohn and McBride have pointed out the crux of the problem when they note:

a central dynamic of postcolonial political thought is the difficult transition from providing opposition to an established regime to articulating principles, institutions and methods of self-determination ... how do movements and leaders evolve from being critics of colonial regimes and instigating revolutionary political change to being able to establish a stable, political alternative?⁶

Furthermore, even the example given by the Western nations was not easily transferable to these newly-independent people. Hence, the European export of the 'mono-cultural nation state left most postcolonial states with the dilemma of how to reconcile this with ethnically and religiously diverse plural societies,' Chiriyankandath argues.⁷ In the case of Pakistan, all these issues were major predicaments for the nascent country.

In the struggle to create new nation states out of the empires which, by their very natures had different layers of sovereignty, state building was inextricably linked to the assertion and exercise of sovereignty. While empires at times derived their legitimacy and subsequent sovereignty by sheer conquest (or luck, or the 'white man's burden'), postcolonial states had, in most cases, to legitimize their existence and assert their sovereignty. In the case of Pakistan, the 'partition' of the British Indian Empire which led to the killing of hundreds of thousands of people, created millions

of refugees, and turned upside down the lives of countless more, led the country to obsess about issues relating to legitimacy and sovereignty. Therefore, Jalal aptly notes 'in the immediate aftermath of independence and partition the questions of sovereignty and state-building were inextricably linked in Pakistan.'⁸

In the introduction to their book, Hansen and Stepputat note that 'colonial sovereignty was constructed slowly and piecemeal and oscillated between confrontation and alignment, between spectacular representation of European might and culture, and incorporation of local idioms and methods of rule.'⁹ Here one can easily understand how the complicated net of the British Indian Empire, with its areas of directly ruled territories (which were further divided into presidencies, governor provinces, lieutenant governor provinces, chief commissioner's provinces), tribal areas, and princely states (not to mention the Gulf states attached to the Indian Empire), operated. However, this fluid, complicated, and at times simply confusing model, did not work for postcolonial states since they were compact territories, not ruled over by a distant metropole, and were established ostensibly in the name of the local inhabitants. Therefore, sovereignty had to be clearly delineated. Hansen and Stepputat further elucidate their point:

Colonial forms of sovereignty were more fragmented and complex, more reliant on spectacles and ceremony, and demonstrative and excessive violence, than the form of sovereign power that had emerged in Europe after several centuries of centralizing efforts. These differences were rooted in indirect rule at a distance, to pragmatic reliance on local, indigenous forms of rule and sovereignty, and tied to the efforts at asserting racial and civilizational superiority. European states never aimed at governing the colonial territories with the same uniformity and intensity as were applied to their own populations. The emphasis was rarely on forging consent and the creation of

a nation-people, and almost exclusively on securing subjection, order, and obedience through performance of paramount sovereign power and suppression of competing authorities. ... As a result, the configurations of *de facto* sovereign power, justice, and order in the postcolonial states were from the outset partial, competing, and unsettled.¹⁰

And herein lay the crux of the initial problem of postcolonial states: they wanted to emerge as the contemporary European nation states without going through the process of centralization and strong assertion of sovereignty.

In the case of Pakistan too, issues surrounding legitimacy and sovereignty were, and are, centre stage. Pakistan was created on 15 August 1947 without even knowing its geographical boundaries: the Radcliffe Award which decided the boundaries between the partitioned provinces of the Punjab and Bengal was only announced on 17 August 1947. Not even one princely state had acceded to Pakistan by 15 August, meaning that Pakistan did not know if it would also have a border with Iran (if Kalat acceded) and with China (if Kashmir acceded), in addition to India and Afghanistan. Furthermore, most tools of government, from bureaucracies to office furniture and stationery, were still in the process of being divided. Pakistan did not even fully control its military, as a supreme commander oversaw the militaries of both countries till March 1948, giving Pakistan a tenuous control over the basic tool for the assertion of power. Therefore, for Pakistan, issues of sovereignty remained very critical.

As empires unravelled, the question of what model the new nations were going to follow also emerged. Were they supposed to go back to their precolonial models of authority and governance? Or were they to accept the Western notions of democratic government?

Also, since the Western model was based on the nation state, were all postcolonial states indeed nation states? Such concerns had a direct impact on what type of a state and nation emerged in the postcolonial dispensation. The problem was that 'anti-colonial movements employed the idea of a precolonial past to rally their opposition through a sense of difference, but they employed this past not to reconstruct the precolonial social-state but to generate support for the construction of postcolonial nation states based on the European nationalist model.'¹¹ Squaring this circle was, in effect, the major hurdle for postcolonial states.

In the case of Pakistan, questions regarding the form of government and the nation and national identity have always loomed large. Pakistan was created for the 'Muslim nation' in India, according to the Two Nation theory championed by Jinnah, but once the country was realized, it was not that easy to weld its disparate parts together as one nation. What did it mean to be a 'Pakistani'? Were non-Muslim residents of areas in Pakistan also 'Pakistani'? Were the Muslims left behind in India 'stranded Pakistanis'? and so forth. Jinnah tried to give a new spin to his Two Nation theory by advocating a nation based on citizenship in his 11 August 1947 speech in front of the Constituent Assembly.¹² However, this 'nation' and 'citizenship' still remain strongly contested notions. Where the current work adds to this discourse is in exploring how the princely states were persuaded to join this new country, especially since they all became part of Pakistan after the country was established. How did the rulers and the people in these princely states view the new country? Did accession and integration create a sense of 'Pakistani identity' and 'Pakistani citizenship' among the erstwhile princely subjects, or did they still hold on to their old identities? Most Pakistani princely states, like their Indian counterparts, were products of centuries

of state formation and consolidation, and a sense of identity had emerged in these areas. Therefore, it is essential to analyse how this new dispensation affected their identities. For example, even today people from the erstwhile state of Bhopal in India would refer to themselves as Bhopali rather than Madhya Pradesh. Similarly, the Chitrali, Swati, and Bahawalpuri identities have survived the merger of these states with the former British Indian provinces. As Yasmin Khan has rightly noted, 'Partition for many South Asians was far more complicated and was the beginning of a process of their construction as new national citizens.'¹³ It is this new 'construction' of citizenship and identity that this book begins to understand by assessing the consolidation of the princely states into Pakistan. The end period of this research, 1955, is not sufficient to answer all the above questions, but provides important markers for future study.

Interlinked with questions of the imperial past, identity, and sovereignty, are issues relating to leadership and institutions in postcolonial states. Did postcolonial states create and empower institutions which ensured the longevity of the state and gave it legitimacy, or did they depend on leaders to somehow create a new world for them? Here, one could argue that the institutional strength of the Indian National Congress and the institutionalization of democracy by India led to its success, as compared to the relative weakness of the Muslim League and the disproportionate emphasis on leaders at the expense of democratic institutions (like parliament), which led to several failures in Pakistan.¹⁴ In fact, several scholars have emphasized the lopsided importance of certain leaders in the formation of postcolonial states. For example, Cartwright argues in the context of postcolonial African states that 'an individual political leader can have a substantial effect in shaping the evolution of almost

any African state'.¹⁵ Similarly, Nkrumah was central to the state formation process in Ghana, argues Apter. The same was true in Pakistan where the founder of the country, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was called the Quaid-i-Azam—the great leader. The centrality of Jinnah, called the 'sole spokesman' by Jalal, was so much in Pakistan that he was beyond reproach, and treated almost as a saint. Even in his exercise of powers beyond those defined in the Indian Independence Act, 1947, called 'viceregal' by Khalid bin Sayeed, few criticized his several high-handed actions. Scholars like Talbot have even tried to justify Jinnah's assumption of such wide-ranging powers as governor-general—singular in Commonwealth history—by noting, '... the strengthening of executive authority in the early months of Pakistan's independence by Jinnah ... could be justified if the state were to function at all.'¹⁶ It is as if Jinnah's demise would mean the end of the country. This overemphasis on certain leaders might be a result of expediency, or their sheer power and influence, but it could also refer, significantly, to pre-modern state formations where charismatic leaders wielded a lot of power. In fact, in South Asia and elsewhere, the power of the 'prince' in such pre-modern state formations might provide an answer to the strong focus on such leaders. As Ramusack rightly argues '... many princes represented a continuity of traditional state formation ...' in South Asia.¹⁷ In Pakistan, this mesmerization by the personality of Jinnah is clearly reflected in a newspaper editorial in Pakistan years after Jinnah's death that states, 'the populace had already begun to greet the Quaid-i-Azam as "Shahinshah-e-Pakistan" (Emperor of Pakistan). Had he so desired, 80 million willing hands would have rejoiced to put a Crown upon his head.'¹⁸

In contrast to the disproportionate focus on leaders, the Marxists have blamed the failure of state formation in postcolonial states

on what Hamza Alavi has called the 'overdeveloped' state. Alavi argued: 'If a colony has a weak and underdeveloped indigenous bourgeoisie, it will be unable at the moment of independence to subordinate the relatively highly developed colonial State apparatus through which the Metropolitan power had exercised dominion over it.'¹⁹ He maintained that it is through this 'superstructure' of the military-bureaucracy nexus that indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled.²⁰ He also notes that this military-bureaucratic 'oligarchy' is not limited to one social class and so can accommodate other interests, even weak political forces, from the inception.²¹ In the case of Pakistan, this 'overdeveloped' state is what Alavi argues is the curse of failed state formation.

While the 'overdeveloped' state thesis convinced many scholars in the past, recent scholarship has clearly shown how problematic this theory becomes if applied to historical facts. Leys has shown that not only did the bureaucracy and military expand dramatically post the colonial period in such countries, but that even the expansion the 'state' in these former colonies was still small 'relative to both populations and the size of the economy, compared with the states of the advanced capitalist countries.'²² Furthermore, government in empires was never as authoritarian and pervasive as the Marxist theorists argued. In fact, government power in Africa as well as in Asia was more 'arterial'; 'strong near the nodal points of colonial authority, less able to impose its discursive grid elsewhere.'²³ Hence in most postcolonial states the military-bureaucratic nexus was not inherently so strong as to takeover power after independence, meaning that there must be other factors which led to their ascendancy. In the case of South Asia, the existence of the princely states which were part of the British Indian Empire, but were internally autonomous, and were 'indirectly' ruled, adds further complexity to the narrative.

Pakistan as a country has baffled scholars for a long time. Some deem it a textbook case of how postcolonial states end up as military dictatorships, and others view it as a unique example of state formation. However, before theorizing on Pakistan as a postcolonial state, it is imperative that we first actually find out what happened, understand the different aspects of state formation, and then analyse its results and effects.

* * * * *

Tomes have been written on why India has been a 'success' and Pakistan a 'failure' in terms of democracy, national cohesion, identity and development, but most have taken the long view.²⁴ Written from the perspective of mostly the 1990s and 2000s these works have read back Pakistan's failures into its past. This has meant that while critical periods and events have been identified, they have not been studied in depth, and have only been used to support claims made later in Pakistan's life. For example, there is hardly any work which focuses on the first decade, the critical, formative phase of the country. Khalid Bin Sayeed's *Pakistan: The Formative Phase* ends in 1948, while Ayesha Jalal's *The State of Martial Rule* covers several decades. Even an in depth analysis of the 1954 Maulvi Tamizuddin case and its background, etc. has had to wait for Allen McGrath's very well-written and researched book in 1996. McGrath's claim that '... it was the success, not the failure, of the Assembly which brought about its demise,'²⁵ for the Constituent Assembly had indeed finished its work of drafting a constitution when it was controversially dismissed by the governor-general, was a revelation to many. Furthermore, while we still have memoirs written by various leaders from the first decade of independence, there is still no good biography of the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, and virtually nothing on

Khawaja Nazimuddin, Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza, and others who literally shaped the destiny of Pakistan. Therefore, we still know very little of this period in Pakistan's history, despite the fact that, as Professor Ayesha Jalal notes,

no understanding of contemporary Pakistan is possible without an historical analysis of the first decade after independence, a period of relative flux in the institutional balance of power between elected and non-elected institutions but during which the state structure was cast into an enduring, even rigid, mould.²⁶

The hundreds of Indian princely states which formed more than a third of the land mass and over a quarter of the population of the British Indian Empire have been notoriously absent from the historiography of South Asia. Until recently, even when the states featured in research, they were categorized as the 'Indian Princely States'—that is treated as one homogenous group. However, as Ernst and Pati note:

Each area of the sub-continent had, of course, its own history of regional and cultural diversity and interaction with the expanding British Empire. It would therefore be inappropriate to generalize about the ways the rulers of the over 500 or so Indian states and the colonial power negotiated the boundaries between 'princely' and colonial rule.²⁷

Therefore, till the last decade or so, when studies began to focus on separate states, the lumping together of the 'Indian Princely States' undermined their individual uniqueness.

Furthermore, much of Indian historiography has looked at the states through the lens of the freedom struggle. As Ian Copland rightly argues: 'The vast bulk of research has focused on the partition and the establishment of Pakistan, much of the remainder

on the imperial debate over decolonization; very little has been given to the fate of the states.²⁸ Therefore, the role of the princely states in the process of state formation in India and Pakistan had been previously ignored. While a lot of recent work has habilitated the states which acceded to India, no comparative interest has been generated in Pakistan, leaving us unable to understand completely and comprehend the process of state formation and consolidation in Pakistan during the first decade of its existence. Ernst and Pati further note:

... if the history of the Indian states is to be more adequately integrated with existing scholarship on South Asia in general, it needs to address more than nationalist endeavours and the states' roles in the political and economic policies and rhetorical designs of British colonialism. Rather, social, political and economic developments in the Indian states require analysis both on their own terms and at the same time in relation to colonial governance and resistance in British India.²⁹

And, as I argue, post-Independence as well. This book is an attempt to link developments in the princely states with the larger conversation on the effects of decolonization, state formation, and consolidation in Pakistan.

The princely states have never been a topic of serious academic research in Pakistan, and the only book on the subject is Wayne Wilcox's, *Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation*. Unlike V. P. Menon's work in which the focus is on the state and the princes as political actors, Wilcox's main interest lies in the democratic experiment in the Pakistani states and how far it was used to dislodge the princes. While an important starting point for understanding the creation and consolidation of Pakistan, the work suffers from a lack of sources (as hardly any official documents

were declassified by the early 1960s) and from an overemphasis on interviews and Pakistani newspapers in which factual accuracy was not always of paramount importance.

The recurring insurgency in Baluchistan has led to a certain focus on the region. In this endeavour, anthropologists Swidler and Titus have been instrumental in deciphering the nature of tribal structure in Baluchistan, something which has always baffled both the British and Pakistani administrators. Further, Raedelli's work has been crucial in understanding the origins of Kalat State, while Axmann has recently assessed the 'national awakening' of the Baluch. However, most of these works do not extend beyond 1947, and where they do, as in the case of Axmann, there is a focus on the dialectic of 'constructing' a national identity among the Baluch as a 'response to the political circumstances of the time.'³⁰ What these political, constitutional, and social circumstances were, still needs investigation.

Several local authors have also published books on Baluchistan. Gul Khan Naseer's history of Baluchistan (in Urdu), is an exemplary work amongst these, since as well as providing an exhaustive overview of Baluch history, Naseer's involvement in Baluch politics since the 1940s enables him to give first-hand accounts of the accession struggle and the later insurgencies emanating from it. Dehwar and Janmahmad's books are also very useful sources on Baluch history from a nationalist perspective. Both authors focus largely on the post-Kalat history of Baluchistan, with an emphasis on the 'Punjabi domination' narrative. Janmahmad strongly underscores the 'different-ness' of the Baluch from the rest of Pakistan. He notes, 'Pakistan, born in hatred and narrow-mindedness, and its subsequent regime of religious intolerance has never been appreciated by the Baloch.'³¹ Several other works of less scholarly value on Baluchistan have also flourished in recent years.

Only a couple of books have been written on the other princely states, in either English or the vernacular languages. In English, Sultan-i-Rome's, *Swat State from Genesis to Merger 1915–1969*, is an exhaustive and exhausting account of the whole life of Swat State. While Sultan-i-Rome makes good use of all the available sources, the book fails to contextualize Swat within Pakistan, and at times overwhelms and even confuses the reader with details. Also, Javaid's book on Bahawalpur is a useful text to gain a broad knowledge of Bahawalpur. However, as its primary focus is the conduct of elections and the rise of local politics post-1972 in Bahawalpur, little, except general knowledge, (which is gleaned from previously published books) is available to the reader about the Bahawalpur State.

In common with many other postcolonial states, and especially other princely states, memoirs by the princes or statesmen are the best published resource. The memoirs of Ahmed Yar Khan, the last Khan of Kalat, and Miangul Abdul Wadud and Miangul Jehanzeb, the only two ruling Walis of Swat, are a wealth of information on the period under consideration. While Ahmed Yar Khan's memoir is a political autobiography written in the 1970s and used to assert the separate nature of the Baluch and his pivotal (and positive) role in the awakening of Baluch nationalism, the memoirs of the rulers of Swat are a very frank account of almost every aspect of their rule, making them very vital sources. A handful of memoirs of statesmen, such as Sir Edward Wakefield who was Prime Minister of Kalat in the 1930s, and Sir Penderel Moon who was Revenue Minister in Bahawalpur in 1947–48, also shed critical light on conditions in the states.

The dearth of scholarly material on the princely states which acceded to Pakistan, (no book has ever been published on

post-accession Chitral, Dir, Khairpur, or Amb) severely limits our understanding of the creation and consolidation of Pakistan.

* * * * *

Beginning with an analysis of the roots of the princely states which acceded to Pakistan, Chapter One assesses the nature of Muslim princely rule in India. These precolonial state formations and understandings of rulership were peculiar to Pakistan as most Pakistani states being tribal based, were situated on the borders, and survived much longer than their Indian counterparts. Chapter Two then delves into the problems associated with the end of British paramountcy and the hard choices these princes had to make in a mere few months. The manner in which some princes acceded to Pakistan, with a contextualization of their options within the Indian Empire, forms the main section of the chapter. Chapter Three focuses on the accession of Kalat to Pakistan. This accession, which still remains a contentious issue, is analysed with a strong focus on the history of the problems with Kalat, the personality of Ahmed Yar Khan, and the role of certain personalities in the saga.

With Chapter Four begins the assessment of the princely states within Pakistan. Chapter Four therefore, charts the haphazard and largely ad hoc process by which the states federated with Pakistan. The numerous supplementary instruments of accession and agreements are examined in detail to establish the constitutional position of the states, especially in comparison to the provinces, in the Pakistani federation. Chapter Five then evaluates the rise of democratic elements in the states. By assessing the activities of political organizations in two states, Amb and Chitral, the chapter explores the nature of political activity and its challenge to the status quo in these states. The chapter also investigates the establishment and functioning of democratic governments in

Khairpur and Bahawalpur during the period under consideration. Lastly, Chapter Six begins to assess the effects of the accession and integration of these states into Pakistan. The change from 'subject to citizen' had just begun in most of the states, yet the changes experienced by the people in the states, even in the few years under examination, were significant, and had begun to have an effect on the understanding of citizenship, nationality, and identity of the people in the states.

The conclusion synthesizes the evidence presented in the previous chapters by assessing three questions about the topic under study. Firstly, why and how did some princely states accede to Pakistan? Secondly, did the Government of Pakistan have a policy towards the princely states, either before or after accession? Thirdly, what were the consequences of the actions of the Government of Pakistan on issues such as national integration, regionalism, and political development? Undoubtedly the accession and integration of the princely states throws open a myriad of questions for the historian, yet without consideration of the above three questions, research is impossible on any other aspect of state formation and integration, as well as on the creation of the 'nation' and 'nationalism' in Pakistan. The negotiation of a modern nation state with these pre-modern state formations and social structures, and the existence of different levels of authority and types of governance in a postcolonial 'transitional' state are topics discussed in this work. Therefore, this study provides the foundation necessary for a further exploration of the aforementioned issues, not only aiding our understanding of Pakistan, but offering a different model to assess state formation and integration in other postcolonial countries.

A Note on the Archival Sources

Historiography of the princely states has not developed at the same pace as research on British India mainly due to the lack of sources. While research on British India blossomed after the 1960s due to the gradual opening up of archives in Britain and India, the lack of any consolidated archival hub for the princely states disadvantaged in depth studies on them. Only a few states had established archives and even then, the declassification of files and access to them usually remained the personal gift of the prince.

In Pakistan, the splitting up of government-held material, where general papers, documents, and newspapers are held in the National Archives, and the papers of government ministries are housed in the National Documentation Centre in the Cabinet Office in Islamabad, has meant that the fluctuating security situation in the country has frequently prevented scholars from accessing such sensitive buildings. At the provincial level there are established archives in all four provincial capitals, but as with the centre, no effort was made until the 1980s to allow public access to government documents. Only in Lahore, the Historical Record Office and the Central Record Office set up during the Raj, allowed continual public access but that too until the 1990s, was limited to pre-1947 documents. In Peshawar and Karachi, the late 1990s saw the construction of dedicated buildings for the preservation of archival material and therefore, easy access to such material has only been recently possible. The dismal state of archives in Quetta, where most of the material survives in a cramped room in the civil secretariat or along the corridors of the divisional commissioner's office makes it hard to access and consult.

At the district level, where most of the local records pertaining to the princely states are kept, there is no formal process for public access. Nor, in the districts, are the records kept in a manner as to be readily accessible, and local authorities are not usually willing to facilitate scholars. In all the archives in Pakistan, access is contingent upon a favourable political situation and a change in government or deteriorating law and order situation can easily limit or even end access to archives. Martin Axmann noted that his access to the Home Secretariat Archives in Quetta ended after General Musharraf's coup in October 1999, while he was repeatedly denied access to the Commissioner's Archives.³² Usually what is available from the relevant departments has been carefully vetted since issues relating to the princely states are not simply issues of the past but, due to the recent Baloch insurgency, very topical.³³

On the side of the princes, very few kept any major records of their rule. As the states merged, the government simply took over the record room maintained by the prince and prevented him from retaining any documents. Some personal documents were also of an official nature, and so the princes lost most of their personal correspondence in this process. Further, in states like Kalat, political problems relating to its accession and later merger into Pakistan led to military action which caused irreparable damage to government buildings in the state. In Dir, the burning of the state record room in 1967 meant that most of its records were lost forever. Many papers were also lost from the Abbottabad and Mansehra deputy commissioners' office on the state of Amb in the aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake, while Taliban control of the Swat Valley in 2009–10 led to a number of papers being destroyed there.

Another factor which has adversely affected the collection and preservation of documents relating to the princely states in Pakistan is the centralizing and decentralizing initiatives of the Government of Pakistan. Thus in Khairpur, the state documents were first preserved in Khairpur itself since it was a district and divisional headquarters. Then later, in the 1970s, the state papers were moved to Sukkur when it became the new divisional headquarters. Much later, in the devolution plan under General Musharraf in 2000, the divisions were abolished and the papers were supposed to be returned to Khairpur. However, in the meantime the Sindh Archives had completed its new purpose-built building in Karachi and demanded that all documents until 1909 be sent there. Further complicating the issue was the fact that under the Musharraf local government system it was unclear as to who had the responsibility for keeping records. The result was a tug of war between the elected *nazim* (mayor) and the district coordination officer (formerly deputy commissioner). Hence, as with other erstwhile states, the materials relating to Khairpur are currently dispersed between Khairpur, Sukkur, Karachi, the Khairpur *nazim's* office, the district coordination officer's office, and a number have inevitably been lost in the process. Often, in fact, a lot of material has been simply 'dumped' along corridors and in toilets and stables, and is slowly being lost. Pakistan suffers from the apparently contradictory restriction of access and disinterest in preservation of archives, which makes it at least an uphill task for any researcher, let alone a member of the public, to utilize them.

The difficult access to archives in Pakistan has a lot to do with the contested nature of the state. Since research into the country's history might throw open a range of new questions and challenge old narratives, access to archival material has always

been restricted. When I tried to access some material which was still not declassified under Pakistan's Freedom of Information Ordinance 2002, I was told that that material would easily be kept classified under the Official Secrets Act, 1923, and so such an attempt would be futile. The emphasis on 'official history' has also thwarted the development of the discipline and hence, prevented any concerted effort by scholars to pressurize the government to improve access to archives. As early as 1947, the central education minister, Fazlur Rahman, remarked at the first Pakistan Education Conference that history writing should be a state-led initiative, and with so many scholars (including the historian I. H. Qureshi) being part of the government, official history easily became the standard in Pakistan.³⁴ With the state dictating what history was, there was then no need to open up archives which might prompt new questions.

In addition to the difficulties associated with access to archives in Pakistan, it must also be remembered that compared to British India, and even some other states, the princely states which acceded to Pakistan were not paper intensive governments. Therefore, considerable government work was conducted through verbal commands and only the most important events and orders were put on paper. For example, the Wali of Swat kept abreast with events in his state mainly through a network of telephones. Hence, even though the Wali was extremely well informed about his state, there were hardly any written reports from informants. Similarly, considerable judicial work in Kalat was conducted through tribal *jirgas*, where, in contrast to British Baluchistan, only the most important cases were noted for future reference. A large number of cases were decided usually in one sitting and therefore, not recorded.

The absence of a large educated class and almost non-existent print media in the states also limits the types of sources available to scholars. As compared to British India, where a large catalogue of memoirs exists, together with a vast collection of newspaper records, relatively few such sources exist for the Pakistani states. Furthermore, scarcely anyone is alive from the time under consideration to aid the understanding of the period. In terms of newspapers, most princely states had strict censorship rules and therefore, the publishing of a newspaper with accurate information and analysis was not always possible. Even in the post-accession period when newspapers were allowed, they were first, too party-political to carry unbiased information, and secondly, due to the localized nature of publication, were rarely preserved for later reference. National newspapers such as the English dailies *Dawn*, *The Pakistan Times*, and the Urdu daily *Nawa-i-Waqt* did carry news on the states, but it was usually very limited and at times inaccurate, with opinion pieces brazenly antagonistic towards the princes. For example, no national newspaper dared to question the process through which the accession of Kalat was achieved, and all took for granted that Kharan, Las Bela, and Makran were independent princely states.

Owing to the nature of the available and accessible archival and other sources, this study has limitations. There is a lot of material on Kalat and the Baluch states between 1947 and 1950, but very little afterwards. Similarly, the dispersed nature of the Bahawalpur and Khairpur records means that a fuller picture of both states during the period under examination cannot be drawn. Also, the real dearth of any kind of material on Hunza and Nagar states means that only questions relating to their status and accession can be fully dealt with. A comparatively larger body of documents

has been available for the Frontier states and therefore, a more comprehensive assessment of these states can be made.

This study also carefully defines the term, 'princely states of Pakistan', in that it does not fully investigate Junagadh which acceded to Pakistan but did not eventually form a part of the country. Only the accession of Junagadh is analysed in Chapter Two since it highlights the policy of the Muslim League and the Government of Pakistan towards the princely states and the muddled pattern of accession to Pakistan. It also does not discuss Kashmir, which Pakistan still claims but which substantially forms a part of India. The study concludes with the year 1954, when it became clear that the One Unit would be soon established, as it marks the end of the constitutional phase of the integration of the princely states. The Frontier states did continue to exist as separate entities until 1969, but it is impossible to follow their integration to the end within the scope of the current study.

Several names and spellings have been changed in Pakistan in the intervening period, but for ease this book uses the spelling and styles used during the period under discussion. Hence, Sindh remains 'Sind', Khyber Pakhtunkhwa remains 'NWFP', and Balochistan is referred to as 'Baluchistan'.

Notes

1. *Report of the Standing Committee on States and Frontier Regions on the Rulers of Acceding States (Abolition of Privy Purses and Privileges) (Amendment) Bill, 2008*, National Assembly of Pakistan, 2009.
2. Twenty Sixth Amendment Act to the Indian Constitution, 28 December 1971, accessed from: <http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend26.htm>.
3. See Chaudhary and Chaudhary, (eds.), *Global Encyclopedia of Political Geography*, 189.
4. See the Conclusion.

5. *SAFRON Yearbook 2008–9*, 43.
6. Kohn and McBride, *Political Theories of Decolonization*, 5.
7. Chiriyankandath, 'Colonialism and Post-Colonial Development', 47.
8. Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, 3.
9. Hansen and Stepputat, eds. *Sovereign Bodies*, 19.
10. *Ibid.*, 4.
11. Ashcroft et al., *Post-Colonial Studies*, 154.
12. See the Conclusion.
13. Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition*, 5.
14. See, for example, Maya Tudor, *The Promise of Power*.
15. Cartwright, *Political Leadership in Africa*, 2.
16. Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, 128.
17. Ramusack, *The Princes of India and their States*, 2.
18. *Dawn*, 11 September 1950, 5.
19. Alavi, 'The State in Post-colonial Societies', 60.
20. *Ibid.*, 61.
21. *Ibid.*, 65.
22. Leys, 'The 'Overdeveloped' Post-Colonial State', 42.
23. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 49.
24. See, for example, Oldenburg, *India, Pakistan and Democracy*; Talbot, *India and Pakistan*; and Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*.
25. McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, 218.
26. Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, 3.
27. Ernst and Pati, *The Indian Princely States*, 1.
28. Copland, *The Princes of India*, 2.
29. Ernst and Pati, *The Indian Princely States*, 4–5.
30. Axmann, *Back to the Future*, XVI.
31. Janmahmad, *Essays*, 235.
32. Axmann, *Back to the Future*, XXIII.
33. See, Nicolini and Raedelli, 'Quetta: History and Archives', 401–14.
34. See, Rahman, *New Education in the Making in Pakistan*, 3–15.

Chapter One

The Making

God created the Maharajas so that mankind could have the spectacle of jewels and marble palaces.

Rudyard Kipling

INTRODUCTION

Princely India, the 'other' India, has always been difficult to categorize. The hundreds of states officially recognized by the Government of India ranged from the tiny state of Dujana, for example, to the vast state of Kashmir.¹ Similarly, the states also differed in age, from states as ancient as Mewar which claimed its status from the sixth century AD onwards, to Swat which was the last state to be recognized in 1926. Religiously too, there were Hindu-majority and Hindu-ruled states, while the most important Muslim states, such as Hyderabad, Oudh, Junagadh, and Rampur were Muslim-ruled but having a Hindu majority. Centuries of Muslim rule in South Asia had made the Muslims masters of a vast area, despite the fact that a majority of the population of South Asia never converted to Islam. With a population following variously Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, different sects of Islam, and other religions, and with conquering legacies spanning thousands of years from the Aryans to the Arabs, Mongols, Afghans, Persians, British, French, and the Dutch, the nature of the princes and princely rule in India was varied and complicated.

Two periods have been critical in classifying the nature of princely rule in India. The first was the long spell of Mughal rule over most of northern, central, and eastern South Asia. Mughal conceptions of rulership, while still too lofty for most princes, still permeated their behaviour and a number of them actively emulated the Mughal court. While most princely states which acceded to Pakistan were on the periphery of the Mughal Empire, and Kalat was only Mughal territory for a short time, the Mughal 'imperial centre' did prove to be a common connecting force for a number of them as the eighteenth century power vacuum developed. As argued by Muzzafar Alam,

the eighteenth century saw not only the collapse of central government, but also a restablization in certain regions and this was achieved almost wholly within the Mughal institutional framework ... no region was in a position to maintain itself in complete isolation of other areas ... the regions remained integrated through trade and monetary transactions.²

In this scenario, Alam claims that the Mughal centre was used as legitimizing factor, especially since it had long been seen as the source of all political power and authority but now had little power to resist regional developments, and could only approve of the adventurers' ambitions.³ Thus, the Mughal clout was used as a legitimizing factor for most Indian states, including those on the periphery.

The second critical phase in the development of princely identity was the Raj. But even before the Raj, the policies of the East India Company, in terms of subsidiary alliances and other treaties, created a common pattern of control and a certain type of patron-client relationship between the British and the Indian princes.⁴ Therefore, even the haphazard alliance system with several rulers

created a loose sense of connection between the Company and the Indian rulers. With the ushering in of the Raj, the Crown took on the mantle of the Mughal Empire and its elaborate durbar ceremonies, both at the centre in Delhi, and replicated it at each local centre of power, such as the provincial capitals of Lucknow and Lahore, and connected them to the Mughal aura. The Imperial Assemblage of 1877 and the Durbars of 1903 and 1911 all brought together the princely cadre in paying homage to their new overlord, much in the way of the old Mughal emperors. The elaborate Indian honours system, established in 1861, and the carefully ranked gun salute system all tied the Indian rulers to these 'new Mughals' as Stanley Wolpert terms them, and created at least a facade of cohesion.

The aim of this chapter is to trace the 'nature' of the princely states which acceded to Pakistan during 1947–48. Before delving into the circumstances which led these states to become a part of Pakistan, it is essential to examine their nature and development in order to contextualize them in the larger context of the other princely states and the British Indian Empire. Therefore, the first part of this chapter will trace the inheritances of these states. The complex mix of Brahmanic ideals, Muslim notions, Persian ideas, and Raj conceptions will be investigated and assessed in this section. Section two will then investigate the historical circumstances in which the Pakistani states emerged and how these affected their self-perception and nature.

I THE NATURE OF PRINCELY RULE

In her seminal work on the princes of India and their states, Barbara Ramusack divides the princely states into three broad categories. The first category consists of 'antique states'. By this

Ramusack means the 'antique, archaic or vintage states (which) originated from the thirteenth century onward and their judicious incorporation into the Mughal administrative and military system prefigured their subsequent accommodation within the British Empire.'⁵ The states in the Rajputana agency, Central India, and the Simla Hill states constitute the main elements of this category. The second category is of 'successor states', denoting states which clearly traced their origins to the Mughal Empire. Such states included Oudh, Hyderabad, and Bengal.⁶ The third category, the broadest of all, constitutes the 'warrior or conquest states'. This classification 'designates states established by warrior groups who contested with an overarching authority to establish new political entities by offering military protection to local populations.'⁷ States like Bhopal, Rampur, and the Maratha states fall into this category since these were states where 'military entrepreneurs gained compensation ranging from rights to the produce of land, to clothing worn by the ruler, to honours such as titles, banners and other emblems of sovereignty.'⁸

While the above broad classifications fit most states in India, states which acceded to Pakistan during 1947–48 do not fit easily into any category. This is because most of them had very different trajectories when compared with other princely states. Almost all the states which acceded to Pakistan were the result of a political vacuum created after the decline of the Mughal Empire in the eighteenth century. Their concept of 'kingship' also differed greatly from the traditional Brahmanic and Islamic concepts of kingship.

Classical Hindu concepts of kingship were based on a variety of understandings.⁹ Mediaeval Hindu texts imagined the relationship between the king, land, and people using familial symbols. So 'the king is said to be the "husband" and "lord" (*vallabha*, *pati*) of

the land or earth and these two are regarded as the "father" (*pita*) and "mother" (*mata*) of the people, their "children" (*praja*).¹⁰ This concept of a Hindu family was based on 'the sharing of one body'.¹¹ The king was also the 'lord' and 'master' of his people who were considered his 'dependants' and 'servants.' However, together with these notions, the king was also supposed to be semi-divine—he was of 'partial descent (*amsa*) of the great god Vishnu, the preserver of dharma, the natural and moral order, and himself a form of the Cosmic Overlord.'¹² The king was also 'the immanent and microcosmic form of the transcendent', and as such a part of the cosmic order.¹³ The king was conceptually, therefore, at the centre of his kingdom and his body was the 'effective symbol of his kingdom's unity, order, and prosperity.'¹⁴ Some kings even claimed transcendence over the earth and asserted their origins from the Sun or the Moon.¹⁵ For example, the Maharaja of Bikaner thought himself to be the Dewan of Lord Lakshminarayan, an avatar of Krishna, while the Maharaja of Benaras was proclaimed to be the representative of Shiva.¹⁶

Hindu kings were supposed to weld together the three basic elements of their rule—the person of the king, the land, and the people, through a code of conduct, *rajadharma*, which was to engender the cosmic unity of these elements. This, as Barbara Ramusack explains, included 'offering protection to prospective subjects; adjudicating disputes among social groups including kinspeople, clans and castes; patronizing religious leaders and institutions; and distributing gifts ... to other cultural activities and social groups claiming kingly support.'¹⁷ Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph have further shown that the princes should preserve and protect the social structures which existed in the state such as 'the customs, activities, and prerogatives of communities, castes, sects, status orders, and guilds (craft and commercial).'¹⁸ In short, a

Hindu king was 'a figure who is expected to transcend the world as a divine, yet humble, almost ascetic worshipper and passive focus of authority on the one hand, and to make himself immanent as a divine warrior and administrator, decisive in the everyday concerns of his realm on the other.'¹⁹

The Muslim notions of kingship in India were almost synonymous with Mughal conceptions of kingship. The Mughals, who ruled India for over two centuries, left a deep impact on the sub-continent, and even had an impact on regions which were only occasionally under their control. In classical Mughal thinking, a king, much like Hindu conceptions, was of a semi-divine status. In Akbar's time, for example, the *Ain-i-Akbari* noted,

Kingship is a refulgence from the incomparable distributor of justice ... and a ray from the Sun, the illuminator of the universe and the receptacle of all virtues. The contemporary language calls it *Farr-i-Izid* [the divine effulgence] and the tongue of antiquity calls it *Kigan Khuro* [the sublime halo]. It is communicated by God to the holy face [the King] without the intermediate assistance of anyone; and men, in its presence, bend the forehead of praise towards the ground of submission.²⁰

Similarly, Jahangir noted that 'sovereignty and world rule are not things to be arranged by the worthless endeavours of defective intellects. The just Creator bestows them on whom He considers fit for gracious and exalted duty.'²¹ Jahangir had no qualms about being addressed as the 'visible God'.²² However, Mughal conceptions began to change from the time of Shah Jahan to more Islamic understandings, and Aurangzeb saw himself in purely Muslim idioms. Therefore, he declared himself *Amir-al-Momineen*, i.e. the Commander of the Faithful—a title of the Caliph. While previous Mughal rulers did not think much of the

Caliph, Aurangzeb was the first one to actually declare himself as such. Therefore, by the time the Mughal Empire began to crumble after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the almost divine nature of the Mughal Emperor had been undermined by the strict religiosity of Aurangzeb and the subsequent strife it engendered.

The decline of the Mughal Empire coincided with the emergence of the Ghilzais of southern Afghanistan as a powerful force. Benefitting from the crumbling Safavid dynasty, the Ghilzais sacked Isfahan, the Persian capital, in 1722, and plundered it beyond repair. However, the brutal Ghilzai rule led to a series of revolts which ultimately brought Nadir Shah to the helm of power in 1736.²³ After sweeping through Afghanistan, Nadir Shah turned to India and led a campaign against the ailing Mughal Empire, sacking Delhi in 1739.²⁴ However, Nadir Shah did not keep his vast empire together beyond plundering it and made off with the famed peacock throne, the Koh-i-noor diamond, and several Mughal heirlooms from Delhi. The brutal policies of Nadir Shah finally resulted in his mysterious murder in 1747 while at camp.²⁵

The murder of Nadir Shah left a power vacuum with a large conquered territory but no government. Therefore, a tribal *jirga* of the powerful Afghan Abdali tribe elected Ahmed Khan (later Shah) as their ruler. It was said that 'a holy man, Sabir Khan, announced that Ahmed was the greatest man among them and placed a sheaf of wheat on his head as a symbolic crown.'²⁶ The same holy man then pronounced Ahmed as '*Durri-Duran*,' i.e. 'Pearl of Pearls',²⁷ and from then onwards the Abdali tribe began calling themselves Durrani and Ahmed Khan became Ahmed Shah Durrani. On assuming power, Durrani quickly pacified Herat in 1750) and then sought control of Meshad and Nishapur. His main area of expansion, however, was the crumbling Mughal Empire and he

made no less than eight expeditions to India. Durrani occupied Lahore in 1749, but curiously left Mir Mannu, the Mughal governor, still in charge as long as he forwarded revenues from the rich province to him. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory and when in 1752 Mir Mannu rebelled, Durrani again invaded the Punjab. This time, however, Durrani conquered Kashmir and parts of Sind and made the Mughal emperor recognize his control of these areas.²⁸ Mismanagement of the Punjab by Mir Mannu's widow led to another expedition by Durrani, but this time he went ahead and sacked Delhi. Significantly, Durrani did not depose the Mughal Emperor, Alamgir II, but allowed him to retain the throne subject to the formal transfer of the Punjab, Kashmir and Sind to him. This retention of Alamgir II on the Mughal throne clearly exhibited that the Mughals were still held in high esteem long after they had ceased to be important military or political figures. Barfield notes:

The necessity of preserving the Mughals was a fine example of the power of dynastic charisma. No matter how great a hero he was in Afghan eyes, Durrani could not see himself as a replacement for such an old prestigious lineage, and chose to cloak himself in its aura rather than risk the consequences of abolishing it.²⁹

Nadir Shah and Ahmed Shah Durrani both hailed from humble backgrounds. Both leaders had worked for the governments they took over, and neither of them came from a princely background nor were they raised in one. Both were military men and conquerors and had little time for imperial fanfare. Therefore, both the Nadir Shah and Durrani empires were characterized by strong military control but little administrative or even political cohesion. As commented by Barfield: 'From a military perspective the (Durrani) Empire was highly centralized. ... But provincial

governors handled local administration and were practically independent of Qandahar (Kandahar) in most non-military matters. Such position gave them so much autonomy that they were virtual mini kingdoms.³⁰ Following the death of Ahmed Shah Durrani, the weak rule of his son Timur (1772–93) allowed the loosely bound provinces on the empire's periphery to gain such a degree of autonomy that by the end of Timur's reign and the subsequent internal Durrani struggle for power, principalities like Kalat, Bahawalpur, and Khairpur were only nominally under Durrani suzerainty. What were later known as the frontier states, however, were still in a state of purely tribal government and emerged as princely states only in the relative stability of British rule in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Therefore, by the time of the ascendancy of the British in India, the states which later acceded to Pakistan had not developed a clear 'identity'; they were neither classic Rajput states inspired by Brahmanic texts nor Mughal successor states like Oudh and Hyderabad which emulated the Mughal court. Furthermore, they were not even conquest states like Bhopal and Rampur, which had developed princely airs by the nineteenth century. The fact that all of these were Muslim majority and Muslim ruled states also set them apart from other major Muslim ruled states in India, in that they did not develop any specifically 'Muslim' nomenclature or modes of rulership in order to preserve their culture and tradition. Almost all rulers of these states hailed from the areas they ruled and so were not markedly different from the people they ruled.

The paramountcy of the East India Company followed by almost a century of the Raj were defining features in the lives of the Indian princely states. Under the cover of paramountcy, the princes were divested from running their foreign affairs and

defence, but were allowed a largely free hand in their internal affairs. British 'political' practice, (as relations with the princes were termed), developed through the initially haphazard and then formal relations. According to William Lee-Warner's influential, *The Native States of India*, published in 1910, political practice consisted of:

... first of all Treaties, Engagements and *Sanads*, entered into with them; secondly, the decisions passed from time to time by the paramount power in matters of succession, intervention, or of dispute with their rulers; and thirdly, the custom or usage, constantly adapting itself to the growth of society. ... Each of these factors act upon each other with which it is intimately connected.³¹

The development of this 'political practice' therefore homogenized British interactions with the rulers, even though the states remained largely different and isolated from each other. As Ramusack also acknowledges, 'the development of an inclusive, reputedly rationalized list of princely states was a colonial venture.'³² The British attempt to create an identity for the 'Indian princely states', though not wholly successful, did have a strong and lasting effect on how the various princes viewed themselves and their states.

British political interaction with the rulers was mediated through a complex and strict order of precedence where rank and honour were of the highest value. Before the British, the Mughals also used to rank their nobles, mainly through the *mansabdari* system, but with the British the system of honours became more formalized, rigid, and important. As noted by Lee-Warner,

[q]uestions of precedence and relative rank seem trivial, but they have even led to war in the periods which preceded the establishment of the British peace. In the present day they give rise to heated discussion

and sullen resentment, but more serious differences would ensue if the authority to arbitrate between rival claims did not vest in the Viceroy.³³

The establishment of gun salutes, English honours in India, and grand durbars, all served the purpose of bringing together the princely rank and file in a show of devoted loyalty to their overlord, the British monarch, and helped develop this motley of rulers into a loosely connected cadre.

Foremost among the new rankings introduced by the British were the gun salutes granted to different states. At the top was the Queen Empress (or King Emperor) with 101-gun salutes, followed by the members of the royal family, and the Viceroy and Governor-General of India with 31-gun salutes. After that followed several functionaries of the Government of India according to rank. For the princes the highest ranked were the five states of Hyderabad, Kashmir, Mysore, Baroda, and Gwalior, with 21-gun salutes. The other princely states followed, with a diminution of two salutes, to nine, the lowest rank. Thereafter, there were non-salute states also ranked in several categories. The states which eventually acceded to Pakistan were also ranked, with Kalat at 19, Bahawalpur at 17, Khairpur at 15, and Chitral at 11-gun salutes. Dir, Swat, and Amb were non-salute states.³⁴ This ranking meant that these states, whatever their history, culture, or governance, were clubbed with other princely states of the same rank during official ceremonies and other events of the Raj. So, the almost medieval Kalat, was in the same rank as the comparatively very modern Travancore which was even more developed than comparable British Indian districts. These gun salutes therefore, gave a very superficial sense of the importance and state of the principalities, but gave a sense of order and form to the British Indian Empire.

Further consolidating the princely cadre was an elaborate system of honours initiated in 1861. The Indian Political Service (IPS) adopted this carrot (and at times stick) policy, just as the Mughal emperors used their *mansabdari* ranks, to ensure loyalty, exemplary character, and at least a basic level of governance. As McLeod notes, 'the British sought to win indigenous allies by generously distributing titles and other distinctions.'³⁵ Therefore, the Order of the Star of India, the highest ranked among the Indian honours, was initiated in 1861, followed by the Order of the Indian Empire, and the Order of the Crown of India (reserved for women) added in 1878, as Queen Victoria assumed the title of Empress of India. Thereafter, the Indian princes—Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh—all vied for these honours. McLeod argues that the main reason why the princes sought these honours was to maintain their *izzat*, that is, their personal and family honour. McLeod notes:

The traditional duties of the Indian king include safeguarding the *izzat* of his family and state. He must fight bravely, avenge all insults, and generally earn respect; and an honour was a sign of respect from the only people who could really make their opinion matter, the British. (Although they tried to use them to manipulate rulers, the British had a genuine regard for honours, and therefore would not grant them to utterly unworthy individuals.) In a sense, an honour was given not only to the recipient himself, but to his whole family and the state that he ruled; so by receiving a knighthood, a prince fulfilled his duty of upholding the *izzat* of his dynasty and realm. This is why ruling families that in the past had tried to earn *izzat* by fighting each other, now occasionally competed in accumulating honours.³⁶

Most highly ranked states received some honours as a matter of course, while others had to actively garner support for them.

Ceremonies and events associated with each grade of honour further created a facade of common links between the princes.

The Imperial Assemblage of 1877 and the Durbars of 1903 and 1911 (where the King Emperor himself was present), were also occasions where all the Indian princes were invited in all their pomp and circumstance to show fidelity to their suzerain. These royal occasions, full of complicated rank and precedence ceremonies, were moments where the feudal hierarchical order of the Raj was emphasized, as Cohn has argued.³⁷ They also became arenas where everyone invited actually wanted to be incorporated in the British Indian princely circle (as explained later in the chapter on Kalat) and despite prohibition on official contacts between the princely cadre, these and other local events served to connect even the hitherto largely isolated princes.

The focus on pomp and ceremony and the bestowal of honours also made a deep imprint on the princes and their states. The British influence also showed its effect in influencing the princely durbars into ceremonial occasions, and transformed their often lacklustre interest in philanthropic activities into one of the most rewarding parts of princely life.

Until the nineteenth century, the primary function of holding 'court', (darbar) in the princely states was to allow the prince to deal with administrative affairs, foreign consuls, and administer justice. However, with the development of the office of prime minister or dewan, who now became the administrative head of the state, the control of foreign affairs by the British, and the setting up of a separate judiciary, the role of the court became largely ceremonial. Thereafter, the princes held darbar mainly to distribute 'rewards and boons to their petty nobles ... (accept) *nazr* and other gifts as well as ... (appear) before their people dressed



The Eleven-Year-Old Maharaja Jaswant Singh of Bharatpur holding Court in 1862

in their finest robes, jewels, and other royal paraphernalia.³⁸ These ceremonies, which were only held a few times a year, were a major symbol of the rule and authority of the princes and offered an opportunity to the subjects to exhibit loyalty towards their prince. Slowly these *durbars* also became a source of significant private income for the princes through the exchange of *nazr*—gifts. Once merely ceremonial gifts of gold coins, precious jewels, and expensive clothes, *nazr* now became a major symbol of the importance of the prince to his nobles and people. Depending on the ruler, these gifts were usually returned to the nobles with a return gift. However, as Benjamin Cohen narrates, Nizam Osman Ali Khan was ‘particularly zealous in collecting inappropriately large *nazr*. The abuse of this practice drew the attention of the Resident ... (and) the Nizam found himself on the defensive, and forced to find less obvious methods of collecting *nazr*.’³⁹

The second defining characteristic of princely rule, an important component of *rajdharmā*, was the patronage of various charitable causes. These ranged from educational institutions, to religious endowments, and patronage of various craftsmen, such as artisans, painters, dancers, musicians, and literary scholars. As argued by Ramusack, through these benefactions 'the princes were active, if unconscious, creators of cultural idioms that shaped regional and national identities and of public arenas for popular imagination of a national community.'⁴⁰

With the ushering in of modern education, schools, colleges, and universities were major beneficiaries of princely philanthropy. Thus, the rulers of Hyderabad, Bhopal, and Rampur donated generously to the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (founded in 1875), which became the Aligarh Muslim University in 1920, and the Maharajas of Patiala, Alwar, Jodhpur, Mysore, and Kashmir endowed the Benaras Hindu University.⁴¹ States such as Bahawalpur and Kalat also contributed to educational establishments and gave money to the Chief's (later Aitchison) College in Lahore. Medical initiatives focused especially on women's health were also major recipients of princely largesse. The Lady Dufferin Fund, which established maternity hospitals and provided training for nurses and midwives, was a key beneficiary, and half of its initial funding came from the princes.⁴²

Thus, towards the end of the Raj, the expectation from a prince was to follow an 'enlightened despot' model. The princes who later acceded to Pakistan did not share their concepts of rulership with most of the other Indian princes, yet because of the lumping together of all the princes in defined ranks, a certain expectation—loyalty and good governance—became the defining features of the 'Indian princely states,' as they were now collectively referred

to. As the following section shows, the princely states which acceded to Pakistan were peculiar in many respects and in a number of ways did not resemble other Indian states. That is why their accession and integration into Pakistan remained more complicated, and its effects more lasting, than the trajectory of their Indian counterparts.

II THE ORIGINS OF PAKISTANI PRINCELY STATES

The princely states which acceded to Pakistan were peculiar in numerous ways. They were all Muslim ruled and had a Muslim majority; they had been part of more than one empire at least; they were all on the periphery of every empire they were a part of; and they were largely (except Bahawalpur and to some extent Khairpur) tribal states. As shown below, the princes and states which acceded to Pakistan were not in the textbook 'Indian Princely States' image, to which the Raj had given rise. Hence, it is critical that a broad overview of their historical development is presented to develop a more in depth understanding of their polity.

a) Bahawalpur

The Nawabs of Bahawalpur, the Abbasi Daoodpautras, were very conscious of their status and claimed descent from the family of the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad. For the Nawabs of Bahawalpur, this claim brought a certain degree of legitimacy and religious authority to their rule, especially in a Muslim majority state. This claim was similar to the foundation myths of some Hindu princes who claimed descent from Hindu deities. The Muslim rulers of states like Hyderabad or Bhopal did not claim legitimacy through descent from Muslim caliphs, as such an assertion would have gained them little prestige among a Hindu majority population.

The myth of their descent from the Abbasid caliphs formed a major part of the regal claim of the Bahawalpur nawabs and was widely disseminated by courtiers and sympathetic writers. The first history of Bahawalpur written in English, in 1848, traced in detail the origins of the nawabs, but in the end gave two rather different accounts of their ancestry. The first was the typical story of the descent from the Abbasid caliphs. In *The History of Bahawalpur*, the author, Shahamat Ali, traces the fortunes of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad from the conquest of Sind by the Umayyads in the seventh century to the caliphate's demise at the hands of the Mongols in the thirteenth century. Then Shahamat Ali carefully recounts the direct descent of the Abbasid caliphs and their subsequent move to Egypt. Shahamat Ali then continues to show how the Abbasids arrived in the Indian subcontinent by stating:

For five generations, the succession was maintained in Egypt in the direct line, commencing with Sultan Ahmed; but the last Sultan, Ahmed, having first given up his throne in favour of his heir, set out on a expedition to Sindh at the head of a body of 12,000 horse, chiefly consisting of the Abbas race. He made Mekran the point of invasion.⁴³

Ali further narrates that after peacefully acquiring territory in Mekran, Ahmed began to be known by the title of 'Ameer,' (alternatively spelled as Amir). The Abbasids then moved eastwards during the chiefship of Cheenee Khan, who had achieved high office under the governorship of Prince Morad (son of Emperor Akbar) and acquired a *jagir* in Sind, with the additional responsibility of collecting taxes from the whole province of Sind.⁴⁴

Shahamat Ali's meticulous account describes the generations that followed, arguing that the name 'Daoodputra' came from Daood Khan II, one of the descendants of Cheenee Khan. Proceeding to the reign of Nadir Shah, Ali notes the tripartite division of the province of Sind with 'Shikarpur, Surkana, Sewistan, and Kachee, as far as the town of Choter, were given to the Daoodputras'.⁴⁵ It is from this first grant of land that the later descendants of the family consolidated their power, first under Nadir Shah, and then under Ahmed Shah Durrani in the eighteenth century. As the Durrani Empire crumbled at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the rulers of Bahawalpur achieved *de facto* independence of their suzerain in Kabul. The subsequent rise of Sikh power under Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Lahore led the rulers of Bahawalpur to make several overtures to the East India Company to establish relations, but these were rebuffed until a treaty was signed in 1833 whereby Bahawalpur accepted the paramountcy of the Company.⁴⁶

This first extant 'History of Bahawalpur' is a very curious work in that even though it primarily attests the official myth of the descent of the ruling house of Bahawalpur from the Abbasid caliphs, it still introduces a different account of their origins—an account which claims that they were nothing more than mere working class progeny. In the 'Supplementary Account of the Daoodputras,' at the end of the main text it states:

The Daoodputras, especially that branch of the tribe of which Bahawal Khan is the head, claim descent from Huzrat Abbas, the uncle of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Their real origin is to be traced to a very different source. Their progenitor, Daood, was the resident of Shikarpur of the class called Juhalas, or weavers. He is said to have five sons, Arab, Abbas, Hussun, Hasib and Casim; from the four first are descended the Arbanee, Abbassee, Husseinee and Hisbanee Daoodputras.⁴⁷



His Highness Nawab Sadiq Mohammad Khan IV and His Court, circa 1884

There is no author cited for the text, perhaps because dissenting from the official version of the origin of the ruling family might have proved dangerous. The fact that the book was published in London, rather than in India, also suggests that it might not indeed have been possible to include such a 'supplementary account' if the book were published in India; only in distant England could it have been inserted at the end of a book affirming the official version. This notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that in the main text the author began with the first Muslim conquest of parts of Sind and Multan, since this was a critical marker in the self-perception of the ruling family of Bahawalpur. The Nawabs of Bahawalpur distinguished themselves from other Muslim rulers of India since their origins lay with the foundations of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad, from the family of the uncle of the Muslim Prophet (PBUH). The detailed generational account of the Abbasids from their move from Baghdad to Egypt and beyond, and the

succession chart from Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) uncle Abbas to the current (in 1848), Nawab Bahawal Khan III at the end of the book, illustrated the importance of this myth for the ruling family of Bahawalpur, for it gave them a claim to nobility, even holiness, and provided a major legitimizing factor to the mainly Muslim population of the state.

The notion that the Daoodputras were descendants of the Abbasid Caliphs was central to their image of themselves as rulers. Since the Nawabs of Bahawalpur were not 'kings' in the normative sense of the word, being of the Abbasid lineage allowed them to see themselves as a part of the 'caliph' style of rulership, deriving their primary legitimacy from religious sanction. The assumption of the title 'amir' by the nawab in 1947, was a part of this perception and followed directly from the title of the Muslim caliphs, that of *Amir al-Momineen*, i.e. leader/commander of the faithful. Thus, the Nawabs of Bahawalpur, lacking kingly titles, were still 'leaders/commanders' of the people, just like the Muslim caliphs, who were not mere rulers but vice-regents of God on earth. Nawab Sadiq Mohammad Khan Abbasi V, who reigned from 1907 until the state was merged with West Pakistan, even imitated the Muslim caliphs by secretly going around his state in disguise. As noted in a post-merger history of the state: '... he keeps himself well informed about whatever happens in his State. To find out facts about the agitation in which his Hindu subjects were involved, he went to Bahawalpur from Dera Nawab Sahib during one cold night disguised as an ordinary camel driver.'⁴⁸ This incident clearly harked back to the caliphs of the early Muslim period who would often go around their states like common men to ascertain conditions. Nawab Mohammad Khan Abbasi V certainly wanted to be seen as one descended from that noble lineage.

Among the states which acceded to Pakistan, Bahawalpur's ruling house was singular in its claim of descent from former Muslim rulers. None of the other states attempted to assert themselves through such links, for most of them were either recent creations or had only assumed the 'princely' nomenclature in the nineteenth century, mainly after coming into contact with the British and other Indian princely states.

b) Khairpur

The Baluch Talpurs rose to prominence after the decline of the Kalhora dynasty of Sind in the late eighteenth century. The Kalhora rulers of Sind were closely related to the Daoodputras of Bahawalpur and claimed the same ancestry from Abbas.⁴⁹ The Talpurs were initially employed in the army of the Kalhoras but several waves of invasions of the Indian subcontinent by Afghans and Persians led to instability in the region, and when Abdun Nabi Khan Kalhora assassinated his successful Talpur general in 1781, Abdullah Khan Talpur, son of the murdered general, seized the administration and the Kalhora ruler fled to Kalat.⁵⁰

The formal rule of the Talpurs over Sind began when, in 1783, Mir Fateh Ali Khan Talpur (who had taken over after assassinating Abdullah Khan Talpur) declared himself *Rais* of Sind and obtained a *farman* to this effect from the Durrani King Shah Zaman.⁵¹ However, the unitary government in Sind was short-lived and soon Mir Sohrab Khan, the nephew of Mir Fateh Ali, settled with his adherents at Rohri, and his son, Mir Tharo Khan, removed himself to Shahbandar. Afterwards, each established himself as an independent ruler, without any reference to Mir Fateh Ali at Hyderabad. It was then Mir Sohrab Khan's family laid the foundations of the new state of Khairpur.



His Highness Sir Mir Ali Murad Khan Talpur I,
Ruler of Khairpur State, 1842–1894

As a relatively new state, Khairpur was quick to recognize the rising power of the East India Company and initiated relations with it. Through a treaty in 1838, the British recognized Khairpur as distinct from the other two Talpur principalities in Sind and entered into separate relations with it.⁵² In 1811, Ali Murad, the younger brother of Mir Rustam who had succeeded his father Mir Sohrab, was very pro-British and actively sought British patronage in order to seize the throne from his brother. The Anglo-Afghan war of 1838 was the defining factor in the independent existence

of Khairpur as a state and the ascendancy of Mir Ali Murad Talpur as the Mir of Khairpur. The *Imperial Gazetteer* noted:

When the first Kabul expedition was decided on, the Sind Mirs were required to assist the passage of the British through their territories, and allow the occupation of Shikarpur. Most of the princes showed great disinclination to comply with these demands. But in Khairpur, Ali Murad, who gradually succeeded in establishing his hold on the *riyasat*, or chiefship, cordially supported the British policy; and the result was that, after the battles of Miani and Daba had put the whole of Sind at the disposal of the British Government, Khairpur was the only state that was allowed to retain its political existence under the protection of the paramount power.⁵³

Khairpur's continued existence and Mir Murad's rule was therefore, largely a consequence of the gratitude of the Company for Mir Ali Murad's assistance in the Afghan war.

The Mirs of Khairpur developed relatively few of the characteristics associated with the princes of India. Whereas, in the rest of India the princes embarked on lavish palace building projects in the late nineteenth century, the Khairpur mirs only had a modest Faiz Mahal to boast of, which hardly matched the opulence of any of the palaces of princes of equal rank. Also, even with Faiz Mahal, most mirs until the turn of the twentieth century preferred to live in tents, reminiscent of their nomadic past, and used Faiz Mahal only for official functions or as a guest house. In terms of gun salutes Khairpur actually went down in ranking during its existence, from 19 to 17, and eventually to 15-gun salutes, due to its declining importance and stature. This factor further reduced the princely prestige of the Talpur Mirs of Khairpur.

The Talpurs were also very religious Shias and faithfully followed the tenets of their faith. This meant that there was a sense of



Faiz Mahal, Khairpur State


religious duty in rulership which permeated the identity of the Talpur mirs. The existence of a ruling chief recognized as a 'prince,' a limited courtly culture, an irregular army, and a local currency until the nineteenth century demonstrated that the Talpur mirs did indeed think of themselves as princes, albeit in a less pompous and assertive manner than most of their contemporaries.

c) Kalat

In terms of its political structure the Khanate of Kalat was the most peculiar of the Indian princely states. With a 19-gun salute, the Khan of Kalat was in second place in the princely table. However, the applicability of the term 'prince,' for the Khan of Kalat was tenuous at best. The Khan of Kalat was the head of a Brahui and Baluch confederacy, and therefore only enjoyed the powers delegated to him by the tribal leaders. Even though the khanship was hereditary in practice, the khan, as the head of the confederacy, could theoretically be removed by the tribes. This

fact alone meant that the Khan of Kalat, when compared to the rest of the princes of India, wielded limited power and authority in his state.

The traditional foundation date of the Khanate of Kalat is usually given as 1666, when Ahmed Khan (from whom the ruling tribe Ahmedzai takes its name) took control of Kalat town. Before 1666, the area of Kalat state had been occupied successively by Arabs, Ghaznavids, Ghoris, and Mongols. In the sixteenth century the area began to be exchanged between Persia and the Mughals, with the Safavids holding it from 1556 to 1595 and then again from 1638 onwards, after the interlude of Mughal rule.⁵⁴ The region again changed hands when in 1708 it came under the control



Mir Nasir Khan I, The Great, Khan of Kalat,
1749–1817

of the Afghan Ghilzais and then Nadir Shah, followed by Ahmed Shah Durrani. However, the decline of empires allowed the Khans of Kalat to increase their control of territory while agreeing to pay tribute to the distant kings. Therefore, the Khan recognized the over-lordship of Nadir Shah and was granted the fertile plain of Kacchi in return for his support in 1740.⁵⁵ Similarly, the Khan became a vassal of the Empire of Ahmed Shah Durrani until, in

1758, Mir Nasir Khan I declared his independence from the Durrani empire. Subsequently, when Ahmed Shah Durrani invaded and laid siege to Kalat, Nasir Khan negotiated nominal suzerainty, based on a supply of arms in case the empire was threatened, but gained a guarantee of non-interference from the Durranis.⁵⁶

The achievement of all but legal independence under Mir Nasir Khan I (called the Great), in the latter half of the eighteenth century was the real setting-up of the confederacy of Kalat. Until that time Kalat was a very 'porous confederacy',⁵⁷ with the country ridden with factionalism and internal fighting, and the tribal leaders wielding almost independent power. Under Nasir Khan the confederal state of Kalat took shape with the Khan at the top of the hierarchy. As Nina Swidler comments: 'Nasir, like his predecessors, manipulated sardari relations through titles, gifts, and favours, but he transformed the fluid hierarchy of the confederacy into an institutionalized ranking centred upon himself. Rank order became a focus of sardari intrigue.'⁵⁸ So, as tribal leadership became hereditary, the headship of the tribal confederacy too became hereditary, centred on the Ahmedzai clan. However, Nasir Khan did not impose many demands on the tribal sardars; loyalty and a promise to supply men-at-arms was usually the limit of the demands made upon them. As Swidler further remarks, Kalat was a political system characterized by 'a level of organization more inclusive than the tribe, yet something less than a state.'⁵⁹

The consolidation and expansion of the state under Nasir Khan I was short-lived and his son and grandson proved to be weak rulers. Soon tribes began to challenge the succession to the khanate, and open rebellion and secession from the state ensued. It was with such an internally weak structure that the Khanate of Kalat came

into contact with the government of the East India Company in 1838, at the beginning of the first Anglo-Afghan war. The main objective of the British in Kalat was to secure the passage of their armies advancing towards Afghanistan. However, events led the British to act as king-makers in this frontier territory—a role they would play until their departure in 1947. An official report noted:

The reign of Mir Mehrab Khan was one long struggle with his chiefs, many of whom he murdered. He became dependant on men of the stamp of Mulla Muhammad Hasan and Saiyid Muhammad Sharif, by whose treachery, at the beginning of the first Afghan War, Sir William Macnaghten and Sir Alexander Burnes were deceived into thinking that Mehrab Khan was a traitor to the British; that he had induced the tribes to oppose the advance of the British army through the Bolan Pass; and that finally, when Sir Alexander Burnes was returning from a mission to Kalat, he had caused a robbery to be committed on the party, in the course of which an agreement, which had been executed between the envoy and the Khan was carried off. This view determined the diversion of Sir Thomas Willshire's brigade from Quetta to attack Kalat in 1839 ... the place was taken by assault and Mehrab Khan was slain. Shah Nawaz Khan was now appointed to succeed him, with Lieutenant Loveday as Political Officer. He was not, however, destined to occupy the masnad for long. In the year 1840 a rebellion of the Sarawan tribesmen caused his abdication. ... By the efforts of Colonel Stacy, Mir Nasir Khan II was induced to submit to the British Government, and was installed by Major (afterwards Sir James) Outram at Kalat in 1840.⁶⁰

From that time onwards, most Khans of Kalat depended on British power and support to maintain their rule.

When the British first came in contact with Kalat, it was understood that the state was of a feudal character. In 1877, a government report noted:

... The political institutions of Kalat State are in the main of a feudal character; that is to say the Khan rules, not directly over the people but over a number of tribal chiefs, who in turn exercise over their own tribes a power which has never been sharply defined. ...⁶¹

While the fluid nature of the powers of the khan and his relations with the tribes made it difficult to clearly ascertain the correct nature of the state, Sir Robert Sandeman, through his famous Sandeman system, defined the government of Kalat as essentially of a federal nature. It was his view that the khan was in charge of only certain specific powers and that the rest of the administration was under the control of the tribal sardars. In terms of the khan's powers Sir Robert noted: '... the Khan had the power of making peace and war and could contract treaties binding on the confederacy or call out the levies which the chiefs were obliged to furnish on demand. ...'⁶² Sandeman's creation of the Agent to the Governor-General (AGG) and Political Agents (PA's) as mediators between the khan and his sardars, and as the source of various allowances and gifts guaranteed the pre-eminent position of the British political authorities in Kalat and further limited the actual authority of the khan.

The Khans of Kalat had only military might and the granting of favours to give solidity to their rule. They lacked a legitimizing foundational myth and claims of descent from a noble Muslim background, though the Ahmedzai's and the sardars of Kharan and Las Bela claimed Arab ancestry.⁶³ Being at the crossroads of empires, and having little revenue to either raise professional troops or placate intransigent sardars, no Khan of Kalat was able to develop the khanate into a centralized state based on the notion of the 'sovereignty' of the khan. The weakness of the position of the khan after the demise of Mir Nasir Khan I, and then strong

British influence meant that the khan was always embroiled in intrigues against his sardars, and was unable to consolidate enough authority and loyalty to assume the style of a monarch. The intense tribal and nomadic nature of the confederacy, and the relative lack of religiosity also meant that the Baluch and Brahui, even though Muslim, were not receptive to any notions of rule based on the Muslim caliphate system. Sir Robert Sandeman recognized this different approach to religion among the Baluch as compared to the Pathans and noted:

Both are warlike, revengeful, predatory; but while the Patan [Pathan] is a republican, having little reverence for the person of his chief, the Baluch respects and obeys the head of his clan; while the Patan [Pathan] is bigoted and priest ridden, the Baluch pays scant respect to the Sayad or the Maulvi. ...⁶⁴

The Khan of Kalat presided over a tribal society and was the chief of a tribal confederacy. At best, the khan was a powerful first among equals with limited power of control over the other tribal chiefs. Except when the towering personality of Nasir Khan the Great dominated the khanate, this understanding prevailed throughout the time that Kalat presented the semblance of a state. This status is also exhibited by one of the titles used by the khan—*Beglar Begi*, which simply meant 'Chief of Chiefs.' The notion of a princely identity based on an understanding of certain ideas of rulership and responsibilities towards the people was an alien concept in Kalat. The khan, who did not have direct control over most of his territory, simply could not view himself as a prince set apart from the people he ruled, and saw no obligations towards promoting the welfare of the people.

d) Frontier States

The rulers of the Frontier states can be best recognized as tribal leaders, or powerful chiefs, who were also princes. The relative isolation of these states also meant that they had little contact with princes elsewhere in India and the meagre revenue base of the states did not lead to any great building projects or other projections of princely prestige and power. Additionally, due to the nature of the tribes they ruled, the princes had to maintain a greater degree of closeness with the ruled in order to consolidate power.

i) *Chitral*

Perched in the northernmost part of India, Chitral has few surviving documents attesting to the foundation of the state and the origins of its ruling family. Even official Government of India records are not consistent about the origins of the Chitrali ruling family and depend on local tales as their sources. Both the *Imperial Gazetteer* and the *Memoranda on the Indian States* give differing versions of the foundation of the state. *The Memoranda on the Indian States* asserts that the ruling family of Chitral descended from one Baba Ayub, a descendant of Timur, the Mongol emperor, or from some noble family in the Hazara region. It notes:

Baba Ayub settled in Chitral about the beginning of the 17th century, and entered into the service of the Ruling Chief, a Rais of the same family as the rulers of Gilgit. About one hundred years later, the Rais line became extinct and Mohtaram Shah (also known as Shah Kator I), a lineal descendant of Baba Ayub became Chief, or Mehtar.⁶⁵

In contrast, the *Imperial Gazetteer* states that the family of the Chitral mehtar's descended from one Sangin Khan who died in 1570 and whose sons dislodged the local ruler and established

the current ruling family.⁶⁶ With such a level of uncertainty about the origins of the ruling family, only physical control of land and pacification of the people were legitimizing factors for the mehtar.

Chitral was first exposed to the Government of India through its relations with Jammu and Kashmir. Mainly to thwart Afghan aggression Chitral and Kashmir signed an alliance in 1878 by which Kashmir became a suzerain of Chitral in return for heavy subsidies from both the Kashmir durbar and the Government of India.⁶⁷ However, the Maharaja of Kashmir was categorically told that he would not be allowed to meddle in the affairs of Chitral despite this agreement. Lord Lytton noted: 'henceforth, he (the Maharaja) will neither be required, nor permitted, to meddle with the affairs of any state, great or small, beyond the Cashmere frontier.'⁶⁸ Internal divisions were rife in the ruling family of Chitral, as exemplified by the dispute over the succession after the death of Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk in 1892. At that time, a bitter struggle ensued over the throne, which culminated in direct interference by the British in 1895, after Umra Khan, the Khan of Jandul, and Sher Afzal the brother of Aman-ul-Mulk laid siege to Chitral Fort, containing a British political agent and garrison.⁶⁹ The security of the Mehtar of Chitral's position now depended largely on the British government and its policies as executed by the political agent, a situation which also alleviated the tensions caused by the mehtar's prodigious talent at producing feuding descendants.

ii) *Dir*

The ruling family of Dir State traces their origins to Akhund Baba, a holy man of the seventeenth century. Although the ancestry of the family was from a religious leader, the later rulers made

no reference to their religious origins. Dir, composed mostly of Yusufzai Pathans, was a tribal society with power vested in the tribal chief. The Nawabs of Dir therefore, were simply leaders of the Painsa Khel tribe and rose to ascendancy in the aftermath of the Chitral Relief Expedition of 1895. The official accounts relate:

In 1895, on the advance of the Chitral Relief Expedition, Muhammad Sharif Khan [the Chief of Painsa Khel] came to the Political Officer and did good service by advancing up the Panjkora line with his own forces, recovering Dir from Umra Khan's garrison and pushing on a force into Chitral territory ... he also contributed to the raising of the siege of Chitral by showing the near approach of Sir Robert Law's column, and rendered good service by capturing and handing over the Chitrali pretender, Sher Afzal.⁷⁰

As a result of such 'good service' the British recognized him as the Chief of Dir and entered into an agreement with him, securing access to Chitral for a subsidy of Rs. 10,000.⁷¹ Later, in 1897, Sharif Khan was granted the title of nawab and in 1898 an agreement was signed which recognized the boundaries of the state of Dir which included Sharif Khan's annexation of the lands on the right bank of the upper Swat river in the spring of 1897.⁷²

The recognition of Muhammad Sharif Khan as the Nawab of Dir and the settlement of the territorial boundaries of the state did not end internal dissension among different factions of the Yusufzai Pathans. When Sharif Khan died in 1904, and later when his successor, Nawab Badshah Khan, died in 1925, the succession was bitterly disputed and the British government had to intervene in order to settle the issue.⁷³

With an often challenged hold on power, and the resulting disputed succession, the Nawabs of Dir had little luxury to

develop and cultivate any princely forms of rule and style. Government in Dir was conducted on a day-to-day basis and most of the nawab's time was spent trying to maintain law and order and collect revenue from the other important khans in the state. Being a tribal leader also meant that the nawab had to maintain a certain degree of closeness to the people of his tribe and ensure their well-being and loyalty. As late as 1959, the British deputy high commissioner in Peshawar noted: 'The Nawab relies for his following in the State on the fact that his Paimda Khel subjects receive especially privileged treatment, paying little or no taxes, unlike other tribesmen.'⁷⁴ The hold of the Paimda Khel Nawabs on Dir was so uncertain in the beginning that they were even willing to put themselves under the suzerainty of the Kashmir durbar in order to consolidate their position. In 1885, Nawab Muhammad Sharif Khan wrote to the Maharaja of Kashmir stating: 'I beg respectfully to state that having lost my own father, I now look upon Your Highness ... as my father ... I who am of old a loyal servant of Your Highness.'⁷⁵ It was only when the Paimda Khel nawabs were able to establish full control of Dir in the years following the Chitral expedition and later the grant of a hereditary title of nawab by the British in June 1918 that their possession of Dir became secure. This gave Dir a particular character among other Pakhtun societies, as only here did a tribal leader assume the title of a prince. Sir Olaf Caroe noted: 'Dir state has always been unique in that there alone among Pathans the tribes acknowledge one of themselves not only as a Khan or Malik, but as their hereditary ruler with power over their person, indeed as a prince.'⁷⁶ This phenomenon, anthropologist Lindholm explains 'revolve(s) primarily around a confrontation in Dir between Pakhtun war leaders and the centralized state of Chitral. This confrontation led to an unusual development of hierarchy in Dir and the rise of a

princely family.⁷⁷ Therefore, Dir was the only tribal Pakhtun state to have emerged in the Indian Empire.

iii) *Amb*

The origins of the small state of Amb are similar to that of Dir. Here too a tribal chief was made a hereditary ruling prince, mainly through the assistance of the Government of India. The main ethnic grouping in the state was the Tanawali tribe, and the Nawab of Amb was the head of the Hindwal section of the tribe. The Hindwals rose to prominence during the decline of the Durrani empire when,

... its chief, Nawab Khan, defied the Durrani, but met his death at the hands of Sardar Azim Khan in 1818. His son, Painsa Khan, played a considerable part in the history of his time and vigorously opposed the Sikhs, but lost all his territory except for the tract around Amb. On his death in 1840 his son, Jahandad Khan, recovered part of it through the favour of Ghulam Singh of Kashmir and the British Government. ...⁷⁸

Later, in 1868, the son of Jahandad Khan was granted the title of Nawab Bahadur and in 1888 made a Knight of the Order of the Star of India.⁷⁹ However, as with the Nawab of Dir, the title of nawab was not made hereditary until 1918 and so the grant of the title, and in effect the rulership of the state, remained in the hands of the British political officer (Deputy Commissioner, Hazara).

In addition to the fact that the Nawab of Amb was a tribal chief made ruler, he was, in effect, just a major landholder with regard to most of his territory. Aside from the *jagir* of Rs. 9,000 granted to the nawab in the British Indian tehsil (small administrative unit) of Haripur in Hazara, more than two-thirds of the area of Amb was what was known as 'Feudal Tanawal'. This strange

arrangement resulted in the Nawab of Amb having a very peculiar status since he was 'at once an independent ruler, a feudal chief, and a British subject. He is the first as regards his trans-Indus territory; the second as regards Feudal Tanawal; and the third on account of his large *jagir* and of certain land in the Haripur tehsil.'⁸⁰ Feudal Tanawal was ruled under Regulation II of 1900 which stipulated that:

except in regards offences punishable under sections 121 to 130 of the Indian Penal Code (rebellion and sedition), or under sections 301 to 304 (murder or culpable homicide), or any other offence specified by a written order of the Local Government, the administration of criminal justice should, in Phulra, vest in the Khan of Phulra, and in the rest of Upper Tanawal, vest in the Chief of Amb. The administration of civil justice, and the collection of the revenue within these tracts are similarly vested in their chiefs, and the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals is excluded.⁸¹

This particular situation meant that in most of what was considered the State of Amb, the Nawab of Amb did not enjoy full authority but merely exercised certain rights granted to him by the Government of India. In the rest of the state, where the Nawab was indeed the ruler, the population was mostly composed of his tribe, the Tanawalis, who expected only a tribal form of government. Hence, although Amb was officially a state, its small size and peculiar constitution prevented the Nawab from acting as anything other than a large landholder.

iv) *Swat*

The state of Swat was also a creation of the lack of centralized control in the aftermath of the fall of the Afghan and Sikh empires. The history of Swat is inextricably linked to its neighbouring states

of Dir, Chitral, and Amb, and the adjoining tribal area, but its foundation was very distinct from that of the other states. Whereas in the other Frontier states, chiefs of locally powerful tribes rose to such prominence that they became the rulers of the state, in Swat, the rulers did not consolidate the state on the basis of tribal leadership alone.

In 1849, during the British occupation of Peshawar, the Swat valley was mainly inhabited by Yusufzai Pathans who were enjoying virtual independence after the demise of the Durrani Empire. The Sikhs had not ventured into the area and so the administration of the area was along primitive tribal lines. When the British sent an expedition to pacify certain border tribes in the Swat valley, the Swatis responded by creating a joint front of tribes against the British attack. The tribal jirga also 'elected' Syed Akbar Shah as the 'King of Swat' in 1849, creating for the first time some form of unitary government and authority in the valley. Syed Akbar Shah immediately set about organizing a revenue and administrative system in the state and created a standing army. However, it was soon clear that these unifying measures were unacceptable to the local population and resentment against the ruler grew.⁸² Abdul Wadud, later a ruler of Swat, stated that 'the people, who were accustomed to self-willed, independent ways and disorganized life for quite a long time, found it difficult to submit to the checks and restrictions imposed by the new government.'⁸³ In 1857, therefore, this unwillingness to be ruled brought about the effective end of the first 'State of Swat'.

The real power broker in the Swat valley, however, was not the elected king, but the 'Akhund' (a religious leader) of Swat, affectionately called Saidu Baba. It was due to his influence that Akbar Shah was elected in 1849 and it was again through

his influence in 1857 that Akbar Shah's son was expelled from Swat and the state collapsed. The later rulers of Swat were then descendants of the Akhund. The Akhund 'whose real name was Abdul Ghafur, was born in 1784 ... probably in Upper Swat. He emigrated at an early age to the Yusafzai tract of British India, where he acquired great reputation for sanctity with the title of Akhund.'⁸⁴ As attested to in government documents, the Akhund was the leading man in Swat throughout his life 'a position he owed rather to his great spiritual reputation than to any attempt to exercise temporal authority.'⁸⁵

After the death of the Akhund in 1877, the valley relapsed into factional fighting with a section led by his eldest son, Abdul Hanan, called the Miangul. Swat also became embroiled in the power struggles in Dir and Chitral. The end of the Chitral Expedition of 1895 and the restoration of Sharif Khan as the Chief of Dir did not end factional fighting, and now the grandsons of the Akhund began jockeying for power in the valley. Meanwhile, in 1915, the tribes of Upper Swat elected Sayed Abdul Jabbar Shah as their 'king', mainly to fight against the Nawab of Dir. Abdul Jabbar Shah did manage to oust the Nawab of Dir from most of Swat in 1915, but could not defend the territory against a counter attack in 1916. Chaotic anarchy then ensued resulting in a jirga being called in September 1917 in Upper Swat, which decided to oust Abdul Jabbar Shah as king and appointed Miangul Abdul Wadud, one of the grandsons of the Akhund, as king.⁸⁶

Miangul Abdul Wadud spent the next three years consolidating the state, part of which was still under the control of the Nawab of Dir. He inflicted a crushing defeat on the Nawab of Dir in August 1919 in the Adinzai Valley, but in 1922 the British political authorities prevailed upon him to abandon the Adinzai valley in

favour of Dir through a tripartite agreement.⁸⁷ Thereafter, Miangul Abdul Wadud focused on Buner and Chakesar and successfully annexed that territory from the Nawab of Amb in 1923. Despite being in control of most of the Swat area by 1923, the Government of India still had not formally recognized Miangul Abdul Wadud as a ruler, and Swat as a princely state. This was only sanctioned in March 1926, and in May 1926 the Chief Commissioner of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) visited Swat and held a public durbar at which Miangul Abdul Wadud was proclaimed the Wali of Swat with an annual allowance of Rs. 10,000 from the Government of India.⁸⁸ It is significant that even though Miangul Abdul Wadud was elected king and locally known as *Bacha* or *Badshah*, the Government of India only granted him the title of Wali, which means a religious ruler. This was obviously with reference to his descent from the Akhund of Swat. Miangul Abdul Wadud wanted to retain the title of *Badshah* or *Bacha* but this was flatly denied by the political authorities on the basis that no ruler in India was a king, and that only the King-Emperor in Britain had the right to be styled in such a manner.⁸⁹ Miangul Abdul Wadud again petitioned the government for the title of *Bacha* in December 1927, but the request was once again declined.⁹⁰

Swat was a very peculiar state in terms of its origin and rulers. It was the only state in the Indian subcontinent which had thrice elected its own king, and deposed two of them on account of unsatisfactory rule. While the use of the title king was also certainly distinctive in India, as no ruler after the Mughals (bar the Oudh nawabs very late in their rule) had employed that title, it is clear that the tribal jirga which elected these kings was not conferring full sovereignty on the thus chosen king. The king was to exercise power subject to the jirga, which was seen as the highest sovereign and judicial body. The title of Wali, which signified a

religious connection, was also singular in its application as even in Hindu principalities, where the religious and secular role of the prince was often inextricably linked, such a title or a similar one, was never used. In practice, however, none of the Walis of Swat took part in religious affairs. Despite the late recognition of the state, anthropologist Barth, who worked extensively in Swat, emphasizes that:

It is a notable fact that the state was an indigenous, not a colonial creation; it reasserted previously unsuccessful efforts of centralization during the nineteenth century and seems to have arisen without external support and subsequently to have relied only marginally on colonial and postcolonial national establishments.⁹¹

Swat was a twentieth century state, but pre-modern state formations were at play here for a long time.

The four Frontier states were classic tribal states. The rulers of Dir, Chitral, and Amb were the elders of their respective tribes which formed the base of support from which they conquered adjoining territories and carved out their states. As such, all three rulers relied heavily on the support of their fellow tribesmen and could not alienate them by appearing to assume the role and titles of imperial princes. Only in Swat did the descendants of a religious leader muster enough support to gain temporal power, but even that was with the acquiescence of a tribal jirga. Also, since it was a tribal society, most issues of justice, social services, and so forth, were mainly the concern of the tribes which jealously protected these rights. All the princes also lived in modest houses with free access to the people and did not build any large palaces or lavish memorials to their rule. As a result, none of the Frontier princes were able to develop a sense of princely identity which transcended

tribal allegiances and allowed the prince to act in a completely autocratic manner.

e) Hunza and Nagar

The states of Hunza and Nagar do not have a well-documented history. What is known about their origins is mostly based on oral traditions. According to Major Biddulph, the first British political agent of the Gilgit Agency, 'the two states of Hunza and Nagar were formerly one, ruled by a branch of the Shahreis, the ruling family of Gilgit, whose seat of government was Nagar. Tradition relates that Mayroo Khan, apparently the first Mohammadan Tham (ruler) of Nagar some 200 years after the introduction of Islam into the region, married a daughter of Tarkhan of Gilgit, who bore him twin sons named Maghlot and Girkis. From the former the present ruling family of Nagar is descended.'⁹² However, in the late fifteenth century, shortly after assuming power in Nagar, Maghlot had his brother Girkis, the Tham of Hunza, murdered in order to gain control of the whole area, sowing the seeds of a feud between the two states which lasted into the nineteenth century.⁹³

Situated on the caravan routes through Central Asia, both Hunza and Nagar were notorious bases for raiders and slave traders. Major Biddulph noted: 'the people of these two states ... have been counted as mere robber tribes, who have brought themselves into notice by their depredation on the caravans between Yarkund and Leh.'⁹⁴ The inaccessibility of these states made control of the areas difficult for any foreign force and neither the Sikhs, nor later the Dogras, had much success against them. Ghulab Singh, first under the Sikhs and later as Maharaja of Kashmir, sent expeditions to control Hunza in 1847 and 1852, but both ended in disaster.⁹⁵ Again in 1865 and 1866, Ghulab Singh's successor, Ranbir Singh, sent expeditions to Hunza but met with failure. It was only in

1868 that Nagar, and in 1869, Hunza finally accepted the formal suzerainty of Kashmir and agreed to pay tribute to Srinagar with a promise to stop raiding caravans and Gilgit. However, their allegiance to Kashmir was short-lived and in 1888 both states joined forces and ejected the Kashmir garrison from Chalt and even threatened Gilgit town.⁹⁶

The states of Hunza and Nagar came in contact with the British Government of India after the establishment of the Gilgit Agency in 1889. At that time both rulers agreed with Colonel Durand, the political agent, that they would stop raiding in return for a subsidy of Rs. 2,000 per year from the British Government of India, which was subsequently increased by Rs. 500 for the ruler of Hunza subject to good behaviour.⁹⁷ This submission, as with the previous one to the Kashmir durbar, was of short duration and in 1891, the Mirs refused the British permission to build a road through their territory and even insulted the political agent's envoy. Thereafter, the combined forces of Hunza and Nagar were defeated by the British at Nilt, finally bringing the two states under direct British control.⁹⁸ Following the crushing defeat, the Mir of Hunza fled to Chinese Turkestan and the British, after a brief period of direct political rule, installed his half-brother, Mohammad Nazim Khan, as ruler from September 1892. In Nagar, the ruler Uzr Khan was deported to Kashmir and his father, Zafar Zahid Khan, reinstalled by the Kashmir durbar (with the concurrence of the Government of India) in late September 1892.⁹⁹ From that period onwards, both Hunza and Nagar came under the formal suzerainty of Kashmir with the agreement of the British Government of India.

As related above, both Hunza and Nagar were small states which relied on limited agriculture and raiding caravans as their means of subsistence. Both states had developed into strong centralized polities, but their small size and meagre resources prevented

the rulers from developing any idea of kingship beyond simple territorial control. Their existence on the borders of major states (China, the Sikh state, Kashmir, and British India) further limited their ability to develop a clear notion of kingship since most of their efforts were spent on trying to avoid being subsumed by other states.

There were, however, some striking features of the nature of kingship in these states, in that both rulers were locally addressed as *Soori*, which, according to Biddulph was 'a title of respect ... (and) appears to be the same as *Sri*, an appellation of Lakshmi, the Hindoo goddess of prosperity.'¹⁰⁰ It is unclear how much this title denoted a semi-divine status, but what was apparent to Major Biddulph was that even though the people of Hunza and Nagar were Muslims, (Ismailis in Hunza and Shias in Nagar) they were not particularly religious. Biddulph describes how 'in cutting the throat of an animal for food, the people of Hunza made a practice of turning it towards the Tham's abode, even when many miles distant, instead of in the orthodox direction of Mecca.'¹⁰¹ Further, Biddulph noted that the name of the ruling family of Hunza was *Ayeshe* (heavenly), and even though they did not claim heavenly descent, just the use of such nomenclature gave a sense of being set apart with even a divine mandate to rule.¹⁰² These factors did indicate that in the very least the Thams were treated as something more than just tribal leaders, occupying a revered position, greater than that of simply a military commander.

CONCLUSION

It is evident from the foregoing section that the princes and the states which acceded to Pakistan had a very different inception and development from most comparably ranked states in the rest

of India. These states do not generally fit in any of Ramusack classifications as already noted. In fact, the category which best suits these states, except to some extent Bahawalpur and Khairpur, is that of tribal states. The Baluch and the Frontier states were realms based on a tribal society and functioned in either federal or feudal ways. The prince in these states was the head of a tribe and remained so throughout his rule. That meant that the tribe of the prince was a privileged one and was the main beneficiary of the spoils of the state. The prince could not afford to alienate his major power base and so had to remain in close touch with the people of the tribe. The dependency on the tribe also meant that no Baluch or Frontier ruler could develop the concept of a 'God-given' kingdom, or that of the special status of the prince—the princes knew well that tribal dissension could spell the end of their rule. The NWFP Governor, Sir Olaf Caroe, noted:

In all Pathan societies the influence of the Ulus (the people of the tribe sitting in their traditional groups and assemblies) is very real, and the ruler cannot far outstay tribal sentiment if he is to remain secure in tribal esteem or keep his place.¹⁰³

Furthermore, the egalitarian nature of Baluch and Frontier societies meant that none of the princes could assume princely airs of staggering palaces, expensive clothes, collections of ornaments, and luxuries associated with other princes. The primitive warrior mentality of the tribes and the meagre resources of the states also put limits on the development of a clearly differentiated princely identity. Only in Bahawalpur did the link with the Abbasid Caliphs, the connection with the Mughal and Sikh courts, and the relative prosperity of the state, create a princely identity. The Nawabs of Bahawalpur saw themselves as the heirs of the Caliphs, and as princes who were chosen by God to rule over the people.

The princely states of Pakistan were very different from the other states in India, both Muslim and Hindu. The classical ideas of kingship which underwrote princely identity for Hindu and other Muslim princes were not present in the self-perception of the Pakistani princes. Their origins as states which had long been under either Persian or Afghan rule (as compared to the other Indian states), and their composition as mostly tribal states also differentiated them from Hindu states and other Muslim Mughal successor and conquest states in India. Concepts like *rajdharmā* were alien to most Pakistani princes—only a few of them, and that too, personally, thought that they had any responsibility towards their subjects other than maintaining law and order.

The princely states of Pakistan, with the exception of Bahawalpur, were more akin to the Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf than to the other princely states of India. Writing on the Frontier states in 1946, Sir Olaf Caroe also recognized the different nature of these states and noted:

They cannot be considered from the same aspects as other Indian states ... they are developments of tribal organisms among tribes to whom the tradition of chieftdom has a certain appeal as among the Arabs. ... All these states are in what might be described a state of monarchical tribalism, not unlike that of the Arab Sheikhdoms.¹⁰⁴

These were states which emerged in the aftermath of the decline of empires (the Ottoman Empire in the case of the Arab sheikhdoms), and where a leader of a local tribe, through inter-tribal negotiations, was able to rise to prominence so that with the advent of British rule he was recognized as a prince even though that nomenclature might be alien to the local culture. For example, the Kuwaiti ruling family of Al-Sabah derives its power from being a part of the Utub tribe which migrated to the region

of Kuwait from central Arabia in the latter half of the seventeenth century after a devastating famine. The leader of a section of the Utub tribe, Sabah bin Jabir, then established Kuwait town as a stronghold of his sub-division of the tribe, thereby laying the foundation of what later became the state of Kuwait.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, the ruling families of Abu Dhabi and Dubai were part of the same section of the Bani Yas tribal confederation and each emirate was founded by a leader of a section of the tribe.¹⁰⁶ In all these cases, Pakistani states and the Arab sheikhdoms, the British recognized prince knew that even though he was guaranteed succession and protection by the British, his real power lay in the support of the tribe. Therefore, very few of them were able to cultivate enough princely airs to create a great distance between them and their own tribesmen. Hence, it could be said that in the Pakistani states, with the exception of Bahawalpur, the nature of kingship was that of tribal monarchism with limited elements of Mughal and British courtly culture and tradition.

Notes

1. The exact number of states recognized by the GoI had always been a matter of contention. Around 500 is the number generally accepted. However, the official government publications widely differ: *IGI* of 1909 notes 693 states (including the Burmese ones); *The Indian States*, gives their numbers as 467 in 1920, 443 in 1924, 442 in 1925, 444 in 1926, and 445 in 1927; the *Report on the Indian States Committee* in 1929 gives the number as 562, while the *Memoranda on the Indian States* in 1935 counts 578 states. Whether this obscurity was deliberate is open to question.
2. Alam, *Crisis of Empire*, 16.
3. Ibid. 17.
4. See, for example, Ramusack, *The Princes of India in the Twilight of Empire*.
5. Ramusack, *The Princes of India and their States*, 13.
6. Ibid. 24.
7. Ibid. 27.

8. Ibid.
9. This section only gives a brief overview of Hindu kingship—itsself a substantial topic—as a reference point for its discussion of Muslim understandings of it. For a deeper discussion see Inden below and Dumont, 'The Conception of Kingship'.
10. Inden, 'Ritual, Authority', in *Kingship and Authority*, ed. Richards, 44.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. 46.
13. Ibid. 47.
14. Ibid.
15. See, Pargiter, *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*.
16. Ramusack, *The Princes of India and their States*, 139.
17. Ibid. 4.
18. Rudolph and Rudolph, 'The Subcontinental Empire,' in *Region and Nation in India*, ed. Wallace, 46.
19. Inden, 'Ritual, Authority,' in *Kingship and Authority*, ed. Richards, 42.
20. Quoted in Streusand, *The Formation of the Mughal Empire*, 130.
21. Farooqi, *Mughal-Ottoman Relations*, 193.
22. Ibid. 193–4.
23. See Axworthy, *The Sword of Persia*, chapters 1–5.
24. See Ibid. chapter 7.
25. See Ibid. chapter 10.
26. Tanner, *Afghanistan*, 117.
27. Ibid. 118.
28. Ibid. 120.
29. Barfield, *Afghanistan*, 99.
30. Ibid. 102.
31. Lee-Warner, *The Native States of India*, 30.
32. Ramusack, *The Indian Princes and their States*, 2.
33. Ibid. 320.
34. Gun salutes were often the honour most sought after by the Indian princes, especially since only those princes with 11-gun salutes or more were entitled to call themselves 'Highness'. The criteria for the salutes varied from the size of the state, to its history, importance for the British, and personal services of the ruler to the Raj (in that case there was a distinction between personal and state gun salutes). For more information see, Tupper, *Indian Political Practice*, vol. 3, 233–9.
35. John McLeod, 'The English Honours System and Princely India', 238.

36. Ibid. 241.
37. Cohn, 'Representing Authority in Victorian India', Hobsbawn and Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*, 185–96.
38. Cohen, *Kingship and Colonialism*, 73.
39. Ibid. 74.
40. Ramusack, *The Princes of India and their States*, 140.
41. See, Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation*, 156, 184, 315; and Ramusack, *The Princes of India in the Twilight of Empire*, 49–50.
42. See Lal, 'The Politics of Gender', 35–6.
43. Ibid. 8.
44. Ibid. 10.
45. Ibid. 25.
46. See *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. I, 235–7.
47. Ali, *The History of Bahawalpur*, 182.
48. Shah, *Sadiqnama*, 75.
49. *IGI*, vol. XXII, 398.
50. Ibid. 399.
51. Ibid.
52. See, *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. VIII, 328–30.
53. *IGI*, vol. XXV, 212.
54. *IGI Provincial series, Baluchistan*, 13.
55. Naseer, *Tarikh-e-Baluchistan*, 49.
56. Ibid. 69–70.
57. Swidler, 'Tribal Chiefdom', 557.
58. Swidler, 'Kalat: the Political Economy', 559.
59. Swidler, 'Tribal Federation', 8.
60. *IGI*, vol. VI, 278–9.
61. See, L/PS/12/3177, IOR.
62. See, R 1/34/60 IOR and First Administration Report of the Baluchistan Agency, paragraphs 10–17.
63. *IGI*, vol. VI, 276 noted: 'The Mirwaris, from whom the Ahmadzais are descended, claim Arab origin. In their earlier legends we find them living at Surab near Kalat, and extending their power thence in wars with the Jats or Jadgals. They then fell under the power of the Mongols; but one of their chiefs, Mir Hasan, regained the capital from the Mongol Governor, and he and his successors held Kalat for twelve generations till the rise of Mir Ahmed in 1666–7.'
64. Thornton, *Col. Sir Robert Sandeman*, 28.

65. *Memoranda 1935*, 152.
66. *IGI*, vol. X, 301.
67. See, *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. XI, 427.
68. Lytton to Egerton, 2 December 1879, Lytton Collection E218, vol. 21, quoted in Keen, *Princely India and the British*, 145.
69. *IGI*, vol. X, 302–3.
70. *Memoranda 1935*, 156.
71. Cohn 'Representing Authority in Victorian India', in Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*.
72. See, *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. XI, 432.
73. See, *Memoranda 1935*, 156–9.
74. The British Deputy High Commissioner, Peshawar to the British High Commissioner, Karachi, 6 July 1959, DO 35/8953, UKNA.
75. Sharif Khan to Kashmir, 8 March 1885, R/2/1072/102, UKNA.
76. Caroe, *The Pathans*, 385.
77. Lindholm, *Generosity and Jealousy*, 39.
78. *IGI*, vol. XXIII, 219.
79. Watson, *Gazetteer of the Hazara District, 1907*, 193–4.
80. *Ibid.* 197.
81. *Ibid.* 198–9.
82. For details see, Sultan-i-Rome, *Swat State*, 38–9.
83. Wadud, *The Story of Swat*, 91.
84. *Memoranda 1935*, 160–1.
85. *Ibid.*
86. *Ibid.* 161–2.
87. *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. XI, 437.
88. *Memoranda 1935*, 162–3.
89. See Wadud, *The Story of Swat*, 94–5.
90. *Ibid.* 104–5.
91. Kuper and Barth, *Features of Person*, 122.
92. Biddulph, *Tribes of the Hindoo Kush*, 27.
93. For details see, Dani, *The History of the Northern Areas of Pakistan*, 197.
94. Biddulph, *Tribes of the Hindoo Kush*, 23.
95. For details see, Ferguson, *Kashmir*, 44–66.
96. See, *Memoranda 1935*, 136.
97. *Ibid.*
98. See, Knight, *Where Three Empires Meet*, 300–37.
99. *Memoranda 1935*, 136.

100. Biddulph, *Tribes of the Hindoo Kush*, 30.
101. Ibid.
102. See Ibid. 27–8. The family is called 'Ayeshe' since a certain Hunza princess was clandestinely impregnated by the son of the ruler of Nagar, but when the child was born it was said that the princess had married a prince of Shighnan, whose name later chroniclers conveniently forgot, and so the descendants began to be called 'Ayesho,'—heavenly-sent.
103. Note by Caroe, Governor, NWFP, 19 March 1946, 93 S/Sts (I), NWFP.
104. Ibid.
105. See Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States*, 95–6.
106. For details on the nature and origins of the Gulf States see, Yapp, 'The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', 44–7.

Chapter Two

Signing the Death Warrant

'... the Princes expected justice and fair play, not lies and half truths to beguile them into a snare.'

The Maharaja of Dungarpur

INTRODUCTION

The failure of the Cabinet Mission plan in 1946, which envisioned a united India on a three-tiered system, showed that it might not be possible for the British to withdraw and leave behind an undivided India. With political stalemate in India, and the British government hoping to leave India as soon as possible, Prime Minister Clement Attlee thought that it was time to replace the viceroy, Lord Wavell, who was seen as having 'a defeatist mind'.¹ Attlee wanted someone who could extricate Britain from India with honour and speed.² Therefore, the lot fell to Lord Louis Mountbatten, a cousin of the King-Emperor, who had just been victorious in the Second World War as Supreme Allied Commander in South East Asia. There were several key reasons for Lord Mountbatten's appointment: he was charming, liberal, popular, self-confident, and known for moving quickly. Shortly after hearing of Mountbatten's appointment, Lord Wavell wrote: 'An unexpected appointment, but a clever one ... Dickie's personality may accomplish what I have failed to do.'³ Most importantly, he was of royal blood. Attlee knew very well that India was a country where royalty was important. Not only would

blood royal, especially if it is liberal, charm the political leaders, it would also help in dealing with the princes. Mountbatten had spent considerable time in India and had made several friends when he had accompanied the Prince of Wales as his aide-de-camp during his visit in 1921–22. Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia, while based in Colombo, had been in constant contact with the Government of India and was well known to Indian politicians. Nehru, the leader of the Congress, already knew Louis and Edwina Mountbatten well, and other politicians had also met them a number of times. The princes too were pleased with the appointment of a royal as viceroy in the waning years of the Raj. The Maharaja of Bikaner wrote to Mountbatten:

It is a matter of much gratification to the princes generally and particularly to me, in view of my having had the privilege of enjoying your friendship ever since our childhood, that in Your Excellency we have a real friend in whose hands the interests of the princes we feel are safe and who will see that justice is done to us.⁴

Lord Mountbatten's views on the princes however, were not too complimentary. Journalist Leonard Mosley noted that Mountbatten 'regarded (them) as semi-enlightened autocrats at their best and squalid degenerates at their worst. He called them "a bunch of nitwits" for not democratizing their administration when they saw the power of the Congress rising, and for not joining the Indian Federation when they had the opportunity in 1935.'⁵ Therefore, by the time Lord Mountbatten reached India on 22 March 1947, there were many expectations from various parties: the home government wanted an honourable and quick exit from India, Nehru was hoping for a united India under his leadership, and the princes were expecting a fair deal.

The fact that the princely states in India ranged from countries as large as Spain to land-holdings of a mere few acres, made a concerted and co-ordinated policy towards them difficult, both in terms of the princes having a common platform or the Government of India having a clear policy towards all of them. Since 1921, the princes had used the Chamber of Princes as a consultative body which could prove to be a useful mechanism for the coordination of policy. However, most of the larger states, especially Hyderabad and Kashmir, sneered at the idea of having to share the platform with lesser principalities, and so the Chamber of Princes became mostly the preserve of the mid-tier of the princely order.⁶ The status of the chamber as just a consultative body also made its decisions hard to implement, allowing the Political Department and dissident princes enough leeway to circumvent its recommendations.⁷ Therefore, when the talks relating to the Constituent Assembly were initiated in 1946, it was very simple for a number of princes just to ignore



Group Photograph of the Chamber of Princes with the Viceroy, 1932

the Chamber of Princes Negotiating Committee and accept the Congress proposals, and then join the Constituent Assembly. Of the 108 states which qualified for individual membership of the Chamber of Princes, only three states—Kalat, Bahawalpur, and Khairpur, eventually acceded to Pakistan. The other states could only voice their opinions through neighbouring larger states or through representatives elected by a group of states.

The summer of 1947 was a time of great trepidation for the princes of India. Negotiations with the political parties in the Constituent Assembly had come to a standstill, the States Negotiating Committee in the Chamber of Princes had disintegrated, and the stance of the British government towards the princely states was being kept vague. In these circumstances, except for the fact that the paramountcy of the British over the princes was ending, nothing was certain. It was not clear whether the princely states would remain independent, become part of either of the two new dominions, or exist under some treaty relationship with one or both of the new dominions. Theoretically of course, the states were free to do whatever they wanted, since following the lapse of paramountcy they were technically independent. However, an overwhelming majority of states were too small to stand on their own feet and even the large ones were unsure as to their international status. Options for the states near the borders of the Indian Empire, such as Dir, Chitral, and Kalat, were even wider since there was no law preventing them from acceding to a foreign country.

To gain a better understanding of the options available to the princes of India on the eve of the Transfer of Power, this chapter begins with an analysis of the British position on the princely states. The character of Lord Mountbatten as the last viceroy, technically

the Crown Representative according to the Government of India Act 1935, is also assessed in the light of his personal and official role in the Transfer of Power. Part II of the chapter continues with an analysis of the policies of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League towards the future of the princely states. Part III then focuses on how the states which eventually acceded to Pakistan weighed and exercised their options. This chapter does not focus on the question of the status of Kalat state and its eventual accession to Pakistan, both of which are dealt with in a separate chapter.

I THE LAPSE OF PARAMOUNTCY

As the Second World War lengthened and the Congress' Quit India Movement began to hurt the war effort, Downing Street tried to end the deadlock by sending a mission under the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Stafford Cripps in 1942, to find a solution to the political and constitutional impasse in India. Cripps was an ardent socialist and was known to both Nehru and Gandhi and therefore well suited for such a mission.⁸ Cripps failed to achieve common ground between the Congress and the Muslim League, but did signal to the princes that the British would not abandon them. He noted:

So far as the undertaking of our obligations of the defence of the States was concerned [it] ... depended on the number and position of States left out of the Union. ... We should stand by our treaties with the States, unless they asked us to revoke them, so far as all matters of paramountcy were concerned.⁹

Therefore, the princes were assured that at least during the war the British were not going to abandon them unceremoniously when a new constitution of India came into force.

After the end of the Second World War, concerted efforts were made to find a solution to the constitutional stalemate in India. In the wake of the failed Simla Conference held under the auspices of Viceroy Lord Wavell, a three-member Cabinet Mission composed of Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, and A. V. Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty, was sent to India in 1946. The Cabinet Mission suggested a three-tiered grouping system for the future India. Under the system, Punjab, Sind, NWFP, and Baluchistan would form Group A; Assam and Bengal would form Group C; and the rest of India would constitute Group B. In this system most of the power was with the groupings, with the centre controlling only defence, foreign affairs, and communication.¹⁰ This configuration also gave the Muslims a majority in two of the three groups. Initially, the Muslim League, under Mohammad Ali Jinnah, accepted the plan, but the whole scheme was torpedoed when Nehru declared in a press conference that even though the Congress had accepted the plan, the Constituent Assembly would be free to make any changes it pleased.¹¹ Knowing that the Congress would have a huge majority in the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah withdrew the support of the Muslim League for the plan.¹²

Even though the Cabinet Mission failed in its attempt to achieve agreement on a plan for the future of India, it did submit a 'Memorandum on the States', to the Chamber of Princes which clearly spelt out the position of His Majesty's Government on the issue of the future of the princely states. It read in part:

When a new fully self-governing or independent government or governments come into being in British India ... the rights of the states which flow from their relationship to the Crown will no longer exist and ... all rights surrendered by the states to the paramount

power will return to the states. ... The void will have to be filled either by the states entering into a federal relationship with the successor government or governments in British India, or, failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them.¹³

Thus, with the transfer of power to Indian hands, the British government was going to repudiate unilaterally all treaties and engagements made with the princely states. Already in 1945 Sir Stafford Cripps had begun to indicate a change in policy when he noted:

While we were bound by the assurances we had given, the practical point ... was that the treaties which were now 80 to 100 years old, by the influx of time and change of circumstances are ceasing to be appropriate to the conditions of the modern world. Thus, Paramountcy itself is essentially derived from the fact that we were the paramount power in British India. If ... India acquired an independent status, certain of our obligations which we had undertaken, in quite different conditions, would clearly not admit ... [of] being discharged.¹⁴

While the policy of the lapse of paramountcy was beneficial in that it gave the princes a free hand in chalking out a future for themselves uninhibited by any legal ties to the new dominions, it left them in a vulnerable state as most of them had long since given up control over defence and foreign affairs to the British and were unprepared to take on such responsibilities at such short notice. The only way they could survive henceforth would be dependent on how well they could devise a joint strategy—something which was neither easy nor forthcoming.

With the establishment, by the end of 1946, of the Constituent Assembly as part of the interim government, it became imperative for the princes to formulate a united front in order to use the

ninety-three seats allotted to them to safeguard their interests. The larger states like Hyderabad and Kashmir just ignored the Constituent Assembly, and Kalat claimed it was not a part of India and so would not send its representatives. This left the Chamber of Princes as the only body to consult with the Constituent Assembly. In 1946, the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes was the dynamic Nawab Hamidullah of Bhopal. An ardent believer in the rights of the princes, Bhopal was adamant to take all measures necessary to ensure the continuity of princely India beyond the departure of the British. Bhopal was sure that if the princes accepted the terms offered to them by the Congress and took up their seats in the Constituent Assembly, the Congress majority would simply sweep them away. Therefore, he planned to deal with Indian politicians outside the ambit of the assembly so that the states could negotiate the best terms for themselves before even joining the assembly.

On the same day that the Muslim League declared that it was firmly outside the Constituent Assembly, i.e. 29 January 1947, Bhopal called a meeting of the princes and their ministers in Delhi to discuss the issue of joining the Constituent Assembly. In the meeting Bhopal tabled and managed to pass a resolution declaring certain *sine qua nons* before the Assembly Negotiating Committee, namely the preservation of the system of monarchy, the right of secession if India became a republic, and recognition of all state boundaries. Bhopal knew well that these terms would be unacceptable to the Congress and a deadlock would ensue. However, princely unity was already very fractured and a number of princes were warming to the idea of joining the Constituent Assembly. As related to a British member of parliament by Panniker, the Prime Minister of Bikaner State, the dissident

princes formulated a plan to outmanoeuvre the chancellor. Panniker wrote:

This [the resolution] seemed in every way to be unsatisfactory and as a result Their Highnesses of Bikaner and Patiala and the representatives of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Gwalior decided to enter into conversations with the leaders of the Constituent Assembly. At a dinner at Bikaner House on January 30, i.e. the day following the resolution of the princes and also the resolution of the Muslim League, we met Pandit Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Sir Gopalaswami Aiyangar representing the Constituent Assembly and after full discussion reached an informal agreement. The next day Krishnamachari and myself met Patel and Gopalaswami Aiyangar. We did not keep these activities a secret, for we desired the Chancellor to know that we will not go with him if he decided to create deadlock in the negotiations ...

The discussions very nearly broke down. In the evening, however, three of us who are on the Negotiating Committee, i.e. HH of Patiala, Sir V. T. Krishnamachari and myself, and the representative of Gwalior met at Bikaner House and decided in consultation with HH of Bikaner that the discussion should not be allowed to break down, and if necessary we should announce our decision to work independently of the Chamber of Princes Negotiating Committee.

... In the meantime, however, Krishnamachari had met the Congress leaders and had evolved a formula by which this move of the Chancellor could be overcome. The way suggested was simple, and that was that a question should be put to the Congress leaders asking them to give us an official resume of the conclusions arrived at the previous days' discussions which we were satisfied would show that the Congress had shown a very conciliatory attitude and met all the points the princes had.¹⁵

Bhopal did not take this defeat lightly and when the whole Chamber of Princes met on 2 April 1947, he linked another

resolution to the one above demanding that no state should join the Constituent Assembly until the assembly had finished drafting the constitutions for the groups and provinces, something which was to take months. At this stage there was an open rebellion against the chancellor led by Bikaner and Gwalior which led to the voting down of the second resolution. After this session, Bhopal resigned as chancellor and the Chamber of Princes only existed as a rump. Internal disunity had begun to dishearten Bhopal so much that he presaged the end of the princely order when he wrote to the Crown Representative's political adviser, Sir Conrad Corfield (the erstwhile secretary of the Political Department) in late 1946:

I am tired of leading a team who have neither the will nor the desire to survive. I am tired of intrigue, calumny and communal feelings of the worst type. ... I am a Moslem in a crowd of Hindu Princes, who suspect me all round, who are blind to their own interests. ...¹⁶

With this failure, any hope for the princes making a favourable deal with the Indian political parties as a whole came to an end and they were left to fend for themselves individually.

Whereas the British government's apposition with regard to the princely states was clear, i.e. no policy after the lapse of paramountcy, strong differences emerged between Lord Mountbatten and his political adviser over the meaning and implication of a lapse of paramountcy. Sir Conrad maintained that the princes should be given a fair chance to decide their own futures and should not be hurdled into the new constitutional arrangement. Thus, while Lord Mountbatten was busy conferring with the Indian political leaders about the future of India, Sir Conrad, knowing that the Transfer of Power would occur by June 1948, set about safeguarding the rights and privileges of the princes. He lifted all restriction on durbars; bestowed full powers

on minor rulers nearing majority age; made sure that residents and political agents did not unduly interfere in the internal matters of the states, and even encouraged the larger states to consider seriously the prospect of full independence. Regarding Hyderabad in particular, Corfield procured weapons for the state when the interim government led by Nehru was not prepared to provide them, and helped the state to get in touch with the Portuguese in an attempt to lease the port of Goa.¹⁷

On 2 May 1947, as negotiations continued between Mountbatten and the Indian political leaders, Sir Conrad Corfield quietly departed for London with Mountbatten's Chief of Staff, Lord Ismay, to meet the Secretary of State for India, Lord Listowel. Sir Conrad knew that the position of the princely states must be clarified as soon as possible so that they might have as much time as possible to decide their future strategy. Lord Mountbatten, he knew, was too embroiled in discussions with Indian leaders to fulfil his role as Crown Representative in regard to the Indian states. Corfield noted in his memoirs: 'I do not think he understood, and I did not explain, what the lapse of paramountcy would mean. My job was to look after the interests of the Princely States. It was not part of my job to make things easier for India.'¹⁸ In London, Corfield received confirmation from Lord Listowel that the His Majesty's Government would stay with the 1946 Cabinet Mission Memorandum on States which stated that with the Transfer of Power to Indian hands, paramountcy would lapse and the states would become 'wholly independent'.¹⁹

When Corfield returned from London, he immediately began to put into effect the process for the lapse of paramountcy, especially after the 3 June Declaration announced the creation of the two new dominions of India and Pakistan on 15 August 1947. He

ordered his staff to cancel stationing of troops, the operation of railways and post offices, customs, and the like, which were subject to an agreement between the Paramount Power (Britain), on behalf of the states, and British India. He also destroyed all personal files on the princes held by the Political Department which could later be used by the successor governments to blackmail them.²⁰

Only in the first week of July 1947 did Lord Mountbatten become aware of his responsibilities as Crown Representative and the princely problem became his 'primary consideration'.²¹ He therefore, created a States Department with Sardar Patel as minister in charge from the Congress and V. P. Menon as secretary, Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar as the minister in charge from All-India Muslim League representing Pakistan and Akhtar Hussain as secretary. Sir Conrad vehemently protested against the creation of such a department, as it would be interpreted as a sign that paramountcy was being transferred to the successor governments.²² Mountbatten ignored these protests and set about formulating a strategy with Patel and Menon to avoid the presence of over 500 independent principalities on 15 August 1947. A plan was worked out under which the princes were to be asked to accede to either dominion, initially only under the three portfolios of defence, foreign affairs, and communications. Mountbatten completely approved of the plan and had a very revealing conversation with Patel concerning how this plan might entice the princes to accede to India. According to H. V. Hodson, Mountbatten's Reforms Secretary, he said to Patel: 'I will do my best. If I give you a basket with, say, 560 apples will you buy it? 'Well, I might,' replied Patel.'²³ Sardar Patel was also clear that under no circumstances should the princes of India be allowed to become wholly independent and remain outside the ambit of the

successor, the government of India. He noted in a statement on 5 July 1947:

Much more would this be the case with that vast majority of states which, owing to their geographical contiguity and indissoluble ties, economic, cultural and political, must continue to maintain relations of mutual friendship and cooperation with the rest of India. The safety and preservation of these states as well of India demand unity and mutual cooperation between its different parts.

... Now that British rule is ending, the demand has been made that the states should regain their independence. In so far as paramountcy embodied the submission of states to foreign will, I have every sympathy with this demand, but I do not think it can be their desire to utilize this freedom from domination in a manner which is injurious to the common interests of India or which militates against the ultimate paramountcy of popular interests and welfare or which might result in the abandonment of that mutually useful relationship that has developed between British India and Indian states during the last century.

... We ask no more of them than accession on these three subjects in which the common interests of the country are involved. In other matters we would scrupulously respect their autonomous existence.²⁴

As time clearly showed, the last assurance in Patel's statement was to prove hollow within months. Corfield was very alarmed by the endorsement of the accession scheme by Mountbatten because in his opinion not only was Mountbatten not authorized to endorse such a plan, the accession formula was not in the long-term interests of the princes in any case. He noted:

I pointed out that, if he used his influence as the representative of the paramount power to persuade the Rulers to enter into political arrangements with a successor government, he would in my view be

acting contrary to the spirit of the promises made in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum. I understood that he had been authorised by the Prime Minister to negotiate with individual states for adjusting their relations with the Crown but not with successor governments.²⁵

Mountbatten ignored Corfield's protests and was adamant that the princely states should accede to either dominion, preferably by the lapse of paramountcy date of 15 August 1947. He therefore asked Sir Conrad to call a meeting of the Chamber of Princes on 25 July 1947, where he wanted personally to press the princes to accede. Sir Conrad arranged the meeting, but resigned and left India three days before the meeting 'with a feeling of nausea, as though my own honour has been smirched and I had deserted my friends.'²⁶

Mountbatten's subsequent address to the packed Chamber of Princes on 25 July 1947 was full of theatrics. In full viceregal regalia he impressed upon the princes that accession to either dominion on the three areas of defence, foreign affairs, and communications, was the best deal they were going to get, and that hopes of complete independence, even for the larger states, were doomed to fail. Campbell-Johnson, Mountbatten's press secretary noted:

He used every weapon in his armoury of persuasion, making it clear at the outset that in the proposed Instrument of Accession, which V. P. Menon had devised, [the princes] were being provided with a political offer from Congress which was not likely to be repeated. ... He reminded them that after the fifteenth of August he would no longer be in a position to mediate on their behalf as Crown Representative, and warned those Princes who were hoping to build up their own store of arms that the weapons they would get would in any case be obsolete.²⁷

At one point when a dewan to whom Mountbatten had pointed said that he had not received any instructions from his prince, Mountbatten, in the words of Campbell-Johnson, said: 'I will look into my crystal', he said, 'and give you an answer.' There followed ten seconds of dramatic pause when you could have heard a princely pin drop. 'His Highness,' Mountbatten solemnly announced, 'asks you to sign the Instrument of Accession.'²⁸ Mountbatten further elucidated his unwritten principle of contiguity which held that only states contiguous to a dominion might accede to it. He noted: 'The States are theoretically free to link their future with whichever Dominion they may care. But when I say that they are at liberty ... may I point out that there are certain geographical compulsions which cannot be evaded.'²⁹ This left the Dominion of India as the main beneficiary of princely India with only a handful of states that were allowed accession to Pakistan.

After the meeting of the Chamber of Princes, many princes saw the writing on the wall and acceded to India. One princely state minister later related to Corfield his reaction to Mountbatten's speech that 'he now knew what Dolfuss felt like when he was sent for to see Hitler; he had not expected to be spoken to like that by a British Officer: after a moment's pause he withdrew the word "British".'³⁰ Whitehall, too, criticized Mountbatten's actions, which lay outside his role as Crown Representative. The Secretary of State for India, Lord Listowel, noted in his report of 29 July 1947 to Prime Minister Attlee that Mountbatten had acted personally and outside his officially sanctioned role:

That in his discussions with States' representatives the Viceroy is acting as mediator in his personal capacity and not on the advice of his Ministers either in form or in fact. We, are therefore, answerable

in a special way for what he may do and it would seem advisable to warn him of the dangers, particularly in view of the importance which the Opposition attaches to no pressure being put on the Princes *by us*.³¹

Despite all protestations, Mountbatten worked endlessly to ensure that none of the princely states declared independence and that they acceded to either dominion by 15 August 1947. Mountbatten personally became involved in securing the accession of a number of states to India. He went to Kashmir at the behest of Nehru to persuade Maharaja Hari Singh not to declare independence, and even called on the Maharaja of Indore, who was ignoring contacts from the States Ministry, to accede to India.³² Mountbatten's role in the accession of Jodhpur to India clearly exhibited his policy towards the princes. Jodhpur was a state contiguous to both India and Pakistan and it was reported that Jinnah had been trying to woo the maharaja to accede to Pakistan. Apparently, Jinnah had given a blank piece of paper to the Maharaja of Jodhpur to fill out his demands, which Jinnah promised to meet. As soon as Mountbatten heard this news, he summoned Jodhpur to Delhi and demanded that he must accede to India immediately. This intervention clearly showed that Mountbatten was already acting in a pro-Congress manner in trying to ensure that the 'basket of apples' he promised Sardar Patel was filled as soon as possible.³³

II THE CONGRESS PARTY AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE'S POLICY TOWARDS THE PRINCELY STATES

In their political struggle, both the Congress Party and the Muslim League, initially, tried to stay away from interfering in the princely states. As noted by S. H. Patil, 'during the early history of the Congress there was no serious effort to understand and solve the

problems of the people of the Indian states.³⁴ There were several reasons for this non-interference. Firstly, in its early days, the Congress members deliberately restricted themselves to reform in British India. Iqbal Singh notes that: '... it was thought best to concentrate the political mind exclusively on the problems of what was then known as British India lest by enlarging the scope of Congress' concern to the Indian states they might introduce a divisive issue ... and raise further controversy.'³⁵ Even though the Congress supported the idea of self-rule in the princely states in its early days, it could not do much except provide lip service to the cause.³⁶ Secondly, a number of Congress members looked upon the princes of India as models for Indian government and did not want to antagonize them by creating political movements in their states.³⁷ Thirdly, and more significantly, as soon as Gandhi took the helm of the Congress, he initiated a policy of strict non-interference in matters relating to the princely states. Gandhi noted:

My attitude towards the Indian states and their rulers is that of perfect friendship. The condition in many states is most deplorable, but reform has to come from within and it is a matter for adjustment between the rulers and the subjects, save for such pressure as is bound to be exerted upon them by the expression of enlightened public opinion in their neighbourhood.³⁸

Various Congress resolutions kept demanding representative governments in the princely states, but the policy of non-interference and friendly relations with the princes remained. Sarojni Naidu as president of the 1925 annual session of the Indian National Congress in Cawnpur (now Kanpur) noted:

... And let not the princes believe for a moment that we want to crush them by any subtlety or device, hidden or covert. ... And let

them feel that some day when we have the great federation of free India, the Indian states will come in line with it as an integral part of greater India working on the same basis of democratic freedom.³⁹

However, by 1929 the tone had begun to change and more emphasis was being given to the sovereign rights of the people. Nehru noted at the 1929 session in Lahore: 'And the only people who have a right to determine the future of the states must be the people of those states including the rulers. The Congress which claims self-determination cannot deny it to the people of the states.'⁴⁰

The Congress only became officially involved in the politics of the princely states in the wake of the Haripura session in 1938. At this session, the Congress decided to reverse its policy of non-interference and agreed to set up local Congress committees. The resolution read:

... Individual Congressmen however will be free to render further assistance in their personal capacities. In this way the struggle can develop without committing the Congress organization, and thus unhindered by external considerations. ... The Congress therefore directs that, for the present, Congress Committees in the states shall function under the direction and control of the Congress Working Committee and shall not engage in parliamentary activity or launch on direction action in the name and under the auspices of the Congress. For this purpose independent organizations should be started and continued where they exist already within the states.⁴¹

Even though Congress members were now allowed to take part in political activity in the states and set up local branches, the Congress still did not want any direct confrontation with the princes and hence limited the scope of the Congress committees to organization. *Praja mandals* (local political organizations) and

branches of the All India States Peoples Conference (AISPC), composed mainly of Congress sympathisers, then spearheaded agitation for democratic reform in most states.

In the run up to the constitutional negotiations on the future of India, neither the Congress nor the Muslim League wanted to antagonize the princes, but clarified their positions as to what role they envisioned for the princely states in the future. The Congress already had a political presence in most states through the AISPC, and many of its branches had long called for representative government in the states. Nehru was also personally interested in a few states, for example his ancestral state of Kashmir, and wanted the constitutional reforms in India to extend to the princely states. In early January 1946, Nehru spelt out his plan for the future of the states. While addressing a meeting of the AISPC he said:

... it is inevitable that the vast majority of states which cannot possibly form economic units should be absorbed into neighbouring areas. ... It is also not desirable that a number of small states should be grouped together to form a larger state unit. There will be no history or tradition of unity about this—only artificial joining together of backward areas with no leaven to pull them up. Therefore, the union should be with provinces. The rulers of such small states may be given some kind of pension and may be further encouraged to serve in a different capacity if they are fit enough for it. Of the other states, which may be 15 to 20 in number and which will form autonomous units in the federation, the rulers can remain as constitutional heads under a democratic system of government.⁴²

However, Sardar Patel's statement on Congress policy on the states in independent India seemed to allow for more autonomy, in a form similar to the existing system of paramountcy. Sardar Patel noted:

... There appears a great deal of misunderstanding about the attitude of the Congress towards the states. I should like to make it clear that it is not the desire of the Congress to interfere in any manner whatever with the domestic affairs of the states. ... Nor would it be my policy to conduct the relations of the new department with the states in any manner which savours the domination of one over the other. ... It cannot be imagined that the future Union government will desire to inherit this arbitrary power to dictate to the states. The Union, therefore, may be expected to work on the following basis:

1. The Union will not interfere in matters relating exclusively to the princes, such as dynastic succession, minority, etc.
2. There will be coordination between the Union and the State government on matters of common concern.
3. The powers exercised by the Union (it may not be appropriate to call it paramountcy under the altered circumstances), will be to the extent of the paramount needs of the Union in matters such as defence, external affairs and economic policy.⁴³

Whereas Sardar Patel did not mention any move towards federated units of states or merger with provinces once the states had acceded to India, in reality, Nehru's statement from a year earlier provided a better picture of what actually happened after the Transfer of Power when, within months of accession, most states were merged and the princes only given powers comparable to those of provincial governors. Sardar Patel's statement is further significant in that it did not permit any state to remain outside the ambit of the future Government of India. It went on to state:

The position will, however, be different in the case of states not joining the Union. In these cases, eventually a considerable measure of paramountcy will devolve upon the Central Government. Either specific agreements between such states and the Union will vest this authority in the Union, or the Union will be obliged to takeover this

authority by force, if necessary, since circumstances may emerge in which independent defence arrangements or external relations of an individual state will become incompatible with national policy and security.⁴⁴

Of course, this was a clear threat to states like Hyderabad, Travancore, and Kashmir which by July 1947 had all but declared their intention to remain independent with the lapse of paramountcy.

In contrast to the Congress, the Muslim League had a very *laissez-faire* attitude towards the princely states. In fact, the Muslim League did not even exist as an organized body in most princely states, even those with Muslim rulers or large Muslim populations. This was largely because most Muslim rulers were sympathetic towards the Muslim League, especially during the war where both the Muslim League and the princes wholeheartedly supported the war effort, and also because by 1946 the Muslim league had only just managed to have a firm presence in British India and simply could not stretch itself to the princely states. Copland notes:

Plagued by internal dissension, low morale, and lack of funds, the League was hard-pressed in the 1930s just to keep afloat; fully occupied in the provinces combating the Congress ... it had no desire to add to its problems by involvement in the internal affairs of the princely states.⁴⁵

The federal scheme under the Government of India Act, 1935 also did not lead the Muslim League to venture into the princely states. This was because the Muslim ruled states were fewer in number than the Hindu ruled states, and between them commanded only twenty-four seats (out of 125) in the lower house, and eighteen seats (out of 104) in the upper house. As such, they were not a

political option the League could rely on. Furthermore, there was no guarantee that the Muslim princes would vote en bloc in the interests of the League as a number of them had other loyalties and some had 'adopted an eclectic approach to religion in the interests of communal harmony.'⁴⁶ The failure of the federal scheme again meant that the League did not see an extension into princely India as important and as late as 1946, when the Congress was clamouring for reform in the states, the League wished to stay out of the states. *Dawn*, the League's newspaper, noted in October 1946, 'so far as the Muslim League is concerned, it has no wish or desire to stir up trouble in the States or to engage in a campaign of ... vilification against the princely order.'⁴⁷

The announcement by the Cabinet Mission that paramountcy would lapse with the Transfer of Power, was, in a way, good news for the League. The lapse meant that all the states would be independent countries and even if a handful would eventually survive (which was plausible even in late 1947), they would serve as an important counterbalance to 'Hindu India'. Therefore the laissez-faire attitude continued. In a statement reported by *Reuters*, Jinnah elucidated the position of the Muslim League regarding the princely states. He noted:

'... Constitutionally and logically the Indian states will be independent sovereign states on the termination of paramountcy and they will be free to decide for themselves any course they like to adopt. ... It is open to the states to join the Hindustan constituent assembly or the Pakistan constituent assembly or decide to remain independent. In the last case they can either enter into such arrangement or relationship with Hindustan or Pakistan as they may choose.' ... Mr Jinnah said: if the states wished to remain independent and wished to negotiate or adjust any political or any other relationship such as commercial or economic relations with Pakistan, 'we shall be glad to discuss with

them and come to a settlement which will be in the interests of both.' He added that he was not of the opinion that the states were limited only to the option of joining one or other constituent assembly. 'In my opinion they are free to remain independent if they so desire. Neither the British government nor the British Parliament nor any other power or body can compel them to do anything contrary to their free will and accord ...' he said.⁴⁸

Being a constitutional lawyer himself, Jinnah understood well the implications of the Cabinet Mission's 'Memorandum on the States' of 12 May 1946 concerning the lapse of paramountcy and could not envisage any limitations on the powers of the princely states after 15 August 1947.

With the approach of 15 August 1947, the British government, along with the governments of several other countries, became worried about the issue of recognizing those princely states which had declared independence as fully sovereign states. The British were of the opinion that even though the states were technically independent from 15 August 1947, they should still align themselves, in one way or another, with the successor dominions. A telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office to the dominions stated:

United Kingdom Government believes that future of Indian States inevitably lies in association with British India with whose territories their own are inextricably intertwined. ... They therefore, hope that all Indian states will enter into a federal relationship with one or other of the new dominions of India and Pakistan or, failing this, enter into particular political arrangements with them and thus retain their connection with the Commonwealth. Some time may elapse before all of this and some, particularly Hyderabad, have so far declared their intention not to federate with either Dominion. Thus, there is likely to be a period during which international status

of at least some of the Indian states will be undetermined. In practice we expect that diplomatic representatives of India or (when they are appointed) of Pakistan, will continue to look after the interests of the Indian states even in advance of the time when by accession to one or other dominion they merge themselves for international purposes with that dominion.⁴⁹

The attitude of the British government towards entering into any kind of a relationship with a princely state which had remained aloof was deliberately kept vague, in the words of the Secretary of State for India, so that they were not charged with 'disintegrating India' especially if such an action would lead the Congress to 'withdraw its application for Dominion status'.⁵⁰ An article in the *Hindustan Times* clearly elucidated the antagonism of the Congress towards any princely states maintaining separate relations with the British government. It read:

It must be clearly understood, however, that the Indian Union will consider it a hostile act if there is any attempt by Britain to conclude any treaty or alliance involving military or political clauses. As for the Indian states, they cannot be permitted to have any foreign policy or contact apart from the Union. It is inconceivable that the Union will seek British assistance after June 1948 in its relations with those parts of India which stand aloof from it.⁵¹

Nehru's clear statement to *Reuters* on foreign countries recognizing princely states as independent also served as a major obstacle for the princely states, since foreign states preferred good relations with the future Dominion of India to recognition of states which might not survive for a long time. Nehru had noted: 'We will not recognize the independence of any state in India. Further, any recognition of such independence by any foreign power will be considered an unfriendly act.'⁵²

However, some princely states had already been in touch with various governments, especially those of America and France, on the question of recognition of independence after 15 August 1947. The American government was particularly alarmed by reports that several Indian princely states wanted to remain independent and was in constant touch with the British Foreign Office on the issue. The American government agreed with the British government's opinion that they should not recognize any princely states as independent on 15 August 1947 and should wait and see which states remained independent before announcing a policy on how to regulate relations with them. The Secretary of State, Lord Listowel, explained to Lord Mountbatten in a letter:

A member of my staff has been shown confidentially by a member of the American Embassy the instructions issued by the State Department to the US Ambassador at Delhi about the attitude that he and American officials should observe towards the Indian states. The State Department have indicated that they do not wish any formal dealings to occur between American representatives and the governments of Indian states while the negotiations for the inclusion of the states in one or other of the two dominions are continuing. They recognize that at some later time it may be necessary for the US Government to determine its attitude towards any states which remain outside the two dominions but they attach importance to their remaining uncommitted so long as there is any prospect of the states who have asserted claims to independence entering into political arrangements with one or other dominion. This is very satisfactory.⁵³

The American State Department was also active in preventing other states from recognizing the independence of the Indian princely states. A note sent to the India Office clearly showed the role the American diplomats played in preventing certain Arab

states, which had ties to a number of Muslim princely states, from recognizing the independence of some states. It read:

Mr Lewis Jones of the American Embassy had been good enough to show me an instruction from the State Department to its posts in the Middle East from Cairo to Delhi stating that information has reached them that certain Arab States may be contemplating diplomatic recognition after 15th August of certain Indian states as separate international entities, and requiring them to make it known to the governments to which they are accredited that the US share the desire of HMG [His Majesty's Government] in the UK that the Indian states should become associated with one or other of the two new dominions and have no intention of according to any Indian state separate recognition.⁵⁴

Thus, even before the lapse of paramountcy, it was assured that no foreign power would recognize any of the princely states as independent entities. The aim of this policy, spearheaded by the British and American foreign departments, was to ensure that the Indian states saw no option but to accede to either dominion after the lapse of paramountcy and were not encouraged to stay aloof by the tacit support of any foreign power.

Despite efforts to impress upon the states that their future lay with the dominions of India or Pakistan, a number of states did welcome 15 August 1947 as technically independent countries. These states included the three largest states—Hyderabad, Kashmir, and Kalat. All the states which eventually acceded to Pakistan also became technically independent on that day since none of them had signed an instrument of accession to Pakistan by 15 August 1947.

The attitude of the Government of Pakistan towards the princely states was characterized by the lack of any concrete policy towards

them. Whereas the Indian Dominion States Department was busy trying to achieve the accession of as many states as possible, the Pakistan section in the States Department barely indulged in any activity. This was because Jinnah had already welcomed the attainment of full sovereignty by the princes, and also because the future Government of Pakistan was more concerned about issues such as the fate of the boundary commission, the influx of millions of refugees, the nearly non-existent civil machinery, and other problems, than about the princely states. Hence, no effort could be spared to woo the states. Furthermore, Jinnah had himself taken on the responsibility of the princely states but barely had any time to respond to the states which were interested in joining Pakistan. In fact, a few months earlier, when the president of the All India States Muslim League asked Jinnah to consider the states, he replied that he was preoccupied with 'more important matters', further exhibiting his casual attitude towards the impending issue.⁵⁵ There was also an unspoken belief in the Muslim League that Muslim-majority states with Muslim rulers would inevitably join Pakistan and that they should focus more on problematic states like Kashmir where the ruler was of a different religion.

It was only a few days before the Transfer of Power, on 11 August 1947, that the designate Government of Pakistan formed a committee to investigate the possibility of the accession of princely states to Pakistan. Jinnah explained in a letter to Maharaja Holkar of Indore:

... as regards the position of Pakistan Constituent Assembly vis-à-vis the States, we have today appointed a committee to negotiate with those states who are desirous of joining the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. When we get the complete list of those who wish to negotiate the terms of accession to Pakistan Constituent Assembly or wish to enter into arrangements as independent sovereign states with regard



Map 1: The Successor States by 1760

to matters which may be to the advantage of both it will be more conveniently considered. ... I do not think that any of the states should be hustled into giving a definite reply immediately on or before the 15th of August. In my opinion the various states must have sufficient time to carefully consider their respective positions before they go into one constituent assembly or the other, or remain independent and enter into such arrangements as may be beneficial to both.⁵⁶

It is very intriguing to note from the above letter that Jinnah was not at all averse to the idea of negotiating something other than accession with the states. However, Jinnah's insistence on accession regarding Kalat in 1948 casts doubt on such a policy, so it might just be the case that Jinnah was trying to entice Maharaja Holkar to consider having some sort of a treaty relationship with Pakistan. In any case, Holkar did take this option seriously and wrote to Jinnah stating: 'Could you suggest an agreement, which would be entirely confidential, on common matters of mutual benefit to Pakistan and the State of Indore?'⁵⁷ Therefore, it is not entirely inconceivable that other states were also contemplating similar agreements with both dominions, since the general expectation was that there would be a great degree of cooperation between the two dominions, at least in the initial few years. Jinnah's opinion that the states should not be 'hurdled' into making a decision was also an example of the dire situation the Government of Pakistan saw itself in. Nevertheless, the Muslim League and later the Government of Pakistan did try to push for the accession of some states to Pakistan when it became clear that they were receiving a 'moth-eaten' Pakistan and that the Indian States Department had already embarked on the process of accession. For example, the Chief Minister of Rampur exclaimed in his conversations with Mountbatten that considerable pressure was being put on him by Leaguers to accede to Pakistan. Mountbatten wrote in this diary:



Map 2: The British Indian Empire in 1947

Mr Zaidi gave a categorical account of a meeting with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and other Muslim League leaders, at which grave threats had been uttered as to what would happen to the Nawab of Rampur if he deserted Pakistan and joined India. ... Mr Zaidi said that he had replied that if the Muslim League could have Rampur transferred to a position of contiguity to Pakistan, they would gladly join Pakistan; otherwise they would have no option but to join India. ... The Muslim League had then carried out their threats and staged riots in Rampur which had become serious, several Government buildings having been set on fire and the servant of an inspector of police having been burnt alive.⁵⁸

Similarly, Copland has argued that 'League agents, working clandestinely in Alwar, Bharatpur ... encouraged local Muslims to take up arms against their Hindu overlords'.⁵⁹ Phadnis, has further claimed that League agents contacted the Patiala durbar too.⁶⁰ The Muslim League, and the Government of Pakistan were also obviously interested in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and keen on providing support to the Nizam of Hyderabad in his bid for complete independence.⁶¹ But despite these efforts, the League did not have the local support or the robust government machinery to induce any state to accede to it by 15 August 1947.

III THE ACCESSION OF PRINCELY STATES TO PAKISTAN

In August 1947 Pakistan was in a state of disarray. Millions of refugees were pouring in, its borders were not secure, it did not have enough manpower or facilities to ensure the running of government, and there was an acute shortage of funds.⁶² In such conditions government could only exist in a skeletal form. While Karachi was the designated capital, the lack of adequate office space and personnel meant that a significant proportion of governance was left to the provincial governments, which fared a little better than a federal government beginning from scratch. Substantial central government work was therefore, undertaken in the provincial capitals, with little coordination.⁶³

The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, like that of India, had a States Negotiating Committee, chaired by Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar. However, except for the fact that it was constituted on 11 August 1947, the nature of its work before the Transfer of Power is unknown. Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that the negotiating committee had little to do with the actual accession of the princely states to Pakistan, and only became active in the aftermath of Jinnah's death and the start of deliberations on a



Map 3: West Pakistan on 15 August 1947

new constitution. As Jinnah had personal relationships with most of the princes, he initially dealt with them on his own. However, since Jinnah was governor-general, president of the Constituent Assembly, and at times directly in control of various ministries, civil servants mainly dealt with the details of accession. As Ayesha Jalal points out, the weakness of the political machinery meant that the politicians had to concede much 'greater autonomy to the administrative bureaucracy', in the formulation and implementation of policy.⁶⁴ Therefore, the two main actors in the accession of the princely states were Mohammad Ikramullah ICS, who was secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

Commonwealth Relations and Lt. Col. A. S. B. Shah, IPS, joint secretary of the aforementioned ministry. Lt. Col. Shah, as joint secretary, was responsible for relations with the states and as such made sure that the accession papers were actually signed. It was against this background of a lack of policy, formidable problems, and lack of political control and initiative that there was no action on the question of princely accession until much after independence.

By 15 August 1947, not one princely state had acceded to Pakistan. The princely states, which were to eventually form more than half of the land mass of the western half of Pakistan, were not constitutionally linked with the Dominion of Pakistan at the dawn of independence. Thus, without understanding how several princely states actually acceded to Pakistan, it is impossible to understand the creation of Pakistan as a country or a nation.

a) Junagadh

Junagadh's accession to Pakistan on 15 September 1947 was the first test of the Indian Independence Act of July 1947, which allowed the princely states to accede to either of the two dominions. Junagadh was the premier state in the western Kathiawar region of India, commanding great strategic importance as a maritime state. On three sides was territory which had acceded to the Dominion of India, and its only free outlet was to the Arabian Sea. In 1941, Junagadh had a population of 670,000, of which over eighty per cent were Hindus, ruled over by a Muslim nawab. Being the premier state in the region, the nawab had great interest in maintaining the unity of the region. A press statement to this effect issued on 11 April 1947 read: 'What Junagadh pre-eminently stands for is the solidarity of Kathiawar and would welcome the formation of a self-contained group of Kathiawar

states.⁶⁵ As noted by Menon, until mid-1947 Junagadh had been hinting that it would join India, rather than Pakistan.⁶⁶ But the dewan, Abdul Kadir Hussein, a Muslim Leaguer, had been working on the nawab, trying to make him accede to Pakistan. Journalist Mosley noted:

Hussein now went to work on the Nawab and soon convinced him that the Congress would kill off his beloved dogs (he has a penchant for dogs—he had hundreds of them!), curb his passion for cruel sports, ration his concubines and rationalize the gir lions.⁶⁷



Colonel His Highness Nawab Sir Sadiq Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III, GCSI, GCIE, KCVO, Ruler of Junagadh State, 1911–1947

Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, a staunch Muslim-Leaguer, became the new dewan of the state in the summer of 1947 and was adamant about persuading the nawab to accede to Pakistan. In fact, Sir Shah Nawaz had only been appointed after the nawab's consultations with Sir Zafarullah Khan, the Muslim League's legal counsel, Wilcox claims.⁶⁸ Just before the lapse of paramountcy, Shah Nawaz wrote a revealing letter to Jinnah in which he acknowledged that he was following Jinnah's advice in keeping quiet about Junagadh's accession. Sir Shah Nawaz wrote:



Map 4: Junagadh State

... I conveyed your advice to His Highness the Nawab Saheb Bahadur to keep out under any circumstances till 15 August. ... Your further assurance that you will not allow Junagadh to be starved out or tyrannised and that Veraval was not far from Karachi gave His Highness immense relief.⁶⁹

The Nawab also wrote to Jinnah directly and stated that, '... I have decided to federate with the Pakistan Dominion. ... In view of this, I send my Private Secretary, Mr Ismail H. M. Abrahani, for negotiating and settling the terms of the Instrument of Accession.'⁷⁰ Jinnah was overjoyed at this accession offer even before independence and immediately replied to the nawab thanking him.⁷¹

The notification of this accession in the newspapers on 15 August 1947 outraged New Delhi which simply could not allow the presence of Pakistani territory deep inside India. Nehru wrote to Liaquat Ali Khan that 'in case Junagadh became a part of the federation of Pakistan, Government of India cannot be expected to acquiesce to such an arrangement.'⁷² It seems that Pakistan did not expect such a strong reaction to Junagadh's accession and, hence dithered about accepting it immediately, even though Sir Shah Nawaz requested Liaquat for '... the formal acceptance of Junagadh's accession ... as I would be glad if you could kindly arrange to convey it as soon as possible.'⁷³ As late as 6 September 1947, Bhutto was writing to the private secretary to the nawab, who was the official emissary of Junagadh to Pakistan, that

I would like you to explain the situation to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and if necessary to Quaid-i-Azam himself, pressing them for immediate action regarding the kind of help we need from Pakistan. Any open pronouncement of support by Pakistan would have immediate effect on the Indian States Department.⁷⁴

Finally, all these pleas had an effect on the Pakistan Government and it accepted Junagadh's accession on 15 September 1947, with the state becoming the first one to join Pakistan. Almost immediately Bhutto began to feel the retaliation planned by the Government of India. Bhutto wrote to Liaquat the very next day: 'The latest reports coming indicate definite plans of organized attack on all sides. ... Having set up our feudatories to accede, Indian Union will to their aid with armed strength, the moment Junagadh interferes and asserts its rights over them.' Sir Shah Nawaz pleaded with Liaquat: '... our morale has to be raised by actual armed assistance. Immediate landing of a fighter or bomber with a spare Dakota on our airfield at Keshod would have the

desired effect.' He ended with an ominous warning: 'I would emphasize that our action should be prompt and immediate. If Pakistan is unable to come to our rescue at this critical moment, we shall be finished.'⁷⁵ Pakistan reacted to such moves by India against Junagadh and Jinnah wrote to Mountbatten: 'Any encroachment on Junagadh sovereignty or its territory would amount to a hostile act.'⁷⁶ However, Mountbatten retorted with a clear threat and stated: 'Each acceptance of accession by Pakistan cannot but be regarded by Government of India as an encroachment on India's sovereignty and territory, and inconsistent with friendly relations that should exist between two dominions.'⁷⁷ Jinnah replied to Mountbatten that his objections were:

totally inconceivable and untenable ... the position of Indian states is very clearly defined and it has been repeatedly accepted that after the lapse of paramountcy, every Indian state is independent and sovereign and free to join Pakistan or India Dominion. You are now trying to import fresh criteria into this matter limiting the free exercise of choice by the States.⁷⁸

Hence a stalemate ensued between the two governments over the issue.

Together with protesting the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan, the Government of India took steps to ensure a bleak future for the state. On 17 September 1947, the Indian cabinet decided to disperse troops, the Kathiawar Defence Force, around Junagadh, with the pretence of ensuring peace in the region. V. P. Menon was also sent to meet the nawab in order to change his mind.⁷⁹ Menon could not see the nawab on 19 September as he had been taken ill, but did have discussions with the dewan in which he emphasized the linked nature of Junagadh with India, asking the nawab to reconsider his decision.⁸⁰ This mission proved futile for

neither could the nawab see Menon, nor could the dewan take any decisions over the issue. As a result, the Government of India resorted to two other tactics to bring Junagadh in line. The first was an economic blockade of the state, which had choked it of food and materials by the end of October 1947.⁸¹ The second tactic was the *Arzi Hukumat* (provisional government), which was set up under the leadership of Samaldas Gandhi, a nephew of Mahatma Gandhi, under the auspices of the Government of India in Bombay. The *Arzi Hukumat* immediately started agitating for the accession of Junagadh to India both inside and outside the state. Though later denied, this *hukumat* was certainly set up with the assistance of at least Menon and the blessings of Patel. Reporting on his visit to Bombay, Menon had noted: 'I also outlined to them the course of action which they would be well advised to take. They went away quite satisfied.'⁸² U. N. Dhebar, the secretary of the Kathiawar Political Conference also noted that that this decision was taken after 'fullest discussion with Menon,' and that Menon assured them of 'moral and material support'.⁸³ Thus the *Arzi Hukumat* declared in their 25 September 1947 statement that 'the Nawab of Junagadh by transferring allegiance of his Hindu subjects against their wishes to Pakistan has forfeited his claim to the allegiance of his subjects, and that the Dominion of Pakistan by accepting the Nawab's Instrument of Accession had violated the principle of self-determination.'⁸⁴ By this time, it was clear that the Government of India was ready to indulge in extra-constitutional means to bring round Junagadh. If Pakistan would not give up the state through negotiations, this *Arzi Hukumat* would simply take it over with the support of Indian troops.

As heated discussions continued between Karachi and New Delhi, the contested accession of two feudatory states to India, Babariawad and Mangrol, gave New Delhi the prime pretext on which to send

troops into the region. For a long time, states in the Kathiawar region had been a source of confusion regarding jurisdictions, as many of them had territorial pockets deep inside each other's territory. The whole region, with a total area of 22,000 square miles and a population of four million, comprised fourteen salute states, seventeen non-salute states, and one hundred and ninety-one other jurisdictions.⁸⁵ Under these circumstances, judging which states had sovereign rights to accede to either dominion was at best difficult, if not impossible.⁸⁶ The three states of Manavadar, Babariawad, and Mangrol were in different degrees tied to Junagadh state under the 1943 Political Department Attachment Scheme.⁸⁷ Menon held discussions with the Khan of Manavadar, but despite his exhortations, the Khan acceded to Pakistan on 24 September 1947.⁸⁸ Further complications set in when the Sheikh of Mangrol, who had been under the suzerainty of Junagadh, acceded to India on 20 September, with the agreement that New Delhi recognize Mangrol as independent from Junagadh.⁸⁹ However, within two hours the Sheikh retracted his accession, but now the Government of India refused to accept the retraction, contending that the accession had already been accepted by the governor-general—a mere two hours after it was signed hundreds of miles away from New Delhi.⁹⁰ As a result, Junagadh became wary of the activities of its vassals, and sent troops into another vassal territory, Babariawad, on 21 September 1947. Apparently, the leaders of the fifty-one villages that constituted the Babariawad territory had already declared their accession to India and so the Government of India decided to take action. New Delhi maintained that with the lapse of paramountcy, the attachment schemes and vassal status of these states had also lapsed and as such they were no longer bound to Junagadh and her decisions.⁹¹

By the last week of September 1947 it seemed that the Junāgadh affair would lead to a breakdown in the Indian government. Menon reported to Mountbatten that '... a complete split had occurred between the Prime Minister (Nehru) and the Deputy Prime Minister (Patel) over the policy about Junagadh.'⁹² Nehru wanted a negotiated settlement, while Patel was adamant on a military solution, and even threatened resignation over the issue. Patel told Mountbatten: '... that the country that had lost its national position need not bother about her international position, and that the Government would be forever dishonest if they let down their own nationals in Kathiawar ... (and that Mountbatten should) appreciate how seriously his honour was involved over the question of Junagadh.'⁹³ Mountbatten therefore noted that: 'Patel had told Nehru that he intended to resign unless the Cabinet backed his aggressive policy against Junagadh.'⁹⁴ Other rulers were also baiting the Government of India into action. The Jamsaheb of Nawanagar said: Unless the Government of India has the will and the capacity to prevent Junagadh from going over to Pakistan, the confidence of the Princes as a whole in the value of their own Accession Instruments would be shattered; and the position of Kathiawar states would be particularly seriously jeopardised.⁹⁵ Therefore, there was no possibility of backtracking left for the Government of India.

Mountbatten still tried to play the role of mediator, and at a conference between Liaquat and Nehru in New Delhi on 1 October 1947, finally convinced Liaquat to talk about the subject (after both had initially refused to be the first one to raise it). Both sides again reiterated their positions but both tentatively agreed that if India gave a clear assurance that no troops would enter Junagadh territory, Pakistan would direct Junagadh to withdraw troops from

Babariawad and Mangrol, where their legal status was disputed, pending its adjudication by a legal counsel appointed jointly by the two governments.⁹⁶ Meanwhile, India deployed its troops around Junagadh and even sent a detachment of light tanks from Bombay to Porbandar. The intention, in the words of Nehru was that 'this disposition of Indian forces all round Junagadh and at the very borders of Mangrol and Babariawad will necessarily produce a powerful impression (on) the parties concerned.'⁹⁷ Obviously the intention was to show Junagadh clearly that if it did not fall in line, military action would compel it to do so very quickly. India also 'declined to retrocede jurisdiction over Railways to Junagadh or to hand over our Posts and Telegraph systems to Pakistan authorities,' in Junagadh state itself.⁹⁸

With Liaquat already indicating to Mountbatten that Pakistan was not contemplating troops to help Junagadh, there was nothing to prevent India from taking concrete action to takeover the state. Patel clearly noted the weak state of Pakistan to Mountbatten: 'They will either have to go to war which I personally think they are in no position to do, or they will be exposed for the weak and blustering State that they are in.'⁹⁹ Signalling how the issue would eventually be settled in less than a month, Patel said at a Defence Committee meeting that 'if the Government of India supported Babariawad and Mangrol, the question of Junagadh would itself be speedily settled.'¹⁰⁰ Therefore, military action was clearly contemplated if a decision were not reached soon.

Continued negotiations between the two countries yielded few results as both further entrenched their positions. Mountbatten told Nehru that he had a rather stern conversation with Liaquat in mid-October on the issue: 'He said that he was prepared to ask Junagadh to withdraw their troops from Babariawad and Mangrol on condition that we disbanded our concentration of troops in

Kathiawar. I made it very clear that we were fully entitled to put our troops where we liked on Indian territory. ... He (Liaquat) said 'How would you like it if I sent a lot of Pakistan troops into Junagadh by air or sea?' I replied, 'I should laugh myself sick at any such unstatesmenlike move. ...'¹⁰¹ By the third week of October, Nehru was sure that '... any further delay in settling the question of Babariawad and Mangrol was to Pakistan's advantage,' and that 'It was agreed that 1 November was the last date by which the operations must take place.'¹⁰² Nehru also gave a final warning to Liaquat:

It appears that your directions to Junagadh have not been carried out and Junagadh troops and police are still in position in Mangrol and Babariawad. Further reports show that Junagadh authorities have been taking oppressive action against people of Babariawad. They are commandeering crops, issuing exacting orders in respect of other property, reaping harvests, breaking open houses and looting property. ... Attempt is being made to force the Chief of Babariawad to renounce accession to Indian Union. ... You will appreciate that it is impossible for us to tolerate any longer such acts of aggression and oppressive action. ... We are, in honour, bound to give this protection by such action as may be necessary.¹⁰³

Liaquat replied wanting to 'discuss conditions and circumstances in which a plebiscite or referendum should be held in any State or States,' but by this time Nehru had run out of patience. With the Kashmir accession taking up most of his time and energy, he simply did not want the Junagadh question to linger. Therefore, on 1 November 1947, the Government of India took decisive action and sent in troops to occupy Babariawad.¹⁰⁴ This action increased unrest in Junagadh and Manavadar, where the elements of the provisional government, now encouraged by the nearby

Indian troops, orchestrated a complete breakdown of law and order in the state.¹⁰⁵

The deteriorating security, food, and economic situation of Junagadh made it easier for India to takeover the state. The Nawab, together with his household and most of the state treasury had fled to Karachi by the end of October, leaving the state's administration in the hands of the dewan. Sir Shah Nawaz tried desperately to shore up defences but the tightening blockade of the state left him few options. Though highly unlikely and untenable, since Junagadh had already acceded to Pakistan in terms of foreign affairs and defence, Menon argued that the Nawab gave the dewan full authority to decide the future of the state, which he did by calling upon the Government of India to takeover the administration of the state.¹⁰⁶ Bhutto thus wrote to Buch, the regional commissioner:

The Junagadh Government, therefore, have requested that in order to avoid bloodshed, hardship, loss of life and property and to preserve the dynasty, you should be approached to give your assistance to the administration. ... This arrangement is sought pending an honourable settlement of the several issues involved in Junagadh's accession.¹⁰⁷

Thereafter, the Government of India took over the administration of the state on 9 November 1947, under the pretext of restoring law and order. The Government of Pakistan reacted strongly to this action and Liaquat sent a telegram to Nehru protesting such blatant occupation of a state that had legally acceded to Pakistan. He wrote:

Your action in taking over the State Administration and sending Indian troops to the State without any authorisation from Pakistan

Government and indeed without our knowledge is a clear violation of Pakistan territory and breach of International Law.¹⁰⁸

Nehru argued for regional stability and refused the demands made by Liaquat for the withdrawal of Indian troops but promised a plebiscite on the issue.¹⁰⁹ The resulting plebiscite on 20 February 1948, under the aegis of the Indian army, was in favour of India with the official count noting that out of a total of 190,870 votes cast, only ninety-one were cast in favour of Pakistan.¹¹⁰ Thus, this Indian-administered plebiscite for India finally settled the matter for India, whereas Pakistan never accepted these results and to date considers Junagadh legally a part of Pakistan.

b) Bahawalpur

The state of Bahawalpur, with a seventeen-gun salute, was the most developed of the princely states which eventually became part of Pakistan. The state had an area of 16,434 square miles, with a population of just under a million subjects in 1931 including about twelve per cent non-Muslims.¹¹¹ The state's ruler at the time of the lapse of paramountcy was His Highness Nawab Sir Sadiq Mohammad Khan Abbasi V. Sir Sadiq had become the ruler of Bahawalpur at the age of two-and-a-half-years in 1907 when his father unexpectedly died off the coast of Aden during an overseas trip. Therefore, the state was ruled under a regency until Sadiq Abbasi assumed full ruling powers in 1924. Since his education was conducted under the auspices of the Political Department and the state run mostly under the direction of officers from British India, Bahawalpur developed greatly under his rule. Sir Penderel Moon, the Revenue and Public Works Minister in the Bahawalpur government in 1947-48 noted, Bahawalpur 'has a great political

importance at the moment as it is the only state of any size and wealth which has a Muslim ruler and a Muslim population.¹¹²

With contiguous borders to both India and Pakistan, Bahawalpur could have theoretically acceded to either country. By the beginning of 1947, the health of the Nawab was poor due to diabetes and other problems. His doctors therefore, advised him to remain at his estate in England for the duration of the summer months. However, the summer of 1947 was one of the most crucial times in the history of the state and without the presence of the ruler no firm decision could be taken about the future of the state. In April 1947, the able Sir Richard Crofton, who had been prime minister of Bahawalpur since 1942, had left and had been replaced by a junior Unionist minister from the Punjab, Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani. Gurmani had already created a cabinet before the horrors of Partition and the lapse of paramountcy befell the Indian Empire. As the date for the Transfer of Power approached, the non-Muslims in Bahawalpur State moved into the adjoining Hindu states, while Muslim refugees from Rajputana states poured into Bahawalpur. This migration, coupled with attacks by different communities on each other made day-to-day governance difficult in the state. At the same time, the absence of the ruler created confusion about its future.

Bahawalpur was no Hyderabad and so did not have the ability to function as an independent country. Early in 1947, the Punjab States Resident had commented on Bahawalpur:

Bahawalpur is not yet ready to stand on its own feet and with the end of paramountcy it is to be feared that the rapid progress of the last few years maybe slowed up until bitter necessity convinces the ruling house that only by their self-sacrifice and leadership can the State progress at the pace at which it has progressed in the recent past



General His Highness Nawab Sir Sadiq Muhammad Khan Abbasi V, GCSI, GCIE, KCVO, Ruler of Bahawalpur State, 1907–1966

due to the enterprise of foreign elements. Meanwhile corruption of the pre-Crofton era remains virulent in the indigenous officers. ...¹¹³

However, with Jinnah's laissez-faire attitude Bahawalpur was certain of good treatment. Moon noted: 'It was known that Jinnah, unlike the Congress leaders, was not hostile to the Ruling Princes and had no plans for sweeping them away or even for curtailing their powers.'¹¹⁴ On accession to Pakistan, Moon further noted, 'I had assumed that Bahawalpur would quietly accede to Pakistan. Our discussions with Muslim League leaders in Lahore and our engagement of Pakistan's counsel, Zafarullah, clearly

implied that this was our intention.'¹¹⁵ However, Bahawalpur's accession was not that readily obtained.


As the date for the Transfer of Power approached, there were rumours that Bahawalpur wanted to accede to India. Mountbatten later reported to the King, in February 1948, that some unofficial attempts were made in this connection but were rebuffed.¹¹⁶ It was also rumoured that 'in April 1947, Mr Gurmani (had) proposed a regional union of Punjab states and toured the neighbours.

...'¹¹⁷ Therefore, Pakistan was concerned as to the real intentions of the Bahawalpur government. Meanwhile, Sadiq Abbasi also declared himself Amir and Jalalat-ul-Mulk ala Hazrat, i.e. the full independent ruler of the state on 15 August 1947. This title was supposedly the result of a change in the status of Bahawalpur from a princely state under British paramountcy to an independent state. The Nawab also made a statement ten days later, declaring Bahawalpur's future to be an Islamic state in some sort of a relationship with Pakistan. He declared:

The States have once again become fully independent and sovereign territories. ... These important and far reaching changes enable us to shape our own destinies. ... In view of the geographical position of my State and its cultural and economic affinities with the Pakistan Dominion, my representatives should participate in the labours and deliberations of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly ... which will enable the two states to arrive at a satisfactory constitutional arrangement. ...¹¹⁸

The Government of Pakistan was obviously alarmed by the assumption of the new title by the Nawab and by his subsequent declaration. It seemed that Bahawalpur was aiming to only associate with Pakistan and had no plans of complete accession. Therefore, Colonel Shah set about making sure that Bahawalpur acceded to Pakistan on the same terms as other states had acceded to India. Shah first advised the Government of Pakistan not to recognize the assumption of a new title by the Nawab. Col. Shah noted:

I had recommended that the government should not recognize the new title assumed by the ruler. The new titles appeared to be incongruous because the Nawab had not possessed them before



Map 5: Bahawalpur State

partition and in the Political Department we were very jealous of the Rulers assuming titles to which they were not justified.¹¹⁹

Being the highest-ranking officer of the Political Department to have joined the Government of Pakistan, Col. Shah was well aware that this the new title clearly asserted an independent and sovereign Bahawalpur—something which the Government of Pakistan was not going to accept.

Negotiations could not take place between the Government of Pakistan and Bahawalpur State since the Nawab had again returned to England and therefore the visits of Major Short

between July and September 1947, General Iftikhar of the Pakistan Army, and later by Ikramullah, did not achieve any results.¹²⁰ Despite later claims that Prime Minister Gurmani had secret plans for Bahawalpur's accession to India as the head of a union of Bahawalpur, Bikaner, and Jaisalmer, it was apparent from the beginning of the negotiations that Gurmani did not oppose the accession of Bahawalpur to Pakistan and that the only thing holding up the accession was the signature of the ruler, which was duly obtained and Gurmani himself brought the Instrument of Accession to Jinnah in Karachi who accepted it on 5 October 1947.¹²¹ The accession of Bahawalpur was of great benefit to the Government of Pakistan since it not only increased its land mass, but it also brought in the only region which had a budget surplus and where the economy was booming.

c) **Khairpur**

Khairpur, a medium-sized state, had an area of 6,050 square miles and a population of 227, 183 in 1931, sixteen per cent of whom were non-Muslim.¹²² In 1947, Khairpur State was in an uncertain situation. In 1944, its ruler, Mir Faiz Mohammad Khan II, had been declared to be suffering from 'Schizophrenic Simples'¹²³ and prevented from exercising any ruling powers, and the state was administered by officials under the guidance of the Punjab Resident. The Mir was sent to a rest house in Poona to recover but it was thought that his condition was now beyond hope and that his heir, George Ali Murad Talpur, who was a minor at the time of his father's illness, would eventually takeover. The Punjab Resident, Thompson, succinctly described Khairpur in late 1946 by noting:

Khairpur ... could only be described as '*jungly*.' Still, tremendous efforts were being made to drag it into the twentieth century. The promising ruler was a minor whose safety and education were of paramount concern and of course personal to the Resident. There was a galaxy of his father's brothers who were slyly referred to as the 'wicked uncles' although I do not think they were really a danger.¹²⁴

In area, Khairpur was smaller than Bahawalpur, but since a large portion of the Lahore-Karachi railway track lay in the state, the Government of Pakistan considered its association with Pakistan important.

As 15 August 1947 approached, the Political Department began to restrict its activities in the princely states. Therefore, measures were taken in Khairpur to ensure that some form of government continued once the British left. The obvious solution was to depose the current ruler, Mir Faiz Mohammad, and recognize the minor, George Ali Murad, and establish a regency board until George Ali Murad's maturity. Thus, the Crown Representative, Lord Mountbatten, wrote to the Secretary of State for India:

... it was not intended to take any final decision regarding deposition of Mir of Khairpur until his son had grown up. With lapse of paramountcy functions of Ruler of Khairpur will have to be entrusted to Regency Board consisting of members of ruling family. Danger after lapse of paramountcy of coup d'état by unscrupulous members of his family to get control of the person of the present Mir and rule in his name will be much lessened if before lapse of paramountcy Mir has been formally deposed and Regency Board is functioning on behalf of his minor son who would succeed.¹²⁵

The Secretary of State concurred with the decisions of the Crown Representative and so Mir Faiz Mohammad was deposed and Mir George Ali Murad Khan Talpur ascended the Gaddi of Khairpur



Map 6: Khairpur State with Sind and Bombay Presidency

State on 24 July 1947 and was recognized by the King-Emperor as the ruling Mir of Khairpur. Since the ruler was a minor, a board of regency was also created with close male relatives of the Mir taking its chairmanship in turn.

Due of the uncertain nature of government in Khairpur State, it seems that no effort was made by either India or Pakistan to persuade the state to accede to either of them, since Khairpur had a contiguous border (after the accession of Jaisalmer State to India) with both India and Pakistan. The presence of a minor ruler, who incidentally was holidaying in Kashmir in October 1947, and the existence of an internally weak board of regency meant that

no serious thought was given to an independent existence either. However, it is significant that on 4 August 1947, the Khairpur government issued a notice for the celebration of 15 August 1947, as the 'Independence Day of Khairpur', and that in the long list of festivities there was no mention of any proposed accession to either dominion except notice of a congratulatory telegram to Jinnah.¹²⁶ It appears that Khairpur was treated in the same way by the Government of Pakistan as Bahawalpur, and so through the efforts of Col. Shah, the Chairman of the Board of Regency, Mir Ghulam Hussein Khan Talpur signed the Instrument of Accession on behalf of the minor ruler on 3 October 1947—the same day as the Bahawalpur Accession. Governor-General M. A. Jinnah then accepted the Accession of the State on 9 October 1947. Hence, on the same day Pakistan gained two very valuable princely states, which were not only significant in terms of land mass but also had significant agricultural land, nascent industries, and strategic value.

d) Frontier States

The four Frontier states of Chitral, Dir, Swat, and Amb were among the most backward tribal states in the Indian Empire. The Malakand Agency administered Chitral, Dir, and Swat, while Amb was under the jurisdiction of the deputy commissioner at Abbottabad in the North West Frontier Province. In the summer of 1947, all four states were eager to regulate their relations with the new Dominion of Pakistan, but it seems that the Government of Pakistan did not want to accept the offers of accession by these states in haste, especially since Kashmir claimed Chitral, and Dir's accession brought to the fore brewing tensions with Afghanistan. However, the government-in-waiting of Pakistan did relate to the states through the political agents that it did wish to maintain political relations with them after the Transfer

of Power. A telegram sent on 4 August 1947 to all the political agents in the Frontier stated: 'Please inform all Rulers concerned urgently ... that while constitutionally they are entitled to become independent, the Provisional Government of Pakistan being desirous of maintaining and extending friendly relations, is willing to continue for the present all subsidies and existing arrangements and agreements. ...'¹²⁷

i) *Chitral*

The ruler of Chitral State in 1947 was His Highness Mehtar Muzzafar-ul-Mulk who had been ruling this mountainous state since 1943. The state had an area of 4000 square miles, and a population of 89,000 in 1931, with a very small percentage of non-Muslims.¹²⁸ The legal situation of Chitral was rather precarious. Technically, it was a princely state in its own right, with its ruler entitled to an 11-gun salute. However, in 1914, Chitral signed the Mastunj Agreement with Kashmir under which it agreed to the suzerainty of the Kashmir durbar in exchange for a considerable subsidy.¹²⁹ Later, however in the 1930s, the then Mehtar Nasir ul-Mulk stopped sending the annual *nazrana* to the Kashmir durbar as a sign of Chitral's non-acceptance of Kashmir's suzerainty. Even though the chief secretary of the NWFP argued that this matter of *nazrana* be dropped, the Crown Representative was clear that as long as the Mastunj Agreement was in force, the mehtar had to give the *nazrana* to Kashmir.¹³⁰ Therefore, when the time came for Chitral to decide about its future course of action in the wake of the lapse of paramountcy, Kashmir claimed that Chitral did not have any right to make such a decision without the concurrence of the Kashmir durbar. The mehtar obviously countered these claims and repudiated any agreements made with the Kashmir government. The mehtar wrote to Jinnah in August 1947:



Colonel His Highness Mehtar Haji Muhammad Muzaffar-ul-Mulk,
Ruler of Chitral State, 1943–1949 with Nawab Bahadur
Sir Muhammad Farid Khan, Nawab of Amb

Now as the end of paramountcy coincides with the emergence of Pakistan, Chitral State exultantly joins Pakistan with full confidence and hope of redeeming its honour by shaking off the Kashmir suzerainty, of recovering the Gilgit districts ceded to Kashmir, and finally concluding a new honourable agreement with Pakistan in due course.¹³¹

The Mehtar was very supportive of the Government of Pakistan and immediately offered to help the new government. He noted in another letter: '... financially Chitral is not a rich state and cannot afford at present to make a befitting contribution in money. But it has natural resources chiefly in minerals and forests. ... I offer these ... for exploitation to the Pakistan Government at special concession.'¹³² The Mehtar again wrote to Jinnah noting that he had collected Rs. 30,000 for the Quaid-i-Azam Relief Fund and

was collecting warm clothes for the refugees.¹³³ Despite all the goodwill and eagerness shown by Chitral, the Government of Pakistan was not prepared to jeopardize its position with respect to the state of Kashmir which had allegedly acceded to India on 26 October 1947, and so Jinnah stalled the acceptance of the Instrument of Accession which the Mehtar signed on 6 November 1947. It was only after the conflict in Kashmir escalated and it seemed that no quick solution would be achieved that Jinnah finally accepted the accession of the state of Chitral to Pakistan on 18 February 1948.

ii) *Dir*

In 1947, Dir was ruled by Sir Shah Jahan Khan who had acceded to the Gaddi in 1925. Dir was a small state with just 3000 square miles of territory and a population of 250,000 in 1931.¹³⁴ Dir's position on the border between Afghanistan and India gave it an additional option of accession to Afghanistan, which many in the state wanted to exercise. The Nawab of Amb had noted Dir's attitude in a letter to Jinnah in August 1947, stating '... the Nawab of Dir, still persists in believing that the British power will never go from India and that even if such a thing miraculously happens, he will be free to do what he likes on 16th of August. ...'¹³⁵ The state was also in a very primitive state of development, and political consciousness amongst the people was almost non-existent. The Nawab ruled the territory with an iron fist and even banned the establishment of schools in his state. The governor of the NWFP, Sir George Cunningham, also did not have a positive opinion of the Nawab. He noted: 'The Nawab is incalculable ... he is very suspicious by nature and it will be difficult to get him to play any intelligent part in the general setup of Pakistan.'¹³⁶


A dispatch from the British High Commission in Pakistan succinctly described the process through which Dir came within the ambit of Pakistan. It noted:

The Nawab of Dir, a more than usually conservative ruler, took fright at the provisions in the instrument of accession regarding defence and external relations, and refused formally to accede to Pakistan; he insisted that his relations with Pakistan should remain the same as those with the British Government previously, and the Pakistan Ministry of States and Frontier Regions have for the present acquiesced in this position.¹³⁷

The Government of Pakistan was very concerned that the Nawab might seriously contemplate accession to Afghanistan and so agreement with him on terms previously between Dir and the British was a useful stop-gap solution. Thereafter, Sir Shah Jahan signed the Instrument of Accession on 8 November 1947, which was accepted by Jinnah on 18 February 1948.

iii) *Swat*

The last state to be recognized by the Government of India, Swat, had an area of 1800 square miles and a population of 216,000 in 1931.¹³⁸ The state was predominantly Muslim but had a small but prominent Hindu presence. The accession of Swat was along the same lines as that of Chitral and Dir. The case of Swat was complicated since shortly after the lapse of paramountcy, Swat troops occupied the disputed area of Kalam. Kalam, which lay in the valley of the Swat River, was claimed by Swat, Chitral, and Dir. While Chitral claimed that the tribes paid tribute to the mehtar and that they were related to the Chitralis, the Nawab of Dir claimed tribal affinity as his reason, whereas the Wali of Swat argued that the valley of the Swat River should be under



Miangul Sir Abdul Wadud, Wali of Swat State, 1926–1949, signing the Instrument of Accession on 3 November 1947

one administration. The issue was a cause of disagreement for a long time between the bordering states and had come to the fore especially in the aftermath of the recognition of Swat as a state. The British did not agree with the claims of any of the parties and kept Kalam as a 'tribal area' directly administered by the political agent of the Malakand Agency. Therefore, when Swat troops occupied Kalam shortly after August 1947, Pakistan refused to recognize the occupation and tried to force Swat to return to the previous position. With a hope of Pakistan's eventual support of Swat's claim to Kalam (especially against that of Dir) the Wali was eager to accede to Pakistan as soon as possible.

Already the Wali and Jinnah were on very friendly terms. In July 1947, Jinnah had written to Abdul Wadood thanking him for his support in the NWFP referendum on the question of Pakistan. Jinnah noted: -

I am pleased indeed to hear of your wholehearted support and encouragement that you have given in our coming fight for the referendum. ... I am ... grateful to you and to your Heir Apparent for having made a most handsome and generous contribution towards the Fund which is necessary for us to contest this referendum. I shall always remember that at the critical moment not only we had your heart with us but you gave us every help.¹³⁹

In return, the Wali was equally complimentary and noted that his '... loyalty to the completion of Pakistan has been constant and enthusiastic ... Swat is cent per cent Muslim League.'¹⁴⁰ Therefore, the accession of Swat to Pakistan was easily obtained. The last ruling Wali, Miangul Jehanzeb noted:

With the creation of Pakistan in 1947 we immediately joined the new state. We were very patriotic, both my father and I. We had also contributed before partition, supporting the Muslim League and the struggle for independence ... the Political Agent at the time was from this country, ... Nawab Shaikh Mahbub Ali ... I talked to him over the telephone and told him we were going to sign the Instrument of Accession. He answered: I know you are a sensible person, that there would be no difficulties with you and that in any case you would do it. So I must clear these other matters, with the other states first.¹⁴¹

The Wali, Miangul Abdul Wadud, then executed the Instrument of Accession on 3 November 1947 and it was accepted by Jinnah on 24 November 1947. Almost immediately thereafter Swat got what it had hoped for, and the Governor, Sir George Cunningham, strongly advised the central government to allow Swat to retain Kalam but with the proviso that it should not be able to extend its territory further and threaten the Nawab of Amb.¹⁴²

iv) *Amb*

The tiny state of Amb, which was adjacent to the Hazara District of the NWFP, and with an area of 225 square miles and a population of just 36,000 souls, was ruled in 1947 by Nawab Sir Mohammad Farid Khan.¹⁴³ The ruler was on very friendly terms with Jinnah and had a keen interest in the development of the province as a whole. He wrote to Jinnah several times before independence reposing his trust in his leadership and even sent his advisor, Rana Tila Mohammad Khan to Karachi, to apprise Jinnah of developments in the state and the province.¹⁴⁴ With the lapse of paramountcy, Farid Khan immediately decided to throw in his lot with Pakistan, since in effect he had no other choice. The correspondence between the Nawab and Jinnah is significant in the initial period since it showed the Nawab's close interest in the politics of the province.¹⁴⁵ Farid Khan even wanted Jinnah to call a meeting '... for the discussion and conclusion of future agreements with the Frontier States ...' since perhaps he was hoping for a better deal, as he further noted '(Y)ou have already hit the nail on the head when you announced that the Pakistan Government will be prepared to negotiate with each State individually.'¹⁴⁶ However, Amb was such a small state and its options so limited, that Jinnah did not even care to reply to the Nawab for a few months. Consequently, the Nawab signed the Instrument of Accession on 31 December 1947, which Jinnah accepted on the same day.

e) **Hunza and Nagar**

The two tiny states of Hunza and Nagar situated on the northern most tip of the British Indian Empire had always been anomalies. Both Hunza and Nagar had populations of just over 16,000 in 1931, though territorially both were comparatively large, Hunza



Nawab Sir Mohammad Farid Khan, KCSI, (1936–1971), with Hon. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Begum Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan, and His Excellency Sahibzada Mohammad Khurshid, Governor of NWFP, Darband, and Amb State, 1949

with 6,848 square miles of territory and Nagar with 1,245 square miles.¹⁴⁷ Their status had been contested not only by the Kashmir durbar but also by the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang which claimed them to be a part of their empire as both states offered tribute to Peking. As a matter of fact, their status was so obscure that *The Kashmir Times*, without thinking twice, published a piece in its 25 February 1936 issue noting: 'We admit that ... these two states pay tribute to four governments—British, Chinese, Russian and Kashmiri and situated as they are, derive benefit from all of them.'¹⁴⁸ Even though the Kashmir prime minister quickly rebuked the editor, the newspaper was not far off the mark. The two states, which still had undefined territories, were simply out to make use of any agreement they could get out of any government so that they could enjoy benefits far outstripping the tribute they were supposed to give.

The question of the status of Hunza and Nagar arose in the aftermath of the discussions with Kashmir over its entry into the federal arrangement under the Government of India Act of 1935. Kashmir maintained that as these were vassal states, they would automatically be a part of the federal arrangement if Kashmir opted for it. The Government of India was unclear about the issue and the question remained under examination for over three years.¹⁴⁹ In a lengthy note to the Government of India the Kashmir government argued that Hunza and Nagar had always been under the suzerainty of the Kashmir durbar and so should be considered vassals of Maharaja Sir Hari Singh. Its main arguments as noted were:

- a) The Sikh government of Lahore exercised some influence and control over Hunza, Nagar and the adjacent territory through their military commander at Gilgit.
- b) Whatever the rights the Sikhs had ... (they) were transferred to Maharaja Ghulabsinghji by the Treaty of Amritsar ...
- d) The extension and consolidation of the authority of the State was done without reference to or assistance of the British Government who were bound by treaty to assist the state only in repelling *external* enemies.
- h) ... The rebellion of Hunza and Nagar, which followed the tightening up of the control of the frontier, was put down by State forces ...
- k) From 1885 upto 1935 the State paid upto three crores (thirty million) rupees towards the maintenance of the Agency ... because it always considered and treated the Agency districts as its territory ...

- n) Whatever the rights of administration which the Government of India exercise or have ever exercised over the Chiefships and territories comprising the Agency are derived directly or indirectly from and through the Jammu and Kashmir State ... the State having already been in effective possession of those rights prior to the establishment of the Agency.¹⁵⁰

The long note of the Kashmir government did not convince the Government of India, though it took time to arrive at a definite pronouncement. However, Col. Fraser, the Resident, when commenting on the note, made it very clear that the Kashmir durbar had no historical right to Hunza and Nagar deriving from



Map 7: Frontier States with Hunza and Nagar

the Sikh Empire. He quoted the earliest political agent, Biddulph, noting in 1881:

Since 1869 Ghanzan Khan [of Hunza] has been in receipt of a yearly subsidy of Rs. 2,000 from Jammu, nominally in return for allegiance but it is really paid as blackmail to prevent him making raids into Gilgit territory ... owing to the defiant nature of their country they have successfully resisted every attempt to subdue them by the Kashmir Government.¹⁵¹

Fraser further contended that the three crore figure mentioned by Kashmir was not all spent on Hunza, Nagar, and the other tribal areas, but also on its own Gilgit *wazarat* and that much of it went for the maintenance of its troops in the area. Therefore, control of the aforementioned areas could not be justified using this logic. He did acknowledge, though, that the last *sanad* granted to the Hunza and Nagar mirs did give the Kashmir maharaja wide ranging powers. He concluded:

... it is true that the wording of the Sanads granted to the two Mirs after the 1891 war were very comprehensive and gave the State the right to supervise ... since then, however, State control has evaporated rapidly and steadily and for very many years these districts have been under the complete charge of the Political Agent.¹⁵²

The Foreign Department also noted that Kashmir's relations with these states were not independent of the British but that 'the control ... was political acquired with the concurrence, encouragement or aid of the British Government, and involved external relations with these territories.'¹⁵³ The Kashmir government also overlooked the fact that Hunza also paid tribute to the Chinese authorities and was claimed by them too. The Government of India was concerned by this dual relationship, especially since considerable

communist activity was being reported in Sinkiang, and so asked Hunza not to pay tribute to the Chinese in return for a Rs. 3,000 subsidy and a *jagir* in Gilgit to offset the loss of grazing rights in Chinese Sinkiang.¹⁵⁴ The Chinese authorities became incensed at the cessation of the tribute in 1937 and raided Hunza in 1938, but the matter soon dissipated with increasing political turmoil in China and the outbreak of the Second World War.

In 1940, the Government of India finally decided on the issue of the relationship of Hunza and Nagar and the adjoining territories by refuting the arguments of Kashmir. The decision was made in May 1940, with the concurrence of both the Crown Representative and the Secretary of State, but it was not relayed to the Kashmir state government until the summer of 1941 due to fears that it might jeopardize the war effort.¹⁵⁵ Finally, on 5 June 1941, Col. Fraser intimated to the prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir the decision of the Crown Representative which read:

The Crown Representative regrets that he is unable to agree with all the conclusions reached in the note of the Kashmir Government forwarded with your letter and has been pleased to decide as follows:

- 1) Hunza and Nagar: though these are under the suzerainty of the Kashmir State, they are not part of Kashmir but are separate states.
- 2) Chilas, Koh Ghizr, Ishkoman, and Yasin: Though these are under the suzerainty of Kashmir State they are not part of Kashmir but tribal areas.¹⁵⁶

Theoretically, the above statement should have settled the issue but the Kashmir durbar never stopped treating Hunza and Nagar as part of its territory.

With the announcement of the Transfer of Power in August 1947, the Government of India also declared that the Gilgit Agency would be returned to Kashmir on 1 August 1947—a fortnight before the actual transfer. The handover of the whole agency, and not just the Gilgit *wazarat* which was actually a part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, convoluted matters as it signalled that the Government of India was also transferring its paramountcy rights over the states and territories in the agency to Kashmir. Mainprice, the last British Assistant Political Agent (APA) in Gilgit, clearly noted the confusion:

It was not however realized that Gilgit Sub-division was only one-tenth of the Gilgit Agency, and that the other nine states and territories, which had never been under Kashmir State but always directly under the Central Government, were in quite a different position.

Mainprice further noted the feelings in the agency, which were entirely against Kashmir. He wrote:

The people of Gilgit sub-division were strongly opposed to the return of the generally inefficient and corrupt State administration, which despised the local population and their aspirations. The peoples of the surrounding states and territories were equally if not more opposed ... and maintained that the British or Central Government suzerainty and responsibilities in this important strategic frontier must continue in the hands of the new Central Government concerned with the North-West Frontier, Pakistan. ...¹⁵⁷

These factors, together with the population of these areas being almost entirely Muslim, created a potentially explosive situation if Kashmir decided to accede to India against the wishes of the people of this region.

The announcement of the handover of the Gilgit Agency to Kashmir perturbed both the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar since their economies and people were inextricably linked with the Gilgit Agency, now under Srinagar's control. Thus, both Mirs paid a visit to Maharaja Hari Singh in Srinagar to discuss future arrangements in July 1947. According to Major Brown, the commandant of the Gilgit Scouts, on whom the Mirs called after their return, Hunza's Mir Jamals' version was:

the Maharaja agreed that Durand's treaty was now null and void as one of the joint contracting parties, namely the Crown Representative had withdrawn. The Maharaja therefore desired that we should enter into a new treaty agreement directly with him. We pointed out that although our intention was to remain on the friendliest of terms with him, and to cooperate with him as far as circumstances allowed, we were not at present prepared to come under treaty obligations ... so ... we are now completely independent.¹⁵⁸

The Maharaja's version was, of course, that the Mirs reaffirmed their support for the durbar, but in light of how they acted and due to the sheer fact that they were in reality independent, it is unlikely that the Mirs affirmed any sort of allegiance to the Maharaja.

The attitudes of the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar in the run up to the Transfer of Power were consistent with their above-mentioned ideas. They kept in constant touch with Major Brown in Gilgit and when Major Brown called the Mir of Hunza on 30 October 1947 to confirm if he had earlier in the day affirmed his support for Hari Singh in his accession to India, Hunza clearly came out in favour of Pakistan and said: 'There is only one way for us to go and that is to Pakistan and we shall join Pakistan.'¹⁵⁹

After the coup in Gilgit, both the Mir of Hunza and the Mir of Nagar sent their instruments of accession to Major Brown by 3 November 1947, which Brown later wired to Peshawar.¹⁶⁰ Even the Raja of Punial, who was thought to be the most pro-Kashmiri of all the governors of the area, sent Brown his accession letter, written in the vernacular, through his son.¹⁶¹ Hence, without even contacting the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar, and providing them with the prepared standard instruments of accession, both these states acceded to Pakistan. This was because, being nearly one hundred per cent Muslim, the people of Hunza and Nagar were very receptive to the idea of accession to Pakistan and also because their prospects looked much better with the Muslim-majority state of Pakistan, rather than the Hindu-dominated India, especially since their relations with Kashmir had not been the most cordial. Hafeez-ur-Rahman Sheikh noted of Hunza and Nagar that, 'the people were of course all for Pakistan, but due to the lack of political consciousness and a severe lack of education they were not able to voice their opinion and were completely under the thumb of their rulers.'¹⁶² Thus, both Hunza and Nagar acceded to Pakistan without any effort from the Pakistani government.

CONCLUSION

1947 was a very ominous year for the princes of India. Not only were the treaties with the British Crown which gave them security and ensured continuity, unilaterally broken, they also had to make tough decisions regarding their futures within a mere couple of months. Most princes had by that time become complacent and were not capable of making informed judgments about the future direction of their states. In this situation they put all their trust in the person of Lord Mountbatten, the Crown Representative, whom they thought would do his utmost to safeguard their interests.

However, Mountbatten was of the firm view that the future of the princely states lay squarely within the future framework of British India and that even the largest ones should not aspire for complete independence once the British left India. At the July session of the Chamber of Princes addressed by Mountbatten, the princes were taken aback by their chief protector arguing the position of the future governments of India and Pakistan. An eminent Pakistan politician later put it very aptly: '... perhaps the princes were doomed to extinction anyhow, but that they should have been coaxed and driven to the slaughterhouse by the shepherd they trusted most is what adds poignancy to the scene.'¹⁶³ Even Lord Wavell was surprised by the attitude of Lord Mountbatten who, long before 15 August 1947, had begun to act like the Congress-appointed governor-general of India in openly pressing the states to accede to India. Lord Wavell noted that Mountbatten had 'very much gone over to the Congress side ... says Jinnah has become an impossible megalomaniac and that Nehru has shown himself a really great man.'¹⁶⁴ Not only did Mountbatten not advise the princes properly on what their future strategy should be, he simply ignored the issue until very late in his viceroyalty and then only coerced them to accede to either of the two dominions.

The initial attitude of the Muslim League towards the princely states in accepting the full implications of the lapse of paramountcy was inasmuch a recognition of the obvious given its inability to deal with the issue before the actual creation of the Dominion of Pakistan. It was very convenient for the Muslim League and for Jinnah, to accept the understanding that with the lapse of paramountcy the princely states became wholly independent territories able to make any decisions about their future they deemed proper, since the Muslim League did not have the ability, manpower, and machinery, to rival the Indian States Department


in luring the princes into the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Whereas the Indian States Department was functional from 5 July 1947, the Pakistan section of the States Department remained dormant until 11 August 1947 when it began to make initial contacts with Muslim princes who ruled Muslim majority states.

The Government of Pakistan was so beset by problems that there remains no evidence of other states which could, or did, try to accede to Pakistan. Manipur State, for example, was adjacent to East Bengal and even though it was not a Muslim majority state, geographical contiguity could have been a good reason to accede to Pakistan. Apparently, the Maharaja of Manipur was not even approached and the state acceded to India on 11 August 1947. It also seems that some of the Khasi Hill states which formed the border between Assam and Bengal had applied for accession to Pakistan in 1947, and that the Pakistan cabinet had accepted the proposal in November 1947.¹⁶⁵ However, what came of the offer of accession remained a mystery for a long time as the Government of Pakistan lost all the papers connected therewith so that by 1950, neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations nor the States and Frontier Regions ministry (SAFRON) knew if the Khasi states legally formed a part of Pakistan.¹⁶⁶

Fascinating, though, was the case of the Nawab of Dujana who apparently offered his accession to Pakistan in August 1947. Dujana was a small princely state of a hundred square miles, perched near Delhi. Its inhabitants were mostly Hindu but it was ruled by a Muslim nawab. As commented by the Secretary of SAFRON, not only did Pakistan refuse the nawab's accession; it also advised him to return to India where his prospects would be better. The secretary wrote:

... When riots broke out in Delhi and the surrounding areas in 1947, the nawab of Dujana migrated to Pakistan and applied for accession. His accession could not be accepted for obvious reason. He however continued to make representations for a maintenance allowance. ... The nawab would have been well advised to stay on in India, where he would have received a substantial privy purse. We could not possibly accept the accession of a state next door to the capital of India. So we can only consider him a displaced person, however much we sympathise with him.¹⁶⁷

By the end of 1947 nine princely states—Junagadh, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Dir, Swat, Chitral, Amb, Hunza, and Nagar had acceded to Pakistan. Junagadh's abortive accession, which was accepted by Jinnah on 15 September 1947, was soon undone by the Dominion of India whose troops entered, occupied, and then annexed the coastal Kathiawar state within months of its accession to Pakistan. Pakistan verbally protested the action by India, but, as noted by Spear, 'the case was so small and the non-juridical considerations so strong that even Pakistan contended itself with indignant protests.'¹⁶⁸ The most important lesson of Junagadh, though, was that if the accession of a state could be contested because the ruler and ruled belong to different religions, and that the will of the people had not been taken into consideration concerning the accession, would India apply the same principle elsewhere? Both Liaquat and Jinnah were hoping to test this principle and India's good faith in the case of Kashmir where a Hindu maharaja ruled over a population that was seventy-seven per cent Muslim and who was tilting towards India in terms of accession.¹⁶⁹ The only state now remaining outside Pakistan was Kalat, with its vassal states of Kharan and Las Bela, which was putting up a tough fight to preserve its claim of separate status.



Map 8: West Pakistan in 1948

The ease with which the above-named states acceded to Pakistan was mostly the result of the lack of political and economic development in these states. The most developed (in relative terms) of the states, Bahawalpur, did toy with the idea of independence initially, but soon concluded that its future lay with Pakistan. Because these states had Muslim majorities and were ruled by Muslim princes, India was simply not interested in luring them and nor were the princes eager to join India.

Notes

1. Attlee to Bevin, 2 January 1947, *TOP*, vol. 9, 445.
2. Wavell's political secretary Sir Conrad Corfield surmised that Wavell was being replaced '... because Lord Wavell was firmly opposed to wrecking the unique achievement of the British Raj in creating a unified India.' Corfield, *The Princely India I Knew*, 149.
3. Wavell, *The Viceroy's Journal*, 13 February 1947, 419.
4. Bikaner to Mountbatten, 3 April 1947, *TOP*, vol. 11, 108.
5. Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, 158.
6. For the attitude of the Nizam of Hyderabad, for example, see, GoI, *Proceedings of the Conference of Ruling Princes and Chiefs*, 155-6. See also, Abhyankar, *The Problem of Indian States*, 250-1, 296, and Das, *Sovereign Rights of the Indian Princes*, 69.
7. Ramusack, *The Indian Princes and their States*, agrees that the 'lack of experience in collective negotiations,' weakened the position of the princes. 247.
8. For more details see, Coupland, *The Cripps Mission*, and Chatterji, *The Cripps Mission*.
9. Note by Cripps, 28 March 1942, *TOP*, vol. 1, 510-1.
10. For details see, L/PJ/10/42, 53-55, IOR.
11. Nehru had said in the press conference: '... you will see in what conditions and circumstances we agreed to go into this Constituent Assembly. ... That is the election of candidates to the Constituent Assembly. What we do there, we are entirely and absolutely free to determine.' L/PJ/10/73, 298, IOR.
12. See R/3/1/135, 6-7, IOR.
13. India (Cabinet Mission), *Statement by the Mission dated 25th May 1946*, in Sever, ed. *Documents and Speeches on the Indian Princely States*, vol. 1, 605-6.
14. Minutes of India and Burma Committee, 11 September 1945, *TOP*, vol. 6, 253.
15. Prime Minister Bikaner to Major Woodrow Wyatt, 15 February 1947, L/PS/13/1826, IOR.
16. Bhopal to Corfield, 23 November 1946, *TOP*, vol. 9, 156-7.
17. Corfield, *The Princely India I Knew*, 151-2.
18. Quoted in Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, 162.

19. Note of discussion at India Office with Corfield, 9 May 1947, *TOP*, vol. 10, 718.
20. Corfield, *The Princely India I Knew*, 151–2.
21. Minutes of Viceroy's 55th Staff Meeting, 9 July 1947, *TOP*, vol. 12, 36.
22. Corfield, *The Princely India I Knew*, 156.
23. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 368.
24. Statement of Sardar Patel on the Indian States, 5 July 1947, L/PS/13/1827, IOR.
25. Corfield, *The Princely India I Knew*, 158.
26. Ibid.
27. Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, 140.
28. Ibid. 141–2.
29. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 358.
30. Corfield Papers, Mss D850/6–7, IOPP.
31. Emphasis in original. Listowel to Attlee, 29 July 1947, *TOP*, vol. 12, 403.
32. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 376–7.
33. Ibid. 377–8 and Viceroy's Personal Report, 8 August 1947, L/PO/6/123, IOR.
34. Patil, *The Congress Party*, 9.
35. Singh, *Indian National Congress*, vol. II, 190.
36. The 1920 Nagpur Congress passed a token resolution saying: 'This Congress earnestly requests all the sovereign princes of India to establish full responsible government in their states.' Resolution No. 14, *Report of the 35th Session of the Indian National Congress held at Nagpur*, 106.
37. This is clear from the condolence message sent by the Congress for the Maharaja of Mysore in 1894. It read in part: '... the loss which has been sustained in the death of the Maharaja of Mysore not only by the state over which he ruled with such wisdom, ability and beneficence, but also by all the Indian peoples, to whom his constitutional reign was at once a vindication of their political capacity, an example for their active emulation, and an earnest expression of their future political liberties.' *Report of the 10th Session of the Indian National Congress held at Madras 1894*, 117.
38. Quoted in Patil, *The Congress Party*, 32. Gandhi's soft stance on the princes might have been a result of him being born as a princely subject in Porbandar state. Brown notes that '... Gandhi's father and grandfather were both senior officials in the courts of various Kathiawad Princes.' Brown, *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope*, 16.

39. *The Congress Presidential Addresses*, 768.
40. Quoted in Patil, *The Congress Party*, 23.
41. Resolution 17, *Report of the 51st Session*, 207–8.
42. Nehru's address to the AISPC, *Hindustan Times*, 1 January 1946, L/PS/13/1826, IOR.
43. Statement of Sardar Patel on the Indian States, 5 July 1947, L/PS/13/1827, IOR.
44. Ibid.
45. Ian Copland, 'The Princely States', 44.
46. Ibid. 46–7.
47. *Dawn*, 14 October 1946.
48. Reuters quoting Jinnah, 17 June 1947, L/PS/13/1827, IOR.
49. Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office to dominions on the Indian States, 12 August 1947, L/PS/13/1839, IOR.
50. Memo by Secretary of State for India, 24 May 1947, L/PS/13/1839, IOR.
51. *Hindustan Times*, 24 April 1947, *ibid.*
52. Nehru's remarks to Reuters, 16 June 1947, L/PS/13/1827, IOR.
53. Listowel to Mountbatten, 25 July 1947, L/PS/13/1839, IOR.
54. Letter to Carter, Private Sec. India Office, 29 July 1947, *ibid.*
55. See Manzar-i-Alam to Jinnah, 9 March 1947, and Jinnah to Manzar-i-Alam, 24 March 1947, QAP 227/20-4, NAP.
56. Jinnah to Indore, 11 August 1947, 1 (C) F 3-GG/47, NAP.
57. Indore to Jinnah, 14 August 1947, *ibid.*
58. Mountbatten, *Report on the Last Viceroyalty*, 244.
59. Copland, 'The Princely States', 61.
60. Phadnis, *Towards the Integration*, 180.
61. On Jinnah's support of Hyderabad see, Copland, 'The Princely States', 62–3.
62. For details see, Sayeed, *Formative Phase*, Part II, and Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, Part I.
63. However, in East Bengal a complete new set-up was required since only one ICS officer from Bengal opted for Pakistan. For details see, Braibanti, *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan*, 49.
64. Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism*, 22.
65. Menon, *Integration*, 125.
66. Ibid.
67. Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, 184.
68. Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation*, 56.

69. Bhutto to Jinnah, F 124 (8) GG/1-4, NAP.
70. Junagadh to Jinnah, 11 August 1947, F 124 (8) GG/5, NAP.
71. Jinnah to Junagadh, 12 August 1947, *ibid.*
72. Nehru to Liaquat, 25 August 1947, Appendix V.26, *JP*, vol. V, 535.
73. Bhutto to Liaquat, 19 August 1947, F 124 (8) GG/11-12, NAP.
74. Bhutto to Abrahani, 6 September 1947, F 124 (8) GG/20, NAP.
75. Bhutto to Liaquat, 17 September 1947, F 124 (8) GG/24-7, NAP.
76. Jinnah to Mountbatten, 18 September 1947, *JP*, vol. V, 604.
77. Mountbatten to Jinnah, 22 September 1947, F 124 (8) GG/29-30, NAP.
78. Jinnah to Mountbatten, 25 September 1947, F 124 (8) GG/31, NAP.
79. Menon, *Integration*, 130.
80. *Ibid.* 131-3.
81. Naqvi, *Junagadh*, 122-5.
82. Quoted in Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India*, 39.
83. Quoted in *Ibid.* It is strange that Raghavan later notes, 'But it is far from clear that the Indian government was in cahoots with the provisional government,' when he himself gives evidence for it. Menon was the point man when it came to the states and no major decision was taken without his concurrence. This is clear from Menon, *Integration*.
84. Lewis to Marshall, 4 October 1947, Political Reports 1947, Box 2, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
85. Menon, *Integration*, 176-7.
86. Infact, while India always publically claimed that Babariawad and Mangrol had the complete right to accede to India, in the Defence Committee meeting on 21 October 1947 it was admitted that even Sir Walter Monckton's 'crystal clear' opinion which both Mountbatten and Nehru have been oft-quoting in favour of Babariawad and Mangrol's status was not as clear. Mountbatten noted: 'Sir Walter Monckton had stated that the legal position with regard to Babariawad was very nebulous; with regard to Mangrol, he considered that there was also a degree of uncertainty as to the position.' Later, even Mountbatten admitted that the Indian position on the legal status of the states was not 'water-tight.' See, Minutes of 6th Meeting of the Defence Committee, 21 October 1947, Mountbatten Papers, F 200/90-C, IOPP.
87. *Ibid.*
88. Manavadar to Jinnah, 21 September 1947, F 124 (8) GG/5-6, NAP.
89. Menon, *Integration*, 134-5.

90. For Mangrol's retraction, see Liaquat to Nehru, 25 September 1947, *JP*, vol. V, 614. For the Indian reaction, see Menon, *Integration*, 136.
91. Menon, *Integration*, 136-7.
92. Note on the Junagadh crisis, Mountbatten Papers, F200/90-A, IOPP.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Note on Junagadh and Kashmir, 25 February 1948, Mountbatten Papers, F200/90-D, IOPP.
96. Note by Mountbatten, Mountbatten Papers, F200/90-B, IOPP.
97. Annex in Ibid.
98. Nehru to Liaquat, 5 October 1947, F 124 (8) GG/50-2, NAP.
99. Note of Interview with Patel and Menon, Mountbatten Papers, F200/90-B, IOPP.
100. Defence Committee of the Cabinet, 4 October 1947, Mountbatten Papers, F200/246, IOPP.
101. Mountbatten to Nehru, 18 October 1947, Mountbatten Papers, F200/90-C, IOPP.
102. See Defence Committee of the Cabinet 21 and 23 October 1947, *ibid*.
103. Nehru to Liaquat, 22 October 1947, *ibid*.
104. For details see, Lewis to Marshall, 17 November 1947, Political Reports 1947, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
105. Menon, *Integration*, 142.
106. See, *ibid*. 143.
107. Quoted in *The Pakistan Times*, 11 November 1947, PS-224, *JP*, vol. VIII, 380.
108. Liaquat to Nehru, 10 November 1947, F 124 (8) GG/78, NAP.
109. See Nehru to Liaquat, 17 November 1947, F 124 (8) GG/84-6, NAP.
110. Alling to Marshall, 3 March 1948, Political Reports 1948, Box 7, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
111. *Memoranda 1934*, 164-5.
112. Letter from Moon to his father, 7 April 1947, Moon Papers, F230/20, IOPP.
113. Report of Resident on Bahawalpur visit, 18 January 1947, L/PS/13/1327, IOR.
114. Moon, *Divide and Quit*, 105.
115. Ibid. 107.
116. Mountbatten to George VI, 26 February 1948, Mountbatten Papers, F200/90-D, IOPP.

117. Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation*, 71.
118. *Dawn*, 25 August 1947, quoted in Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation*, 73.
119. *Dawn*, 5 April 1958, 6.
120. See, Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation*, 73.
121. That Gurmani's role was critical in securing Bahawalpur's accession was noted in Lewis to Marshall, 11 January 1949, Political Reports 1949, Box 16, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
122. *Memoranda 1934*, 186-7.
123. Medical Report of Mir Faiz by Col. Moore Taylor, IMS, of European Mental Hospital Ranchi, 16 November 1944, L/PS/13/1370, IOR.
124. Sir Joseph Herbert Thompson Papers, F226/29, 204, IOPP.
125. Crown Representative to Secretary of State, 16 June 1947, L/PS/13/1370, IOR.
126. *Independence Day of Khairpur Notification*, KDA.
127. Ikramullah to Nowref, 4 August 1947, 93.S.St (I), NWFP.
128. *Memoranda 1934*, 150-1.
129. *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. XI, 428.
130. For details see, Chitral and Kashmir Suzerainty, R/2/1079, IOR.
131. Mehtar to Jinnah, 3 August 1947, 5GG/1-2, NAP.
132. Mehtar to Jinnah, 20 September 1947, 5GG/4, NAP.
133. Mehtat to Jinnah, 29 October 1947, 5GG/9, NAP.
134. *Memoranda 1934*, 150-1.
135. Amb to Jinnah, 3 August 1947, F. 7-GG/3-5, NAP.
136. Note on the NWFP by Cunningham to Jinnah, 8 May 1948, Cunningham Papers, D670/23, IOPP.
137. British High Commission Dispatch No. 303 (198) 31.5.1949, L/PS/12/3284, IOR.
138. *Memoranda 1934*, 150-1.
139. Jinnah to Swat, 28 July 1947, F. 718/3, NAP.
140. Swat to Jinnah, 8 August 1947, 6-GG/1, NAP.
141. Jehanzeb, *The Last Wali*, 103.
142. Note on the NWFP by Cunningham to Jinnah, 8 May 1948, Cunningham Papers, D670/23, IOPP.
143. *Memoranda 1934*, 150-1.
144. See, Amb to Jinnah, 3 August 1947, F 7-GG/3-5, NAP.
145. For details see, 1 (S) F 7 GG/47, NAP.
146. Amb to Jinnah, 13 August 1947, F 7-GG/6-7, NAP.

147. *Memoranda* 1934, 130-1.
148. *The Kashmir Times*, February 1936, R/2/1085/294, IOR.
149. See Appendix 1 to Notes—Summary, R/2/1085/294, IOR.
150. Note of Prime Minister Kashmir to Resident, L/PS/13/1860, IOR.
151. Comments by Resident, 31 August 1939, *ibid*.
152. *Ibid*.
153. Note by the Foreign Department on the States, *ibid*.
154. For details see, Report on Mission to Chinese Turkestan, L/PS/12/2371, IOR.
155. See numerous letters exchanged between the Political and Foreign Departments and the Resident, L/PS/13/1860, IOR.
156. Resident to Prime Minister Kashmir, *ibid*.
157. Note on Gilgit Agency, December 1947, Mainprice Papers, CSAA.
158. Brown, *The Gilgit Rebellion*, 101.
159. Quoted in *ibid*. 187.
160. Brown had both the originals of the Hunza and Nagar accession letters, which were only given to Pakistan by his wife posthumously in 1994. For details of the Gilgit accession see, Bangash, 'Three Forgotten Accessions.' Mainprice papers also give the details of the Gilgit accession, and attest to the central role of Major Brown in securing the agency, and the accession of Hunza and Nagar to Pakistan. See, 'Events at Gilgit: Oct-Nov 1947', Mainprice Papers, Box 1, part 1, CSAA.
161. Brown, *The Gilgit Rebellion*, 234.
162. Sheikh, 'Inquilab-e-Azadi', 62.
163. Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 232.
164. Roberts, 'Lord Mountbatten', 105.
165. Cabinet Minute, 11 November 1947, 176/CF/47, NDC, Islamabad.
166. *Ibid*. Actually, the twenty-five Khasi states acceded to India between 15 December 1947 and 19 March 1948. See, *White Paper*, Appendix XXV, 215-8, and Mizan-ur-Rahman, *Combating the Khasi Uprooting*, 77.
167. Note by Acting Secretary, 9 August 1960, in General File (States), SAFRON.
168. Spear, *The Oxford History of India*, 427.
169. Mountbatten, too, noted the connection of the Junagadh affair with Kashmir. Mountbatten's Personal Reports quoted in Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 436.

Chapter Three

Father, Son, and the Tribal State

'I have been helping you and the Muslim League for the last ten years to win Pakistan. During all this time, you have been like a father to me and you have been good enough to call me your son.'

The Khan of Kalat to Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah
27 April 1948

INTRODUCTION

Kalat was the largest princely state to become part of Pakistan in the aftermath of the Transfer of Power. Having been part of the Mughal Empire for a brief period and situated on the periphery of the British Indian Empire, Kalat had few direct links with governments in Delhi (or Calcutta), and so a sense of detachment from Indian affairs had gradually developed in the state. Ahmed Yar Khan, who became the Khan of Kalat in September 1933, was from the outset ambitious and wanted to strengthen the position of the Khan and achieve the unity and coherence evident under his eighteenth century predecessor, Nasir Khan I. The Prime Minister of Kalat in 1933, Sir Edward Wakefield noted:

... Ahmed Yar was heir to a different tradition, a tradition of craft and guile and incessant intrigue. ... These, with poison and the sword, were the weapons with which his ancestors had established their position; these, he felt incessantly, were the weapons with which he must maintain his position. Ahmed Yar was concerned, first, to

consolidate his existing position ... secondly, to convert that position of relative superiority into one of absolute supremacy.¹

These aims, together with the recognition of Kalat as a non-Indian state and the retrocession of the leased areas after the lapse of paramountcy, were the major concerns of his reign.

The peculiar constitution of Kalat as a confederal state rather than an absolute monarchy added complexity to the issue of its nature. A note by the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India elucidated the differing interpretations of government in Kalat. Weightman noted that according to Colonel Keyes, the constitution of Kalat State was much more complicated than the simple terms of 'feudal' or 'federal' implied. Col. Keyes commented:

... Kalat is a multiple federal state and not a simple confederacy. In the *niabats*, both in Sarawan and Jhalawan and in Kachhi, the Khan was an autocratic ruler ... while in the tribal territory he is head of a confederacy but even so holds a position higher than that of *primus inter pares* ... the difference between the Khan and the sardars is therefore, not of degree but of kind. ... It was the Khan alone who had ceded territory to the British Government jurisdiction and powers of administration in the Bolan which is almost exclusively tribal territory, while the agreements ceding the land required for the Kandahar State Railway, the Mushkaf Bolan Railway and the Nushki Railway, though for the most part covering tribal territory, were made by the Khan without the sardars. Similarly, Nushki and Nasirabad were ceded by the Khan alone though the former includes tribal territory and the latter jagirs.²

The complications resulting from the different explanations given for the constitution of Kalat, with the above being the most accurate, meant that the Government of India was now



Map 9: Kalat State and its Feudatories

‘thoroughly confused ... (and) finally concluded that the constitution of Kalat State seemed to defy any definition and was fated to arise controversy among those who attempted one. ...’³

Similar problems existed regarding the status and composition of Kalat. From being recognized as a vassal of the Amir of Kabul in 1839, to being officially listed as an Indian state, several problems arose as to the exact status of the state. This was especially so when there was no agreement between the Government of India and the Khan on the interpretation and applicability of past treaties and events. Also intertwined with the status of Kalat was the question

of the retrocession of the leased areas. If Kalat were a non-Indian state, then Pakistan would legally inherit the leases; but if Kalat were an Indian state, then the lease agreements would lapse on 15 August 1947 with the termination of paramountcy. The question of the status of Kharan and Las Bela were also causes of great confusion. Las Bela, which was regarded as a feudatory state of Kalat under the Khan's formal suzerainty, had been mentioned as forming part of Kalat state in the treaty of 1839, while Kharan was only formally recognized as a state by the Government of India in 1940.⁴ All these factors made the case of Kalat after the lapse of paramountcy decidedly peculiar.

To address the aforementioned issue fully, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first section analyses the claims of Kalat being a non-Indian state, and its impact on the issue of the leased areas, as well as the initiation of negotiations between the Government of Pakistan and Kalat. The second part focuses on the role and impact of political forces, and especially certain political figures, on the question of accession. The third part then traces the events from the accession of Kharan, Las Bela, and Mekran to Pakistan by concentrating on the aims and intentions of the Government of Pakistan behind such a move, to Kalat's accession on 27 March 1948.

I THE STATUS AND THE TRANSFER OF POWER

When Ahmed Yar Khan assumed the title of Khan of Kalat in 1933, the position of the khan in the Baluch-Brahui confederacy was very precarious. Ever since the forced abdication of Khudadad Khan in 1893, the British had been the supreme power in Kalat, and the powers and authority of the khan were extremely curtailed. The tribal sardars of Sarawan and Jhalawan received

their allowances from the political agent in Kalat, and the chiefs of Kharan and Las Bela had achieved *defacto* independence from Kalat. Furthermore, the *Wazir-e-Azam* (prime minister) of Kalat, who had full financial control over the state, was usually an officer of the Government of India on deputation and hence, not answerable to the khan in practice.

The first task of Ahmed Yar Khan was to retake authority from the political agent and re-establish himself as the pre-eminent chief in the state. In order to gain full control of the state, the Khan wrote a long note to the Government of India, through the Agent to the Governor-General, for the restoration of his power. He acknowledged that British rule had been beneficial for his state, but stressed that the time had come for him to assume control. He stated:

... I do not for a moment deny that during this period circumstances here in fact required certain functions of government, which might ordinarily have remained with the Khan, should be exercised by the PA ... but I would ask you now to consider whether such circumstances still exist. I am myself willing, and I believe myself to be capable, of assuming the full responsibilities of my position as Khan of Kalat and Head of the Brahui confederacy. ...⁵

The Government of India was willing to transfer all powers to Ahmed Yar Khan, except that it wanted to keep control of the disbursement of allowances to the sardars as well as have an imprimatur over their appointment and removal. As P. A. Skrine wrote to AGG Cater: 'these allowances give the British Government great power over the individual sardars.'⁶ Quite obviously, this caveat prevented Ahmed Yar Khan from having any real influence or control over the sardars since without the

subsidy carrot and the removal stick, the Khan had no real way to rein them in.

The 1935 earthquake devastated Kalat and flattened Quetta, and so Ahmed Yar Khan suspended all negotiations with the Government of India on his and the state's legal status. When talks resumed in 1938, the Khan again sent a lengthy memorandum to the Government of India elucidating his key demands. Amongst various items, he asked for a full restoration of the 1876 treaty and for a new one to be drawn up reaffirming all that was stated in the previous one. He also wanted New Delhi to restore his full control over the affairs of the state, recognize his sovereignty over Kharan and Las Bela, and return Quetta, Nasirabad, and Nushki districts. Significantly, he wanted to regain from the prime minister and the political agent full control over all the financial matters of the state and especially those relating to the sardars.⁷

The Government of India, while not comfortable with his manoeuvrings to gain more power, recognized that in order to solidify his loyalty to the British Crown it had to ensure that he at least possessed certain powers. Replying to Ahmed Yar Khan's demands the AGG noted:

His Excellency the Crown Representative agrees with Your Highness that time has now come when the powers should be restored to the Khan; and it gives me pleasure to inform Your Highness that subject to the provision of Article 5 of the Treaty, full powers of control and jurisdiction over the sardars and tribal areas of the state will now be resorted to you.⁸

However, the subsidiary letter bound the Khan to certain conditions so that even though he could now be in charge of the disbursement of the allowances to the sardars, he could not take

any important decision concerning them without the agreement of the AGG. The Khan also gained full financial control, but even so he had to furnish his records periodically for inspection. Clearly, this full restoration was window dressing, since without full control over the tribal sardars, it was very hard for the Khan's power to be felt. Also, without having the ability to extract revenue from the sardars, the meagre resources of Kalat gave the Khan little chance of creating a strong base of influence. Despite all the drawbacks, the restoration of powers was a victory of sorts for Ahmed Yar Khan who had at least nominally regained control over the state which had been effectively lost since the 1880s.

Having established a semblance of authority in areas directly administered by him, Ahmed Yar Khan argued that Kalat had the status of a non-Indian state, and therefore, it should not be treated as an Indian state by the Government of India Act, 1935. In a memorandum, he elucidated his claim to a different status while also asking the Government of India to recognize his suzerainty over the feudatory states of Kharan and Las Bela, as well as the Maari and Bugti tribal areas. The Government of India carefully studied this memorandum and reached a decision in 1941 that Kalat was an Indian state and had never been treated any differently from states of comparative rank. In a letter to the Under Secretary of State for India, the Joint Secretary External Affairs of India explained the reasons why the points raised by Kalat to merit a different status did not hold fast upon scrutiny. He wrote:

It would appear that His Highness bases his estimate of his constitutional position on a misrepresentation of Article 3 of the Treaty of 1876 ... reinforced by family recollections of the special position accorded to his grandfather, Khan Khodadad Khan, at the

Darbar of 1877. Article 3 of the treaty of 1876, however, expressly saves the provisions of Article 3 of the Treaty of 1854, by which the Khan of Kalat bound himself, his heirs and successors, in all cases to act in subordinate cooperation with the British Government. Thus, the engagement of the British Government to respect the independence of Kalat must be read subject to the Khan's undertaking to act in subordinate cooperation with them, and the position thus arrived at does not differ materially from that reached in the treaties with various other Indian states. ... The extraordinary reception given to the Khan of Kalat at the Darbar of 1877 is to be explained by the fact that it was the first occasion in which a Khan had attended an Imperial Indian gathering ... on the other hand, when the Khan of Kalat attended the Darbars of 1903 and 1911 he was received in exactly the same footing and was accorded identically the same treatment as other Indian princes of equal rank.⁹

In fact, at the Durbar of 1877, the Khan of Kalat was indeed treated as a non-Indian prince—something which Mir Khudadad Khan objected to. Lord Lytton wrote to Queen-Empress Victoria:

the Khan asked to have a banner given to him. It was explained to His Highness that banners were only given to Your Majesty's feudatories, and that he, being an independent prince, could not receive one without compromising his independence. He replied 'But I *am* a feudatory quite as loyal and obedient as any other. I don't want to be an independent prince and I do want to have my banner like all the rest. Pray let me have it.'¹⁰

However, at the conclusion of the Imperial Assemblage, the Khan of Kalat was admitted to the rank of Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India as a full member, like other Indian princes, and not as an honorary member which was the norm for non-Indian princes. The acceptance of the specifically Indian honour unmistakably showed that while Kalat

was invited and accorded non-Indian protocol at the beginning of the assemblage, by the end of the gathering, Kalat had in fact been admitted to the rank of the Indian states by the British Government in exercise of its paramountcy, which Kalat had accepted under the 1876 Treaty.¹¹ Henceforth, and especially after the creation of the Baluchistan Agency in 1877, Kalat was treated as an Indian state.

Even after intimation of this clear decision affirmed by the Crown Representative and the Secretary of State, Ahmed Yar Khan did not give up his claim and kept pressing it. In a conversation with Metcalfe, the AGG in Baluchistan, he explained his reasons to be partly historical, since Kalat had never really felt a part of India,



His Highness Mir Khudadad, GCSI, Khan of Kalat, 1857–1893 and His Courtiers
Imperial Assemblage in Delhi, 1877

and partly because he did not want to be sucked into the Indian political scene, especially in the wake of the constitutional changes brought about by the Government of India Act of 1935. Metcalfe explained in a letter to Olaf Caroe, Secretary, External Affairs Department:

... in his [the Khan's] view and in that of his predecessors, Kalat and indeed Baluchistan was not part of India at all. Baluchis and Brahuis were a separate race quite different in language, origin and customs from the people of India. ... His practical objection to being regarded as an Indian state was that he feared being drawn into the political system which current events appeared to foreshadow for India. ... He could not agree to sever his connection with the British Crown and become a member either of an All India Federation or of a Muslim constitutional unit such as Pakistan and he felt that it would be much more difficult to avoid this misfortune if he admitted Kalat to be an integral part of India ...¹²

It is important to note here that in his private conversation with Metcalfe, Ahmed Yar Khan made it clear even in 1942 that he did not wish to be connected with any future constitutional solution of India without the British. Therefore, his apparent enthusiasm for Pakistan in 1947 carries little credibility when read in conjunction with this conversation and his later reluctance to accede unconditionally to Pakistan.

Only in relation to the feudatory states of Kharan and Las Bela did the Khan achieve some recompense. Ahmed Yar Khan argued that both Kharan and Las Bela were petty states which were an integral part of Kalat State and asked the Government of India to recognize his full suzerainty over them. Previously, in 1893, owing to the weakness of the state, the Government of India had assumed

control of several of the powers of the Khan concerning Kharan and Las Bela. The political agent in Kalat noted:

On grounds of administrative policy and convenience, the British Government entered into direct agreements with the Kharan chief and corresponded with him through their Political Officers; but since 1893 the British Government have had similar direct relations with all the leading sardars of the Kalat State; and there are other examples of agreements made directly with sardars.¹³

The foreign secretary of the Government of India further noted:

... it would appear that the Khan of Kalat lost his practical control over the Sardar of Kharan in the same way as he did over other sardars in the confederacy with the result that in 1906 the Government of India recognized the fact that 'the confederacy and the Khan's position as its head were matters more of sentiment and tradition than of existing fact' and that the Kharan sardar had become practically independent of the Khan's authority.¹⁴

However, since the policy of the Government of India was to prevent the fragmentation of the confederacy, it was finally decided to acknowledge only the formal suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat over Kharan and Las Bela. Declaring the decision of the Crown Representative on the case of Kharan (and by extension Las Bela), the foreign secretary of the Government of India stated:

... that Kharan should be treated as entirely independent of Kalat, and decided that the Khan of Kalat and the Chief of Kharan should be informed that the Crown Representative regarded the Chief of Kharan as a member of the Baluch Confederacy, of which the Khan of Kalat is the head, but that in practice the subordination of Kharan to Kalat would not for the present be greater than the subordination

of Lasbela to Kalat or in other words, that Kharan would be under the purely formal suzerainty of Kalat.¹⁵

The Government of India never defined the parameters of the 'suzerainty' the Khan of Kalat was to exercise over the states of Kharan and Las Bela, but even this formal recognition of Ahmed Yar Khan's suzerainty over these recalcitrant chiefs was seen as a victory by the Khan.¹⁶

As the date for the Transfer of Power approached, the Khan of Kalat became more active in asserting his authority and finding allies. When it became clear that the British might be leaving soon, he issued a proclamation in April 1947 asserting that 'In future, the Government of Kalat will be a fully free and independent government in all international and external affairs.' He did, however, signal a close association with the future state of Pakistan and noted: 'As for the ideology of Pakistan, Muslim League Party and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Government of Kalat is in complete agreement with him and is ready to render any sacrifice for establishing Pakistan.' Then, in order to argue that Jinnah wholeheartedly agreed with his plans, Ahmed Yar Khan noted: 'The Baluch people should also remember that the policy of the Khan-i-Kalat is the same as that of Quaid-i-Azam. Indeed the Khan of Kalat has been consulting the Quaid-i-Azam in all important matters and the Quaid-i-Azam fully approves of the restoration of all the ceded territories. ...'¹⁷

The first test of the 'full support' the Khan claimed of Jinnah was in the aftermath of his request to the Government of India for the retrocession of the leased areas. In 1947, there were three areas in India that the Government of India had leased from the princely states. In central India, Berar had been leased from Hyderabad since the late nineteenth century; Gilgit *Wazarat* had

been leased from Kashmir for a period of sixty years in 1935, and the Government of India had leased Quetta in 1883, Nushki in 1899, and Nasirabad in 1903 from Kalat. Since paramountcy was to end with British departure, all treaties and agreements between the princes and the Government of India were to be terminated, including those concerning the leases. However, while Lord Mountbatten was keen on the termination and retrocession of the Gilgit lease, he was not eager to see either Hyderabad regain Berar, nor for Kalat to gain control of the strategic Bolan Pass and Quetta.

It is evident that both Mountbatten and the future Government of Pakistan were agreed that the leased areas should not retrocede to Kalat. For Pakistan, the strategic location and mineral resources of Kalat were essential for the defence and economic well-being of the country. Barrister M. Ziauddin explained to Jinnah in a letter in July 1947:

... those portions of Baluchistan which are described as British Baluchistan in the Independence Bill and which are coming into Pakistan, are in reality mountain areas and quite useless. They are isolated from the rest of Pakistan. Baluchistan as a province will in any case be a liability for Pakistan, but disintegrated and shorn of the Leased Areas, it will become a millstone around its neck. At the present juncture if Pakistan loses Quetta it loses one of the most important military stations, and the strategic routes to Persia and Afghanistan ... the potential mineral wealth of Baluchistan exists in the tribal areas. Therefore all the potential sources of Baluchistan's wealth will also go out under the present scheme [of retrocession].¹⁸

Here, the claim by the Khan of Kalat to a status different from that of the other princely states of India became a useful tool for both Mountbatten and Jinnah to use in their argument to

keep the leased areas under the control of the future Pakistani administration. Mountbatten wrote to the Secretary of State:

The Kalat States' representatives claimed that they were an independent and sovereign state in treaty relations with the British Government. The Pakistan States Department readily agreed to this view since, in their opinion, the successor authorities in India would inherit any treaty obligations with foreign states on behalf of India, whereas of course the Indian Independence Bill renounces all treaties entered into with Indian states ... it looks as though if the Khan of Kalat insists on his independent status it will cost him the leased territories including Quetta—a high price to pay for vanity.¹⁹

The choice now lay before Ahmed Yar Khan—either to accept Kalat's status as an Indian state and obtain control of the leased areas, or to continue arguing for a different status and lose these more developed and strategically important leased areas.

For his part, the Khan of Kalat was not playing his cards without due consideration. His aim was not only to achieve retrocession of the leased areas, but also to gain recognition of independence from the Government of Pakistan so that he could hold treaty negotiations with Pakistan on a parity basis. To strengthen his position further he asked for a legal opinion from one of the most eminent British jurists, Sir Walter Monckton, who generally agreed with the Khan. Sir Walter observed in his opinion:

in each case [of the leased areas] there was a specific condition that the district should be administered on behalf of the British Government ... this provision makes the agreements, whether or not they were leases, personal to the British Government, so that on cessation of British power in India, the Khan of Kalat has a right of the reversion of the rights and powers ceded to the British Government. ... I am further of the opinion that the conclusion stated in paragraph 12

(2) of the memorandum that, with the termination of the Treaty [of 1876] with the British Government, the Kalat State will revert to its pre-treaty position of complete independence, is sound.²⁰

Therefore, Ahmed Yar Khan was confident that once Pakistan recognized Kalat's independence, it would not be overly difficult for him to press Jinnah to agree to the return of the leased areas that were indisputably part of Kalat state territory.

The Government of Pakistan, led by the constitutional lawyer Jinnah, had also developed a very sound case in order to keep the leased areas as a part of Pakistan. It appears that the Government of Pakistan had no qualms about recognizing Kalat as independent since they were sure that neither Britain nor India would recognize Kalat as a separate country and hence a mere communiqué recognizing Kalat independence would do little harm. Pakistan's interest was to keep Quetta and the other leased areas away from the Khan of Kalat's so that it could consolidate its territory, especially in such a strategic location. Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar, Pakistan's States Minister, was clear about his aims and explained to the viceroy's secretary, George Abell: 'the Pakistan Government would claim to succeed to the treaty obligations and rights of His Majesty's Government. Otherwise if Kalat claimed like the Indian States to be independent, it could also claim retrocession of leased areas. ...'²¹ Thus, Pakistan unequivocally accepted Kalat's independence but refused to accept retrocession of the leased areas in its negotiations with Kalat.

It is also significant that despite playing midwife to the Kalat-Pakistan communiqué recognizing Kalat's independent status, Mountbatten did not sign the declaration himself. The minutes of his meeting with the Kalat delegation note:

Nawabzada Mohammad Aslam Khan [Prime Minister of Kalat] asked that a statement should be made declaring the recognition by the Crown Representative, as well as by the Government of Pakistan, of Kalat's independent status. The Viceroy replied that the advice which he had received on this point from the Political Adviser precluded this; in any case a declaration by the Crown Representative would be of little value at the present time. ...²²

While the Kalat delegation did not make much of Mountbatten's refusal to pen his name—and hence signal the recognition of the British government—it was this very fact that made the 11 August 1947 Kalat-Pakistan declaration useless. Without the acknowledgment of at least the British government, which was still the supreme power in India, any agreement between a still-to-be-created dominion government and a princely state stood little chance of international recognition. Therefore, when the joint communiqué stated that 'The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign state in treaty relations with the British Government; with a status different from that of Indian states,'²³ its non-acceptance by His Majesty's Government lent little credibility to that piece of paper. Mountbatten was indeed quite astute in simply de-emphasizing the importance of his recognition—an attitude which certainly helped the Pakistan government, but not Kalat whose interests he was still charged to look after in his role as Crown Representative. That in relating to the leased areas problem, Mountbatten was not acting on Whitehall's advice is clear from his correspondence with the Secretary of State who showed consternation at his dubious involvement in the Kalat issue on the Pakistan side. The Secretary of State noted:

The treaties of 1854 and 1876 do not lead to the inference that Kalat is an independent and sovereign state and it has, in fact, always been

regarded as an Indian state. ... Consequently, the leased areas lapse to Kalat and the future is a matter for negotiations between the state and Pakistan. We have been at pains in parliament to discourage claims by states to be regarded as separate international entities and to accept such a claim by Kalat will surely encourage other states to press similar claims. ... It seems to me, therefore, that any possible simplification of the problem of the areas leased by Kalat is outweighed by the general considerations set out above.²⁴

As this letter predates Mountbatten's further meetings with the Kalat delegation where, while clearly sidelining the issue of his recognition he still conferred with the delegation on the basis of Kalat's independent status, his sincerity as Crown Representative in the final solution of the issue of the princely states must be seen as untenable.

Pakistan's recognition of Kalat's non-Indian status was in essence of no real significance after the lapse of paramountcy on 15 August 1947. All the Indian states over which the Crown exercised paramountcy became legally independent on that date in any case, and so in law there was no constitutional distinction between a state like Kalat or, for example, Hyderabad after the lapse date—both were technically free to join either dominion or remain independent. The Government of Pakistan was also aware of the merely technical nature of this question regarding the legal independence of states. Pakistan's foreign secretary Ikramullah wrote to AGG Dundas:

... During his last visit the Khan was told quite clearly that the fact of independence was immaterial because according to our interpretation all states became independent and sovereign on the lapse of Paramountcy. Therefore, even if there was a difference in the

position of Kalat in the pre-partition days ... after the partition the position changed completely.²⁵

The Khan was insistent on the recognition of Kalat as 'non-Indian' so that he could keep out of constitutional and political developments in India, but that same status was now being used by the Government of Pakistan to make certain that areas leased from Kalat remained firmly under the control of the successor government.

The negotiations between Kalat and the Government of Pakistan commenced in September 1947, when the Khan sent his Prime Minister, Nawabzada Aslam Khan, and Foreign Minister, Douglas Fell, to Karachi to negotiate an agreement with Jinnah on the basis of the 11 August 1947 communiqué. Talks between the Kalat officials and the Government of Pakistan made it clear that despite the fact that Pakistan had recognized Kalat as a non-Indian state, it was not prepared to treat it differently and demanded accession on broadly the same terms as those offered to the Indian states. Foreign Secretary Ikramullah noted:

They tried to persuade me to agree to having a treaty, but acting on direction of Quaid-i-Azam I did not agree. All that I was prepared to do was to give the Khan of Kalat a modified Instrument of Accession. The modification consisted mainly in the elimination of references to the Government of India Act, 1935 which was ... a *bête noire* to the Khan.²⁶

It is unclear as to what the Khan of Kalat was prepared to accept at this stage, but it seems that at least Nawabzada Aslam Khan was confident that the Khan would sign the instrument of accession or else 'if he did not, his sardars would turn him out, as they were

determined to join Pakistan anyhow and were only waiting to be assured of their own rights.²⁷

These discussions also highlighted the problem of having Nawabzada Aslam Khan as both the Prime Minister of Kalat and a member of the Pakistan civil service. Ikramullah reminded him clearly of his duty as a Pakistani political officer:

I have also told Mr Aslam that as an IPS officer he should remember that we have made up our mind to make Pakistan into a strong state and therefore, would like to know where we stand with all these states, and that we were anxious to recall him. I had allowed him to remain in Kalat simply because of his assurance that by being there he was serving the interest of Pakistan.²⁸

Later events showed that Aslam's loyalty towards Kalat became a very contentious issue, and the Khan and the nationalists blamed him for the problems relating to accession.

Sensing that the Khan of Kalat was not agreeable to outright accession, Jinnah invited the Khan to Karachi in October 1947 to persuade him personally to accede. The Khan, in contrast, saw in this invitation an opportunity to obtain agreement from Jinnah on a treaty of perpetual friendship which would in effect allow the Government of Pakistan broadly the same degree of control and influence in Kalat but would not amount to complete accession. Jinnah was not prepared to consider a treaty and expressly asked the Khan to accede on the terms the Instrument of Accession offered. Jinnah said: 'I would sincerely advise you to merge your State with Pakistan. ... As far as the demands and the other problems of Kalat are concerned, these will be finally decided in a spirit of mutual friendship.'²⁹ The Khan was taken aback by such a change in attitude from Jinnah, and tried to buy time by

referring to the peculiar nature of his state and his intention to refer the matter to his newly created houses of parliament. Ahmed Yar Khan said:

... it is my considered opinion that Kalat's merger is necessary in order to make Pakistan stronger. In this connection, I would suggest that Baluchistan, being a land of numerous tribes, the people there must be duly consulted in the matter prior to any decision I take; for, according to the prevalent tribal convention, no decision can be binding upon them unless they are taken into confidence beforehand by their Khan.³⁰

While technically correct about the confederal nature of the state, by referring the matter to the sardars of the state, the Khan opened the door to the chance of the Government of Pakistan directly dealing with individual sardars—a threat the Government of Pakistan was not averse to using.

II POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AND DEMOCRATIC REFORM

Political activity in Kalat crystallized in the 1920s and was led by Abdul Aziz Kurd and Mir Yusuf Ali Khan Magsi. In 1927, Kurd started a newspaper *Baluchistan* in Delhi to clamour for change. However, this newspaper quickly gained notoriety and was banned. Then in November 1927, a newspaper article by Magsi entitled the 'Cry of Baluchistan', created such an outcry in the official circles in Kalat that Sir Shamas Shah (the prime minister) arrested Magsi and a tribal *jirga* fined him and sentenced him to confinement for one year. Thereafter, in order to consolidate their movement for change, Kurd created the *Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochan wa Baluchistan* in the late 1920s, and the *Young Baluch*, modelled after the *Young Turks*, in cooperation with Yusuf Magsi.

The *Anjuman* newspaper, *Al Baloch*, soon became the voice of Baluch nationalists. In the December 1932 issue, an article by Ghulam Mohammad Baloch called 'An Unfulfilled Dream', argued for a 'Greater Baluchistan' comprising of areas under Kalat, the British, Persia, and Afghanistan—thus reflecting the pan-Baloch sentiments of the organization. The *Anjuman* also took on the government of Kalat and Magsi and published a pamphlet in 1933 called *Shams Gardi* (the activities of Shams) strongly criticizing the role played by the Kalat prime minister in the succession to the khanship in 1933. Magsi wrote:

according to the old traditions it has been the right of the people to choose their ruler and leader, and we the Baluch cannot give up this right. ... We accept that Shamas Shah will present the issue of succession before the sardars, but the sardars cannot give their free will in the presence of Shamas Shah as they are afraid of him. We announce that such election will not be accepted, rather the people of Kalat State demand a ruler who can manage state affairs democratically and will establish a responsible and constitutional government. ...³¹

The *Anjuman* also held two conferences, in 1932 and 1933, where it resolved to call for representative government in a unified Baluchistan, the creation of a new *Shahi Jirga* and the abolition of the Frontier Crimes Regulation.³² Of course, at that time there was no chance of the realization of any of these demands, but they were important as rallying points for Kurd who soon established the first fully-fledged party in Kalat—the Kalat State National Party (KSNP)—in 1937, and took these demands as its main aims.³³ Initially, Ahmed Yar Khan supported these movements since they called for a greater Baluchistan under his tutelage. However, with Kurd clamouring for democratic reform and a break with the British, relations cooled and Ahmed Yar Khan

banned the party in 1939. This ban, however, did not prevent the party from popularizing its agenda in concert with the Indian National Congress whose nationalist agenda meshed well with that of the KSNP, and so the KSNP formally joined the All India States Peoples Conference (AISPC) in 1945.

By September 1939, the Muslim League, led by Qazi Mohammad Isa, had also begun to develop roots in Baluchistan. Yet the wartime restrictions on political parties, the general revulsion of the Baluch to a communal party, and the close relations of KSNP with the Congress kept it mostly confined to British Baluchistan. Furthermore, as the Pashtun inhabitants of Baluchistan were more prone to religious propaganda, the Muslim League could only establish itself in Pashtun-dominated Quetta and adjoining territories. Raedelli notes: 'the main backing for the Muslim League came from the peoples of the Pashtun ethnic group in Baluchistan, while the Baluchi tribes generally were never interested in the idea of the setting up of a large Muslim state in India.'³⁴ Therefore, even after the Transfer of Power and accession of Kalat to Pakistan, the Muslim League was never able to make any significant headway in the Baluch and Brahui areas of Baluchistan, where it constantly remained at the mercy of local sardars trying to gain control of the official party for their own motives.³⁵

The democratic ideals of the Khan and the KSNP converged in the aftermath of the Transfer of Power. Being ideologically nationalist, the KSNP was not eager to join a Pakistan led by the Muslim League and preferred either a relationship with India or, in agreement with the objective of the Khan, complete independence. The declaration of independence of Kalat allowed the Khan to initiate the first democratic reforms in the state. Therefore, according to the Government of Kalat Act, 1947, two houses of

parliament were created for Kalat State. The lower house, Dar-ul-Awam, consisted of fifty-five members of which fifty were to be elected and five nominated by the Khan to represent minority groups. The upper house, Dar-ul-Umara, consisted of the thirty-six hereditary chiefs of the tribes of Kalat State.³⁶ The electorate for the lower house was composed of men recognized as *motabir* (respectable) in a village or town. This meant that together with the usual conditions the candidate had to be at least twenty-one years old, of sound mind, and free from criminal convictions, he was also supposed to own property worth at least Rs. 4,000 and pay at least Rs. 100 in tax annually.³⁷ These restrictions obviously meant that only the wealthy members of Kalat society could vote in the elections and the very loose definition of what was meant by respectable allowed the authorities considerable sway in the elections. Agha Nasir Khan, brother-in-law of the Khan and governor of Jhalawan in 1947 recalled to Axmann in 2000:

... I went to Khuzdar and there I took a public leader—Ghous Bukhsh Bizinjo ... and we went throughout the area of Jhalawan and we conducted the elections. The principle was adopted that in every tehsil the jury members [i.e. the members of the local *jirga*] will be the electorate. In every tehsil of Kalat State there were jury members; in some tehsil there were thirty members, in some there were thirty-five who used to sit to decide the cases. So, all the *jirga* people elected their members. ...³⁸

As the act did not specify the exact composition of the electorate, and due to the very limited time between the announcement of the act and the elections (barely two months), the above description is very plausible. The result of these elections was that the KSNP won thirty-nine seats out of fifty-five in the lower house.³⁹ Obviously these elections were not democratic in the normative sense, but in a culture where the tribe was the basic

unit of society, the election of a member of the lower house by the people who had been entrusted with legal and social power in a tribe meant that the members were broadly representative of the tribes. As a first step towards involving people in decision-making, beyond the tribal sardars, this was a very revolutionary step, and even though the houses only had advisory powers, their mere existence energized the political forces in the state.

After returning from meeting Jinnah in Karachi in October 1947, Ahmed Yar Khan summoned both houses of parliament in December 1947 and January 1948, to ascertain their views on the subject of accession to Pakistan. The first session of the lower house was held on 12 December 1947. Its opening by the Khan was followed by a lengthy speech by the foreign minister, Douglas Fell, in which he elucidated the options available before the house. The prime minister's speech followed Fell's, in

which he impressed upon the members of the house their heavy responsibility to advise the Khan on relations with Pakistan. Replying to the offer of accession, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizinjo, leader of the KSNP, and therefore, in effect of the house, stated emphatically:

We have a distinct civilization. We have a separate culture like that of Iran and Afghanistan. We are Muslims but it is not necessary that by virtue of our being Muslims we should lose our freedom and merge with others. If



Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizinjo, Leader of the Kalat State National Party

the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to join Pakistan then Afghanistan and Iran, both Muslim countries, should also amalgamate with Pakistan. ... We are ready to have friendship with that country on the basis of sovereign equality but by no means [are we] ready to merge with Pakistan. ... We can survive without Pakistan.⁴⁰

Another member of the lower house, Maulana Mohammad Umar, further exclaimed:

Even though the previous speech was uttered through the tongue and throat of Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizinjo, in reality, it is the representation of the aspirations of all the Baluch who live in the mountains. ... Accession means that two things merge so completely that no difference remains between them, but a treaty means that two governments exist side by side and cooperate on certain issues. ... If Pakistan pleases then we are ready to have a treaty based on the three issues mentioned by the President [of the house], but we cannot accept accession.⁴¹

As the quotations above make plain, it was clear that not only was the house against accession to Pakistan, it also understood the difference between accession under the heads of foreign affairs, defence, and communication, and a treaty on the same issues. A treaty gave them equal status and allowed them to pull out of its provisions on their own initiative whereas accession made them an irrevocable constituent unit of Pakistan with internal autonomy but no legal basis for re-negotiation at a later stage. Therefore, the house unanimously resolved that 'Relations should be established with Pakistan on the basis of a Treaty, as two independent nations on friendly terms. Accession is not acceptable.'⁴²

When the upper house met on 4 January 1948, the debate on the question of accession exhibited a similar sentiment among the tribal sardars of the state. Speaking on the debate, Nawab Zarakzai,

the head of the Jhalawan tribes, stated: 'If the Government of Pakistan wants to achieve a respectable and friendly agreement, then the Kalat Government would have no objection to it. But we will never accept accession or merger with Pakistan.'⁴³ The house then passed a resolution stating: 'We want that both the Muslim governments of Pakistan and Kalat establish cordial relations. But these relations should be on a treaty basis and not on the basis of an accession through which our separate national existence and honour is extinguished forever.'⁴⁴

From the perspective of the tribal sardars and popular political leaders, therefore, it was sufficiently clear that there was no support for an outright accession to Pakistan in the state, and relations on a treaty basis were the preferred model—a fact already noticed by Aslam. On 29 October 1947, Aslam had informed the Government of Pakistan that: '... not only His Highness but the vast majority of his people, including the sirdars, also are totally against accession.'⁴⁵ This was interesting since only a month earlier Aslam had reported to the Government of Pakistan that all the tribal sardars were pro-Pakistan. It seems that since Aslam was not from Kalat (he was a relative of the Nawab of Amb) his grasp and assessment of politics in Kalat was not as good as one would expect of a prime minister. After the decision of both houses, the Khan, through his prime minister, again approached the Government of Pakistan for a discussion on the basis of a treaty but suffered a strong rebuff from them. Secretary Ikramullah noted:

... We told Mr Aslam that there was a fundamental difference between our attitude and that of the Khan. We were not in a position to deviate in the slightest from the line we had taken because the result of this deviation would be of incalculable harm to Pakistan. ...⁴⁶

The only two people in the Kalat government who were in full favour of Kalat's accession to Pakistan were the Prime Minister, Aslam, and the Foreign Minister, Fell. As mentioned earlier, Aslam's existence as a Pakistani civil servant on deputation meant that he was perceived as 'Pakistan's man' in Kalat. In early October 1947, he asked for 'instructions' from the Government of Pakistan. Aslam wrote to Ikramullah: '... I would request that I very kindly be guided with such further instructions in this regard as you may deem fit to give. ...'⁴⁷ Fell, who initially seemed to have agreed with the Khan on the quasi-independence of Kalat, apparently changed his opinion after discussions with Pakistani officials in Karachi and began to support the accession of Kalat to Pakistan, but on honourable terms. Fell noted that when he realized that Jinnah was not going to modify his demand for outright accession, he '... came to the conclusion that the State would be well advised to come to terms as soon as possible with Mr Jinnah on the basis of accession and to pursue plans of local independence and development within the framework of Pakistan.'⁴⁸ It also appears that due to the intransigent attitude of the Government of Pakistan on issue of the leased areas and suzerainty over Kharan and Las Bela, the Khan had begun to come round to the idea of accession. However, as Ahmed Yar Khan had openly committed himself to preserving the independence of Kalat and had referred the matter to his parliament, there was no easy way for him to extricate himself from the situation and accede to Pakistan upon his personal authority. Aslam noted that what:

... the Khan was really trying to have is some face saving device and if some formula could be found by which he would be able to show to his people that his position is slightly different (by however little) from other states, Pakistan would get substantially and actually what it wants.⁴⁹

However, by this time the houses of parliament, especially the lower house, had been energized by the responsibility entrusted to them and robustly defended the cause of an independent Kalat. There were even rumours that some nationalists had approached the Afghan and Indian governments for help. Ikramullah noted:

... rumours are floating about that the Khan is again trying to negotiate with India and Afghanistan. This time the channel of communication is the Afghan Consul in Karachi. He is alleged to have visited the Khan in Quetta. The Khan's emissary to Delhi is no other person than Khan Abdus Samad Khan. How far reliance is to be placed on these rumours, I am unable to say. ...⁵⁰

The Khan of Kalat had unleashed staunch nationalist forces in the state and now it was impossible to ignore them.

Realizing that further delay was only complicating the issue further, Aslam tried to cement the Khan's support for the Instrument of Accession at the Sibi Durbar in mid-February 1948, which, exceptionally, Jinnah attended. It was expected that both the Khan and Jinnah, who had been corresponding about the issue informally would settle the issue at Sibi with a formal accession of Kalat to Pakistan. However, as events turned out, the durbar led to a further deterioration of relations between not only the Kalat government and the Government of Pakistan, but between the Khan and Jinnah personally. Fell stated, after conversations with Government of Pakistan officials:

... the Khan had agreed to accede to Pakistan and had discussed the details in a private meeting with Mr Jinnah at which everything was settled. Mr Jinnah had then paid a formal visit to the Khan at Dhadar, ... and it had been intended that the Khan should return the visit formally at Sibi and sign the Instrument of Accession. These arrangements had been made by the Prime Minister [of Kalat].

The Khan, however, changed his mind and pleaded sickness as an excuse ... and informed Mr Jinnah that he was not able to sign the Instrument immediately, but required a period of two months to obtain the consent of sardars ...

[Shah further reported that] ... Mr Jinnah had not been particularly anxious to bring matters to a head then, but on being pressed to do so by the Prime Minister and His Highness he had agreed and he has been most put out by His Highness's last minute change of mind which, besides being a discourtesy, made the Governor-General look 'foolish' in Baluchistan.

It was made clear to me that Mr Jinnah had lost patience with the Khan over this, and was preparing to take action to undermine the Khan's position, and the action which he contemplated was to accept the Instruments of Accession from the chiefs of Kharan and Bela and from the Khan's brother-in-law Sardar Bai Khan of Turbat, all of whom were in Karachi with their tongues hanging out at the prospect of being recognized as independent princes, independent, that is to say, of Kalat.⁵¹

The fiasco at the Sibi Durbar made it clear that even if the Khan were agreeable to accession, he was under considerable internal pressure to stay firm and only offer a treaty of friendship. Fell further noted that the Khan 'had genuinely intended to come to an agreement with Jinnah but had at the last minute succumbed to pressure from members of his own family, especially his brother Abdul Karim.'⁵²

The Khan summoned both chambers of his parliament again in late February 1948 to ascertain their final views on accession. As expected, both houses were reluctant to agree to accession and the lower house passed a resolution against accession and again offered a treaty, while the upper house asked for three months for further consideration. At the session of the lower house on 25 February 1948, the Prime Minister of Kalat delivered a summary

of negotiations with the Government of Pakistan and pleaded with the House to agree to accession. He stated:

The intentions of the Government of Pakistan are good ... that is why the Islamic government of Pakistan has invited the Khan, the Ruler of Kalat State, that while keeping his independence and self-determination, he should merge with them only on those affairs which Kalat State due to its physical weakness cannot take care. ...⁵³

However, the members of the House were not convinced that accession was the only possible alternative and members like Maulvi Arz Muhammad even questioned the 'Islamic' credentials of Pakistan.⁵⁴ Presenting a resolution signed by thirty-three members of the house, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizinjo argued that friendly relations could be established with Pakistan on the basis of a treaty too, and that 'Pakistan's real intention is only to enslave us and nothing else.'⁵⁵ Maulana Mohammad Umar went further and even challenged the prime minister and enquired if 'he were a lawyer for the Pakistani government?'⁵⁶ Maulana Umar also stated the dangers of accession through which the state would be bound to accept whatever laws the Pakistan Constituent Assembly made under the acceded subjects, and thus lose its real sovereignty and independence.⁵⁷

The clear decision of the Kalat legislature further tied the hands of the Khan and he asked Jinnah again for more time.⁵⁸ However, by this time Jinnah had lost all patience with the Khan and decided to terminate his personal dealings with him and hand over the case to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. S. M. Yusuf, Jinnah's private secretary, wrote to the Khan: '... in view of the passage of time and the indecisive and changing attitude of Your Highness, he has now decided that it would be best to terminate his personal negotiations with Your Highness and

to hand over the matter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ...'⁵⁹ This termination of personal negotiations was a considerable blow to the Khan of Kalat as he saw in Jinnah a just arbiter. The Khan now realized that stern action would be taken by the Government of Pakistan officials if Kalat did not accede immediately. The Government of Pakistan had now lost its patience and was ready to play its hidden cards.

III ACCESSION

As narrated earlier, the Khan of Kalat had long been wary of the claims of the chiefs of Kharan and Las Bela who maintained that they were not under Kalat's suzerainty. On the eve of the lapse of paramountcy, the AGG Baluchistan had reaffirmed the decision of the Government of India and wrote to the Jam of Las Bela in July 1947:

... you expressed the desire of your state to remain independent. When you paid me a visit. ... I informed you that I regretted I was unable to do anything at all and reiterated that your position was that of feudatory of His Highness the Khan of Kalat. ... You accepted this in writing and paid a formal visit to His Highness. In view of the imminent closure of the Kalat Agency and in order that the Kalat State may be in a position to undertake full responsibilities before the lapse of paramountcy, orders have already been passed for the transfer of your supply arrangements to the Kalat State Government with effect from the 15th July. I am now transferring your external relations also to the Kalat State and they will in future deal with them according to the orders of His Highness the Khan.⁶⁰

The Government of Pakistan, focused on the accession of Kalat, also accepted the decision of the Government of India, and treated Kharan and Las Bela as part of the Brahui-Baluch confederacy

headed by the Khan of Kalat. In July 1947, an official in the foreign office-designate of Pakistan had stated: 'Kalat's suzerainty over Las Bela and Kharan has never been disputed in the past by the British Government and his claim is therefore valid.' While recognizing the suzerainty, the official however, clearly hinted that if Kalat proved to be a difficult case, the future Government of Pakistan might reconsider the relationship of the feudatories with Kalat. He continued:

It is, however, upon the successor government to recognize it or to refuse to do so. I would suggest that in negotiations with Kalat this may be treated as a bargaining counter. If Kalat State agrees to continue the present arrangements about leased areas, the successor government should readily acknowledge the Khan's suzerainty over these states. If he is unreasonable in negotiations about [the] leased areas he may be told straightaway that the new government propose to deal with these states direct and will recognize them as separate entities. ... This is likely to have a sobering effect on the Khan and to facilitate an amicable settlement.⁶¹

Elucidated in July 1947, this was the policy of the Government of Pakistan until March 1948. The Government of Pakistan was careful not to commit to any declaration on the status of the two feudatories and kept such a declaration as a last threat. In November 1947, Foreign Secretary Ikramullah readily acknowledged that the Government of Pakistan had still not committed itself to a firm view on the two feudatories and was bidding its time. Ikramullah noted:

Las Bela and Kharan have not been promised independence by me nor do I think they have been promised independence by the Quaid-i-Azam. The only authentic note we have on the subject which I submitted to the Quaid-i-Azam recognizes the suzerainty of Kalat

over Las Bela and Kharan. What we shall do in the event of the Khan not acceding is a different story.⁶²

The AGG in Baluchistan further explained that the Government of Pakistan had been following the policy of the outgoing Government of India by treating these states as dependencies of Kalat. Sir Ambrose wrote: '... The facts are that we started deliberately ... treating Kharan as a dependency of Kalat from 15th August onwards, and indeed earlier in anticipation of the Transfer of Power ... because we thought this to be in accordance with the constitutional position.'⁶³

During the long negotiations between the Government of Pakistan and Kalat, the chiefs of Kharan and Las Bela tried their best to get their separate existence recognized by the Government of Pakistan. The chief of Kharan, realizing that the accession of Kalat would pose problems, offered the accession of his state to Pakistan as early as November 1947. On 1 December 1947, Habibullah Khan Nowsherwani wrote to Jinnah: 'After 15 August 1947, Kharan is absolutely an independent state. It has decided to accede to Pakistan.'⁶⁴ Similarly, the Jam of Las Bela wrote to Jinnah: 'I have recently written to Prime Minister, Pakistan Government, offering accession of Las Bela State to Pakistan Dominion, and have also agreed to sign Instrument of Accession and Standstill Agreement, when called upon to do so.'⁶⁵ Despite their enthusiasm, in both cases the Government of Pakistan put their aspirations on hold as long as the accession of Kalat was being discussed. The deputy secretary in charge of the states clearly told the Jam of Las Bela in December 1947: '... the major question was that of accession of Kalat and until that question was settled no examination of the claims of various sirdars could be undertaken ...'⁶⁶ The Government of Pakistan also never signed any standstill

agreements with these states and kept all the arrangements, from the British period, unchanged.

The transfer of negotiating power from Jinnah to Government of Pakistan officials finally led to the realization of the threat which had long been contemplated. Therefore, on 17 March 1948, Kharan and Las Bela were recognized as separate states and allowed to accede separately. The Government of Pakistan also recognized the Gichki Sardar of Mekran, where the Khan's brother Abdul Karim was governor, as the ruler of Mekran and accepted his separate accession to Pakistan. This action left Kalat with less than half of its territory and no outlet to the sea. The Khan reacted violently to this news and dismissed Aslam and appointed Fell as the new prime minister. Fell noted that despite his apprehensions that the Government of Pakistan might undertake such actions, the Khan did not believe that Jinnah would authorize such a course of action.⁶⁷ After the accessions, the Khan asked Fell to write to Sir Zafarullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, protesting this action. He wrote:

The Kalat Government have however, heard a Radio Pakistan announcement that the Pakistan Government have accepted separate accession of Lasbela and Kharan, Kalat State feudatories, and Mekran, a district of the Kalat State. Kalat Government have asked for this report to be denied. The Kalat Government strongly request you to take steps to ensure that no illegal or hostile action should be taken against Kalat State by the Foreign Office ... and repeats assurances that the Kalat State desires to reach a satisfactory accord with Pakistan by negotiations. ...⁶⁸

The Government of Pakistan disregarded these protests and issued a press statement on 20 March 1948 affirming its positive attitude towards Kalat. The statement noted: 'The Pakistan Government

will await with friendly interest the proposals which Kalat State intends to send.⁶⁹ Separately the Government of Pakistan also claimed that the nature of the Kalat confederacy was such that each sardar had the right to secede from the confederation and accede to Pakistan on his own initiative.⁷⁰ Col. Shah also wrote to Secretary Ikramullah that '... we should do nothing to obstruct Baluch and Brahui sardars joining Pakistan by means of separate, individual or collective agreements.'⁷¹ The British High Commission was keeping a close watch on developments in the region and was of the opinion that if the Khan delayed any longer he could be left with no territory at all. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Relations Office it was noted: 'There are a number of Kalat sardars in Karachi offering their accession to Pakistan, and Pakistan Government may repeat procedure followed in case of Mekran and accept these offers, leaving the Khan practically without territory.'⁷²

Immediately after the accession of Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran, the Government of Pakistan dispatched troops and levies to takeover administration of ports and communications in the states. The Government of Pakistan told the Kalat government to withdraw its officials from Mekran and decided to send:

a whole brigade to Baluchistan ... two battalions of the brigade to proceed to Quetta ... one platoon ... taken by RPAF [Royal Pakistan Air Force] to Jiwani Airport for protection of aerodrome. One company ... taken by RPN [Royal Pakistan Navy] to Pasni to takeover civil administration, port administration and the Radio station ... [and] a platoon forward to Turbat. Remainder of the battalion will be kept in reserve. ...⁷³

It was also alleged by the Khan that 'the Government of Pakistan had now instructed the brigadier stationed in Quetta to be on

the 'alert for action' against Kalat; and the AGG in Baluchistan was also preparing for 'police action' against Kalat State.'⁷⁴ How far this assertion, often repeated also by Baluch nationalists, is true is hard to ascertain since there is little evidence of any kind from the Government of Pakistan concerning this issue. However, what is clear is the fact that the hurried occupation of ports and communication posts in Kharan, Las Bela, and Mekran, and the dispatch of troops to Quetta was a clear signal to the Khan that military action against him could be easily contemplated. With the presence of Pakistani troops in Kalat's feudatories, and the district of Mekran, it can also be argued that Kalat was already under partial occupation in any case.

Col. Shah left for Quetta on 21 March 1948, to settle finally the accession issue of Kalat. By the time he reached Quetta, the Khan had left for Kalat but in his meeting with Fell (who was now officiating Prime Minister), Shah was informed that while the Khan would accept the accession of Kharan and Las Bela, he was adamant on the issue of Mekran and would not budge.⁷⁵ Thereafter, conditions might seem to be coming to a head, as the British High Commission report noted:

Only two unimportant sardars obeyed Khan's summons to meeting on 25th; all others refused to attend. Khan then intensified efforts to rally people to his side, and is believed to have distributed large sums of money to Mullahs in hope of obtaining their support, but these efforts were counteracted by State Muslim League emissaries. Khan also held up transport between Kalat and Mekran, and orders that supply of stores to Mekran levy corps should be stopped.⁷⁶

Shah also reported to Ikramullah that 'There are rumours that Khan is sending his valuable property to Afghanistan. ... There are also rumours that Khan's Afghan brother-in-law has brought

him a letter from Prime Minister of Afghanistan offering his good offices in representing Kalat's case to UNO (United Nations Organization).⁷⁷ The British High Commission also believed in the veracity of some of these rumours and stated: 'There is good reason to believe that he has, in fact, been flirting with both India and Afghanistan.'⁷⁸ Thus, by the end of March 1948 it was clear that something dramatic might happen as Pakistan would never tolerate the Khan's interactions with the 'enemy' countries of India and Afghanistan. The Khan also seemed to be preparing for some kind of a showdown.

A startling announcement from All India Radio on 27 March 1948 changed the nature of the issue. A *Reuters* report described the events:

The Ruler of Kalat's communiqué said: On the night of March 27, All India's Radio Delhi announced that two months ago Kalat State had approached the Indian Union to accept its accession ... and that the Indian Union had rejected the request. ... This news was most surprising and disturbing to me as a Moslem neighbour of Pakistan. It had never been my intention to accede to India. ... This was nothing but a piece of false propaganda. ... My first reaction after hearing the news was that no time be lost to put an end to the false propaganda and to avoid and forestall the possibility of friction between the Moslem brethren in Kalat and Pakistan. ... It is therefore declared that from 9 p.m. on March 27—the time when I heard the false news over the air, I forthwith decided to accede to Pakistan and that whatever differences now exist between Kalat and Pakistan be placed in writing before Mr Jinnah ... whose decision I shall accept.⁷⁹

Thus, through an error in reporting on the part of All India Radio, something which Nehru later apologized for, the Khan of Kalat acceded to Pakistan on the same instrument of accession he had rejected many times.⁸⁰

CONCLUSION

Kalat's attempts at remaining an independent state following the lapse of paramountcy only lasted a mere seven months. In comparison with other princely states which wanted to remain independent after 15 August 1947, Kalat did not fare too badly. Only the premier Indian state, Hyderabad, was able to resist accession to India for over a year, and only became a part of India after military action in September 1948. Kashmir, whose maharaja wanted to remain independent, was also unable to maintain its hope of being the 'Switzerland of Asia', and a disputed accession, quickly followed by military intervention from India made it a lasting bone of contention between India and Pakistan. In a way therefore, the fate of Kalat was long written as an eventual part of Pakistan. Kalat was too strategic to be left alone, especially since the leased areas were integral to the defence of Pakistan, and even South Asia. Nehru had noted in 1946: 'The fact that Kalat is a border state adds to its importance from our point of view as frontiers are always strategic areas. An independent India cannot permit foreign forces and foreign footholds such as Kalat might afford near its own territories.'⁸¹ The British Foreign Office was also uneasy with the attempts of Kalat to remain independent, mainly for strategic reasons and for its effect on other states contemplating full independence. Henderson, the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations noted:

The Khan of Kalat, whose territory marches with Persia, is of course in no position to undertake the international responsibilities of an independent state, and Lord Mountbatten, who before the transfer of power, was warned of the dangers of such a development doubtless passed on this warning to the Pakistan Government.⁸²

Even in parliament, the British government was clear that it preferred that Kalat achieve an agreement with Pakistan. In an answer to a supplementary question, the government stated: 'HMG (His Majesty's Government) consider it important that a very close understanding should be arrived at between Pakistan and Kalat on all matters of common concern.'⁸³ With no international help and growing pressure from Pakistan to accede, it was only a matter of time before Kalat would have succumbed to pressure and acceded.


Kalat's claim of being a non-Indian state, while useful in opting out of the federal and democratic arrangements envisaged by the Government of India Act, 1935, spelt the death knell for the state after the lapse of paramountcy. Kalat was certainly treated as a non-Indian state at the 1877 durbar, but that was before the establishment of the Baluchistan Agency in 1884, and the full exercise of British paramountcy in Kalat affairs. The clause where the British government pledged to 'respect the independence of Khelat' in the 1876 treaty was not peculiar to Kalat. Various treaties with Indian states had previously carried the same provision, but later interpretations and practice meant that in effect the 'independence' was limited to internal affairs and that too was subject to the control of the paramount power. The key point here was that once states came under the paramountcy of the British, the very loose definition of paramountcy gave the British government vast powers. So new states could be carved out (like Kashmir or Benaras), the ranking of states could be altered (Khairpur started with a 19-gun salute which was successively lowered to 15), and even their status could be changed (for example with Afghanistan in 1919). Through the legal opinion of eminent jurist, J. H. Morgan in 1948,⁸⁴ the Khan did attempt to argue that the British never exercised paramountcy in Kalat,

but events after the abdication of Mir Khudadad Khan in 1893, the restrictions put upon the later khans, and the powers the political agent and AGG actually carried, made it sufficiently clear that paramountcy was indeed being practised in relation to Kalat. Therefore, Kalat established relations with the British as a non-Indian state but was eventually judged an Indian state by the British government in exercise of its paramountcy.

As argued earlier, Pakistan had not intended to treat Kalat as a non-Indian state, and only recognized it as such to prevent the retrocession of the leased areas. The legal opinion of the British Foreign Office and the Political Department was that Pakistan only inherited the leases 'on the basis that Kalat state is an independent sovereign state in treaty relations with HMG;⁸⁵ otherwise the leases lapsed under the Indian Independence Act 1947. The Khan tried in vain to argue that the leases were 'personal' to the British government and hence, with their departure automatically lapsed. Since these treaties were made before the distinction between treaties with the Crown and the British Government of India these arguments were untenable. In fact, almost all treaties made with Indian or non-Indian states used the term British Government without defining whether it meant the Crown, the Westminster government, or the British Government of India. The complicated nature of governance in the Baluch-Brahui confederacy also made the claims of the Khan with respect to Kharan and Las Bela a matter of contention. A great deal of official work relating to Kalat depended on convention rather than on actual codified treaties. Hence, the attitude of Sir Robert Sandeman and later AGG's, who continually interfered in Kalat, made a clarification of relations between the Khan of Kalat and Las Bela and Kharan very difficult. Following Ahmed Yar Khan's assertion that he was the sovereign of Kharan, the Government

of India spent almost four years (1936–40) assessing the case, and finally accepted a formal suzerainty of the Khan over Kharan while also recognizing Kharan as a separate state (until that time Kharan was generally considered a district of Kalat). A Political Department note explained the complexity of the issue where a lot relied on precedence: 'The truth of the matter seems to be that in olden times when a particular Khan of Kalat was strong he extended his influence as far as he could and the exact limitations of his suzerainty varied according to the power of the individual Khan.'⁸⁶ So due to the weakness of successive khans, by 1906 the Kharan 'sardar has become practically independent of the Khan's authority.'⁸⁷ The Government of Pakistan simply used the vagueness of the suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat over Las Bela and Kharan as an excuse to allow them to accede separately.

The case of Kalat was also peculiar since, despite its considerable complications, it involved relatively few people. Up until March 1948, the negotiations ultimately depended on the relationship between Ahmed Yar Khan and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The Khan and Mr Jinnah had known each other for over a decade and Jinnah had acted as legal adviser for the state. As a matter of fact, Jinnah personally presented the Kalat memoranda to the Cabinet Mission in 1946, which argued for Kalat's different status.⁸⁸ Even though Jinnah was close to Ahmed Yar Khan, he made it sufficiently clear that he wanted Kalat to accede to Pakistan on the same terms as other states. As relations deteriorated, especially after the Sibi durbar, the Khan began to look for other people to blame. Ahmed Yar Khan had deep respect for Jinnah and simply could not accept that Jinnah would create problems for Kalat. He noted:



Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah with Captain His Highness Beglar Begi Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, Khan of Kalat, 1933–1979

I had been in direct touch with the Quaid-i-Azam right since 1936 to 1948 when he died ... but soon after the creation of Pakistan, the Quaid was surrounded by certain top-men who ... were not the true well-wishers of the new State ... they laboured to create misunderstandings between me and the Quaid-i-Azam by telling him that the “Khan-i-Azam was avoiding the merger of Kalat State ...”⁸⁹

The Khan then looked for scapegoats to blame and singled out the AGG, Sir Ambrose Dundas, his prime minister, Nawabzada Aslam Khan, and Col. A. S. B. Shah of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, as troublemakers. He charged: ‘These individuals, plainly speaking, were opposed to the idea of Kalat’s merger with Pakistan.’⁹⁰ These were hollow charges, since Aslam had been pressing the Khan, on the instructions of the Government of Pakistan, to accede from September 1947 onwards, and Col. A. S. B. Shah was the official who finally created such conditions (the acceptance of the accession of Kharan, Las Bela, and Mekran), which finally led to the accession of Kalat, and

Sir Ambrose Dundas was out of the loop during much of the negotiations in any case.

In reality, however, the Khan started and ended the story.⁹¹ Ahmed Yar Khan had expectations of Jinnah which he could not fulfil. In August 1947, the ailing Jinnah became the Governor-General of a country in turmoil. In these circumstances, Jinnah was not able to remain on the friendly terms that Ahmed Yar Khan was used to, and had to place the interests of Pakistan before everything else ruthlessly. In doing so, Jinnah used everything in his power, including what seemed deceptive to the Khan, to induce the Khan to accede to Pakistan. Jinnah, the legal advisor of the Khan and Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan were certainly not co-terminous and the Khan failed to see this important difference. Unfortunately for Ahmed Yar Khan, except for Douglas Fell, who really wanted an honourable settlement for Kalat, all other officials involved were members of the Pakistan civil service and obviously wanted Kalat to accede to Pakistan on the standard instrument of accession.

The issue of the accession of Kalat to Pakistan did not end with the formal accession of the state on 27 March 1948. The creation of the houses of parliament had unleashed powerful political forces in the state which were overwhelmingly against the accession of Kalat to Pakistan. The Khan had himself highlighted the nature of his government where important decisions had to be taken in concert with the tribal sardars and elected representatives, and so his disregard of them in the final decision was not accepted lightly. The Kalat State National Party (KSNP), led by Ghaus Bakhsh Bizinjo, decried this act as one of cowardice and betrayal and almost immediately the Khan's younger brother, Abdul Karim, repudiated the accession and led the first of many insurgencies against Pakistan in Kalat.⁹²

Notes

1. Wakefield, *Past Imperative*, 136.
2. Précis of the Constitutional History of Kalat State by Weightman, Foreign Secretary GoI, 14 September 1934, R/1/34/60, IOR.
3. Ibid.
4. See, *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. XI, page 350 for the 1839 Treaty and pages 362–4, for the 1876 Treaty, and also, Foreign Secretary India to Under-Secretary of State for India, 30 March 1940, R/1/34/65, IOR.
5. Ahmed Yar Khan to Norman Cater, 27 February 1935, R/1/34/63, IOR.
6. Skrine to Cater, 27 December 1935, *ibid*.
7. For details see, *Murasila to the Government of India*, 12 August 1938, *ibid*.
8. Parsons to Ahmed Yar Khan, 3 June 1939, R/1/34/64, IOR.
9. Joint Secretary, External Affairs Department, GoI to Under-Secretary of State for India, 31 December 1941, R/1/1/4926, IOR.
10. Balfour, *Lytton's Indian Administration*, 124.
11. See excerpt from the First Administration Report of the Baluchistan Agency by Sir Robert Sandeman in R/1/1/4927, IOR.
12. AGG Baluchistan to Caroe, 12 June 1942, R/1/1/4925, IOR.
13. PA Kalat to AGG Baluchistan, 16 May 1939, R/1/34/59, IOR.
14. Metcalfe to AGG Baluchistan, 13 July 1939, *ibid*.
15. Foreign Secretary India to Under-Secretary of State for India, 30 March 1940, R/1/34/65, IOR.
16. To further bolster his sense of 'different-ness' the Khan wanted to exercise his treaty right of accrediting an agent to the Government of India. The AGG Baluchistan noted in a letter to the Secretary External Affairs Government of India on 16 October 1940, that the Khan: '... was very annoyed at the Government of India's decision to recognize Kharan as a separate state and at their refusal, to insist on an apology from the chief of Kharan. He attributed their attitude to the effect of propaganda in the newspapers and in political circles in India organized by the chief of Kharan, which the Khan had made no serious attempt to counter. He therefore, considered that his interests would be better served in future, if he exercised his treaty rights and had a representative in Delhi or Simla, who could press his point of view with the GoI and also keep in touch with political personalities, and organizations at headquarters.' However, the viceroy shattered the Khan's hope of this special and different treatment and emphatically stated that the agent would only serve a ceremonial

purpose and bring no change in practice. Lord Linlithgow wrote to the Khan on 4 January 1941: '... and I may tell Your Highness at once that I acknowledge fully your right to accredit a suitable representative to the Government of India. Whether you decide on further consideration to exercise this right is solely for Your Highness to decide, but I think it is proper to inform you, in order to avoid any possibility of future misunderstanding, that the functions of such an official would necessarily be closely circumscribed; for I should find it impossible to consider any departure whatsoever from established practice by which the relations of the Crown Representative and the Government of India with the Khan of Kalat are conducted through the Resident in Baluchistan and the PA in Kalat.' R/1/1/4927, IOR.

17. Annex to a letter from Kalat to Jinnah, 14 April 1947, F 699/21, NAP.
18. Ziauddin to Jinnah, 8 July 1947, PS-77, *JP*, vol. VIII.
19. Mountbatten to Listowel, Personal Report No. 14, 25 July 1947, L/PO/6/123, IOR.
20. Opinion of Monckton, 5 June 1947, underlining in original, R/1/1/4921, IOR.
21. Abell's note to Corfield regarding interview with Nishtar, 18 July 1947, *ibid*.
22. 25th Miscellaneous meeting of the Viceroy with the Kalat Delegation, 4 August 1947, *ibid*.
23. Pakistan-Kalat Communiqué, 11 August 1947, R/3/1/166, IOR.
24. Secretary of State to Viceroy, 2 August 1947, R/1/1/4921, IOR.
25. Ikramullah to Dundas, November 1947, 2 (20) S/47, SAFRON.
26. Note by Ikramullah, 25 November 1947, *ibid*.
27. Note, 14 September 1947, *ibid*.
28. *Ibid*.
29. Ahmed Yar Khan, *Inside Baluchistan*, 153.
30. *Ibid*.
31. Naseer, *Balochistan Qadeem aur Jadeed*, quoted in Bakht, 'Role of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizinjo', 61.
32. For details see, Memorandum of Evidence by Samad Achakzai to Joint Select Committee, House of Lords, London on 1 May 1933, L/PS/12/3174, IOR.
33. KSNP, *Manshur* (Manifesto), 1937 and KSNP, *Dastur* (Constitution), 1938, KSA.
34. Raedelli, *The Father's Bow*, 148.

35. In a chapter on the accession of British Baluchistan and Kalat, Javed Haider Syed does not even mention the almost non-existence of the Muslim League in Kalat and the significance of the KSNP. See, Sayed, 'The Political Development in Baluchistan', Chapter 7.
36. Government of Kalat Act 1947, Chapter III, No. 13, 14, KSA.
37. See, Naseer, *Tarikh-e-Baluchistan*, 544.
38. Quoted in Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 228.
39. Naseer, *Tarikh-e-Baluchistan*, 544.
40. Translated by Janmahmed, *Essays*, 174-5.
41. Naseer, *Tarikh-e-Baluchistan*, 552-3.
42. Ibid. 554.
43. Ibid. 558.
44. Ibid.
45. Aslam to Ikramullah, 29 October 1947, 2 (20) S/47, SAFRON.
46. Note by Ikramullah, 30 January 1948, *ibid*.
47. Aslam to Ikramullah, 29 October 1947, *ibid*.
48. Fell Papers, D971/1, 47-8, IOPP.
49. Note by Ikramullah, 30 January 1948, 2 (20) S/47, SAFRON, and Naseer, *Tarikh-e-Baluchistan*, 562.
50. Note by Ikramullah, 25 November 1947, 2 (20) S/47, SAFRON.
51. Fell Papers, D971/1, 61-4, IOPP.
52. Ibid. 84.
53. Government of Kalat, *Proceedings*, 3, KSA.
54. Arz Muhammad said: 'Why Kalat, where Shariat was the law, was being subjugated to Pakistan where shariat was not in force and where liquor shops, brothels and many other vices were flourishing. Pakistan should first purify itself and then seek union with the state.' G. Ahmed to Mohammad Ali, F 14 GG/69-70, NAP. This was the typical attitude of most religious scholars in India, who were aghast at westernized Indian Muslims raising the slogan of an 'Islamic country' when the country was hardly going to be different from the erstwhile British India. That was one of the reasons why the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind was not aligned with the Muslim League.
55. Ibid. *Proceedings*, 8, KSA.
56. Ibid. 10.
57. Ibid. 11.
58. Kalat to Jinnah, 2 March 1948, F14-GG/38, NAP.
59. S. M. Yusuf to Khan Kalat, 4 March 1948, F14-GG/40-2, NAP.

60. *Murasila* from AGG Baluchistan to Las Bela, 15 July 1947, Fell Papers, D971/2, IOPP.
61. Note by Z. H. Burney, 14 July 1947, 2 (20) S/47, SAFRON.
62. Note by Ikramullah, 25 November 1947, *ibid*.
63. AGG Baluchistan to Ikramullah, 24 November 1947, *ibid*.
64. Kharan to Jinnah, 1 December 1947, F.124 (5)-GG/10-3, NAP.
65. Las Bela to Jinnah, 5 September 1947, F. 20-GG/5-6, NAP.
66. Note by Akhtar Hussain, 23 December 1947, 2 (20) S/47, SAFRON.
67. Fell Papers, D971/1, 86, IOPP.
68. Fell to Zafarullah Khan, 20 March 1948, S.5/40/48, SAFRON.
69. Quoted in Alling to Marshall, 23 March 1948, F.845.00/3-2348, USNA, Annex to PS-133, *JP*, vol. VIII.
70. See, Naseer, *Tarikh-e-Baluchistan*, 566-77.
71. Shah to Ikramullah, 23 March 1947, F 14 GG/76-7, NAP.
72. British High Commission to Commonwealth Relations Office, 27 March 1948, L/PS/1847, IOR.
73. Foreign Office Karachi to Baluchistan Quetta, 26 March 1948, S.5/40/48, SAFRON.
74. Ahmed Yar Khan, *Inside Baluchistan*, 161.
75. Savigram from British High Commission to Commonwealth Relations Office, 5 April 1948, L/PS/13/1847, IOR.
76. *Ibid*.
77. Shah to Ikramullah, 26 March F 14 GG/96, NAP.
78. Telegram from British High Commission to Commonwealth Relations Office, 27 March 1948, L/PS/13/1847, IOR.
79. *Reuters*, 28 March 1948, L/PS/1847, IOR.
80. For Nehru's denial of the veracity of the radio report see, F. 845.00/4-248, USNA, Annex to PS-101, *JP*, vol. VIII.
81. *Dawn*, 18 July 1946.
82. Memo by Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, 12 September 1947, FO 371/F.12773, in *JP*, vol. XVIII, 51.
83. Reply made on 11 March 1948, L/PJ/7/12616, IOR.
84. Legal Opinion by J. H. Morgan, 11 February 1948, Fell Papers, D971/2, IOPP.
85. Memo on Kalat, R/1/1/4922, IOR.
86. Note, 29 July 1938, R/1/34/59, IOR.
87. Quoted in Foreign Secretary India to AGG Baluchistan, 13 July 1939, *ibid*.

88. Ahmed Yar Khan, *Inside Baluchistan*, 142.
89. Ibid. 156.
90. Ibid.
91. A year later, however, a report by the US Embassy argued that the Khan wanted accession all along but that his fickle temperament delayed accession. It noted: '... it appears that the Khan only wanted to delay accession to Pakistan ... the Khan's personal will and ambitions were less important than his personal indecisiveness, vacillation and miscalculation. ...' Memorandum on Baluchistan 1949, by H. G. Josif, 5 October 1949, Box 12, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
92. It is beyond the purview of the current chapter to go into the activities of Prince Karim. However, there are several accounts of Abdul Karim's activities in 1948, best among them is that of Fell in D971/3, IOPP.

Chapter Four

The Raj Resurrected

This voluntary acceptance of the authority of the centre ... has revived the old practice of paramountcy.

States and Frontier Ministry (SAFRON):
Half Yearly Report from October 1948 to March 1949

INTRODUCTION

After the accession of Kalat in March 1948, the Government of Pakistan turned its attention towards establishing a framework to ensure effective administration in the states and smooth communication between the centre and the states. As the states formed a considerably large percentage of the area of western Pakistan and were mostly situated on the border with unfriendly countries, it was imperative for the Pakistani establishment to have direct and commanding lines of communication with the states so that not only could internal strife be controlled, but foreign threats could also be thwarted.

The integration of the princely states in Pakistan took a different path from that in India. One major difference between the patterns of integration was the fact that Pakistan did not have to deal with hundreds of small principalities, where administrative and democratic problems necessitated some reform. Also, the lack of any sympathetic political movements in most states which acceded meant that the Government of Pakistan had

little leverage in these states. The stability and depth of the government were also differentiating factors. In its early days the Government of Pakistan was unstable and relied heavily on Jinnah and Liaquat. It also had a number of problems, such as lack of administrative facilities, civil servants, finance, and the like, which the Government of India did not suffer from to the same extent. Thus, while the princely problem in India lingered on until the occupation and annexation of Hyderabad in September 1948 but it did not prevent Patel from starting the process of integration in December 1947, while in Pakistan, until the accession of Kalat in March 1948, no steps had been taken to initiate reform in the states which had acceded to Pakistan.

The instruments of accession signed by the states were very limited in nature and only allowed the Government of Pakistan to interfere in matters related to defence, foreign relations, and communications. This meant that legally the Government of Pakistan had no role in the internal affairs of the princely states. As such, the role of the new States Ministry was very circumscribed as compared to the Indian Political Department which exercised paramountcy over the states—meaning that as paramount power it held in reserve powers to interfere in any matter it thought fit.¹ However, in both India and Pakistan, the States ministries soon attempted to revive the doctrine of paramountcy through a series of supplementary instruments of accession and other agreements.

This chapter traces the constitutional integration of the princely states into Pakistan. Beginning with a short introduction to the Indian Political Department, the chapter contextualizes the main characters who initiated, developed, and carried out policies regarding the states in Pakistan. It then succinctly describes the process of constitutional integration in India, a process eventually

followed by Pakistan in certain ways. The major part of the chapter then outlines the long drawn-out process of constitutional integration focusing on the reasons behind the staggered process and the different levels of integration achieved by the states. The chapter also situates the process of integration within the larger framework of the constitutional and political struggles within Pakistan that ultimately led to the merger of the states, except for the Frontier states and Hunza and Nagar, in the One Unit in 1955.

I THE POLITICAL CADRE

There is an old saying about the famed Indian Civil Service (ICS), that it was neither 'Indian', nor 'Civil', nor a 'Service'. The same can be said of the Indian Political Service (IPS), the name collectively given in 1937 to the officers who held posts in the Indian states. This is because firstly, even after the rapid Indianization of the ICS in the twentieth century, the IPS remained overwhelmingly British, and among the 124 serving officers of the cadre in 1947, only seventeen were Indian: twelve Muslims, four Hindus and one Sikh.² Secondly, the officers did not deal with anything political, in the normative sense, as their posts were primarily of a diplomatic nature. Thirdly, the IPS was not formally a service since it did not have any separate entrance examinations and all its officers were technically on deputation from either the Indian Army or the ICS.

The members of the IPS were recruited either from the ICS or from the Indian Army, usually on permanent deputation. Sir Terrance Creagh-Coen, a veteran of the IPS, noted that the selection of officers was as follows:

Army officers who had passed their promotion examinations, were unmarried and were under twenty-six, could apply through their commanding officers ... Indian Civil Service officers who had passed their departmental examinations, were unmarried and had less than five years service, could similarly apply, through their provincial governments. The precise recruitment formula was, 2 members of the ICS every year, subject to a reduction by 1 in every fifth year, and 4 or 5 military officers in alternate years. ...³

However, the calibre of men recruited to the service fell short of the standards expected. Recently Dr Keen has noted:

By the twentieth century there was a groundswell of dissatisfaction with existing procedures of training and recruitment. Even by its own standards the Political Service had failed to attract enough men of a sufficiently high calibre from the Indian Civil Service and, more importantly, from the Staff Corps of the Indian Army, which was naturally reluctant to release its best young regimental officer for civil employment.⁴

Interestingly, when there was immense nationalist pressure to Indianize the ICS, most of the princes staunchly opposed the Indianization of the ICS. The main reason behind such an attitude was that 'as their relations were with the British Crown and not the Government of India, British officers were more suitable intermediaries.'⁵

After the reorganization of the Government of India under the 1935 Act, a new position of Crown Representative was created as distinct from that of Governor-General of India. The Crown Representative (who in practice was the same person as the governor-general) was now responsible for relations with the states through his political adviser, who in turn headed the IPS. In 1947, the Political Department had a very small staff consisting

of the political adviser, one secretary, one joint secretary, two deputy secretaries, and one assistant secretary, in addition to a crown finance officer, and the military adviser-in-chief.⁶ While it is impossible to go into the details of the working of the Political Department here, it is worth noting that until the consolidation of the officers under the IPS and the Crown Representative, decisions by political officers in the states were a complex mix of personal decisions, attitudes of provincial governments (which had their own Political Departments for a long time), conversations between the foreign and political secretaries of the Government of India, private correspondence between the viceroy and the secretary of state for India, and at times a result of the intervention of the Crown.⁷

On the eve of the Transfer of Power in India, while most all-India services continued under some guise in the new dominions, the IPS was the only one to have been completely abolished. Since only a handful of Indians had ever entered the IPS, both new governments had few experts to call upon. In Pakistan in particular, the NWFP and Baluchistan, as well as the princely states within its ambit, were mainly administered by officers of the IPS, and so its demise was a larger problem for Pakistan.

As noted in Chapter 2, both India and Pakistan had officially established the States' Departments in July 1947, but the Pakistani department had a rump existence until late after independence. In the Indian case, Patel and Menon had to run the department with a few Hindu ICS officers, and with officers with limited experience in the states, but the rapid process of integration, as outlined below, diminished the need for experienced IPS hands. On the other hand, Pakistan already suffered a great dearth of experienced civil servants and since more than half of

western Pakistan was administered by the IPS, and the process of integration took much longer, there was considerable dependence on the few retained IPS officers. As a result, these officers were able to exert considerable influence on policy towards the states in Pakistan, as compared to in India.

After the creation of Pakistan, the relations with the princely states were initially conducted through a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. Mohammad Ikramullah of the ICS headed this ministry as secretary, but the leading man in dealing with the accession of the states was the joint secretary of the ministry, Colonel A. S. B. Shah, who had joined the Indian Army in 1923 but had been seconded to the political service in 1930.

Soon it was clear that it was not possible for the Foreign Affairs Ministry to deal effectively with the princely states beyond accession. Quite obviously, as the Dominion of India inherited the legal title of the now defunct British Government of India, Pakistan had to start from scratch to establish diplomatic relations with foreign governments and organizations. Therefore, a new ministry, the States and Frontier Regions Ministry (SAFRON) was set up in July 1948 to act as successor to the Political Department. Distinct from other Commonwealth countries, the Governor-General, Jinnah, rather than the prime minister, had the ultimate responsibility for this ministry. Col. Shah was the new Secretary of SAFRON, followed by Abdur Rahim Khan in 1951 (when Shah was posted as ambassador to Kabul) who had joined the Indian Army in 1920 and later transferred to the political service in 1925. The posting of these two officers was critical in ensuring the smooth-running of the ministry and the maintenance of strong control over the affairs of the states. Under the ministry, the post

of the AGG in Baluchistan (who was also the chief commissioner of British Baluchistan) was retained, as was the political agency of Malakand to deal with the Frontier states. Amb was to maintain political relations with the deputy commissioner Hazara, while both Bahawalpur and Khairpur were directly dealt with by SAFRON.

While Pakistan did not constitute a separate service on the model of the IPS to conduct its relations with the acceded states, it did retain several former IPS officers in key positions for a few years. Therefore, Sir Ambrose Dundas (IPS, 1925) became successively the AGG and Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan (1947–48), and the Governor of the NWFP (1948–49), Cecil A. V. Savidge (IPS, 1934) was the AGG and Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan from 1948–49, and Major R. K. N. Saker (IPS, 1933) held the post of Revenue and Judicial Commissioner and acted as AGG occasionally during the early 1950s in Baluchistan. In the Frontier too, several former IPS officers were retained as PA's in the tribal areas and Nawab Mahbub Ali Khan (IPS, 1915), was made PA in Malakand. Later, Major-General Iskander Mirza (IPS, 1927) who had gone back to the army, was made SAFRON minister under the second cabinet of Mohammad Ali Bogra in 1954.

The continuance of several IPS officers in top positions meant that after the arduous task of accession to Pakistan was completed there was no immediate rush for integration. Most of the officers retained had spent a considerable part of their careers in the frontier regions and were well-acquainted with local political conditions and knew the temperaments of the rulers. Therefore, the integration of the states in Pakistan was slower and distinctions were made between the various states as long as the 'old' hands continued in office. However, the presence of these officers also

meant that policy towards integrating the states was freely and firmly developed by people like Col. Shah, while officers like Sir Ambrose Dundas tried to shield the states from further interference as long as they remained in office.⁸ Therefore, the influence of ex-IPS officers was strongly felt in the development and execution of the policies of the Government of Pakistan towards both the accession and integration of the princely states.

II INTEGRATION OF THE INDIAN STATES

While Pakistan was still trying to secure the accession of the Muslim princely states contiguous to its territory, India had already embarked upon the first phase of integration of the states. The ink on the instruments of accession had barely dried when India, in late 1947, set about integrating the states in various ways. V. P. Menon in *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States* describes in detail the saga of integration, arguing that the situation in eastern India (Orissa and Chattisgarh states) prompted the Government of India to initiate such action.

The Orissa and Chattisgarh states varied greatly in size, ranging from medium size states to small landholdings. Many states had also had long spells of minority administration under the Political Department in the first half of the twentieth century. As the date for the Transfer of Power approached, a number of these states formed a union—the Eastern States Union, which was inaugurated on 1 August 1947. This Union was mainly undertaken to ensure the longevity of princely rule, to placate locals who were clamouring for more political reform, and for ease of administration. However, as this union was formed without the blessing of the new central government and did not include all the states in the region, the Government of India refused to recognize

it. Furthermore, in some states such as Nilgiri and Bastar, the people had begun to agitate for responsible government. Being states with very few resources to counter these agitators and, in the changed circumstances of the lapse of paramountcy, being unable to call on the paramount power for help, there was little the states could do to prevent a major law and order problem. V. P. Menon, while recognizing that some changes had to be brought about, was not supportive of the idea of responsible government in these small states. He noted:

... the people were politically very backward. ... There was hardly any political organization worth mentioning. The area of most of the states was small and the resources inadequate for any modern administration. In some, the grant of responsible government by the rulers had led to strange results. In some of the states the ruler and the ministers agreed to divide the revenue of the state equally between them, without any provision for the administration! In another, responsible government was followed by the closure of all public offices!⁹

V. P. Menon went on to note that various options were discussed including setting up a union of all the Orissa and Chattisgarh states, coordination with the Orissa government on specific issues, and the merger of the states in Orissa. Critical here of course was the fact that both Sardar Patel and V. P. Menon were sure that something drastic had to be done—the states could not be left as they had been under British paramountcy. Menon himself acknowledged that they were about to go back on the assurances they had given to the princes, but tried to rationalize the change of mind by noting:

... I pointed out to Sardar that the proposed merger of the states [with Orissa] was contrary to the assurances held out his own statement of

5 July and in Lord Mountbatten's address to the Chamber of Princes on 25 July 1947. It was true that, at that time, we were anxious by the policy of accession on three subjects to preserve the integrity of the country, thus preventing the States from becoming so many 'Ulsters' in the body politic. Nevertheless, a guarantee once given could not be lightly set aside, unless it could be proved that there were overwhelming considerations which were demonstrably in the interests of the country.¹⁰

Thus, when Sardar Patel and Menon met the rulers of the Orissa and Chattisgarh states on 14–15 December 1947, they impressed upon them that if they did not agree to the merger they would very soon lose all their power and authority. Under the merger agreement they were being promised their personal property, succession, and other privileges. Sardar Patel further noted that 'if his advice were not listened to, the rulers, after being ousted by their people, would have in the end to come to Delhi, by which time things might have gone so far that he would no longer be in a position to help them.'¹¹ The rulers were also given a tight schedule of about thirty hours to consider all their options. Obviously, the only option which lay in front of them, in August 1947, was to agree with the Government of India. None of the rulers was powerful enough to ward off a revolt, especially in circumstances where the rebels would have the clear support of the Indian administration. The rulers saw the writing on the wall and merged their states with Orissa in return for a privy purse. Sardar Patel defended his decision:

In the world of today, where differences are fast shrinking and masses are being gradually brought into touch with latest administrative amenities, it is impossible to postpone for a day longer than necessary the introduction of measures which would make the people realize that their progress is also proceeding at least on the lines of their

neighbouring areas. ... Indeed in many of the States, with which I had to hold discussions during the last two days, large-scale unrest had already gripped the people. ... In such circumstances ... there was no alternative to integration and democratization.¹²

On the heels of the merger of the Orissa states with Orissa and the Chattisgarh states in the Central Provinces, other mergers and unions were soon carried out. The policy of the Government of India was that, except for the larger viable states, all others should either merge with existing provinces, be created into centrally-administered chief commissioner's provinces, or be joined together to form a union of states. With some medium-sized states such as Baroda and Rampur, a transitional phase was the takeover of the states by a chief commissioner for a few months, pending merger into adjoining provinces. By the end of the integration phase there were seven centrally-administered areas under chief commissioners—Bilaspur, Kutch, Bhopal, Tripura, Manipur, Himachal Pradesh, and Vindhya Pradesh (converted to a chief commissioner's province on 1 January 1950). Five unions of states had also been formed through regional groupings. The Union of Saurashtra, inaugurated in February 1948, included all the states in the Kathiawar region; the Madhya Bharat Union created in May 1948 consisted of the states of Gwalior, Indore, and Malwa; Patiala and East Punjab States Union comprised of all Punjab states was established in July 1948; in May 1949 the new United State of Rajasthan was created after a three-stage process consisting of all the states within the Rajputana region, and in July 1949 the union of Travancore and Cochin was finalized. All the other states, except Hyderabad, Mysore, and Jammu and Kashmir which retained their territorial integrity, were merged into neighbouring provinces. Shortly after, all rulers signed supplementary instruments of accession to give legal cover to the these changes, and also accepted

the federal and concurrent lists according to the Government of India Act of 1935.¹³

The speed at which the Government of India had gone back on its assurances given in the instruments of accession was not lost on the rulers who complained to Lord Mountbatten, now the Governor-General of the Dominion of India, at a conference on 7 January 1948. However, Lord Mountbatten commended the action of the States Ministry and compared it to the mediatization of Germanic states by Napoleon in 1801. After the merger of the Kathiawar states, Mountbatten had written to Menon: '... I am lost in admiration of the masterly way in which you handled this matter and I cannot refrain from sending this short brief note to congratulate you most heartily on all that you have achieved.'¹⁴ Menon himself, however, was very much aware of how he and Sardar Patel had begun the final demise of the princely order, just months after assuring them otherwise. Menon noted:

No ruler had thought even a month previously that he would have so soon to part with his state and rulership. Something which had been in their families for generations and which they had regarded as sacrosanct had disappeared, as it were, in the twinkling of an eye. Though all of them put up a bold front, the mental anguish they were going through was writ large on their faces. ... The scene here was to the last degree moving and will ever linger in my memory.¹⁵

But the process of integration and democratization was the ultimate aim of the Government of India. The *White Paper* gleefully noted:

The policy of integration and democratization, which the Government of India have applied to the States, constituted the only solution of the problem of the States, and the only method of fitting in the

states in the new set-up of India. This was, therefore, no emotional approach, any expansionist policy, nor power politics.¹⁶

At the end of the integration process, all the princes in India were constitutional rulers at best. A number of rulers lost all power as their states merged with the provinces or became a part of a states union where only one ruler became the *rajpramukh* (equivalent to the governor in the provinces) with usually another prominent prince appointed as a deputy, i.e. *uprajpramukh*. In the stand-alone states, the rulers now became constitutional heads of state also with the title of *rajpramukh*. Menon, therefore, concluded: 'The constitutional position thus reached was that ... the Unions of States had come in their relations with the Centre into exactly the same position as the provinces.'¹⁷ The rulers, who were by 1950 mere titular governors of their former states or the new unions, only had a short span of existence as they were summarily dismissed in the reorganization of states in the 1950s.

The cushion provided by the Government of India to the princes was the provision of the privy purse. Menon noted: 'The grant of privy purses to the rulers was sort of *quid pro quo* for the surrender by them of all their ruling powers and for the dissolution of their States.'¹⁸ In settling the privy purses, Menon was very conservative in his estimates. He noted that both the formula of the Political Department from 1946 and of Congress's sub-committee for the Deccan states 'erred on the generous side.'¹⁹ He decided on a formula by which 'the ruler of a State with an average annual revenue of Rs. 15 Lakhs (1.5 million) would get an annual privy purse of Rs. 130,000.'²⁰ For states with revenues above Rs. 15 lakhs, the formula would allow for 7.5 per cent from every lakh to a maximum of Rs. 10 lakhs. Only in the cases of larger states did Menon allow for a larger privy purse but even then he curtailed

the amount as much as possible. As a result, the Maharaja of Jaipur secured Rs. 18 lakhs, Gwalior, Rs. 25 lakhs, and the Nizam of Hyderabad continued with his purse of Rs. 50 lakhs, which accounted for a mere two per cent of the state's revenues.²¹ Menon, therefore, rightly concluded that the benefits of securing the integration of millions of square miles into the Indian Union, the abolition of internal customs, the acquisition of over 12,000 miles of railways without any compensation, and above all, assets and investments of over seventy-seven crores (seven hundred and seventy million), far outstripped the financial burden on the Government of India.²² Furthermore, as the agreements were only tenable during the lifetime of the rulers, they could easily be revised downwards with the next ruler, allowing significant negotiating ground for the government. For the princes, the privy purses and the guarantee of private property and the continuation of their titles and privileges were momentary sops before being divested of even these considerations in later years.

III MAJOR REFORMS

From inception, Pakistan was overwhelmed by a myriad of problems. Not only were there internal issues of governance and a fledgling economy to shore up, Pakistan had embarked on a devastating war with India over Kashmir in October 1947, thereby freezing its relations with Kashmir, and by extension, Hunza and Nagar. Also, the insistence on accepting the Durand Line incurred the hostility of the Afghan government, which made any development of relations with the Frontier states difficult. The long drawn-out accession struggle with the Khan of Kalat complicated matters for the Baluch states, and so it was only with the states of Bahawalpur and Khairpur that some integration

could be initiated after the initial mass influx of refugees had been stemmed.

a) Bahawalpur and Khairpur

i) First Supplementary Instrument of Accession: Appointment of Ministers and Integration of Forces

The appointment of prime/chief ministers in the princely states had always been a matter of contention between the princes and the Political Department. Where the prince wanted a person whom he could trust and who would be subservient to his interests, the Political Department focused more on how far the minister would be friendly towards the Government of India, initiate reforms, and spearhead development in the state. In a number of cases, such as in Kalat when Sir Edward Wakefield was appointed Prime Minister in 1933, the Political Department invoked its paramountcy powers to force a prime minister on the state.²³ The instruments of accession signed by the states in 1947–48, however, did not allow the successor governments such influence. The Government of Pakistan was acutely aware of the fact that if it did not have a decisive role in the appointment of ministers in the state, it could not ensure its general sway over the states. The example of Kalat, where Fell's tenure as Prime Minister did cause a little consternation in Pakistan, further ensured that the States Ministry was adamant on controlling who became the prime/chief minister in both Bahawalpur and Khairpur. The operational and administrative control of the state forces was also another major issue for the Government of Pakistan. Under the instrument of accession, even though defence was the responsibility of the dominion government, the states were still permitted to establish and operate their own armed forces, with little or no oversight.

The Government of Pakistan viewed this situation as unsuitable and embarked upon convincing the rulers to give up control of the regular forces. Therefore, the Government of Pakistan pressed the ruler of Bahawalpur to sign a Supplementary Instrument of Accession in October 1948. The Supplementary Instrument of Accession for Bahawalpur, signed on 1 October 1948, and accepted by Governor-General Khawaja Nazimuddin on 4 October 1948, stated: 'The Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army should be the Commander in Chief of the Bahawalpur State Forces and shall exercise full operational, administrative and financial control over them.'²⁴ It also stipulated that the Amir would pay an agreed sum of money for the upgrading and upkeep of the state forces. The instrument also permitted the Government of Pakistan to use the Bahawalpur prime minister as their agent. It read:

The Government of Pakistan may entrust to the Prime Minister of my State such duties relating to the administration of acceded subjects within the state as it may deem necessary. In the discharge of such duties the Prime Minister of my State shall be under the direct control of and responsible to the Government of Pakistan and shall carry out its directions issued to him from time to time.²⁵

The Supplementary Instrument of Accession signed by Khairpur on 1 February 1949, contained the same provisions regarding the armed forces and their maintenance, but carried a crystallized version of what the Government of Pakistan aimed at concerning the appointment of the prime/chief ministers. It read: 'The Chief Minister of the State will be appointed by the Durbar with previous consent and approval of the Government of Pakistan and the person so appointed shall not be removed without their prior consent.'²⁶ Thus, with the execution of these agreements, the Khairpur durbar (still functioning in the name of the minor ruler),

and the ruler of Bahawalpur, under pressure from the Pakistan government, lost effective control over the two most important modes of authority—the army and the executive government. The rulers now only commanded ceremonial duties with regards to the state forces (even though they continued to be paid through state coffers), and did not have a decisive role in the appointment of prime/chief ministers.

The first supplementary instrument of accession was almost immediately put into operation and further practicalities were resolved by the time of Col. Shah's visit to Bahawalpur in December 1948. By the end of 1948, Prime Minister Mushtaq Gurmani, who had served in Bahawalpur since just before the Transfer of Power, was ready to move on to a ministerial post in the Government of Pakistan. Therefore, the search for a new prime minister was initiated. As mentioned by Shah in the report on his visit to the Amir on 6 December 1948, the Amir wanted an Englishman of his choice as prime minister. The Amir wanted '... someone who would not rush things too much but go about his work in a steady and tactful manner and also bear in mind the dignity of the ruler as well as the interests of the people of the state.'²⁷ Shah, however, insisted that the nominee of the government, Colonel Dring (who at that time was Chief Secretary to the Government of the NWFP), be accepted by the Amir. Shah noted: 'I reassured His Highness ... and said that Col. Dring fulfilled all the qualifications His Highness had in mind and had the advantage of his name being sponsored by the Prime Minister of Pakistan.'²⁸ In the end, the Amir accepted Shah's suggestion, but with reservations and a promise of review within a year. The same attitude was also adopted regarding Khairpur when its durbar began searching for a chief minister. As noted in a letter by Shah, the Khairpur durbar wanted the services of a certain Mr Williams

as Chief Minister. However, Jinnah overruled the choice and instead suggested a member of the Pakistan Administrative Service, Khan Bahadur Mumtaz Hasan Kizilbash as Chief Minister.²⁹

In his lengthy discussions with the Amir regarding the state forces, Shah insisted that the Amir hand over complete control of the state army to a General Officer Commanding appointed by Pakistan. Shah also demanded that the Amir sanction Rupees One crore (ten million) every year for the expenses of the army as well as an additional Rupees One crore as a non-recurring expense for the immediate training and upgrading of the army. As expected, the Amir was reluctant to give up complete control and argued for the retention of one brigade (half of the Bahawalpur forces) under his direct command as his bodyguards. Shah tried to dissuade the Amir from this move and argued: 'It should have been obvious to His Highness that in pay, equipment, training and efficiency, the forces under the control of Pakistan would be far better off than those remaining under him. The Household brigade would thus be relegated to an inferior status. ...'³⁰ In the ensuing discussion with the Amir, Colonel Dring, the new Prime Minister of Bahawalpur, and several other officers, the complications of the manner in which the agreement was being discussed became clearer. First, there was a clear attempt by the Government of Pakistan to resurrect the doctrine of paramountcy in an even more powerful form through the complete takeover of the states' forces. Secondly, the dual role of Col. Dring as Prime Minister of Bahawalpur and Political Agent of the Pakistan government with regard to the acceded issues led to numerous misunderstandings. Shah emphasized in his telegram to the Pakistani prime minister that he was not happy with the way in which Col. Dring had behaved during the negotiations with the Amir. He noted:

As soon as I arrived here I informed Dring of my plans. I told him I would submit my appreciation of each question for your orders before I finalize it with His Highness. I still fail to understand why he was so anxious to rush me through everything in one afternoon, and why when he saw that I was going to tackle my task in my own way he took it upon himself to present me with a *fait accompli* and why he sent the ruler away on tour and himself proceeded to Karachi. All this must have caused him a very uneasy conscience because he had to tell lies in my face and accuse me of statements which he knew I had not made. ... I request that Dring may be told that all negotiations will be conducted personally with the Ruler by me under your instructions. ... He is quite capable of adapting himself to the conditions and a word from Prime Minister will put him in an wholesome state of mind. Unfortunately, he has still not reconciled himself completely to the fact that the British rule has gone and that we mean to do our work in our own way. Should Dring threaten to resign or asks for reversion to Norwef (NWFP), I recommend that his request may be accepted because the situation in Bahawalpur does not permit any differences with the policy of the centre.³¹

Whatever the real intentions of Col. Dring, it was patent that he found it hard to represent both the Government of Pakistan and the Amir of Bahawalpur when Pakistan was trying to limit the authority of the Amir, and the Amir was desperately trying to shore it up.

Shah was very clear where the future of Bahawalpur lay. He saw the integration of the state forces as just the beginning of a process of ultimate integration of the whole state with Pakistan. Shah wrote to Liaquat:

We must get the people of Bahawalpur State behind the Government of Pakistan without any further delay. The only way to do this is to get them a representative form of interim Government. The Prime

Minister should be allowed to work directly under the Government of Pakistan in matters relevant to defence, external affairs and communications, and all financial and executive powers should be concentrated in ministers nominated by the Pakistan Government. The Ruler should give an undertaking that he will not exceed his Civil List or take advances from State Budget. ...³²

Thus, by the end of the process, Shah envisaged the ruler to be only a constitutional head with very limited authority. Real power, he hoped, would ultimately reside with the centrally appointed and controlled minister. The first supplementary instruments of accession were just the beginning.

ii) *First Democratic Reforms*

Following the establishment of local municipal bodies (with universal franchise) under the 8 November 1948 *farman*³³ of the Amir of Bahawalpur, further pressure was exerted on the Amir to initiate more reforms, and an agreement was signed between the Amir and the secretary of the States and Frontier Regions Ministry (SAFRON) on 19 January 1949, which charted the future of the state. Under the agreement, the Amir agreed to assume the position of a Constitutional Ruler, with 'the responsibility for the executive administration of the State ... with the Prime Minister.'³⁴ The prime minister was to keep the Amir informed on the salient features of policy, but was to work free from any interference from him. Furthermore, the Amir agreed to freeze his privy purse at the prevailing allowance, and also promised to unveil more democratic reforms on 8 March 1949—the twenty-fifth anniversary of his accession. The agreement also began the fiscal integration of Bahawalpur into Pakistan by the state accepting that 'the Government of Pakistan will organize and control a land customs line along the Indo-Bahawalpur border and

the custom laws of Pakistan will apply to the State of Bahawalpur. ... It is also agreed that the Bahawalpur Government will adopt the Pakistan rates of excise duties and direct taxation.'³⁵

After the January 1949 agreement, further democratic reforms were announced on 8 March which were later codified in the Government of Bahawalpur Act of 1949. This Act created a majlis (assembly) composed of twenty-five members with sixteen elected by the elected representatives of local bodies from among themselves, two ex-officio members, and seven nominated by the ruler.³⁶ Under the Act, the ruler still appointed the prime minister from outside the majlis and could dissolve the legislature without giving a reason. Only two ministers in the cabinet were to be members of the majlis and held the portfolio of 'Transferred subjects,' i.e. 'local self-government, medical and public health, education, agriculture, civil veterinary, cooperative societies, stores and stationery ... forests and gardens.'³⁷ The actual powers of the majlis were extremely restricted. The majlis could make laws concerning the transferred subjects, but they were subject to the veto of the prime minister. It could discuss the reserved subjects, but only with prior consent of the prime minister. The prime minister could also override the majlis and promulgate any laws he thought were 'essential for the safety, tranquillity or other interest of the State or part thereof.'³⁸ Therefore, in effect the act's main effect was that the ruler became more or less a constitutional ruler and the prime minister became the executive head of government. The assembly was there to advise and give the semblance of democratic government, but ultimate control lay with the prime minister, who was now appointed only after the approval of the Government of Pakistan. The ruler's powers were extremely curtailed and his only consolation was that all 'executive

action of the Government ... (was) in the name of the Ruler' and that majlis members had to swear allegiance to him.³⁹

Similarly, in Khairpur, as soon as the Supplementary Instrument of Accession was signed in February 1949, the Government of Pakistan began to create plans for reforms along the same lines as Bahawalpur. The result was the Government of Khairpur Act, 1949, which created an assembly of fifteen members, was to work in conjunction with the chief minister.⁴⁰ However, just like the Bahawalpur Act, in Khairpur also the Government of Pakistan appointed the chief minister who could veto or himself promulgate laws. In the absence of a ruling prince (since Mir George Ali Murad Talpur was still a minor) it was relatively easy for the Pakistan government to push through these changes, especially since Chief Minister Mumtaz Kizilbash was already their appointee. It was significant, however, that even though the act related to internal government, it was mainly formulated, scrutinized, and approved by the Government of Pakistan and the Khairpur durbar was merely asked to promulgate it.⁴¹

The objective of these reforms in Bahawalpur and Khairpur was primarily to weaken the hold of the ruler under the guise of democratic reform. Real power was now being transferred to the Pakistani's civil servants who were appointed prime/chief ministers in both states. When, in September 1949, agitation began in Bahawalpur against the appointment of a foreign prime minister, the Government of Pakistan not only ignored such protests but blamed them on 'old pre-partition anti-league workers of the Congress ... some of them have not severed their connection with India even now.'⁴² However, in both states, the creation of an assembly raised the hopes of the newly elected representatives, and soon there was wide spread agitation for fully elected assemblies and popularly elected ministers.

iii) *Provincial Status*

By the end of 1950, the momentum of constitutional reform in Bahawalpur and Khairpur had picked up. In December 1950, the Amir of Bahawalpur announced further reforms by which 'the strength of the elected members of Majlis (was) ... increased by five and the *Sadr* and *Niab Sadr* of the Majlis (were) to be elected members. An additional minister from amongst the elected members ... (was) appointed.'⁴³ Almost at the same time, Liaquat Ali Khan inaugurated the first directly elected assembly in Khairpur on 11 November 1950. This assembly, though still with limited power under the 1949 reforms, was the first in Pakistan to be directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. Kizilbash was still the chief minister, but the Muslim League did well in the elections and captured a large number of seats.

Assured by the entrenchment of the Muslim League in Bahawalpur and Khairpur, the Government of Pakistan continued with its constitutional reforms to bring both states at par with the provinces as separate units of Pakistan. There was a clear consensus that, given the example of India where states had either been merged or allowed to continue but as democratic and federated entities at par with the former British Indian provinces, both Bahawalpur and Khairpur were ready to proceed to such a status.

The first step in the fiscal and administrative integration of Bahawalpur was the signing of the Second Supplementary Instrument of Accession by the Amir on 30 April 1951. Under the provisions of the agreement, Bahawalpur State's contribution towards the defence budget was replaced by net receipts of the imposition of central taxes, viz. sales, income, excise, customs, and salt tax. Further, the 'Government of Pakistan will takeover the administration of the Central subjects described under the VII

schedule (List I) of the Government of India Act, 1935 as adopted for Pakistan as well as of the concurrent subjects (List III) to the extent provided for in the Act.⁷⁴⁴ In other words, through this instrument, Bahawalpur achieved the same status as the provinces of Pakistan on administrative and fiscal issues.

After fiscal and administrative integration, the final step of the constitutional reform of Bahawalpur was to bring it to the same democratic level as the provinces. Therefore, The Government of Bahawalpur (Interim Constitution) Act was promulgated by the Amir on 5 March 1952, by which Bahawalpur became a federated unit of Pakistan, with the status of a province. This interim constitution was only supposed to be in force until the promulgation of the constitution of Pakistan, which would then become the law of the state. The Bahawalpur constitution provided for the election of a forty-nine member legislative assembly based, for the first time, on universal suffrage. The prime minister and the council of ministers would be chosen from the assembly to serve for a period of five years, and exercise powers similar to those of the provincial ministries.

The provisions relating to the Amir in the interim constitution were significant since they vested vast powers in him. Under the Act, the Amir agreed to become the constitutional figurehead of government in the state (analogous to the governor in the provinces), save that he had special responsibilities, and in their execution he could overrule the democratically elected government in the state. These responsibilities included:

the prevention of any grave menace to the peace and tranquillity of the State or any part thereof ... the safeguarding of financial stability and credit of the State Government ... the implementation and carrying into effect of directions issued by the Governor-General in

respect of matters with respect to which the Federal Legislature has powers to make laws ... [and] in so far as any special responsibility of the Ruler is involved, he had in the exercise of his functions exercise his individual judgment. ...⁴⁵

Further, Section 74 of the Constitution allowed the ruler to 'assume to himself of or any of the powers vested or exercisable by any body or authority,' if 'at any time the Ruler is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Act. ...'⁴⁶ Since Section 74 was lifted from the Government of India Act, 1935 regarding provincial governors, the Government of Pakistan could do little to prevent the Amir retaining these powers. However, almost immediately the Government of Pakistan asked the Amir to sign the Third Supplementary Instrument of Accession on 27 March 1952 by which the Amir agreed to:

appoint an experienced officer with the approval of the Governor-General, as my Adviser to aid and advise me in the exercise of my powers and authority under the Government of Bahawalpur (Interim Constitution) Act, 1952, as the constitutional Ruler of my State and in the discharge of my functions in respect of matters with respect to which I am charged with special responsibility ... and required to act in my discretion or in the exercise of my individual judgment.⁴⁷

The Amir further agreed that 'should an occasion arise where I differ from the advice given to me on any matter by my Council of Ministers or my said Adviser, I shall seek the advice of the Government of Pakistan thereon and shall accept the advice as given.'⁴⁸ This instrument crystallized the policy of the Government of Pakistan towards the Amir, where even though he still technically held vast powers, he could now never act without the consent of his centrally-appointed adviser or, in the

case of a disagreement, the central government. Thus, the adviser was in effect the proxy governor of Bahawalpur State and was to direct the Amir in his conduct on the lines agreed by the central government. The Amir was now a mere puppet and the centrally-appointed adviser the real master of Bahawalpur. Thereafter, Col. Sir John Dring⁴⁹ retired as the chief minister of the state and was replaced by A. R. Khan who was to act as chief minister until the new elections and then as the adviser to the Amir.

Reforms in Khairpur followed a similar pattern and were in some ways easier to implement due to the absence of the Mir at the University of Cambridge. Therefore, combining the Second and Third Supplementary Instruments of Accession of Bahawalpur into one, the Second Supplementary Instrument of Accession was signed by the Mir in November 1952, by which Khairpur became a federated unit of Pakistan, with the status of a province. By this instrument the Mir accepted the future constitution of Pakistan as the constitution of the state and agreed to the federal and concurrent lists as applicable to the provinces.⁵⁰ This agreement was followed by the Government of Khairpur Act of July 1953 by which the membership of the legislature was doubled to thirty and all ministers were hitherto supposed to be chosen from the legislature. However, unlike the Bahawalpur Act, the Government of Pakistan still retained the right of nomination of the chief minister, who also remained the political agent. This measure made the chief minister also the proxy governor of the state, since the Mir was bound to accept the advice of the political agent. Thus, Mumtaz Kizilbash, when reappointed chief minister by the Government of Pakistan in late July 1953, unlike his opposite number in Bahawalpur, held the powers of both the prime minister and adviser.⁵¹ Despite the fact that Kizilbash was elected to the assembly in the ensuing elections, this measure was

coldly received by the press since it was clear that this act only concentrated more power in the hands of the appointed chief minister and did not allow for full responsible government. *Dawn's* editorial noted: 'With this hotch-potch democracy, the claim that this new constitution has brought Khairpur "in line with the democratic set-up in the other provinces" can have no substance at all.'⁵² But, for the moment, the Government of Pakistan was only prepared to go this far in democratizing Khairpur State and allowing it more autonomy from the centre.

b) Baluch States

After the Accession of Kalat, and that of Kharan, Las Bela, and Mekran, the main objective of the Government of Pakistan was to secure its hold on these states. These states were tribal organisms with a strong sense of local autonomy, and Pakistan's main policy in this area would be to ensure that the tribal sardars owed their allegiance mainly to the Government of Pakistan over and above their own rulers. To this end, the administrative structure of the Baluchistan Agency was not changed and left as it was during the British Raj, with an agent to the governor-general and political agents in the states. The Pakistan government also moved quickly and appointed its own officers in the feudatory states, in order to keep a firm control over them and separate them from Kalat. A British High Commission note stated: 'The last vestige of Kalat's control over Mekran was removed on 14 May (1948) by an order of the Baluchistan Government placing the APA Sibi in charge of the administration, a post previously held in theory by the Khan of Kalat.'⁵³ Similarly, *wazirs* were appointed in Las Bela and Kharan by the government.

Since the Khan of Kalat did not sign any supplementary instruments of accession after his initial accession, the Government of Pakistan had to exercise control in Kalat through the prime minister who, after the resignation of Nawabzada Aslam Khan, was Douglas Fell. As the Khan noted in his autobiography:

A fortnight after the merger, on the 15th of April 1948, to be exact, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan called upon me with an order of the Quaid-i-Azam, informing me that it was decided to maintain a status quo ante in Kalat. That the position of Kalat State would revert back to what it was during the preceding British rule! A Political Agent, an officer subordinate to the Agent to the Governor-General was appointed to look after the administration of the State and guide the Chief Minister in all internal affairs. Thus, my legal authority as the *Khan-e-Azam* came to an end on 15 April 1948, and my connections with the affairs of Kalat were cut off; and within 20 hours of the Orders executed upon me, several of the ministers of Kalat Government were exiled or arrested.⁵⁴

Despite the fact that Fell was now working under the guidance of the Pakistan government, he was not a part of Pakistan's Civil Service and was still technically employed by the Khan. Within months, therefore, Fell was labelled as 'disloyal' to Pakistan and a campaign started to remove him from office. *Dawn* noted in its editorial:

Neither the AGG nor the officials of the new Ministry which the Governor-General has set up ... can deny that Kalat State continues to be the happy hunting ground of anti-Pakistan elements and that the activities of these elements have been on the increase. ... It needs no great imagination to realize that these elements could not possibly be engaging in their anti-Pakistan activities without encouragement from responsible quarters within the state. The name which is widely

and openly mentioned in this connection is that of Mr D. Y. Fell ... (who) seems to be going strong and snapping his fingers at Pakistan.⁵⁵

The newspaper even quipped that such conditions would not be allowed to prevail in a state which had acceded to India, and noted: '... we deliberately draw this comparison because it is by no means pleasant to reflect that the wheels of the Pakistan Government move so slowly and grind not at all, even in the department which functions directly under the Quaid-i-Azam's guidance.'⁵⁶

With such vitriolic attacks against Fell in the media, the Pakistan government took immediate action and appointed Khan Bahadur Mohammad Zarif Khan of the NWFP and Punjab Provincial Civil Service as Prime Minister of Kalat in late July 1948. Placed in a situation where he did not have the backing of either his sardars or the Government of Pakistan, the Khan had no option but to accept the nomination. The Government of Pakistan further thought it best to send the Khan as part of its United Nations delegation in 1948, so that the new prime minister could consolidate his control of state affairs. The Khan was also encouraged to tour various countries with the expectation that the longer he remained out of the state, the stronger the prime minister could become, and that the Khan might even acquiesce to becoming a constitutional ruler. However, no sooner was the Khan back that he decided to create a situation in which the prime minister would resign. The report of the SAFRON ministry noted:

He [the Khan] seems very anxious to get rid of his Wazir-i-Azam and replace him with Nawab Jamal Khan Leghari or someone else of his own choice who would be subservient to his wishes. According to reports His Highness has started a campaign of propaganda and abusive anonymous letters against his Wazir-i-Azam.⁵⁷

In order to assert his authority the Khan even called a session of the now dormant *Dar-ul Awam* and *Dar-ul Umara*, the parliament of Kalat State, in August 1949, which alarmed the Government of Pakistan since it was under their guise that the Khan had managed to postpone the question of accession until late March 1948. A message was therefore sent to the Khan through the AGG that this move was unacceptable to the Government of Pakistan, since the future constitutional arrangements of Kalat vis-à-vis Pakistan had still not been finalized.⁵⁸ Thereafter, the Khan was encouraged to go on Hajj in October 1949, in order to buy some time for the government.

Besides the difficulties in dealing with the Khan of Kalat, by accepting Kharan, Las Bela, and Mekran as separate states, the Government of Pakistan had created for itself a new set of problems. Not only was the Khan of Kalat unhappy about this situation, the rulers of these states were adamant on asserting their authority, and hence were proving to be difficult for the APA's to handle. For example, when the Government of Pakistan restricted the powers of the Nawab of Mekran, large-scale agitation began in the state for the restoration of the Nawab, creating a law and order problem for the APA.⁵⁹

All four Baluch states were small, impoverished, backward, and sparsely populated. These factors meant that only a joint approach to reform was workable for the states, as they did not have the ability to support separate constitutional structures. In February 1951, AGG Aminuddin commented that only Kalat had the requisite structures available for the introduction of democratic reform, based on its 1947 Constitution. He emphasized to the Government of Pakistan that 'the machinery should be allowed to start functioning before it rusts away through disuse.'⁶⁰ Aminuddin

noted that the Khan could be persuaded to accept the position of a constitutional ruler and Kalat thereby brought to the same level as other princely states in the near future. Aminuddin was however, not enthusiastic about the prospects of the other Baluch states. He noted:

I feel that some caution is indicated in approaching the problem of drafting constitutions to pave the way for reforms in the States of Las Bela, Kharan and Mekran. The economy of the first and last is shortly to be profoundly disturbed by the taking over of the Customs Posts and control of the coast by the Central Government and by the general abolition of 'Sung'. It is hoped that generous compensation offered for the former and the substitution of true octroi for the latter, will open the way for an elected assembly of sorts and some form of local bodies respectively ... I can, at present, see no future for Kharan; the State can barely afford her existing ridiculously cheap system of administration and, until some way is found of making the desert pay increased dividends, cannot contemplate the cost of any reforms. Progress has so far passed Kharan by almost entirely, and the State in many ways resembles an Arab Shaikhdom of the Middle Ages.⁶¹

Thus, from the perspective of the Government of Pakistan there was hopelessly little which could be done to reform the Baluch states, except Kalat to some extent, under the prevailing conditions.

Following the federation of Bahawalpur in 1951, the focus of the States Ministry turned to the Baluch states with a view towards streamlining their administration. There were differences in the government as to the mechanism by which progress could be made in all four Baluch states at the same time. All four rulers were creating hurdles for the government and the maintenance of separate administrations was costing the government substantial

amounts of money and taxing the already stretched civil service. AGG Aminuddin was even of the view that the states should be dissolved once and for all. He wrote to the SAFRON Secretary, Col. A. S. B. Shah:

... if the States are to survive at all, it must be accepted that they will not conform exactly to the standards of the administered Districts and Provinces of Pakistan, and that the political and constitutional structure of the Federation will be 'lop-sided' to this extent. If the future constitution of Pakistan is broad and flexible enough to include these individual and dissimilar elements, all may be well; if on the other hand it is the policy of the Government to assimilate their administration entirely with that of Baluchistan and takeover their activities one by one ... it would be far more satisfactory to pension off the Rulers as has been done in Bharat and reconstitute the States as Districts now instead of prolonging their dissolution.⁶²

Whereas the two above options were feasible, the central government also knew that the amalgamation of the Baluch states with the chief commissioner's province of Baluchistan would cause dissatisfaction among the tribes, and the entire removal of the rulers would create an even larger problem.

A plausible solution to the Baluch states' problem was, however, to return somewhat to their status before accession to Pakistan, i.e. when they were all treated as one. After all, the government knew that it had only recognized Las Bela and Kharan as separate states to put pressure on the Khan, and Mekran was simply a figment of legal imagination. Therefore, a solution could be found if all four states were brought together in some sort of a union of states. As early as March 1948, Nawabzada Aslam Khan had suggested the creation of a Baluch States Union (BSU) as the 'only way the states and tribes can be saved from disintegration.'⁶³ As a result, in

January 1952 the idea of a Baluchistan States Union was mooted, first to the Khan of Kalat and then the other rulers.⁶⁴

The first step towards the creation of such a union was to bring all four states at par with the other states in terms of administrative and fiscal integration with Pakistan. As a result, all four rulers signed supplementary instruments of accession on 11 April 1952, along the same lines as the Second Supplementary Instrument of Accession of Bahawalpur signed in April 1951, under which the rulers agreed to accept the federal and concurrent lists from the Government of India Act, 1935, as applied to the provinces. They also 'agreed to accept the future constitution of Pakistan as the constitution of their states.'⁶⁵ The same day, the rulers also signed a covenant establishing 'a united state comprising the territories of our respective states with a common executive, legislature and judiciary.' Under the covenant, the executive government of the state would be carried out by a chief adviser, also known as the *wazir-i-azam*, who would be appointed by the Council of Rulers comprised of the four rulers, with the Khan of Kalat as the president of the Council of Rulers during his lifetime, as the *Khan-i-Azam*. The *wazir-i-azam* would be approved by the Government of Pakistan and could not be dismissed without its concurrence. A legislative assembly of twenty-eight elected members and twelve appointed sardars was to be created. The cabinet of the Union would be composed of members of the assembly with a limit of five and a maximum of two appointed members. However, no cabinet ministers could be appointed or dismissed without approval of the Government of Pakistan.⁶⁶ Subsequently, Agha Abdul Hamid, (who had been private secretary to Liaquat Ali Khan and the Prime Minister of Kalat since March 1951), was appointed as the first prime minister of the

Baluchistan States Union (BSU), keeping the new union firmly under the control of the central government.⁶⁷

The key attraction for the rulers to sign the BSU covenant and the effective surrender of their ruling powers was the signing of ancillary agreements on the same day, which guaranteed them a generous privy purse, all personal wealth, privileges, titles, and succession. Thus, the Khan of Kalat received Rs. 425,000, which amounted to over twenty-five per cent of the revenues of Kalat State in 1950–51, in addition to the Rs. 100,000 he received under the terms of the 1876 treaty. The Jam of Las Bela received Rs. 170,000 per annum, which was 18.5 per cent of the revenues of his state in 1951–52; the Nawab of Mekran received Rs. 200,000 which was 24 per cent of the revenues of his state at the 1951–52 levels, while the Nawab of Kharan received Rs. 61,000 which formed twenty-seven per cent of the revenues of the state in the year 1950–51.⁶⁸ These unprecedented levels of privy purses for all four rulers were a millstone around the finances of these states, making the BSU a heavily deficit unit, and retarded economic and social growth in the Union.

Later, on 3 November 1952, the *Khan-i-Azam* signed an Instrument of Accession (on the same terms as the Third Instrument of Bahawalpur), making Baluchistan States Union a federated unit of Pakistan.⁶⁹ The Council of Rulers also agreed to promulgate the Baluchistan States Union (Interim Constitution) Act, 1952, which codified the previously signed covenant and instrument of accession and mandated an election. However, the Council of Rulers was hopelessly divided, the promised elections never took place, and the Union continued to function under the centrally appointed prime minister for the remainder of its duration.

c) Frontier States

The trajectory of centre-state relations in the Frontier states largely followed the pattern of the Baluch states. Here too the emphasis was on firm central control and democratic reform was kept on the back burner. The issue of Pathanistan also loomed large in the background, leading the government to devise its policy very carefully.⁷⁰ The main factor which differentiated the Frontier rulers from the Baluch ones was the fact that, with the exception of Dir, all of them, were loyal to the Government of Pakistan. As long as the rulers agreed with the government, there was no demand for any further integration or reform from the central government. Dr Hussain, the SAFRON minister, succinctly noted the policy of the government:

We have dealings with one single individual who looks after law and order and who practically does exactly the same thing in the states which all the maliks do in the tribal regions. So here at the moment we are not thinking in terms of establishing a parliamentary system of government on western lines.⁷¹

Regarding Dir, its position on the border with Afghanistan, and the distrusting nature of the nawab prevented any further development of its relations with the centre, and relations with the state were governed by the original instrument of accession until the 1960s.

With democratic governments in Bahawalpur and Khairpur, the promise of an elected assembly in BSU, and recent elections in some of the provinces, political agitation in the Frontier states picked up, demanding reform, and forcing the central government to take some initiatives towards the partial integration and democratization of the Frontier states.



The Political Agent of Malakand proclaiming Saif-ur-Rahman as Mehtar of Chitral in 1949

Of the four Frontier states, Chitral was the first where conditions allowed the Government of Pakistan to exercise greater influence than the original instrument of accession permitted. On 6 January 1949, the Mehtar of Chitral, Muzzafar-ul-Mulk died, resulting in his young son, Saif-ur-Rahman, becoming the Mehtar.⁷² Owing to the young age and inexperience of the Mehtar, and the continual intrigue of some of his family members, the Government of Pakistan thought it best that the Mehtar be sent away for training and the state be managed by a Board of Administration presided over by the APA. The Malakand political agent noted:

... His Highness is young and easily misled. He is not able to govern as he should. He has little aptitude for making correct decisions. He has to rely on advice which is not always reliable. His uncles appear to be either actively working against his authority, or intriguing

amongst themselves. ... The present Ruler appears to be helpless. One remedy appears to be the appointment of an able APA with powers to control the affairs of Chitral through a Council appointed by Government. ...⁷³

In November 1949, the Mehtar agreed to the above proposal and promulgated a *farman* establishing a Board of Administration under an APA and proceeded to training in Lahore.⁷⁴

The actions of the central government in Chitral, where the ruling Mehtar was easily removed and an APA made all-powerful without even a supplementary instrument of accession, alarmed the neighbouring states and provided fodder for the propaganda of the Afghans against Pakistan. To placate the rulers, the governor of the NWFP issued a communique detailing the circumstances which had led to the setting up of a Board of Administration in Chitral...' and assured the other rulers that no such action would be taken in their states.⁷⁵ Any proposals for further development of relations with the other states were also consequently dropped.

After the decision of the government to merge Feudal Tanawal with the NWFP in 1950, Amb was left with only the trans-Indus part of its territory which was barely a third of its previous area.⁷⁶ Already there had been a near revolt of the tenants against the Nawab and the take-over of Tanawal fuelled calls for the complete absorption of the state into the NWFP.⁷⁷ The central government therefore, forced the Nawab's hand to initiate some democratic reforms in return for a privy purse. The Supplementary Instrument of Accession signed by the Nawab of Amb on 29 April 1953 was along the same lines as the federating instruments of Bahawalpur, BSU, and Khairpur. The instrument noted that the nawab would accept the constitution of Pakistan as the constitution of his state and agree to the federal and concurrent subjects list as related in

the Government of India Act, 1935. The Government of Amb (Interim Constitution) Act of 1953, provided for a *wazir* and a council of four advisers, two nominated by the nawab and two elected. The *wazir* would be appointed with the approval of the governor-general and the nawab would follow his advice on matters of state. The constitution also provided for elections to the council, for which only male residents of the state were eligible to vote.⁷⁸ Hence, the centrally-appointed *wazir* was now the main authority in the state and the nawab was to follow his advice on all matters relating to state affairs. The same day, of course, the Government of Pakistan signed an agreement with the Nawab of Amb guaranteeing him a privy purse of Rs. 15,000 per annum, entitlement to all personal property, rights of succession, and preservation of all privileges and honours.⁷⁹

In Chitral, the agitation of the local Muslim League led to the return of the Mehtar in April 1953, who immediately promised democratic reform. For the Government of Pakistan, which had been running the administration since 1949, democratic reform had to mean no dilution of its authority and control in this strategic state. Consequently, when the Mehtar signed the Supplementary Instrument of Accession on 2 April 1953, and later promulgated the Government of Chitral (Interim Constitution) Act on 29 September 1953, effective power remained in the hands of the APA who became the *wazir* under the new dispensation. Under the act, the *wazir* or chief adviser was the chair of an advisory council composed of ten members, half of whom were to be elected.⁸⁰ The agreement on the privy purse, property, and privileges, signed earlier on 20 March 1953, allowed the Mehtar the generous grant of Rs. 90,500 per annum from state coffers. Later, however, on 12 October 1954, the Mehtar died in a plane crash and was succeeded by his four-and-a-half year old son,



Mehtar Saif-ul-Mulk Nasir, aged four-and-a-half-years receiving his *Sanad* of Recognition from the Governor-General of Pakistan, 1954

Saif-ul-Mulk Nasir. The age of the new ruler mandated that a regent be appointed by the central government who was the Political Agent Malakand, meaning that government officials now held supreme power in the state.⁸¹

The relations of Swat State with the central government developed very differently compared to those of the other Frontier states. Swat was by far the most developed and progressive state on the Frontier and its wali, Miangul Jehanzeb, who had taken over in 1949 after the abdication of his father, was very loyal to Pakistan.⁸² As a result, the Government of Pakistan wanted to strengthen his rule, rather than weaken it through democratization. Nevertheless, reforms in adjoining states put pressure on the central government to press for the federation of Swat with Pakistan. Accordingly, Swat became the last state on the Frontier to federate with Pakistan through the signing of the Supplementary Instrument of Accession by the Wali on 12 February 1954. In the Government of Swat (Interim Constitution) Act of 1954, however, no adviser or *wazir* was imposed upon the wali and he was left alone at the helm of an advisory council of twenty-five, of whom fifteen were to be elected.⁸³ The Wali also secured Rs. 500,000 as privy purse in the related agreement. The English daily, *Dawn* clearly saw the wool this Act had pulled over the eyes of the people of Swat as it only further consolidated the power of the wali, now with the official blessing of the central government. In a scathing editorial *Dawn* noted:

... the Council is only advisory and can only advise on matters on which the Wali is pleased to refer to it. Even then, since the Wali will be the President of the Council, he will be in the position of advising himself on matters chosen by himself.⁸⁴

Quite obviously, the Government of Pakistan was not prepared to permit democratic reforms to weaken the control of a loyal ruler.

IV ONE UNIT SCHEME

a) **Constitutional Struggles in Pakistan**⁸⁵

Until the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution, Pakistan was governed under an adapted form of the Government of India Act, 1935, which meant that the provinces of the country operated with a large measure of autonomy. As federated units with provincial status, Bahawalpur and Khairpur were internally autonomous. The Frontier states, except Dir, and the Baluchistan States Union (BSU), functioned under separate instruments of accession which federated them with Pakistan, but did not give them provincial status. Dir remained the only state where the ruler retained significant theoretical power. These factors meant that all the princely states had little direct connection with the various political and constitutional struggles in Karachi which had plagued the country since its inception.

The death of Jinnah in September 1948 and the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951, resulted in the task of drafting a constitution being postponed several times. There was also a constant struggle between provincial and central politicians. Jalal notes, 'Pakistan has been remarkable for the tensions between its dominant and subordinate regions, than for the purported unities of a common religion.'⁸⁶ The Basic Principles Committee (BPC) set up in the aftermath of the Objectives Resolution in March 1949 was given the task of chalking out a framework for the constitution of Pakistan. The Objectives Resolution had not mentioned the princely states by name but did refer to them as constituting a part of Pakistan. It stated:

Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan, and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan, shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed.⁸⁷

In the lead-up to the report of the Basic Principles Committee, the States Negotiating Committee submitted its report in December 1949, and recommended that Bahawalpur and Khairpur each send one representative to the Constituent Assembly, with the four Baluch states also selecting one member. It did not reach a decision on the representation of the Frontier states however.⁸⁸ What was striking in this recommendation was that all the representatives of the states were to be nominated by the rulers concerned with no reference to the people—the Government of Pakistan had now officially sanctioned that no popular representatives of the princely states take part in the all-important constitution-making process in Pakistan. As a result of the recommendation of the committee, Bahawalpur nominated Fazl-i-Hussain, Khairpur nominated its Chief Minister Kizilbash, and the four Baluch rulers agreed to nominate the Jam of Las Bela as their representative. All members took their seats on 16 January 1950, nearly two and a half years after the establishment of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.⁸⁹

The interim report of the BPC was submitted in September 1950, during the lifetime of Liaquat Ali Khan. While the report did not give extensive details of the proposed constitution (as the subcommittee on franchise had still not completed its deliberations), it did lay out its fundamental parameters. According to the report, the country would be a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature. It stipulated that the lower house, the House of the People, would be elected on the basis of population,

while the House of Units, the upper house, would have equal representation from all the provinces including Baluchistan.⁹⁰ Both houses were to have equal power and any conflict between them would be resolved through a joint sitting. This interim report did not mention the fate of the princely states and it was unclear how they would be represented in the lower or upper house. The reaction to this report was extremely negative in East Bengal, where it was thought unfair that the provinces of western Pakistan were given an equal share of seats even though all of them put together formed less than half of the country's population. The fact that both houses had equal power meant that the western provinces could easily thwart legislation proposed by East Bengal. The adoption of Urdu as the sole national language also irked the politicians and people in East Bengal, rallying them against the interim report. The *Pakistan Observer* of Dacca 'called the report a 'fatal stab' and a 'shameless conspiracy against the province' by the 'power drunk oligarchical ruling clique in Karachi to impose a dictatorship under the camouflage of Islam.' The Interim Report would turn East Bengal into a colony of West Pakistan 'worse than that of Imperial Britain or France.'⁹¹

In reaction to the BPC interim report, a provincial convention was held in Dacca from 4–5 November 1950, which recommended two autonomous governments for each of the two wings of Pakistan with a central legislature elected on the basis of population only controlling foreign affairs, currency, and defence.⁹² This proposal already indicated the extent of the disillusionment with the central government and its constitution-making process in East Bengal, and was in some ways the precursor of the six point agenda argued by Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League in the 1960s. The East Bengal Muslim League Working Committee which met on 29 October 1950 also proposed 'drastic amendment to the report',

based on the objections of the East Bengalis. Increasing public agitation in East Bengal led Liaquat to announce on 20 November 1950 in the Constituent Assembly, that further deliberations on the report were to be postponed until the BPC had considered the objections and suggested amendments to its report.⁹³

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951, the work of the BPC again suffered a setback and hardly any work was done for months. McGrath notes:

The Basic Principles Committee itself held no meetings for almost two years, awaiting the reports of its subcommittees, but the Suggestions Subcommittee was quite active during that period, holding many meetings to consider a broad spectrum of comments. ... Considerable discussion and debate took place between the religious and secular members of the subcommittee, and progress was made in determining the extent of the Islamic nature of the state.⁹⁴

In December 1952, a second report was submitted to the Constituent Assembly by the new prime minister, Sir Khawaja Nazimuddin. The second report described in detail the proposed constitution of Pakistan. The constitution had now moved in a decidedly Islamic direction with the new requirement that the head of state be a Muslim. It also went beyond the first report, which had merely stated that no law should be repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah, by establishing a board to advise the head of state on the consonance of laws with the Quran and Sunnah. Chapter Three of Part II set out in great detail the procedure to be followed to ensure the compatibility of laws with the Quran and Sunnah.⁹⁵

The new BPC report kept the bicameral nature of the legislature but recommended that in the House of Units there should be 120 seats, equally divided between the two wings of the country.



Members of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan with Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad in 1952

Therefore, under this proposal East Bengal had sixty seats in the upper house, the Punjab having twenty-seven, Sind with eight, the NWFP with six, the tribal areas with five, Bahawalpur with four, and Baluchistan, the Baluch states, Khairpur, and Karachi with two seats each. Thus for the first time the states achieved representation in the federal legislature by right, and on the same basis as the other provinces of Pakistan. At that moment the state rulers enjoyed the right of nominating the states' representatives in the Constituent Assembly while the new system proposed their election by the state legislatures or councils. In the House of the People too, the states attained representation according to their population with thirteen seats for Bahawalpur, five for the Baluch states, four for Khairpur and seventeen in total for the NWFP, tribal areas and the Frontier states. The House of the People was also supposed to function on the principle of parity between the two wings of the country with two hundred seats each for East Bengal and the rest of Pakistan.⁹⁶ This draft also made the House of the People the main legislative chamber with only revising powers vested in the House of Units. A conflict between the two

houses, as before, was to be decided by a joint sitting of the houses where a simple majority would prevail.

This draft of the BPC also met with opposition in the country, this time mainly from the Punjab where it was seen as violating the basic federal principle whereby all units, whether large or small, should be treated at par. The press in the Punjab was extremely critical of the report and the Urdu newspaper *Nawa-i-Waqt* charged that such a proposal would only ensure the permanent dominance of one province, namely East Bengal, over the others.⁹⁷ A conference of Punjabi politicians and officials held on 11 January 1953 in Lahore demanded a return to the 1950 formula where the lower house would be elected on the basis of population and the upper house based on an equality of numbers from each of the federal units. It also demanded equal powers of legislation for both houses.⁹⁸ As a result of such staunch opposition from the Punjab, consideration of this draft of the BPC report was postponed indefinitely by Nazimuddin in January 1953, and the report sent back to committee.

In the wake of the dismissal of the Nazimuddin ministry by Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad in April 1953,⁹⁹ the new Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, proposed a new formula for the constitution. In October 1953, Bogra proposed that under the new constitution the House of Units should be comprised of fifty indirectly elected members equally divided between the five newly classified territorial units. Under this scheme the five units were: Punjab, East Bengal, Sind with Khairpur, NWFP and the Frontier states, and Baluchistan, the Baluch states, Karachi, and Bahawalpur would form the fifth territorial unit. The House of the People would in turn be directly elected based on population. Hence, East Bengal would get 165 seats in the lower house with

Bahawalpur having seven, BSU with two, Khairpur with one, and the NWF states and tribes with a total of eleven seats. The Punjab would get seventy-five seats, Sind nineteen, Baluchistan three, the NWFP thirteen, and Karachi four seats. As with the previous drafts, any disagreement between the houses would be solved with a joint sitting where each wing of the country would have 175 seats. The formula further stipulated that a bill could only pass the joint sitting if at least thirty per cent of legislators from both wings of the country supported it.¹⁰⁰ The formula envisaged that the most contentious issues would lead to a joint sitting and so the principle of parity between the two wings would only be enforced in such a scenario.

This new formula appeared to have assuaged fears and Burks reported that '... the federal formula was unanimously accepted by the government, by the chief ministers of East Bengal, the Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province, and Bahawalpur, all members of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party, as well as by the Constituent Assembly.'¹⁰¹ Bogra urged the assembly members to complete their considerations by November 1953, so that the constitution might be enacted soon. The *New York Times* aptly recorded the joyous mood: 'The enthusiasm and active interest of the Pakistan legislators in working on the constitution has been interpreted by diplomats here as the most encouraging sign in recent years.'¹⁰² However, soon the territorial classifications and thirty per cent formula led to disagreements. Lumping together Bahawalpur, the Baluch states, Baluchistan, and Karachi into one group was seen as ludicrous and Qazi Isa, the Muslim League leader from Baluchistan, pledged to oppose the fifth grouping 'to the last.'¹⁰³ From the perspective of the states, the formula was also disastrous since they would now have to share votes in the upper house with either the provinces or other states, and would hardly

retain an independent voice. As McGrath noted: 'This provision, designed to limit Bengali power, proved to be of little solace to the Punjabis because it worked both ways.'¹⁰⁴

Meanwhile the obvious way of achieving parity between the two wings, i.e. through the creation of a unified West Pakistan, was already being discussed. The dissatisfaction among certain sections of the public over the territorial units proposed by the Bogra formula could be addressed if the whole of West Pakistan were to constitute one province and as such be able to legitimately demand parity with the more populous East Bengal. This measure was also favoured in terms of administrative efficiency since it would do away with provincial ministries and consolidate the western half under one strong provincial government and a unified bureaucracy.¹⁰⁵ This act would also simplify the distribution of parliamentary seats between the two wings as each of them would now have an equal number. The creation of a 'West Pakistan' would also do away with the complexity added by a second chamber of parliament since a single house, based on the parity of the two wings, would be able to adequately deal with all issues concerning the federation.

The idea of the merger of the princely states had already been considered by the Constituent Assembly and a Memorandum on Federated States of Pakistan, was submitted to the Assembly by Abdul Hamid, Joint Secretary of the Constituent Assembly in June 1954. In the memorandum, Hamid argued that the Constituent Assembly was free to decide on any future for the states (save Dir which had not executed any agreement, except the initial instrument of accession) including merger with neighbouring provinces. Hamid noted:

All Federated States, with the solitary exception of Dir, from time of time executed other Instruments of Accession known as Supplementary Instruments of Accession under which the Rulers surrendered further authority to the Federal Legislature of Pakistan, and empowered it to enact laws for their states in the same manner in which it can make laws for other parts of Pakistan. ... In these Supplementary Instruments of Accession all Federated States with the exception of Dir, by a declaration, accepted the authority of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan to make constitutional provisions for their States and empowered the Assembly to enact Constitutions for the States in the same manner in which the Assembly stood endowed with power to make Constitutional provisions for the rest of Pakistan.¹⁰⁶

Hamid further contended that since these states, excepting Dir, had made the above declaration, any decision of the Constituent Assembly concerning their future constitutional status should be binding upon them and that the states, 'if the Assembly so decides can be converted into new Governor's or Chief Commissioner's province or can be merged in any of them or can be permitted to function in the manner now prevailing.'¹⁰⁷ Hamid, at the end of this long submission, compared, unsurprisingly, the status of the princely states in Pakistan with those of India where by in 1954, most states had either been merged or were in the process of being reorganized. Since the basic documents which underwrote the Indian mergers were similar to the supplementary instruments of accession signed by the Pakistani states, Hamid argued that there was no bar to such a course of action being followed in Pakistan.¹⁰⁸ Hence, by the middle of 1954, there was a strong opinion developing in favour of merging the princely states with the provinces. With the proposal of merging the existing three provinces in western Pakistan and Baluchistan into One Unit, the merger of the states therefore, became a foregone conclusion.

While heated discussions were being held on the Mohammad Ali Bogra Formula among the members of the Constituent Assembly, provincial elections in East Bengal in March 1954 resulted in a routing of the Muslim League which managed to win only ten out of a total of 310 seats in the legislature. The United Front (*Jugto* Front), which participated in the election calling for full provincial autonomy, won 232 seats. The United Front demanded that Bengali be treated at par with Urdu, that the draft constitution be rejected and a new directly elected Constituent Assembly be chosen, and that the centre should only control defence, foreign affairs, and currency. The result of this election led to calls for the resignation of members of the central cabinet from East Bengal (who were all Muslim Leaguers), and for a dissolution of the Constituent Assembly as it had become unrepresentative. The prime minister, however, dismissed such calls and said: 'The mandate to frame the constitution ... had been given to the Assembly, and not to the Muslim League.'¹⁰⁹

Work on the BPC report continued throughout the summer of 1954, and on 21 September 1954 the assembly voted to approve the report as amended, with all the Hindu members voting against it, and all the Muslims members present voting for it. Thereafter,

'the approved clauses of the Basic Principles Committee Report were drafted into a formal constitutional document by the drafting committee, and on 15 October sent for printing to Government Printing Office. ... The date of 25 December, the anniversary of Jinnah's birthday, had been announced earlier by Bogra as the date the new constitution was to go into effect.'¹¹⁰

Before adjourning, however, the Assembly also passed an act which divested the governor-general of his powers to dismiss ministers, who were now made responsible to the legislature. This

amendment of sections 9, 10, 10-A, and 10-B of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted by Pakistan, infuriated Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad who saw that 'if he did not take action he would be considered to have acquiesced in the Assembly's newly-passed statutes and the new constitution which defined his role as figurehead. ...'¹¹¹ Therefore, he summoned Prime Minister Bogra, who was on a visit to the United States, and dismissed his government on 24 October 1955, proclaiming that:

The Governor-General having considered the political crisis with which the country is faced, has with deep regret come to the conclusion that the constitutional machinery has broken down. He therefore, has decided to declare a state of emergency throughout Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function.¹¹²

Quite obviously, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad had dissolved the assembly since it had tried to curtail his powers, but it was also accurate that with the result of the East Bengal elections, the people of at least East Bengal had lost faith in the assembly members representing that particular province.

It is outside the scope of this study to chart the complicated legal issues which resulted in the Maulvi Tamizuddin and Usif Patel cases, but the end result of the dissolution of the first assembly was the election of the second Constituent Assembly, as directed by the Federal Court in May 1955, which then resumed the task of framing the constitution of Pakistan.¹¹³ In the new assembly, there were ten seats reserved for the princely states and tribal areas, and the assembly itself was to decide on the procedure for filling them. On 9 July 1955, therefore, Suhrawardy presented a bill before the assembly for the representation of the princely states whereby the rulers of Bahawalpur and BSU would nominate their members

while the Khairpur Assembly would nominate its member. The representation of the Frontier states was left to the Governor of the NWFP. The minister argued that under various agreements with the states, the rulers had retained the right to nominate members of the Constituent Assembly from their respective states and so only in Khairpur, where the Mir did not insist on the right of nomination, would the elected state assembly choose its member for the Constituent Assembly.¹¹⁴ Thus, where the governor-general had dealt with the problem of representation by ensuring parity between the two wings of the country in the new Constituent Assembly (each wing had forty seats), and had based the election of the assembly on the newly elected provincial assemblies, the representatives of the states, except Khairpur, were still unelected and unrepresentative nominations of the rulers. There was clearly no urgency on the part of the government to ensure that the members from the states also be broadly representative of the people. Thereafter, the Amir of Bahawalpur nominated Syed A. N. S. Gardezi and Chaudhri Abdus Salam, the Khairpur Assembly chose its chief minister, Mumtaz Kizilbash, as its representative, while Nawab Bai Khan of Mekran and Miangul Jehanzeb of Swat were appointed as the representatives of the BSU and Frontier states respectively.¹¹⁵ The Constituent Assembly then began anew the task of drafting a constitution for the country.

b) Merger of the States into the One Unit

The idea of the One Unit began to gather support in western Pakistan, murmurings were heard of an imminent merger of the Baluchistan States Union (BSU) with Baluchistan. This idea was not new and had already been considered and dropped in the lead-up to the creation of the BSU. However, as the BSU was still a heavily deficit unit, and despite the promulgation of its

Constitution in 1952, no election had been held or even envisaged by 1954, and questions were being raised about its viability. As noted by Dehwar, a petition had already been submitted to the AGG at the February 1954 Sibi durbar by some Baluch leaders requesting the merger of BSU with Baluchistan.¹¹⁶ However, Agha Gul Naseer argues that there was a strong public reaction against the petition for merger and so all the sardars except four—Nawab Mohammad Khan Shahwani, Sardar Ghaus Bakhsh Raisani, Wadera Noor Mohammad Khan, and Sardar Mohammad Zaman Khan—withdrew their signatures and wrote a letter of apology to the Khan of Kalat.¹¹⁷ At the same time, some leaders from the BSU issued a pamphlet which argued that the BSU was the real Baluchistan and if the government wanted to initiate some reform in the region it should return the leased areas to the BSU, merge the Baluch areas of the chief commissioner's province with the BSU, and handover the Pathan areas to the NWFP.¹¹⁸ The government, on the other hand, only contemplated the merger of the BSU with Baluchistan, and the Minister for SAFRON, Gurmani Mushtaq Ahmed, formally declared on 16 June 1954 in Quetta Town Hall, in front of tribal sardars and members of the Quetta municipality that the BSU would be merged with Baluchistan in the very near future.¹¹⁹

The Khan of Kalat immediately reacted to this announcement and sent a lengthy memorandum to the Prime Minister of Pakistan arguing his case. In the memorandum, the Khan contended that Kalat was an ancient state and that its unilateral merger with Baluchistan would certainly lead to a violent reaction from the Baluch people. He stated that such a merger would be against all the agreements made between the rulers of the BSU and the Government of Pakistan and would make a mockery of the constitutional arrangements. In a last ditch effort to save the BSU,

the Khan suggested that if change were to happen, then the leased areas should be merged with the BSU and the other tribal areas given a chance to accede to the BSU. The Khan also offered to establish a committee composed of ten people each from the BSU and Baluchistan to oversee the new BSU and report back after a five year probationary period.¹²⁰

The Constituent Assembly took notice of a cabinet member encroaching on its sovereign right to determine the future of the states and declared on 31 July 1954 that it only had the authority for 'framing the constitution for the acceded states which shall be binding on the Rulers of the States and shall not be questioned in any court of law.'¹²¹ However, the government was not ready to negotiate its announcement and a heated session of the parliamentary board of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) on 12 September 1954 finally agreed to the amalgamation of the BSU with Baluchistan.¹²² The opposition to the merger, though, led the government to allow the BSU to be designated as a 'Special Area' under the proposed constitution, which would shield it from legislation without the consent of the governor and president. Paragraph 132-C of the amended report of the BPC now read that the BSU was to merge with the new governor's province of Baluchistan but since 'these areas have no representation in the provincial legislatures, the provincial legislatures will not be competent to extend their laws in these areas.'¹²³ Thus, except for the legal amalgamation of the BSU with Baluchistan, no steps were taken to actually democratize the areas of the BSU and integrate them into the province. Seeing the writing on the wall, the BSU rulers finally agreed to the merger of their states with Baluchistan and signed the Merger Agreement to this effect on 1 January 1955. Subsequently, the BSU was disbanded and reorganized into divisions and districts from 14 October 1955.

The rumours of the amalgamation of the BSU with Baluchistan in early 1954 also led to other states becoming concerned about their future status. Khairpur especially was worried that it might be merged with Sind. In order to pre-empt such a move by the government, the Khairpur Assembly passed a unanimous resolution on 25 May 1954, arguing against the change of status for Khairpur. It noted,

The Government and people of Khairpur State have heard with concern vague rumours of a suggestion to merge the Khairpur State in the province of Sind ... such rumours have created serious apprehensions in the minds of the Government and the people of Khairpur about their future.¹²⁴

The resolution gave numerous reasons against such a rumoured merger stating that Khairpur was a viable and progressive unit of Pakistan and even though it was small, it should not be reorganized. The resolution charged that Jinnah too would not have agreed to the extinguishing of the states and noted:

Quaid-i-Azam was the democrat of democrats, and it was far from his mind to wipe out the separate existence of a State against the wishes of its people. And it is certain that this Constituent Assembly, the creation of which is the life work of Quaid-i-Azam, will not depart from his principles'.¹²⁵

The resolution further stated:

This resolution of the Legislature Assembly of Khairpur State should be enough to convince the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan of the strong views of the people of the State on the question of maintaining their separate identity. If inspite of this, any doubt is entertained in any quarters in this respect, the people of the State are ready to vote on this issue in a referendum and remove these doubts.¹²⁶

However, by the middle of 1954 the central government, now firmly under the control of Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad, had set its mind on the creation of a unified West Pakistan and would not listen to any opposition to the plan, either from the states or even the provinces. On 7 November 1954 the Sind ministry under Pirzada Abdul Sattar, declared its opposition to the One Unit scheme and was summarily dismissed within twenty-four hours on account of maladministration and replaced by Mohammad Ayub Khuhro with the task of making the provincial assembly agree to the One Unit plan.¹²⁷ Similarly, the Sardar Abdul Rashid ministry in the NWFP was dismissed on 18 July 1955 and replaced by the pro-One Unit Sardar Bahadur Khan (who had been appointed Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan in November 1954) to bring about support for the One Unit scheme in the provincial assembly.¹²⁸

With the summary dismissals of provincial ministries which opposed the unification of West Pakistan, the states had little chance of survival. On 1 November 1954, the Amir of Bahawalpur was summoned to Karachi by the Governor-General and following the day it had been announced that the Amir had dismissed the elected ministry of Hasan Mahmud and had assumed full ruling powers under Section 74 of the interim constitution of Bahawalpur.¹²⁹ Seeing the treatment of Bahawalpur and subsequently the Sind ministry, the Khairpur Assembly realized that it had no option but to accept the merger and so passed a resolution in favour of the unification on 10 November 1954.¹³⁰

With support for the One Unit finally gathered, the central government made the rulers of the BSU, Khairpur, and Bahawalpur sign merger agreements which *inter alia* wiped out their states and abolished their status as sovereign rulers. The Amir of Bahawalpur

was the first to sign a merger agreement on 17 December 1954, followed by the Mir of Khairpur on 20 December 1954, and the BSU rulers on 1 January 1955. All the merger agreements started with the express transfer of sovereignty over the state from the ruler to the Government of Pakistan. Article 1 of the Bahawalpur Merger Agreement, for example, read:

His Highness the Ameer of Bahawalpur hereby cedes to the Government of the Dominion of Pakistan his sovereignty and all his rights, authority and powers as Ruler of the State of Bahawalpur together with all his territories; and the authority, jurisdiction and powers for the governance of the said State and territories shall vest in the Government of the Dominion on and from the day to be fixed by the Governor-General of Pakistan. ...¹³¹

The merger agreement also abrogated all the previous instruments of accession but guaranteed the personal property of the rulers. Article IV (III in other agreements) of the agreement with Khairpur, for example, read: 'His Highness the Mir shall be entitled full ownership, use and enjoyment of all the jewels, jewellery, ornaments, shares, securities and other private properties, moveable as well as immovable not being State properties, belonging to him on the date of this Agreement.'¹³² The agreement also assured the rulers of the right of succession and the continuation of their personal privileges. Article IV of the merger agreement of the BSU stated: 'The Rulers, their wives and children shall be entitled to all the personal privileges, dignities and titles enjoyed by them whether within or outside the territory of the State immediately before the date of this agreement.'¹³³ The most important clause of the merger agreement was, however, the one that related to the privy purses of the rulers. In return for transferring their sovereignty to the Government of Pakistan,



Map 10: West Pakistan in 1955

all the princes were guaranteed higher privy purses than agreed under the supplementary instruments of accession. Thus, the privy purse, which was free of all taxes, for the Khan of Kalat was fixed at Rs. 650,000; the Nawab of Mekran secured Rs. 225,000; the Jam of Las Bela's purse was fixed at Rs. 200,000, and the Nawab of Kharan received Rs. 70,000 annually from the Government of Pakistan. The privy purses for the Amir of Bahawalpur and the Mir of Khairpur were set at Rs. 3,200,000 and Rs. 1,000,000 respectively. These financial incentives, which were now to come from the central government rather than the revenues of the states, meant that even the Khan of Kalat, who was most ardently

opposed the One Unit, did not campaign against it vociferously until much later.

The constitutional crisis in the aftermath of the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly had frustrated the plans of the governor-general to create a unified West Pakistan. The ground work had already been done and so the first action of the second Constituent Assembly was to pass the Establishment of West Pakistan Act on 30 September 1955. Under the Act all the states were merged into the new West Pakistan unit except the Frontier states and tribal areas. Thus, in one stroke the Baluchistan States Union, Khairpur, and Bahawalpur were wiped out as separate states and their rulers lost all their powers retaining only personal privileges. In India too, the princes lost their ceremonial powers as *rajpramukhs* with the passing of the States Reorganization Act in 1956. However, while India moved towards recognizing regional diversity and strengthened it by linguistic reorganization, Pakistan moved in the other direction by trying to diminish regional identities in the name of administrative and political efficiency.

c) The Exclusion of the Frontier States

The four Frontier states, along with Hunza and Nagar, survived the formal establishment of the One Unit on 14 October 1955. Under the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955, the Frontier states were designated as Special/Tribal Areas, and left as they were. Hunza and Nagar, on the other hand, formed a part of the Gilgit Agency and since Pakistan considered the whole of the Gilgit Agency to be a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, these states were not mentioned in the West Pakistan Act of 1955.

The central government's reasons for not merging the Frontier states remain unclear. Miangul Jehanzeb, the Wali of Swat between

1949 and 1969, contended that perhaps one of the reasons behind his state not being merged was the fact that it was well-governed and peaceful.¹³⁴ However, he notes that even he was unsure when the eventual merger would happen. He wrote:

And I always had to have the question at the back of my mind: when is this State going to be merged? For that reason, I could not make long-term plans, or concrete commitments that would last more than two or three years. All the time I was feeling: one day, maybe tomorrow, maybe the day after, maybe after one year. ...¹³⁵

It is curious to note that even though the Frontier states were not merged, there was strong support for the One Unit scheme in them. Miangul Jehanzeb supported the idea and stated: 'I am supporting One Unit for my personal interests. As a big unit, they will be involved in their own affairs rather than merging the states. Whereas a small unit like the Frontier Province, would wish to expand as Qayyum was doing.'¹³⁶ Therefore, for Jehanzeb, One Unit was an attempt to escape the consolidation of the NWFP where he claimed that the premier, Qayyum, was already acting dictatorially.¹³⁷ The Chitral Advisory Council also supported the One Unit scheme and passed a unanimous resolution congratulating the government. The resolution stated that the One Unit scheme would 'benefit the downtrodden areas and allow them to develop together with the more developed areas.' It would also make Pakistan 'stronger and stable.'¹³⁸ It is not at all improbable that the motives of the Chitral Advisory Council for supporting the One Unit were the same as Miangul Jehanzeb's since by late 1954 it was clear that the Frontier states were not being merged and by providing lip service to such a plan, the central government could not harm but gain the government's goodwill and support in the future.

The main reason why the central government did not merge the Frontier states, it seems, was the continual propaganda by Afghanistan against the merger. As noted by Wilcox, 'Radio Kabul analysed the plan as a conspiracy to put the Pathans under the heel of the Punjabis,'¹³⁹ and therefore, there was natural resentment in the region against the plan. Furthermore, the appointment of Major-General Iskander Mirza as Minister for SAFRON in October 1954 meant that there was now an experienced Frontier man at the helm of affairs and so the threat of Afghan propaganda was taken seriously. In late 1962, the political authorities in the Frontier states were wary of giving any impression that the Government of Pakistan was planning to take-over or merge the states. On the question regarding extending Pakistan's law in the agency, the Malakand political agent noted: 'the extension of laws is likely to create the impression that it is a prelude to a complete take-over of the administration by the government. This is an impression, which we must avoid to create.'¹⁴⁰

Keeping in mind the tense relations with Afghanistan and the strategic location of the Frontier states, the government did not desire that the comparative firm control it had over the states should be weakened through a merger with the One Unit. Both the rulers of Swat and Amb were loyal and friendly towards Pakistan and by 1954 the administration of Chitral was completely under the control of the APA. Only the Nawab of Dir and his son the Khan of Jandul posed problems, but it was considered preferable to deal with them under the existing procedures rather than usher in democratic government. In other words, the government risked losing power and influence in the Frontier states if they were fully merged and democratized as part of the One Unit, and therefore, no attempt was made to lure them into the scheme. In the case of Khairpur and Bahawalpur, however, the existence of

elected ministries in these states meant that the merger would only increase the powers of the central government. Under One Unit, both Bahawalpur and Khairpur became divisional headquarters and therefore, centres of bureaucratic administration. Regarding the Baluch states, most government officers considered the Baluch princes, especially the Khan of Kalat, a hindrance rather than a help and so were eager to see them pensioned off. Therefore, the amalgamation of the BSU with Baluchistan streamlined the administration of the region and made it easier to control and govern.

The Frontier states were finally merged through the promulgation of the Dir, Chitral, and Swat (Administration) Regulation of 1969 under General Yahya Khan, which removed the rulers from their roles in the administration of the states. While the regulation did not technically merge the states, the take-over of the administration by the officials of the Government of Pakistan meant that effectively the states had ceased to exist and had been merged with the country. The states of Hunza and Nagar remained a separate entity until 1973, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto merged them fully with the Gilgit Agency, which remained outside the constitution of Pakistan.

CONCLUSION

The course of constitutional reform in the princely states was different in both India and Pakistan. In India, reform was fast-paced and the princes lost their powers in quick succession so that by the inauguration of the Indian constitution in 1950, they were indistinguishable from governors in the provinces, if they had assumed the office of *rajpramukh*, or had been pensioned off. In Pakistan, the princes also lost their powers, though more gradually,

and with the establishment of the One Unit in 1955, the Baluch, Khairpur, and Bahawalpur princes were pensioned off, while the rulers of the Frontier states, Hunza and Nagar, continued in office for more than another decade.

What distinguished the process of constitutional integration in India from Pakistan was not just the pace of reform, but its nature and the principles guiding it. As noted above, the policy of the Government of India regarding the states quickly became clear after the initial phase of accession had passed. Both Nehru and Patel were of the view that autocratic governments could not continue in the states once they had become a part of India and therefore, democratization and constitutional integration were non-negotiable. Once the princes were constitutional monarchs, they continued in office until the reorganization of the provinces and states, after which they were absolved of all official roles.

In Pakistan, on the other hand, the integration of the princely states was considerably more complicated. Here, the policy was not formulated by the politicians, but was developed with substantial input by the bureaucracy and the military. As discussed earlier, a number of former IPS officers held key posts in the government after independence and played a pivotal role in the relations with the princely states. These officers, supported by the military (from where a number of them originally came), ensured that the primary consideration relating to the princely states was not political, social, or economic reform, but security. Most princely states in Pakistan are situated on the borders, and with a state of war with India and extreme hostility from Afghanistan, security considerations soon became the primary concern of the government. A US Embassy report attested to the powers of the civil servants in the states. It noted: 'Pakistan Government's policy

toward the states has been in the hands of a group of permanent civil servants concentrated in the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, who have tended to carry on the traditions by which Britain dealt with the states in the past. ...¹⁴¹

With security being the overarching concern, the aim of constitutional reform in the princely states focused on strengthening control over the states. Thus, the first supplementary instruments of accession focused on the appointment of ministers and the integration of the forces. Administrative and fiscal integration were the next steps of integration, which ensured that the centre had access to the revenue resources of the states. The ultimate step of political integration, however, was not important for security concerns, and only in Bahawalpur did a constitution on the pattern of the provinces take shape. In the other states, bureaucratic control of ministries and central control of the army were considered sufficient reforms. The aim was to re-establish control through paramountcy with no consideration for political and social reform. Hence, the SAFRON ministry report noted in 1949: 'This voluntary acceptance of the authority of the centre to advise the States in the Central list of subjects has revived the old practice of paramountcy.'¹⁴² The policy of the Government of Pakistan stopped at the establishment of paramountcy. Political reform, when it did come, was more a result of local agitation for change than the policy of the government.

The disagreement between the prime minister and certain members of the Constituent Assembly after the presentation of the States Negotiating Committee's report on states' representation, highlighted the nature of the integration envisaged by the government. In the debate on 6 January 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan defended the decision of the government to allow the rulers to nominate

their representatives to the assembly. He said: 'Would the world applaud you if you marched your forces into the states? ... some other country had done it, but it was wrong. ...'¹⁴³ In response, the English daily, *Dawn* noted:

The criticism was led by Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan who charged that the States Negotiating Committee's report was a 'betrayal of the revolution' and a 'betrayal of the principles for which we fought', and asked that the people of the States should be given the right to elect their representatives. Mian Iftikharuddin was the other staunch critic who hurled volleys of abuse on the rulers of the states. ... He said that it was a mistake to negotiate with them. 'By doing so we accepted the principle of people being properties'. ... With sarcasm he told the House: 'You are going to build our State in a new way ... Let us tell the world that Pakistan is a really progressive, revolutionary, and democratic state'. He urged the House to 'do away with the despots with the stroke of the pen ...'¹⁴⁴

The dissenting members struck at the crux of the issue: if the government was devoted, as it had repeatedly proclaimed, to bring the states to the same level as the provinces, then why, they rightly wondered, were they not prepared to follow India's example and pension off the princes and fully integrate their states?

The procedure by which the states achieved representation in the new Constituent Assembly in 1955 was the same as in 1949. Even after the lapse of six years, and the existence of legislatures in Bahawalpur and Khairpur (although the Bahawalpur Assembly had been dissolved in November 1954), and semi-elected advisory councils in Swat, Chitral, and Amb, the government thought it fit for the rulers to again have full powers of nomination. A member of the United Front in the Assembly sarcastically noted, according to *Dawn* '... that like kerosene, oil, sugar, and food grains,

democracy was also being controlled in Pakistan.¹⁴⁵ Another member from East Pakistan further stated:

... [he] was pained to find that an honourable gentleman [the SAFRON Minister] who dedicated his life for the establishment of democracy in Pakistan, has come up with a Bill which curtails the rights of the people, and vests the ruling monarchs with powers to make arbitrary selection of persons to represent the people. ...¹⁴⁶

Mian Iftikharuddin again pointed out that the government was only providing lip service to real reform and that the 'responsibility for their non-representation (of the states) ... lay with those who control the destinies of the nation.'¹⁴⁷ What perhaps Mian Iftikharuddin had not fully realized was that the destinies of the nation, were increasingly being controlled by the bureaucracy and the army.

It is sufficiently clear that the government did not see the princes as an anachronism which needed to be removed from the public sphere. Rather, the government, especially in its weakness, saw the princes as allies at a time of difficult relations with India and Afghanistan on the one hand, and internal problems on the other. Much like the British who saw the princely states as bastions of loyal support for their continued rule, the government relied upon the princes to ensure territorial integrity and internal control. Even when the princes were pensioned off, the substantial increase in their privy purses, especially when compared to those received in India, were a testament of the government benevolent attitude towards loyal princes.

Thus, by the end of 1954, Pakistan had achieved constitutional, fiscal, and administrative integration of all the princely states except in Dir, Hunza, and Nagar. All were now constitutionally

part of the Federation of the Dominion of Pakistan, but still lacked full democratic rights. The Government of Pakistan, relying heavily on the bureaucracy and the military, had given its seal of approval to the longevity of autocratic rule and, except for Bahawalpur and Khairpur, the creation of the One Unit in 1955 did not bring full rights and responsibilities to the people of the states—the subjects of the Frontier and Baluch states would have to wait for decades, while the people of Hunza and Nagar are still waiting for the final phase of integration.

Notes

1. For a discussion on paramountcy, see Naik, *Paramountcy in Indian Constitutional Law*, and for a specific example, see, Copland, *The British Raj and the Indian Princes*.
2. Creagh-Coen, *The Indian Political Service*, 4.
3. Ibid. 35.
4. Keen, *Princely India and the British*, 23.
5. Creagh-Coen, *The Indian Political Service*, 38.
6. *India Office and Burma Office List 1947*, 15.
7. For details see, Creagh-Coen, *The Indian Political Service*, 47–55.
8. Sir Ambrose Dundas gave the attitude of the central government towards the Frontier states as one of the reasons for his resignation. He wrote to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan: 'I am dead against the policy of interference with the States in the name of the Muslim League, both on principle and on personal grounds'. 2 (8) PMS/49, NDC, Islamabad.
9. Menon, *Integration*, 157–8.
10. Ibid. 159–60.
11. Quoted in *ibid.* 164.
12. See Chopra, *The Collected Works of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel*, vol. XII, 257.
13. For details see, GoI, *White Paper*, 38–58.
14. Menon, *Integration*, 196.
15. Ibid. 193.
16. GoI, *White Paper*, 145.
17. Menon, *Integration*, 466.

18. Ibid. 477.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. 478.
22. Ibid. 483.
23. Wakefield, *Past Imperative*, 110-1.
24. Supplementary IoA of Bahawalpur State, *Instruments*, 7.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid. 11.
27. Report of Shah to Prime Minister, 13 December 1948, 10 (5) PMS/49, NDC, Islamabad.
28. Ibid.
29. Shah to Mohammad Ali, Secretary General, GoP, 13 July 1948, 10 (5) PMS/49, NDC, Islamabad.
30. Shah to Private Secretary to Prime Minister, 13 December 1948, 10 (6) PMS/49, NDC, Islamabad.
31. Shah to Prime Minister, 2 January 1949, *ibid.*
32. Ibid.
33. See, Government of Bahawalpur, *Extraordinary Gazette* notification, 8 November 1948, BCL.
34. Agreement between the Nawab of Bahawalpur and the GoP, Karachi, 19 January 1949, General File (States), SAFRON.
35. Ibid.
36. Government of Bahawalpur Act 1949, part II, 1, (a), (b), (c), BCL.
37. Ibid. part III.
38. Ibid. part IV.
39. Ibid. part V.
40. Press Note, Chief Minister's Office, Khairpur, 17 August 1949, KDA.
41. See FNS of SAFRON from April to October 1949, 264/CF/49, NDC.
42. FNS No. 20, 264/CF/49, NDC, Islamabad.
43. SAFRON Half-yearly report, October 1950 to March 1951, 150/CF/48, NDC, Islamabad.
44. FNS No. 6, 23/CF/51, vol. II, NDC, Islamabad.
45. Government of Bahawalpur (Interim Constitution) Act 1952, Part IV, Section 10, BCL.
46. Ibid. Part XIII, Section 74.
47. Third Supplementary IoA, Para. 2, 67/CF/52, NDC, Islamabad.
48. Para. 3 in *ibid.*

49. The GoP had Col. Dring appointed as a Knight of the Order of the British Empire in the Queen's Birthday Honours List for 1952 for his services in Bahawalpur.
50. Second Supplementary IoA 1952, 107/CF/51, NDC, Islamabad.
51. FNS No. 14, 33/CF/53 Vol. XI, NDC, Islamabad.
52. *Dawn*, 5 July 1953, 7.
53. Savingram from British High Commission to Commonwealth Relations Office, 19 May 1948, L/PS/13/1847, IOR.
54. Ahmed Yar Khan, *Inside Baluchistan*, 163–4.
55. *Dawn* editorial, 15 July 1948.
56. Ibid.
57. FNS No. 14, 264/CF/49, NDC, Islamabad.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid. and Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 240–57.
60. AGG Baluchistan to Shah, 26 February 1951, 367-S/49, 1949 vol. 2, BN 27, BSA.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Aslam to AGG Baluchistan, 23 March 1948, 9.369-S/1948 vol. 1, BN 26, BSA.
64. FNS No. 2, 17/CF/52, NDC, Islamabad.
65. FNS No. 7, ibid.
66. See, Covenant entered into by Rulers of Kalat, Mekran, Las Bela, and Kharan for the formation of BSU, 11 April 1952, General File (States), SAFRON.
67. FNS No. 8, 17/CF/52, NDC, Islamabad.
68. See BAAR for 1950–51, and 1951–52, CQA.
69. FNS No. 22, 17/CF/52, NDC, Islamabad.
70. This study does not cover the details of the Pathanistan issue, but, in short, it was a movement for the creation of an autonomous/independent Pathan country in the NWFP, supported by Afghanistan. For details see, Rittenberg, *Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns*; Sayeed, *Pathan Regionalism*; Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed*, *Dawn* editorial of 12 January 1950, and *New York Times*, 21 November 1949, 2.
71. 21 March 1951, 531–3, CAPD.
72. For details see, 54 S.Sts. I vol. V, NWFP.
73. Note by PA, Malakand, 14 March 1949, 347, NWFP.
74. FNS No. 21, 264/CF/49 vol. III, NDC, Islamabad.

75. FNS No. 24 in *ibid.*
76. For details on the Upper Tanawal decision see, FNS No. 3, 23/CF/51, NDC, Islamabad.
77. Survey of the Pakistan States, 28 May 1951, Box 34, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
78. For more details see, KW 175 S.Sts., NWFP.
79. See, Agreement with the Nawab of Amb regarding Privy Purse, Private Property and Rights, and Privileges, General File (States), SAFRON.
80. For details see the text of the Act and Supplementary IoA, 89/CF/53, NDC, Islamabad.
81. FNS Nos. 20 and 21, 8/CF/54 vol. XVI, NDC, Islamabad.
82. In his inauguration speech Jehanzeb had noted: 'We form part of Pakistan without which we cannot exist. ...' *Dawn*, 14 December 1949, 8.
83. See, Government of Swat (Interim Constitution) Act 1954, 3/CF/54, NDC, Islamabad.
84. Quoted in Fortnightly Report, 25 February 1954, DO35/5327, UKNA.
85. This section only serves to contextualize the princely states in the constitutional struggles of Pakistan. Therefore, only an overview of the period and its problems is presented. For a more detailed discussion see, McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*.
86. Jalal, *State of Martial Rule*, 1.
87. 7 March 1949, *CAPD*, vol. V, 7.
88. See, *Dawn*, 1 January 1950, 1.
89. *Dawn*, 17 January 1950, 4.
90. Mahmood, *Constitutional Foundations*, 59.
91. Quoted in McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, 76.
92. Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History*, 109 and Ziring, *Pakistan: A Political History*, 132.
93. *Dawn*, 22 November 1950, 1 and 4. See also Newman 'Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy. ...' and its discussion in McGrath, footnote 63, 76.
94. McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, 87.
95. Mahmood, *Constitutional Foundations*, 88–90.
96. *Ibid.* 95–8.
97. *Nawa-i-Waqt* editorial, 28 December 1952.
98. Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History*, 116, and Ziring, *Pakistan: A Political History*, 133.

99. For a detailed discussion of the dismissal, the first of a prime minister and a very important one in Pakistan's history, see McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, 93–101.
100. Political events for the week ending 9 October 1953, Box 35, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
101. Burks, 'Constitution-Making in Pakistan', 25.
102. *The New York Times*, 8 October 1953, 3.
103. Quoted in Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation*, 173.
104. McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, 114.
105. McGrath claims that this was Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad's tactic to retain power. See McGrath, 115–7.
106. *Memorandum CA*, 2–3.
107. *Ibid.* 3.
108. *Ibid.* 9.
109. *Dawn*, 21 March 1954, 1.
110. McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, 124.
111. *Ibid.* 128.
112. *Dawn*, 25 October 1954, 1.
113. See, Pirzada, *The Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan*, McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, chapter 6, and a detailed analysis of the cases by the US Embassy, Box 51, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
114. *Dawn*, 10 July 1955, 7.
115. They took up their seats on 8 August 1955, *Dawn*, 9 August 1955, 4.
116. Dehwar, *Contemporary History*, 336. Also see, US Embassy Dispatch for week ending 19 March 1954, Box 50, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
117. Naseer, *Tarikh-e-Baluchistan*, 594.
118. *Ibid.* 594–5.
119. *Dawn*, 21 June 1954, 1.
120. Text of the letter in Naseer, *Tarikh-e-Baluchistan*, 596–601.
121. *Dawn*, 31 July 1954, 1.
122. *Dawn*, 15 September 1954, 10.
123. Prime Minister's Speech, 20 September 1954, *CAPD*, 454.
124. Memorandum BPC, 1, KDA.
125. *Ibid.* 3–4.
126. *Ibid.* 4.
127. *Dawn*, 9 November 1954, 1.

128. Hildreth to State Department, 19 July 1955, Box 50, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
129. *Dawn*, 3 November 1954, 1.
130. *Dawn*, 11 November 1954, 1.
131. Bahawalpur State Merger Agreement, 17 December 1954, BCL.
132. Khairpur State Merger Agreement, 20 December 1954, KDA.
133. BSU Merger Agreement, 1 January 1955, KSA.
134. Jehanzeb, *The Last Wali*, 131.
135. Ibid. 131.
136. Ibid. 129.
137. Ibid. 107.
138. *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 6 December 1954, 1.
139. Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation*, 184.
140. PA to CPD, 13 February 1962, 703, NWFP.
141. Survey of the Pakistan States, 28 May 1951, Box 34, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
142. SAFRON Half-Yearly Report, October 1948–March 1949, 150/CF/48, NDC, Islamabad.
143. *Dawn*, 7 January 1950, 1.
144. Ibid.
145. *Dawn*, 10 July 1955, 7.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid.

Chapter Five

A Democratic Princedom

Democracy has to be controlled. We have to save people from themselves ...

Major-General Iskander Mirza, Interior Minister,
quoted in *New York Times*, 3 November 1954.

INTRODUCTION

At the time of the Transfer of Power all the princely states which acceded to Pakistan were autocracies. Political development was not considered a concern of the paramount power by the Political Department, and therefore, no efforts were undertaken during the Raj to induce any kind of democratic governments in the states. Good governance was the emphasis of reform and was mostly carried out through the appointment of efficient administrators. Besides, with the numerous problems brought about by gradual democratic change in British India, the Political Department was content with the fact that the states remained loyal bulwarks of autocratic government.

Given the vibrant nature of politics in British India, it was impossible for the princes to shield their subjects from indulging in political activities. Many state subjects had studied or worked with Congress or Muslim League stalwarts and boasted progressive ideas about democracy, basic rights, and the like. Since the Congress was not allowed to set up branches in the princely states, an All India States Peoples Conference (AISPC) was set up in December 1927 to demand democracy in the states. However, the AISPC only

became politically active when it elected Jawaharlal Nehru as its president in 1935. Nehru kept his role in the AISPC until 1946, and as such brought about a very close alliance between the Congress and AISPC. This partnership proved to be crucial in twisting the arms of intransigent princes at the time of accession, and indispensable in ensuring that governments sympathetic to the Congress were established in the states after integration.

There also existed an All India States Muslim League (AISML), largely on the pattern of the AISPC. It was mainly active in Muslim minority provinces. Little is known of its activities, except that it was generally aligned with the Muslim League. It seems that its primary activity was to support the Muslim League in British India rather than demand democracy and broader rights in the princely states. It was formed in 1940, but the lack of interest in the states can be gauged by the fact that in a lengthy speech to the All-India Muslim League Session in 1943, the President of the All India States Muslim League, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung of Hyderabad, did not even mention the princely states let alone the activities of his organization therein.¹ Jinnah was also reluctant to advocate significant Muslim political activity in Muslim ruled states as a number of Muslim princes were important patrons of the Muslim League and any political movement would threaten their authority in their states. In addition, since the Muslim League had a very superficial existence even in British India as a grassroots party until the mid-1940s, Jinnah did not want to open up another area of conflict.

With the accession process completed, the Government of Pakistan pressed the princes to introduce some democratic reform in their states. As discussed in Chapter Three, Kalat already had a two chamber parliament before its accession to Pakistan; but

since both of these houses were vehemently against accession to Pakistan, the States Ministry did not demand the establishment of popular government in the Baluch states and was content with working through its own appointed ministers. However, both Bahawalpur and Khairpur had easily acceded to Pakistan and so limited democracy could be introduced in these states. The absence of any organization subservient to the Muslim League in these states meant that full democratic government was not seen as an immediate goal in case governments unfriendly to the centre came to power, and thus democratization was gradual. With regards therefore, to the Frontier states, all the four states, together with Hunza and Nagar, were thought to be too small and politically backward to have a full democratic government. It was only in the early 1950s that limited political reform was implemented in Swat, Chitral, and Amb, whereby partially-elected councils were created to advise the prince. Dir, however, staunchly refused to be part of any such scheme and remained a complete autocracy until its merger in the late 1960s.

The course of democratic development differed widely amongst the princely states which acceded to Pakistan. From being completely thwarted by the Government of Pakistan in Kalat and the other Baluch states, it blossomed into a working system in Bahawalpur and Khairpur. In the Frontier states, it showed signs of development, but due to the very slow nature of reform in these states, nothing concrete was achieved during the period under consideration. The level of democratic reform in the states clearly showed that the primary objective of the central government was to ensure its hold on the states and any movements threatening such control were not tolerated.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the nature and aim of democratic change in the princely states. Beginning with an assessment of the All Pakistan States Muslim League (APSML), the sister organization of the All India States Muslim League, this chapter looks at the creation of a movement demanding democratic rights in the princely states. The examples of political agitation in two states, Amb and Chitral, are used in this first part to assess the nature, extent, and effect of political mobilization. The second part focuses on the period of major democratic change in the states where Bahawalpur and Khairpur attained some measure of responsible government, and some nominal reform was undertaken in Amb, Chitral, and Swat. The state of Dir and the Baluch states are only briefly dealt with in this part since hardly any political activity was allowed in these states during the period under study and nothing concrete changed in Hunza and Nagar.

I ALL PAKISTAN STATES MUSLIM LEAGUE

With rapid democratization and integration in India, pressure soon began to mount on the central government to undertake some democratic reform in the princely states. The *Pakistan Times* charged as early as January 1948: 'Despotic rule continues in Bahawalpur.'² The article severely criticized the central government's lack of interest and blamed the Muslim League for inaction regarding responsible government beginning from pre-independence times. Urdu language newspapers were also very critical of the government's inaction and lack of policy initiatives. The daily *Nawa-i-Waqt* opined:

Pakistan is lucky that as compared to India very few native states came in its area. But it is sad to notice that where the States Department in India has nearly done away with most states within a few months in

order to end the archaic and badly run administrations in the states, Pakistan has until now given no attention to the states' problem.³

Thus, reluctantly the central government had to devise a strategy to lead to some form of responsible government in the states.

Whereas the ushering in of responsible government in the princely states which acceded to India was aided by the fact that in the most significant states local *praja mandals* (people's organizations), affiliated with the Congress existed and had a grassroots following, there was no such corresponding organization in the states which acceded to Pakistan.⁴ Political parties were banned in Khairpur and Bahawalpur and no discernable political organization existed in the Frontier states. Only in Kalat did the Kalat State National Party have a formidable presence, but this party was pro-Congress and pro-independence and therefore, seen as anti-Pakistani. This lack of political organizations with which to cooperate in order to bring about a responsible government made it difficult for the central government to push for democracy in the states with any rigour. The only political party which did lay claim to some representation in the states was the All India States Muslim League headed by Manzar-i-Alam in its Pakistani manifestation.

Even before its formal re-organization as the All Pakistan States Muslim League (APSML), the organization sent its general secretary, Mohammad Mahmud, on a goodwill mission in February 1948 to ascertain the political situation in the states and to establish branches of the APSML.⁵ However, this mission was not welcomed in most states and Las Bela State even barred its entrance.⁶ The political activity of the APSML meant that the Government of Pakistan had to take its existence seriously and the SAFRON secretary, Col. Shah met Manzar-i-Alam in May 1948,

to assure him that the central government was also committed to the introduction of responsible governments in the states.⁷

The APSML was formally organized in June 1948, after the bifurcation of the dormant All India States Muslim League, along similar lines as the All-India Muslim League.⁸ Although it had hardly any members in the states which had become a part of Pakistan, the APSML quickly launched a series of agitations calling for full responsible governments. Since this new organization was not formally a part of the PML, its ability to create nuisance caused considerable consternation among Muslim League members and especially alarmed the central government. In June 1948, at the first session of the APSML, fiery speeches were made demanding the immediate realization of responsible government, in the states. With regard to Khairpur in particular, a resolution was passed threatening direct action if responsible government were not granted within fourteen days. The Interior Minister, Khawaja Shahabuddin, addressed the session and urged the members not to take any rash decisions but to 'establish good relations between the princes and their subjects.'⁹ However, the minister's words went unheeded and the session clearly put the Government of Pakistan and the APSML on a collision course, because the former was hesitant on implementing democratic reforms and the latter was set on direct action if its demands were not met immediately.

The APSML enjoyed only mild public support in the states at best, but appeared to be a formidable force through its speeches and press coverage, and was quite successful in creating problems for the princes and the central government through its denunciations. It was also not a coherent party and had a number of local factions, all vying for influence. The *Nawa-i-Waqt* editorial of 6 October

1948 noted that the Bahawalpur State Muslim League was split in two with one faction consisting of old Muslim Leaguers while the other consisted of former Congress and Ahrar elements.¹⁰ A US Embassy report expanded on the Bahawalpur League issue and noted:

The Prime Minister, M. A. Gurmani, apparently somewhat disturbed by the demands of Manzar-i-Alam ... undertook to organize his own branch of the League, separate from the Bahawalpur group, approved by Manzar-i-Alam. On a visit to the State, Alam was shot at, quite possibly at the instigation of Gurmani and was forced to make a hurried retreat from Bahawalpur. At its final meeting in Karachi on 9 November, the States League Council passed a resolution demanding the dismissal and trial of Gurmani who was accused of trying to crush the Muslim League and the League National Guards, and of imprisoning a number of innocent Muslims.¹¹

The APSML had elicited a strong reaction from the local governments who were now vehemently against its activities. SAFRON'S fortnightly report noted at length:

The reactions of the states and the local administrations to this pillorying of the rulers in the press have naturally not been very favourable. HE the Governor of the NWF Province is of the view that the States Muslim League in the Frontier consists largely of discontents who had been externed from the states, e.g. some cousins of the Nawab of Amb and Shahzada Hissam-ul-Mulk of Chitral. HE does not favour a visit by Mr Manzar-i-Alam ... as he feels that efforts are being made to cause a rupture between the states and the Central Government. ... The views of the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan are similar as he feels that the political evolution of the Baluch states should follow the way of that in the province. ... Nawab Gurmani in Bahawalpur has accused the States Muslim League of underhand dealings and of blackmail and is inclined to the view

that they may be a source of difficulty and embarrassment to the Government of Pakistan.¹²

However insignificant these press and verbal protestations may be in terms of real popular support, events in India and the general desire for some sort of changes in the states had by mid-1948 made the Government of Pakistan realize that some policy had to be developed. The SAFRON report therefore noted:

... the intrusion of the States Muslim League in State affairs has brought matters to a head and a decision on such issues as the policy to be adopted towards them and in regard to the political evolution of the people in the states has become the matter of urgent necessity.¹³

With stability as the need of the hour and the political allegiances of politicians still uncertain, the Government of Pakistan was reluctant to commit to full responsible government in the states. A policy of gradualism was thus adopted, under which responsible government would be phased in, but not immediately granted. A discussion between Colonel Shah and the Amir of Bahawalpur in December 1948 highlighted the concerns of both the rulers and the central government. The summary of the meeting noted:

His Highness was against hurrying the pace of reforms for which he thought his people were not yet fully prepared. I agreed that the general situation in the country and the educational backwardness of the people could NOT be ignored. At the same time I stressed that the association of the people with the governance of their country could not be delayed forever on these grounds. ... At the end of our conversation, His Highness agreed that political evolution of the people of Bahawalpur must be in step with the political freedom enjoyed by the people of the adjoining provinces, although he insisted that mistakes made elsewhere should not be repeated in Bahawalpur and the constitutional advance of his state must proceed from one

stage to another in an orderly fashion and without disturbing the peace of the state.¹⁴

Initially, the attitude of the Government of Pakistan towards the APSML was positive, as it expected the party to be a help rather than a hindrance in its attempt to introduce gradual reform in the princely states. Writing to the governor of the NWFP, the secretary of SAFRON was very complimentary about the aims of the APSML. He wrote that the President of the APSML:

... has given the impression that he wants the States Muslim League to cooperate with the Rulers as well as the local representatives of the Government of Pakistan in furthering our common interests in the same way as the Pakistan Muslim League is lending its support to the central and provincial governments.¹⁵

The secretary even supported the tour of the APSML president of the Frontier states and asked the governor to afford him any assistance as may be necessary. However, very soon afterwards the central government and the APSML, while not disagreeing on the goal of reform, clashed violently on the pace of reform. The US Embassy commented:

Whatever statements the Government of Pakistan and its States Ministry may make by way of mollifying leaders of the States Muslim League, it is doubtful whether any real steps towards increase of self-government are in prospect. ... Deputy Secretary's in the States Ministry, have both indicated profound distrust of the intentions and abilities of the States Muslim League leaders. ... It is evident that the States Ministry has not the slightest faith in the ability of any of these ardent 'democrats' to carry on successful or efficient governments.¹⁶

Where the government was unsure about the suitability of full democratic government in the states, the APSML knew that

delay would only lead to a loss in momentum and spell its doom. Therefore, the APSML embarked on a public campaign in most states to demand democratic rights.

By the middle of 1948, the APSML had established branches in most princely states. Scant information survives today as to its activities in all the states, but the records which do survive demonstrate that the local branches carried out considerable propaganda against the princes, mainly through press statements and pamphlets. In most states, members who were against the ruling prince for one reason or another ran the local affiliate of the APSML and so utilized the APSML to discredit him. Politically the local branches had scarcely any plan for reform and their continual propaganda even made the Government of Pakistan react against them.

a) Amb State Muslim League (ASML)

The Amb State Muslim League (ASML) was formed around April 1948 by a few relatives of the Nawab of Amb with Alam Zeb Khan, a first cousin of the Nawab, as its president.¹⁷ It became affiliated with the APSML on 25 May 1948, and immediately launched a public campaign against the rule of Nawab Farid Khan. In its propaganda pamphlets the ASML claimed that every subject of the state was treated as a personal slave of the Nawab and was called upon to tender different kinds of services without compensation. It also alleged that the Nawab exterminated any individuals he saw as a threat to his rule without any legal procedures since the two magistrates in the state were completely subservient to his will. The ASML deplored the state of social services where only two primary and one lower middle school existed, and where despite the establishment of two dispensaries

there was still no qualified doctor in the state.¹⁸ The picture that the ASML pamphlet drew of the state of affairs in Amb was not too off the mark. The state was still run on feudal lines with a firm autocratic hand. But as noted in the British High Commission dispatch a year later: 'conditions in these states are strictly feudal ... (but) they do not compare unfavourably on the whole with some of the settled districts of the NWFP; and the standard of living is appreciably higher than the average of the tribal areas.'¹⁹ However, this alone was not reason enough for the ASML to halt its protests and it created a long list of reforms it wanted to see implemented immediately. Its pamphlet stated:

- 1) Our objective is to attain for all the inhabitants of the state their political and organizational rights and to establish responsible government in the state.
- 2) We want that all inhabitants in the state who have lands and houses and are in possession of them should be given proprietary rights ...
- 3) We demand that all people in the State of Amb should enjoy the same rights as the rest of the citizens of Pakistan.
- 4) We demand that primary education be declared compulsory in the state and that a number of new schools should be established.
- 5) We want to curtail the limitless authority of the Nawab and establish a people's government. ...²⁰

The above demands were not extraordinary. In contrast to some movements in India, the ASML did not demand the abolition of the state itself or of the office of Nawab. But the introduction of responsible government, which was still an alien concept for most of the subjects of the state, was a revolutionary enough idea to stir controversy. Further, as the main leaders of the League were close

relatives of the Nawab, this party was seen as a personal threat by the Nawab, and therefore, the reaction was swift and strong. The governor, Sir Ambrose, tried to dissuade the Nawab from taking any drastic action against the League members since that would only create further conflict. Dundas wrote:

I am not yet convinced that it will be best in your own interests for you to expel them from your state in so summary a manner as you are proposing. ... Once you have done that there will be no further hope of reconciliation. You will have planted enemies outside your state who will intrigue, out of your control, with other existing enemies. ... You must remember that there is a general awakening among tenants to a realization of their own rights. If what the *guzara-khors* [people granted gifts of land] have been telling the tenants is true, the expulsion of the *guzara-khors* will not make it any less true. If anything, it is likely to make matters worse by drawing attention to the arbitrary powers that can be exercised in a State.²¹

Sir Ambrose was almost prophetic in his warning for in 1951 there was an all out revolt of the tenants against the Nawab. However, the Nawab of Amb was adamant and immediately confiscated the properties of members of the League and prohibited them from entering the state.

Farid Khan explained to the governor: '... the only answer to the machinations of the *guzara-khors* is to hit them to realize that their true status viz. "that they hold the *guzaras* on condition of absolute loyalty to the ruler."²²

The Government of Amb however, maintained its staunch stance against the Leaguers and insisted that they had no popular base and so their drastic measures were justified for the peace and stability of the state. A telegram to the political resident pointed out the extent of the reaction of Amb authorities. It stated:

'300 state soldiers have raised Kala Maira in Amb State and are ransacking the crops, etc. of Mohd. Afzal Khan, father of Mohd. Aslam Khan, Joint Secretary, Amb State Muslim League. Situation Highly Serious. ... Whole of *guzara* of Kala Maira being rendered barren. Intervention requested.'²³ But the Nawab was adamant and wrote to the governor:

The three young boys however,—Alamzeb, Sher Mohd and Mohd. Aslam—who between themselves form the office bearers and the total membership of the so called Amb State Muslim League at Mansehra are flouting their parents and playing into the hands of the old enemies of the State, and are still pursuing their game of inciting hatred and trouble in the State. ... Their recent activities have become decidedly communistic and they have also been trying to establish some contact with anti-Amb and Pro-Swat elements in the adjoining tribal territory ...²⁴

The ASML vehemently protested the arrests, the confiscation of lands, and expulsion of its members from the state. The President of the APSML wrote to the governor:

May I bring to your kind notice that a number of deputations of the Muslim League Workers from NWFP States apprised me that their organizational activities are sometimes suppressed with the help of NWFP officials. The attitude of the Deputy Commissioner Hazara and the Assistant Commissioner Mansehra has been brought to my notice. ... A number of Muslim League workers are reported to have been arrested on flimsy grounds.²⁵

The secretary of the ASML also wrote to the political resident deploring the actions of the Nawab and demanded an inquiry. He wrote:

Since the set up of this organization, the ruler of Amb State has been striving his last nerve to see the last of it, and many unfair means were employed to this end. The persecution of the Muslim League workers ... has become every day phenomenon. Well organized subversive campaign is in progress by the armed men who are busy hunting out Muslim League workers from village to village. The State has been subjected to a severe blockade disallowing movement from and to the State. The common man is not allowed to cross the State boundaries into Pakistan, and no Pakistani is allowed to enter the State. ... I will request you to please expedite restoration of peaceful and normal conditions in Amb. Also as suggested on several occasion an impartial and immediate inquiry into the internal medieval ... aggravated situation of the state many please be instituted.²⁶

Amb reacted angrily to these and subsequent protestations by the APSML and ASML. The Adviser to Amb State wrote to the Governor:

These gentlemen have been itching for sometime to create some opportunity of poking their noses into the internal affairs of the Frontier States. They know absolutely nothing ... of these States and the tribal areas surrounding them and their only source of information about the 'great atrocities being committed right and left' are the few selfish and unreasonably disgruntled members of the ruling families concerned whose obvious lies and falsehoods appear to be taken as gospel truths.²⁷

In addition to the strong reaction from the Amb government, other political organizations in the Hazara region also lambasted the ASML. In July 1948, a meeting of the Frontier Tanawal Association in Abbottabad strongly denounced the ASML and resolved:

That this meeting of the Frontier Tanawal Association views with scorn and disdain the activities of some of the young party belonging to the Amb State, which they have started recently to defame the Nawab of Amb and to stir up trouble in the state for their selfish interests.²⁸

In tandem with the Frontier Tanawal Association some members of the Hazara Muslim League issued a pamphlet against the ASML titled: 'The new plan of Pakistan's friendly looking enemies.' This pamphlet charged that the ASML had forgotten the sacrifices made by the rulers of the Frontier states towards Pakistan and especially the Kashmir *jihad*, by clamouring for restraints to be put on the authority of the rulers. It stated that the league created by 'these three miscreants' cannot even 'convince five or six like-minded people in the Frontier.' The pamphlet further called the leaders of the APSML, Manzar-i-Alam and Mohammad Mahmud, as 'oblivious to reality' in that they blindly supported the Amb League. In order to vehemently oppose the Amb League, the members of the Frontier Tanawal Association and the Hazara Muslim League even argued that the Pakistan government's attitude towards the ASML had been very lax and that 'the provincial government during the time of the British used to respect the sensitivities and environment of the tribal and princely world of the Frontier province.'²⁹

The Government of the NWFP had been nervously monitoring the situation in Amb since it had wider implications for the stability and security of the province. The Governor, after failing to dissuade the Nawab from taking any drastic actions, wrote to the President of the APSML asking him to use his influence to calm things down. The Governor wrote:

I am sorry to say that the situation in the Frontier Province is at the moment so explosive, both with internal and external troubles, that the greatest service which the States' Muslim League can do to its own members, to the remaining public of the states and to Pakistan, is to refrain from any kind of activity—certainly from any kind of one-sided activity—on the Frontier until a more favourable juncture. The general aims of the League are so wide ... that they will not suffer for a few months' or even a year or two's, abstention.³⁰

Thus, even the government agreed with the Nawab that the Amb League was a nuisance and needed to be restrained for the foreseeable future. The governor also asked the local administration to report on the real nature of the ASML, its members and popularity. The Assistant Commissioner, Mansehra made a detailed investigation and reported in early October 1948:

Enquiries made in the case have revealed that there is no movement of the Muslim League inside the Amb State. The residents of the State are leading a peaceful life under the protection of the Nawab of Amb, and the donations and services of the latter to the Pakistan Govt. are well known to the authorities. ... The so called Amb State Muslim League is comprised of persons who are interested in the State affairs. The agitation has in reality been started by certain *guzara-khors* ... [who] consider themselves dissatisfied with their *guzara* amounts and have started agitation for their personal interest and have enlisted the sympathies of others who live in the Hazara district. K. Mohd Farid Khan who is now the Intelligence Officer at Peshawar, and who is the brother in law of the Nawab himself is taking the lead. ... I am given to understand that the expenses for propaganda in this respect are borne by the Wali of Swat who is not on good terms with the Nawab of Amb State.³¹

While it is true that the ASML was led by disgruntled elements of the Nawab's family, it is also clear that a political awakening

had reached Amb. These relatives, whether their grievances were justified or not, knew that they could create considerable trouble by simply aligning themselves with a political party and demanding wholesale reforms, including those which favourably affected them. The extent of the Nawab's reaction and the concern of the NWFP government also showed that the membership of ASML might not be large, but that it did certainly have more than just three members—contrary to the claims of the Nawab and official reports. The nature of the ASML also exhibited the tangled nature of political life in Pakistan and especially in the princely states. The personalization of issues and the scant regard towards the party platform later became hallmarks of the Pakistani political scene. Furthermore, the Government of Pakistan was now being asked to make political decisions for the state. The ASML wanted internal reform, but could only achieve it through outside interference. The Government of Pakistan therefore became the final arbitrator of political change. The Nawab and Amb League tussle continued throughout and after the reorganization of the PML and the disbanding of the APSML in 1949.

b) Chitral State Muslim League (CSML)

In early 1948, the CSML was set up mainly by members of the Mehtar's extended family and certain religious leaders, who were unhappy with the existing government in Chitral, and saw in the states' Muslim League an opportunity to vent their frustration. In mid-1948, the CSML sent a memorandum to the central government stating that their demand for responsible government was: '... the only voice of those State subjects, who after the creation of an Azad (independent) Pakistan Dominion are still under the clutches of Nawabs' slavery and are experiencing enormous difficulties.' It argued that the members of the League in

Chitral were being harassed and made to approve of the Mehtar's rule. It stated: '... that all applications regarding "The States' peoples confidence in the present State Administration," could not be considered from the State Public. The applications are quite illegal (sic) and have no authority.'³² In another letter to the central government the CSML deplored the policy of the Mehtar against certain religious leaders (ulema) who due to their religious and political views had either been arrested or banished from the state. It read:

Hardly, there would be any country over the Globe which has banned the reciting and preaching of religious doctrines or where the religious leaders would be molested or shabbily treated. ... This cruelty has only been achieved by the Chitral State Ruler who dislikes the religious preaching in his state ... hundreds of ulemas have been locked up ... hundreds of ulemas have been banished for voicing against the maladministration of the Chitral State. ...

It demanded in the name of the CSML that the central government take urgent action to induce the Chitral administration to 'release immediately all harassed ulemas and all restrictions should be relaxed from their person.'³³ It also charged that the Mehtar was not really a friend of the Muslim League, even in Pakistan. A resolution of the CSML read:

... if [the Mehtar] is really a well wisher and supporter of Muslim League, he should prove it by joining the Chitral State Muslim League, as an office holder and thus recognize it as such. He should remove all restrictions placed by him on the Chitral State Muslim League, and afford all possible facilities to the office holders. ...³⁴

The Mehtar of Chitral was alarmed by the propaganda of the CSML and did not take lightly the allegation that he was not

a committed well-wisher of Pakistan or the Muslim League. He wrote to the Prime Minister Pakistan:

As already known to you that some of my country people, who hold Congress views up to this time and who lived in Delhi up to the birth of Pakistan, carry on their fool propaganda [sic] against this State and me. ... It must be known to you that the peace and prosperity of this State is the peace and prosperity of Pakistan. ... These people are not real friends of this State. ...³⁵

The Government of Chitral thereafter, took stern action against the agitators and arrested a few of the leaders.

Concerned about the situation in Chitral, the NWFP government carried out a thorough investigation on the nature of the CSML. In his report, the Deputy Director of Intelligence confirmed the accusations of the Mehtar that the CSML was mainly composed of wayward relatives and ex-Congress people. The report stated:

The membership of this party in Peshawar is between 80 and 100. All the members belong to Chitral and for some reason a number of them have permanently settled down in Peshawar and work as mullahs in different mosques. Rahim Beg and Abdul Majid are servants of Hissam-ul-Mulk, brother of His Highness, now in exile in Loralai. They are the chief instigators working under the orders of their master. Hissam-ul-Mulk is reported to be busy doing all what is in his power to overthrow the present His Highness. These two servants of his are reported to be bringing in money regularly to be spent on propaganda work and are most of the time in Peshawar instigating. ...³⁶

The governor agreed with the assessment and also concurred with the punitive actions taken by the Mehtar. He wrote to the Prime Minister of Pakistan: 'The Chitral Muslim League also is

purely disruptive, and has no good intentions towards anybody nor any popular support. ... I have not hesitated, and the Chief Minister has supported me, to suppress any agitation which seems to menace the stability of the States. ...³⁷

The situation in the other two princely states in the NWFP was not dissimilar to that in either Amb or Chitral. While there is no evidence that there was a States' Muslim League presence in Swat in 1948, the Dir State Muslim League was mainly composed of elements that had personal enmity with the Nawab and wanted to vent it through the channel of the state's Muslim League. The dearth of information on Dir prevents a clear picture of the political situation in the state, but the statement of the Governor of NWFP to the Prime Minister of Pakistan succinctly captured the political reality in Dir State. It noted:

In Dir, a party was formed on 13th August this year, which swelled quickly to about 1000 members. It is purely subversive and its object seems to be, as much as anything else, to extort money from the Nawab. It is no more a genuine Muslim League movement in Dir than anywhere else.³⁸

c) The Demise of All Pakistan States Muslim League (APSML)

The fervent agitation of the APSML for democratic reform in the states induced the central government to undertake measures to rein in the organization. The APSML president, Manzar-i-Alam, wanted the APSML to affiliate *en bloc* with the PML (keeping its branches in the states). However, a number of PML members were of the opinion that the APSML should merge with the PML, and then the PML should set up new branches in the states. This was obviously an attempt to establish some control over the activities

of the APSML so that it did not embarrass the central government or the princes.

The idea that the APSML should be merged into the PML, which in turn would set up its own branches in the states, was not new. Already the advisor to the Nawab of Amb had questioned the separate existence of the ASML. He noted:

... the States Muslim League was brought into being to safeguard Muslim interests in the non-Muslim Indian States and is quite superfluous now when the few Muslim States in Pakistan have acceded to Pakistan, and there is apparently no need to safeguard Muslim interests therein. The general opinion is that if any Muslim League bodies exist in such states (they do not in the Frontier States) they should be amalgamated with the Muslim League parent organization. ...³⁹

Similarly, the parties against the ASML also doubted the rationale behind the continuation of the APSML. The Frontier Tanawal Association pamphlet observed that the APSML was established to

organize the hundreds of thousands of Muslims who lived in the hundreds of Hindu states in India, so that the demand for Pakistan becomes the strong and united demand of all the hundred million Muslims of India. Now, when Pakistan has been established and ... the States Muslim League cannot operate in the Indian states, then what is the rationale behind the existence of the All Pakistan States Muslim League?⁴⁰

The Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, agreed with the assessment that there remained no need for the separate existence of the APSML. Addressing the first session of the PML in 1949 he said:

... As we had decided to confine the membership of the All-India Muslim League to Muslims of British India, the Muslim subjects of the states formed the All India States Muslim League. The late Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung and many other states' Muslims had suggested the merger of the States' League with the All-India Muslim League. The circumstances of British India and the States being then different, the Quaid-i-Azam had advised that the States Muslims should have a separate organization of their own but the states have now acceded to Pakistan and together with our provinces, constitute Pakistan. As there can now be no discrimination between Pakistan and the Pakistan states and the Government of Pakistan is responsible for the defence of the states, there is no need for a separate league for the Muslims of these states.⁴¹

By 1949 it was clear that both the central government and the PML were unwilling to allow the APSML to exist as a separate entity. Chaudhary Kaliquzzaman, president of the PML, further noted that group affiliation had never been allowed and so on 4 April 1949 the Working Committee of the PML decided to establish its own branches in the princely states of Pakistan. It stated that supervisory committees were being established to create 'organizing committees for the states which have acceded to Pakistan and for the tribal areas of the North West Frontier Province.'⁴²

The Working Committee of the APSML reacted angrily to the announcement of the establishment of separate Muslim League branches in the states. It drafted a manifesto which charged that:

the Amir of Bahawalpur had introduced reactionary changes in the administration, that the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions needed a complete reorganization and that a committee would be appointed to draft a 'Charter of Rights for the Tillers of the Soil and the Oppressed Women of the States'.⁴³

Manzar-i-Alam further blasted the 'gradualism' policy of the Pakistan government. He said: 'It is surprising that responsible statesmen have given expression to reactionary views regarding constitutional reforms in the Pakistan States. They propose to delay the establishment of fully responsible government in the States until the Constituent Assembly frames a constitution for the whole Dominion.'⁴⁴ The PML replied through its organ, *Dawn*, in an editorial on 6 April 1948. It noted that the APSML had no public backing, and that Manzar-i-Alam and his committee were only self-interested and cared little for the welfare of the people in the states. It warned that if the APSML continued with this attitude, it would be tantamount to creating two parallel leagues in the princely states.⁴⁵ Thus, it was only a matter of time before the APSML was relegated to the political wilderness as state branches of the PML were soon established in most of the princely states.

The end of the APSML and its branches in the states showed the weak and diffuse nature of its aim, organization, and tactics. The APSML centrally, and in the states, was mainly anti-prince and wanted to do away with his autocratic rule as soon as possible. The APSML's ranks were primarily composed of people disgruntled with the ruler for personal reasons. Therefore, it never took root as a grassroots organization in any of the princely states. The party also had no plausible plan for reform. Its demands were often considered frivolous, as a sudden change from total autocracy to full democracy would have created considerable confusion in the states. Furthermore, the overuse of the media in denouncing the princes not only brought the wrath of the rulers, but also the disapproval of the central government which in its initial years was trying not to create any new problems. Nevertheless, the pressure brought about by the constant agitation of the APSML and its

branches did make both the rulers and the central government realize that democratic reform could not be indefinitely postponed.

II MAJOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS, 1949–54

After the consolidation phase of 1947–48, the Government of Pakistan moved towards limited democratic reform in some of the states. The aim was not to bring them into parity with the provinces and grant equal rights immediately, but to 'phase-in' such measures. This policy was the opposite of what had just taken place in India but very much in the tradition of the Raj. As discussed in chapter four, the main reason for this staggered pace of reform was the overarching need for control, not the lack of development or political experience and preparation, as charged by the Government of Pakistan. Thus, the half-yearly report of SAFRON for 1948–49 noted:

During the period under review the Government of Pakistan's relations with the States developed to a stage where it became possible to introduce measures for a democratic form of government in the states of Khairpur and Bahawalpur. In the case of the Baluch States, the policy has been to secure the agreement of the Rulers to the gradual assimilation of their administration with that of the neighbouring province of Baluchistan. ... No progress could be made on the Frontier states due to circumstances beyond the control of the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions.⁴⁶

a) Bahawalpur

Being the most developed state in the country, and with a reasonable standard of administration, Bahawalpur State was the prime test case for real political reforms. After the demise of the All Pakistan States Muslim League (APSML), the Bahawalpur

State Muslim League (BSML), which was still divided into two camps, continued to function for a time until the (PML) appointed a committee under the chairmanship of the Khan of Mamdot (the president of the Punjab Muslim League) to organize a new Bahawalpur Muslim League (BML) in March 1949. This action again split the Muslim League in Bahawalpur which finally ended with two basic factions: one affiliated with the PML and to an extent loyalist, and the other composed mostly of old BSML members, i.e. ex-Congress workers and the new settlers.

The initial reaction of the BML to the Government of Bahawalpur Act, 1949, which created a partially elected assembly (*majlis*) with two responsible ministers in charge of 'transferred subjects', was cautious. While it could not wholeheartedly accept the reforms as being positive per se, it did not vociferously denounce them either. The primary reason behind this benign attitude was the selection of Syed Hasan Mahmud by the Khan of Mamdot as the new leader of the BML. Hasan Mahmud came from an aristocratic background and as such was firmly welded to the status quo of the state. He favoured responsible government but was also content with the piecemeal approach of the Amir as long as his party came out on top. The old BSML faction of the party was less happy with the reforms, but could not do much except prepare for the elections in May 1949.⁴⁷ The elections to both the local bodies and the assembly resulted in a sweeping victory for the League faction affiliated with the PML. It won ninety seats out of the 122 local body seats, which translated into fifteen out of the sixteen elected seats in the assembly. Seeing the writing on the wall, the old BSML faction became reconciled with the BML by the inauguration of the *majlis* on 29 May 1949. Thereafter, no opposition to the BML was forthcoming for some time.

The creation of the *majlis* did not end political agitation; rather, it just made it turn towards another contentious issue: the prime minister. Knowing that the central government would be hostile to the popular election of the prime minister, some politicians in the state began agitating against the presence of a foreign prime minister. Several articles were published in newspapers against the presence of a British prime minister and calls were made for him to be replaced by a Pakistani, or better still, a Bahawalpuri.⁴⁸ These protests left the prime minister, Colonel Dring, in a very precarious situation. However, since he was appointed by them, the central government simply dismissed these calls as being the destabilizing work of ex-Congress Workers, many of whom 'have not severed their connections with India even now.'⁴⁹ The Amir also backed his prime minister and issued a special *farman* supporting him.⁵⁰ Still, these actions by the central government and the Amir did not quell the calls for drastic change and a campaign continued, now from outside the state, demanding further reform.⁵¹

By the end of 1950 it was clear that further measures had to be taken towards the introduction of a full responsible government in Bahawalpur. Yet again, the watchful eye of the central government guided the process and Prime Minister Dring spent some time in Karachi towards the end of November 1950 discussing the extent of reforms with the Pakistan government.⁵² The minister of SAFRON also visited Bahawalpur in December 1950 and held discussions with the Amir, and addressed the BML on the nature of further reforms and the need for patience.⁵³

During the course of 1951, more reforms were announced and through the new Second Supplementary Instrument of Accession signed in April 1951, Bahawalpur became a fully federated unit of Pakistan. But the chief minister was still an appointee, and law

and order was still outside the control of the *majlis*. The popular reaction to these changes was not very favourable and suggested frustration at the slow pace of reform. By June 1951, a number of newspapers in the state had also started to severely criticize the limited nature of responsible government. As commented by *Dawn*, the state press satirized the leadership of the state by stating: 'There are just three persons who rule over this state and their position is like the Holy Father, the Holy Son and the Holy Ghost.'⁵⁴ This public ridiculing of the Amir, Chief Minister, and Hasan Mahmud brought swift reaction from the state government which banned both the newspapers, *Sutlej* and *Insaf*, which carried such articles.⁵⁵ Only in September 1951 was the ban removed after lengthy negotiations between the Bahawalpur government and the newspaper associations, where the former emphasized that it would not tolerate such blatant attacks in the future.⁵⁶

With the strong backing of the central government, the BML was more or less the only political force in Bahawalpur. Opposition politics was mostly confined to a small group of mainly refugee or peasant politicians who could only vent their frustration at the state of democracy in the state as a faction of the BML in the *majlis*. Sardar Mahmud Khan, who represented this opposition faction, called the 'Left Muslim League', was vociferous in his criticism of the prevailing political status quo. He noted that with 'the crippled system of reforms. ... The Majlis met only nineteen days within three years. Property belonging to the municipalities was sold to friends of the League leader at rupees one per foot inspite of public demands for the same land at seventeen rupees.'⁵⁷ He listed four further demands: full provincial autonomy and self-government; exhaustive economic reforms, the proper settlement of refugees, and a complete reorganization of the BML so that it became fully representative and shorn of its ties with the landed

class.⁵⁸ However, the Left Muslim League was so small and its base in the refugee and peasant population so unstable that it failed to adequately challenge the main faction of the BML under Hasan Mahmud.⁵⁹

The final set of reforms allowing provincial autonomy and responsible government on the same basis as the provinces was promulgated by the Government of Bahawalpur (Interim Constitution) Act, 1952.⁶⁰ New elections under the interim constitution were announced for April 1952, and as they were the first in which real power was delegated to the elected representatives, electioneering by the political parties was strong. The BML was now challenged at the polls by the Left Muslim League, which later became the Jinnah Awami League, and the Jamaat-i-Islami. However, the scrutiny of nomination papers soon revealed the haphazard nature of this process. Whilst exact motives are hard to discern, the fact of the matter was that the returning officers rejected the nomination papers of twenty-five of the thirty-seven candidates of the Left Muslim League, while the Jamaat-i-Islami suffered nine rejections out of eleven nominations. The opposition immediately cried foul and withdrew from the elections as the rejections had hardly affected the BML. The opposition charged: 'The pattern of pre-election events in Bahawalpur creates the impression that the Muslim League have adopted the Frontier Muslim League's tried recipe for ensuring success in the general elections ... (by) ... cajolery and threats.'⁶¹ The central government also realized that elections under such conditions would only show that the whole exercise was farcical and undermine the credibility of the new administration. Therefore, the cabinet advised the Amir, and he agreed, to 'annul the present elections and order fresh elections.'⁶² The rejection of the nomination papers was thereafter, blamed on the inexperience

of the returning officers and new elections were called for May 1952 with adequate provision for opposition participation.

The May 1952 elections saw a thumping victory for the BML led by Hasan Mahmud. The BML won thirty-five seats out of a total of forty-nine. The Left Muslim League managed to capture ten and the Jamaat-i-Islami and independents claimed two each.⁶³ This was a huge success for Hasan Mahmud, who now formed the new government with three cabinet ministers. The reasons for the success of the BML were clear: it had the backing of the central government; the national party sent the premiers of the Punjab and NWFP to tour the state and campaign for BML,⁶⁴ and the BML had a strong control over the hinterland. As Hasan Mahmud admitted in an interview with Wilcox in 1960, he cleverly presaged the choice of candidates by the opposition in the rural areas and then persuaded them to withdraw, but only on the eve of the elections so that the candidates of the BML could win uncontested.⁶⁵ This plan was even more workable since the BML chose the most important man in the village as its candidate and so the candidate already had significant political capital and leverage in the village.

The activities of the Bahawalpur Assembly during the period 1952–54 exhibited limited enthusiasm for political debate and practice by the politicians. Since the members of the assembly were mostly landlords or hailed from the upper classes, drastic change was never contemplated and even in smaller matters the assembly always followed the lead of the central government. The opposition was mainly composed of refugees and so usually in the end it would be an inconclusive tug-of-war between the landlords and the refugee politicians. Given the fact that the elected chief minister had also to represent Bahawalpur in the Pakistan

Constituent Assembly since March 1951, Hasan Mahmud was rarely present in the state assembly to answer questions or attend debates. Several bills, like those on land, tenancy, refugee rehabilitation, and the Bahawalpur version of the Public and Representative Officers (Disqualification) Act did attract some lively debate, but as the assembly only sat for short periods, debates were never conclusive and legislation was always rushed. A typical session of the Bahawalpur *majlis* was reported thus:

The Chief Min[ister] faced with such a united opposition found it necessary to back-track on several important bills which the Muslim League intended to get passed at this session. ... Having removed most of the controversial bills from the agenda this left the opposition a fairly innocuous bill ... on which to make an issue. The opposition could not rally enough support from other members to really obstruct the passage of this bill. On the following day however, the opposition insisted that all items on the agenda be taken up and not withdrawn. The Chief Minister, trying to avoid a head-to-head clash with the opposition moved to adjourn the session. The ten members of the opposition then staged a dramatic walk-out. With the opposition out of the way, the majority party passed a controversial Rules Bill in record time and adjourned the Assembly sine die.⁶⁶

This report evidenced that the government of Hasan Mahmud, even though elected, felt very uncomfortable with the parliamentary practice of debate and wanted to limit it as much as possible. Before the 1952 Act the assembly sat for the average of six days a year. After the 1952 Act gave it full provincial powers, the Bahawalpur Assembly sat for nine days in 1953 and eleven in 1954. During that short time, it had not only to approve the budget, but also pass extensive legislation (mainly initiated by the central government), carry out its own and private members'

business, and field questions. For example, a total of 237 questions were asked during the eleven days it was in session in 1954.⁶⁷

Hasan Mahmud's government also did not tolerate any form of dissent and in September 1953 the Revenue Minister, Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan Leghari was dismissed. It was alleged that 'in collusion with anti-Muslim League elements to meet his personal ends in utter disregard of party discipline and his non-cooperative and irresponsible attitude towards the party leader,' Leghari had been dismissed by the Amir with the concurrence of the central government.⁶⁸ However, the American Consul General characterized the issue as a tussle between the progressive politics of the chief minister versus the status quo interests of the landed Leghari's. The consul general noted:

The Chief Minister is young and energetic and not always tactful in his political utterances. He has big ideas about land reform which do not set well with the landowners. He has in the past advocated gradual improvement of the tenants' position but has now evidently gone too far for the Leghari's.⁶⁹

Thus, while Hasan Mahmud was a conservative, there were even more conservative elements in the *majlis*, who did not want any change. This incident showed that even though a full responsible government had been introduced in the state, dissension was not tolerated and radical change thwarted.

Shorn of active participation of the assembly, the government of Hasan Mahmud was very much a cabinet-run administration and in that too it was mainly led by the initiatives of the central government. Since Bahawalpur was eligible for federal funding after joining the federation in 1951, uplift schemes financed by the central government became the mainstay of the government.

In 1953–54, the central government allocated Rs. 1 million for the health and educational schemes of the Bahawalpur government, followed by massive irrigation plans consisting of an expansion of the tube well system and the upgrading and expansion of the Abbasia canal.⁷⁰ Development work did continue under the new democratic set-up but at a slower pace and with more corruption than under the previous administrations. However, since the experiment was abruptly cut short by the dismissal of the ministry by the Amir on the advice of the central government on 2 November 1954, no complete assessment of the first democratically elected, responsible government in Bahawalpur can be made.

b) Khairpur

Political activity before and immediately after accession to Pakistan was negligible in Khairpur. This was because political parties were banned in the state under the Associations Act and punitive measures were taken against anyone indulging in political activity. As noted by Mirza Qaleech Baig, when, during the ministership of Khan Bahadur Ijaz Ali some people demanded a relaxation of the Associations Act, the result was a large-scale clamp-down by the government. Hundreds of political workers were arrested and military police began to roam the state regularly. Even when the case was put before the Punjab Resident, only sympathy could be garnered as the Political Department was not intent on radical political reform in the princely states.⁷¹

After accession to Pakistan, only the APSML ventured to organize in Khairpur and began demanding responsible government. However, the demands were ignored and the relative unimportance of Khairpur meant that little notice was taken of these demands

by the central government. The Khairpur State Muslim League therefore, charged the central government of indifference towards the people of the state and of ignoring their needs.⁷² Nothing concrete is known further about the activities of the Khairpur State Muslim League until it was dissolved, and a new Khairpur Muslim League emerged in June 1949, as a branch of the PML with the state chief minister, Mumtaz Kizilbash, as its convenor.

Soon after accession, the regent, Mir Ghulam Hussain, realized that in order to modernize the administration of the state and bring about effective changes, a new minister was required. Therefore, he asked Jinnah to appoint someone of ability. The lot fell to Mumtaz Hasan Kizilbash, a refugee member of the ICS who had opted for Pakistan. Kizilbash had worked as secretary in the municipal administration of Delhi and was experienced in the running of government on a smaller scale. Therefore, he was recalled from his recent posting to the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul and joined the Executive Council of Khairpur as Chief Minister on 30 September 1948.

The minority of the ruler and the presence of a Pakistan civil service officer at the helm of affairs in the state meant that the central government had no hindrance in the way of reform. However, since stability and control were the mantra of the time, change could only be contemplated if the central government was assured that it did not translate into losing power.



Mumtaz Hasan Kizilbash, Chief Minister, Khairpur State 1947-1955

Mumtaz Kizilbash was an efficient administrator and very quickly became highly popular in Khairpur. While making sure that he commanded ultimate authority, Kizilbash introduced lavish reforms, political as well as economic, which made Khairpur an exemplary state within a few years. In one of his first acts after becoming chief minister, Kizilbash repealed the Associations Act and allowed for political activity in the state without the threat of repercussions from the state government. He noted:

Government is always successful with the cooperation of the people. And to achieve this cooperation it is essentially needed that they be allowed the freedom of expression in all matters. That is why there shall no longer be any prohibition on public gatherings or newspapers by the Government of Khairpur.⁷³

Reforms along the same lines as those of Bahawalpur led to the Government of Khairpur Act, 1949, which, exceptionally, allowed for universal adult suffrage. This was a major development in the political and constitutional history of Pakistan. Hitherto no assembly had been elected in either Pakistan or the states on the principle of universal adult suffrage. While the Muslim League newspaper, *Dawn*, received the news of a new act as a constructive sign of political development, the *Sind Observer* lambasted the piecemeal approach adopted by the act. The *Sind Observer* called for the immediate grant of a full responsible government, including the right to choose the chief minister and saw no reason for the delay.⁷⁴

In the ensuing elections of May 1950, the Khairpur Muslim League won ten out of the fifteen seats. This election was hailed as major breakthrough in the process of democratization and the chief minister appointed two popularly elected ministers, A. M. Sial and Ali Mardan Khan Talpur. The Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali

Khan, himself came on 11 November 1950, to inaugurate the state assembly and lauded the courage of Khairpur in holding the first elections in Pakistan based on universal adult franchise. He said:


... Khairpur has the distinction of being the first Pakistani state to have a Legislative Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise. ... I congratulate you, gentlemen, on having stolen a march on others. ... It is their [the central government's] earnest desire to enable the people of the States to enjoy the same rights as enjoyed by the people of the provinces of Pakistan and to see that the system of government in the States takes the same shape as has developed gradually in the provinces.⁷⁵

However, this assembly, while being elected on an adult franchise, was more of a farce, because law and order, and revenue and finance remained the preserve of the chief minister and outside the ambit of the assembly's authority. Also, the policy of 'gradualism' endorsed in the speech meant that full responsible government was still a distant dream.

During 1950–51, under the steady leadership of Kizilbash, Khairpur made considerable progress in terms of economic and social development. Education was expanded, a local transport system was established, and several new industrial units were set up with the Khairpur Textile Mill a shining example of the rapid economic development witnessed by the state. The state even boasted its first newspaper—a Sindhi-Urdu newspaper *Murad*, which was a radical move. In the past, newspapers were banned in the state and even the import of newspapers from Sind or the Punjab was done clandestinely. Baig noted that even though *Murad* was legally established, for a long time people were scared to read it in public as the memory of political oppression was still alive in the minds of the state populace.⁷⁶

The occasion of the investiture of full ruling powers on Mir George Ali Murad Talpur on 16 September 1951 ushered in a new era of further democratic reform. In his speech, Liaquat Ali Khan lauded the democratic reforms in the state and noted that: 'The main task before Your Highness henceforth will be bringing of the administrative, judicial and constitutional machinery of your State at par with that of the rest of Pakistan.'⁷⁷ Hence, it was clear that Khairpur would now follow the path of Bahawalpur towards becoming a federated unit of Pakistan with provincial status.

Political activity increased in the state after the announcement of imminent further reforms and in spring of 1952, nine members of the assembly asked the central government that they should be



The Investiture Ceremony of His Highness The Mir of Khairpur State by Hon. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, 16 September 1951

able to elect their own officers, including the chief minister.⁷⁸ The functioning of the assembly, however, exhibited that it was merely a forum for debate and no dramatic changes were allowed. The shooting down of the motion by Jan Mohammad Sandile in March 1953 condemning the *jagirdari* and *kam rakhi* (concessionary rates of land revenue taxes) was a clear example that no radical change was contemplated through the assembly.⁷⁹

The Government of Khairpur (Interim Constitution) Act of 1953 did make Khairpur a federated state of Pakistan with an expanded legislature of thirty, but it still kept the nomination of the chief minister reserved for the central government. The popularity of the chief minister and the progress made under the several 'uplift schemes'⁸⁰ meant that there was no real political opposition to the state government. The only evidence of unhappiness with the state government was found in an apparent lone incident in mid-1953 amongst the textile factory workers, which was immediately dealt with by labelling the instigator a communist, and imprisoning him. SAFRON's fortnightly report noted:

One Shabbir Haider Paikar, a self-appointed leader styling himself President of the Khairpur Textile Union, is found to be a communist agitator. He was spreading discontent among the labourers of the Textile Mill. As serious unrest and disturbance was apprehended as a result of his activities, he was arrested last month under the Safety Act and will be kept in detention for a period of six months.⁸¹

This small incident clearly showed that Khairpur was still run very much like a police state, where freedom of expression was permitted, but only within centrally agreed bounds. Dissent was tolerated but not when it could lead to any serious unrest or protests.

Aware of the fact that the appointment of the chief minister by the central government was not a very popular democratic move, Kizilbash decided to run for elections due in early 1954 so that he could prove his popularity.⁸² This move was extremely successful and led to Kizilbash being elected unopposed from two constituencies. In the elections held on 28 January 1954, nearly half of the thirty-member assembly were returned unopposed and the Khairpur Muslim League bagged twenty-six of the thirty seats.⁸³ Kizilbash again formed the government, now with a mandate from the people, and created a cabinet of four members chosen from the assembly.⁸⁴

c) Frontier States

Even though there were movements for democratic reform in most states on the North West Frontier, the central government was reluctant to support any meaningful democratic reform. Law and order and stability remained the main interests of the central government and all assistance was provided to the rulers to keep political movements in check. A dispatch from the British Deputy High Commission in Peshawar in 1949 noted:

... although there is doubtless some discontent at e.g. the rudimentary conditions' of land tenure, trouble has obviously been mainly fomented by the self-styled States Muslim League leaders. The latter are almost without exception professional agitators with no real stake in the state; in many cases, indeed, they are ex-Congress workers who sought asylum in the state from the post-partition drive conducted by the NWFP Government against the Red Shirts.⁸⁵

Thus, any democratic reform in the princely states on the NWFP was slow and in the case of Dir failed to materialize at all.

i) *Amb State*

As discussed earlier, agitation against the rule of the Nawab of Amb was mainly carried out by disgruntled relatives under the guise of the Amb State Muslim League (ASML). While strong action was taken against the agitators by the Nawab, and the demise of the APSML helped, the movement against the rule of the Nawab continued. As the agitation picked up, so did the harsh response of the Nawab, to the extent that by 1951–52 there was a near rebellion against him, and the provincial government had to intervene and restore order.

After the merger of Feudal Tanawal with the NWFP in 1950, the movement against the Nawab gathered further momentum.⁸⁶ A pamphlet issued by the 'Soulless, Down-Trodden Public of Amb and Phulra States,' lamented the state of the people in these states (Phulra was actually an estate, not a princely state)⁸⁷ and demanded intervention of the Government of Pakistan. The pamphlet read:

The rulers possess everything one could possibly think of ... all the cultivable and waste land in the states, mountains, forests, trees, lands, villages, hamlets, earth, stones, men, women ... etc. ... The lands we cultivate for generations can never belong to us. The rulers only turn us out from our home and hearth from one village to another at their sweet will and for no fault of ours ...

We are very poor but are loyal subjects of Pakistan. The rulers have been treating us like slaves but all the same we have been for centuries loyal to the ruling families. ... The Muslim League party formed in the state recently has been completely crushed and once again the Nawab is the Master of all he surveys. ... Why are we kept like slaves? Come to our help Your Excellency in the name of God come

and liberate sixty-five thousand slaves from perpetual oppression and tyranny.⁸⁸

Significantly, the authors of this pamphlet did not ask for representative government in Amb. Instead, they demanded merger into the adjacent Hazara district, something which had already been popular with some politicians in the NWFP.⁸⁹ It continued:

... the states are much too small for introducing representative Governments. The revenue of the states is too little and the people are illiterate—due to the kindness of the present Nawab and his ancestors. There is hardly one in thousand who is primary pass. It is impossible to introduce any such Government and therefore we are not asking for it. What we want is a merger in the Hazara district.⁹⁰

Even the central government received a number of such petitions asking for a merger of the state with Hazara.⁹¹ But the central government did not want to abolish the government of the Nawab of Amb. The takeover of Chitral by a board of administration in 1949 had already scared the princes and a further measure of completely abolishing a state would have created more unrest and suspicion in the minds of rulers, especially the Nawab of Dir, who was already in touch with the Afghanistan government.

Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1953 it was clear that the conflict between the Nawab and his people was coming to a head. The Deputy Commissioner, Hazara noted that the people were in a very agitated mood and that the Nawab had effectively lost most of his authority. He wrote in his report to the chief secretary:

... large numbers of the peasantry living in Amb State saw me. They reiterated their demands for better conditions, for better terms of tenancy, for better Government, for more social services (no school

or hospital exists in Amb) and for a share in administration of the State in the form of a representation in Jirga which should govern this little territory. ... The sincerity and the genuineness of the demands of this peasantry was quite patent.⁹²

In these conditions the central government was forced to take some action to address the situation in the state. The Deputy Commissioner Hazara noted:

Conditions in Amb State are far from normal. The local people are completely out of hand of the Nawab's present administration and things are bordering of chaos. It is therefore, essential that we must immediately take steps to restore order and recreate confidence in the administration. ... I have explained to the Nawab that the only remedy for this is to institute a better system of administration in which a partly elected/nominated council under a 'Wazir-i-Azam,' will run the administration of the State.⁹³

The Nawab was not comfortable with the suggestion as in his understanding only an autocratic government suited the people of his state. The report of Mr Carse stated: 'His motto is 'L'etat c'est moi' and he declares that no representative government is possible in his territory as it is inhabited by a martial race which have no idea of the problems of government.'⁹⁴

Sensing the inevitability of the situation, however, the Nawab finally agreed to become a constitutional head of the state. The resulting Government of Amb (Interim Constitution) Act of 1953 introduced limited democracy in the state, with power concentrated in the hands of an all-powerful *wazir*.⁹⁵ These measures were not the full responsible government some people in the state wanted, but they did go some way in loosening the grip of the autocratic Nawab. Henceforth, the state was a federated area of Pakistan and measures were soon brought into place to modernize

the state and bring it at par with other districts in the NWFP. The people of the state were also by and large content with the limited changes. The deputy commissioner noted: 'On arrival at Amb we were received by the people of Amb State with great enthusiasm. The local inhabitants shouted slogans of joy and happiness over the coming of reforms and the new administration. ...'⁹⁶

ii) *Chitral State*

The end of the APSML did not spell the demise of the Chitral State Muslim League (CSML) and it continued to agitate against the Mehtar's rule. However, now it was joined by the Chitral Muslim League (CML) as the state branch of the PML. The CML was quick in labelling the CSML as anti-Pakistan and anti-state. Its propaganda pamphlet stated:

Some good-for-nothings tried to trick and dupe the simple people of Chitral and created numerous parties. ... There is no 'State Muslim League' present in the State of Chitral except the Muslim League. This façade has been created by those who are related to the Royal family. ... Their enmity with Pakistan is clear from the fact that the propagation of their aims and objectives is being done by their brothers through Afghanistan radio.⁹⁷

It appears that the CML also did not have an extensive programme for reform in the beginning except for a vague demand for representative government in the state and opposition to the CSML.⁹⁸

Responding to the criticism by the Muslim League, the new Mehtar conceded the principle of responsible government in Chitral in October 1949 as a result of;

a march on the royal palace by a combination of the ruler's intra-family enemies and the wealthier townsmen of Chitral city.⁹⁹ This

declaration was hailed by the Muslim League as an important victory. It was reported in the *Pakistan Times* that 'Mir Hisanuddin, Joint Secretary of the Chitral State Muslim League, had congratulated the Mehtar on his wise decision to accede to the popular demands of the State Muslim League and to introduce responsible government. The Joint Secretary said that the setting up of democratic institutions in the State would enhance Pakistan's prosperity and stability.'¹⁰⁰

However, very soon the Mehtar was sent on 'training' to Lahore and a board of administration was established in November 1949 under an APA to run state affairs. The CML was extremely displeased by such a quick renunciation of the declared intention of the Mehtar. It contended that not only were they not consulted about its composition, the board consisted of old hands they were vehemently opposed to. The statement by the President of CML read:

... a great injustice has been done to the Chitrali nation because our nation does not trust these people at all. These are the very people whose tales of tyranny we have still not forgotten. The Chitral people and the leaders of the Chitral Muslim League were not consulted before the appointment of the Board, so how can we accept the leadership of these people?¹⁰¹

Hence, there was an immediate clash between the CML and the board. The response of the board of administration was to continue with the old policy of repression. As noted by a telegram sent by the CML general secretary, several party members had been arrested. It read: 'APA Chitral in collaboration with the administrative board has initiated high handedness towards Muslim League leaders by unjustified mass arrest. Numerous Chitralis are migrating to Pakistan. ...'¹⁰²

Since the main faction of the Muslim League in Chitral was still not affiliated with the PML, the APA found it expedient to ban it from further organizing itself and holding public gatherings. However, as noted by the APA, they simply ignored his orders. He wrote to the PA Malakand: 'As a result of my notice to the League leaders ... the Leaguers have stopped their activities in open air but my information shows that they are not going to abide strictly by my instructions.'¹⁰³ In fact, one Mullah Abdul Hakim Khan of Broz village soon began a propaganda campaign against the board and asked the people not to obey the orders of the board, but only act under instructions from the League. The APA was incensed by the actions of Mullah Abdul Hakim and promptly arrested him.¹⁰⁴

The members of the League continued to campaign against the board throughout Chitral and in Peshawar throughout most of 1950 and 1951, much to the consternation of APA who did not waste any time in arresting them as soon as they broke any of his orders. The PA Malakand noted:

... it became clear that the Muslim League were not only not carrying orders but deliberately misleading the poor, miserable and illiterate common people. The Chairman of the Board of Administration repeatedly called for their leaders and told them with all the emphasis at his command that the Board of Administration was approved by Govt. and was responsible for Law and Order in the State, that the Muslim League must not create a situation which would make it necessary for action to be taken against them: that if they had anything against the Board of Administration they must make regular reports to him in the proper manner ...¹⁰⁵

Knowing that their agitation was not weakening the board of Administration, the CML began agitation first for the enforcement of Sharia law in the state, and secondly petitioned the central

government for a return of the Mehtar to Chitral. The main reason behind the demand to enforce Sharia law was the clear fact that the board would never allow it to be enforced, and hence, its refusal to do so could be used against the board of administration by labelling it un-Islamic. However, a severe clampdown by the administration prevented the League from successfully utilizing the Sharia card, and so they changed tactics and began to clamour for the return of the Mehtar. A meeting of the pro-mehtar *Ittehad*i faction of the Muslim League in early January 1952 demanded the return of the Mehtar to Chitral and threatened to court arrest if not allowed to see the governor of the NWFP concerning this matter.¹⁰⁶ The League's leaders also began writing to all concerned in the government asking for a return of the Mehtar. In a letter to Gurmani, the SAFRON minister, President Qazi Mohammad Jehan Khan stated:

The continued absence of His Highness from the State is creating doubts in the minds of the public and interested parties are utilizing this state of suspense to their advantage. ... We earnestly request Your Excellency to consider our important appeal and oblige us by sending His Highness Saif-ur-Rahman to the State without delay.¹⁰⁷

The League members thought that with the return of the Mehtar, fresh from training in Lahore and Hazara, they might have a chance for the introduction of some form of responsible government. But the central government was not receptive to the idea of sending back a ruler who in their opinion was not fit to rule. As the British High Commission dispatch had already noted, the Mehtar was 'both stupid and weak' and so unsuited to rule.¹⁰⁸ The Government of Pakistan was of the same opinion and did not want the alcoholic playboy returning anytime soon and noted that the Mehtar of Chitral, '... will only return to his State

when the Government is satisfied he is fit enough to shoulder the administration.'¹⁰⁹

After a constant campaign for his return, the Mehtar was finally allowed to come back to Chitral on 11 April 1953, to a rapturous welcome. However, it was clear that after four years of the board of administration, the central government was not going to allow the Mehtar to assume ruling powers. Hence, a supplementary instrument of accession was prepared which paved the way for the promulgation of the Government of Chitral (Interim Constitution) Act, 1953. Under this Act, the Mehtar became a constitutional ruler with his *wazir*, appointed in conjunction with the Governor-General of Pakistan, wielding real power. Thus, in September 1953 the board of administration was dissolved and the *wazir* assumed all powers, pending an election to the advisory council.¹¹⁰

The effect on the Muslim Leaguers of this announcement of some amount of democratic involvement in the running of the state was that the Muslim League further split. As stated in the SAFRON fortnightly reports: 'Tensions continue in Chitral State between the Muslim Leaguers and the Royalists. A new political organization, known as, *Riyasati* Muslim League has been set up by the pro-Mehtar elements to fill in the vacuum created by the dissolution of the *Ittehad*i League. ...'¹¹¹ The split between the Royalists and those who wanted further reform was short-lived, since the new administration (created under the 1953 Act) excluded both parties from a share in the government. The political secretary to the NWFP governor stated in his note:

... ever since the change over in the Administration, there has been dissatisfaction and some agitation in all classes of the people of Chitral. The Muslim League party which was created and backed up

by our officials in the State, was the first to openly agitate against the new Administration. Even to this day they are flying a black flag along with the Muslim League flag on their office in Chitral. Their main complaint is that they were neither consulted in the selection of the new officials nor given a share in the new Administration. The Shahzadas who formed another party in the State and who were running their own political organization called the 'Riasati League' are disgruntled and annoyed over losing their jobs and prestige which they held under the old Administration. Their other fear is that their *jagirs* and properties, which they enjoyed under the old regime, may also be taken away from them. The Mehtar himself is disgruntled because all power has been taken away from him. ... As a result the 'Riasati League' has recently merged itself with the Muslim League thereby forming a common front against the Administration.¹¹²

The constitution of the advisory council in 1954 did not further political development in the state. The council had fifty per cent appointed members who were not complimentary towards politicians and complaints were made regarding their interference. Shah Abdul Hasan, a nominated member, noted: 'Since the emergence of political parties in the State these people (officials) are prevented from the discharge of their functions. ... Government must impose restrictions on them (the politicians).'¹¹³ Therefore, even in the semi-democratic advisory council political tensions remained between officials and politicians and little development work was carried out.

Thus, on the eve of the creation of the new province of West Pakistan, Chitral State was in a situation where even the local Muslim League had not been co-opted into the administration created under the new democratic dispensation. The Muslim League was also so faction-ridden that it was difficult for the central government to even distinguish between rival groups.

iii) *Swat State*

The APSML did not have any affiliate in Swat state during its short lifespan. Nevertheless, when the tide of agitation for responsible government had begun to affect the Frontier states, Swat too had its share of people demanding responsible government in the state. Therefore, a Swat State Muslim League was established, possibly in early 1949, to campaign for democratic reform. By the middle of 1949, it was reported that its agitation was causing the Wali some consternation, resulting in arrests and repression. The Director of Intelligence gathered the happenings in Swat through news reports, noting:

... The *Zamindar* of Lahore writes, 'Inhuman atrocities are being perpetrated on the unfortunate inhabitants of the Swat State. A deputation of about 120 Muslim League workers was taken to wait upon the ruler and put its grievances before the ruler. But when the members of the deputation arrived, they were rounded up and arrested. Similar arrests were made in a village in the state where a man and woman were shot dead. Savage treatment is meted out to the prisoners, who are frequently starved to death.' The *Inquilab* writes, 'So far some 1200 persons have been arrested in Swat. ...' The *Ehsan* writes under the caption 'Oppressed people of Swat State,' 'The Ruler of Swat, like Chengiz Khan, has surpassed limits in his maltreatment towards his subjects, and the Government of Pakistan are seeing all this like idle spectators.'¹¹⁴

It is hard to ascertain the veracity of these allegations, but the attitude of the Government of Pakistan towards these reports was to treat them as 'exaggerated', and take no action as a result.¹¹⁵

The attitude of the Government of Swat was very similar to the one adopted in Chitral and Amb where any public agitation, and anti-government propaganda was severely dealt with. With the full

backing of the Government of Pakistan, the states had nothing to fear as they clamped down on public expression. In 1952, another disturbance broke out when certain leaders of the Jamaat-i-Islami allegedly gave anti-state and anti-Pakistan speeches in Swat and were subsequently arrested. As a result, hundreds of letters and telegrams were sent to the central government denouncing the rule of the Wali and demanding that the state be amalgamated with the rest of the NWFP. The SAFRON fortnightly report characterized the issue as such:

... a large number of telegrams were sent on behalf of Jamaat-i-Islami to the Ministers of the Central Government condemning the Wali of Swat for the detention of three Jamaat-i-Islami leaders in his state prison. ... The cause of the trouble as reported by the local administration is that certain leaders of the Jamaat-i-Islami organized meetings in Swat State and delivered speeches which were anti-State and anti-Pakistan. Three persons were arrested and are in detention. They would be released if they execute securities for their good behaviour in the State and for their loyalty towards it. ...¹¹⁶

The central government again refused to interfere in the matter and decided to let the Wali deal with the issue.

While local conditions in Amb and Chitral necessitated the introduction of some democratic reforms in those states, the relative peace and prosperity of Swat meant that change was not contemplated until it became obvious that some reform was necessary to keep it on the same level of political development as its neighbouring states. The Wali of Swat, Miangul Jehanzeb, was generally a very popular ruler. By the early 1950s the state boasted a thriving economy, a higher literacy rate than the adjoining districts or states, and comparative peace. However, after the announcement of reforms in both Chitral and Amb, Swat lagged

behind in political reform. Therefore, a Supplementary Instrument of Accession and an Interim Constitution were negotiated with the Wali in February 1954, with the Government of Swat (Interim Constitution) Act, 1954 coming into force in September 1954. This measure of representative government was welcomed by the population of Swat and took some steam out of the agitation of Muslim League workers for the time being.

iv) *Dir State*

The Nawab of Dir was singular in his refusal to introduce any form of reform in his state and in steadfastly declining to federate his state with Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan wanted integration of the state but was concerned about the relations between the Nawab and Afghanistan and hence, did not introduce any measures which might force his hand. Therefore, whatever political movements developed in the state, they were at the complete mercy of the Nawab who did not tolerate dissent.

Elements opposed to the Nawab's rule had already established a branch of the Muslim League in the state which continued to function in a modified form after the demise of the APSML. As attested by the British Deputy High Commissioner's report in 1949, the Nawab was ruthless in his suppression of the Muslim League. It related:

Serious allegations of 'oppression and suppression' of supporters of the Muslim League in Dir State were contained in a statement by Mr Liaquat Sayed, Propaganda Secretary of Dir State Muslim League. He said that heavy fines were being imposed for concocted offences and they were being collected forcibly and by cruel methods. Forced labour and the compulsory sale of immovable property to the Nawab on nominal prices had also greatly increased. League workers were confined to their villages.¹¹⁷

The investigation of Mr Carse into political developments in the Frontier states shed more light on the situation in Dir, where the actions of the Nawab stemmed mainly from the uncertainty of his own position. It noted:

The masses are in no mood to listen to promises of reform, as they have been deceived too often and through their Muslim League they are carrying on propaganda against the Nawab. The latter seems to be somewhat timorous character—he is afraid of his people and is endeavouring to placate them—he is afraid of his own position vis-à-vis the NWFP Government after what happened in Chitral. ... The agitation of the Dir Muslim League is in favour of absorption of the state in Pakistan.¹¹⁸

By 1953, the Nawab had initiated no reforms and so the agitation of the Dir Muslim League continued. The American consul general noted that he had 'been impressed by the violent nature of political activity there.'¹¹⁹ However, the Government of Pakistan was very concerned about the Nawab's influence in the Bajaur tribal agency and fearful of his secession to Afghanistan, and therefore, no pressure was put on the Nawab.¹²⁰

d) Baluch States

As discussed earlier, soon after the accession of Kalat to Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan dismissed its ministers and appointed its own prime minister. The result of the tight control of the Government of Pakistan in the aftermath of accession was that political development was retarded for a long time in the Baluch states. In June 1948, the pro-independence Kalat State National Party was banned and all of its main leaders, such as Ghaus Bakhsh Bizinjo, Maulana Mohammad Umar, Maulana Arz Mohammad, and Mir Gul Khan Naseer were arrested.¹²¹

There was also reportedly a Kalat State Muslim League. However, little is known of its activities except a letter from its president in December 1947 to Jinnah in which he recounts the formation of the league and its activities. Abdul Qadir noted:

I therefore, continued individual activities till 1946 when Qazi Mohd Isa Khan, impressed by my active efforts, sent Fazal Ahmed from Karachi to me with the advice that I should establish States' Muslim League Organization in Kalat State, and he, as President, Baluchistan Muslim League, would render all possible help to me. I was encouraged and immediately called a meeting of some notables at Mastung who unanimously agreed to my proposal. ... Since then, we have established League branches in almost all the towns of Kalat State and we have been sending monthly reports to the President, All India States' Muslim League Council at Delhi, but unfortunately riots broke out just after and inspite of several telegrams and letters to our President, Mr Manzar-i-Alam, we were at a loss to receive no replies. Now, therefore, having no knowledge of the States' Muslim League Office and its office bearers, I have been compelled by circumstances to turn to you for help and guidance. ...¹²²

It seems that this letter, written by the son of the Shahwani tribe's Nawab was little more than self-aggrandizement, as no other record of the activity of the Kalat State Muslim League can be found prior to the creation of Pakistan. It is also significant that there is no reply by Jinnah to this letter in his papers, showing that he perhaps understood how shallow these claims were.

In 1949, after the Khan of Kalat returned from his tours abroad, he tried in vain to recall his two houses of parliament, the now dormant Dar-ul Awam and Dar-ul Umara. The Government of Pakistan was perturbed by such plans and thwarted them immediately. The SAFRON report noted:

... these houses are a creation of His Highness. Dar-ul-Umara was an attempt to bring the semi-Independent Sardars of Kalat State firmly under the control of the Khan and to wean them from their loyalty to the Agent to the Governor-General, while Dar-ul-Awam was a body of Congress-minded individuals whom the Khan used, to keep his own sardars under control, and to stop the British Government interfering too much in the internal affairs of the State. ... Under the Hon'able Prime Minister's orders instructions were issued to the Agent to the Governor-General to ask His Highness to explain the necessity of calling these Houses at this juncture, and to defer their summoning till he has thrashed out with the Government of Pakistan the future constitution of his State. ...¹²³

While accurate about the composition of the houses, the report was flawed in that it characterized the lower house as existing to prevent the interference of the British, since both houses of parliament were only called in the first instance after the lapse of paramountcy. Moreover, they were broadly representative of the people in the states—no less than the advisory councils established in the Frontier states. In any case, the Government of Pakistan foresaw political turmoil in case the houses met and so strongly advised the khan against convening them. Shah noted: 'our experience of the Khan has been that whenever he decides to create mischief, he summons his Upper and Lower Houses. ... I advise against allowing him to start meddling with politicians by summoning the Houses of Legislature.'¹²⁴ As a result, the houses never met again.

The creation of the Baluchistan State Union (BSU) in 1952 signalled that political activity might be allowed in the princely states. As a result the Pashtoon leader, Abdul Samad Acakzai, established the *Pushtoon Wur Wur* (Pashtoon Brotherhood) soon after his release from jail in 1954, but since the party demanded

Pakhtunistan, it was promptly banned. In 1954, Prince Abdul Karim was also released from jail and sensing elections, he established the *Uthman Gall* party on the back of the Kalat State National Party (KSNP) with the support of Ghaus Bakhsh Bizinjo. The aims of this party were largely the same as the KSNP, except that it was focused on working within the boundaries of Pakistan, and did not publically lay claim to Baluch areas in Iran and Afghanistan.¹²⁵ It was also believed that a BSU Muslim League had also been formed by Bizinjo in anticipation of elections.¹²⁶

Under the interim constitution of the BSU promulgated in late 1952, the Union was to have a legislature of twenty-eight elected, and twelve nominated members. Initially, the BSU constitution allowed for universal adult franchise, i.e. both men and women of age could vote. However, in September 1953, the government of the Union proposed to amend the constitution to allow only men to vote, a move the central government approved.¹²⁷ This amendment was a clear sign that even though the central government wanted to see some democratic reform in the Baluch states, it did not want the introduction of democracy to initiate any radical change in the social and political structure of the states. Adult males, especially in the *jirga* system, were the decision makers, and the new constitution now envisaged the same. There was consideration given to the equal status of women and their individual, and political rights under the new constitution and it seemed that no one cared either. However, the voters' lists and the general preparations for the elections never materialized and in June 1955, the BSU merged with Baluchistan, and later with the One Unit in October 1955.

CONCLUSION

By 1950, there was not a single princely state in India where people did not have full democratic rights. The policy of mergers, unions, and centrally governed areas initiated by the Government of India in December 1947, ensured that all the princes were constitutional monarchs by the end of the integration process. On the other hand, in Pakistan, even by 1954, only the rulers of Bahawalpur and Khairpur had assumed a purely ceremonial status. The BSU and Frontier states (except Dir) had introduced some reforms, but by 1954 they only allowed limited democracy with the prince still wielding considerable power; Dir, Hunza and Nagar were still complete autocracies. The creation of the One Unit in 1955 wiped out Bahawalpur, Khairpur, and the BSU, but the Frontier states and Hunza, and Nagar continued to be governed by their rulers for decades to come. The democratic experiment had blossomed in some states while it was crushed in others and only allowed limited breathing space in some.

The critical lifeline for democracy in the states was the support it received from the central government. In most states, the princes were obviously not prepared to loosen their hold over the government and so politicians naturally looked for support from the Government of Pakistan. However, the attitude of the government was very cautious towards change in the states. The government denied that it had anything at all to do with the All Pakistan State Muslim League (APSML). Liaquat noted: The Muslim League that used to exist in the states was not a branch of the Muslim League in this House.¹²⁸ Such disassociation from the APSML gave the rulers the freedom to suppress its agitation with full force. Furthermore, the fractured nature of the Muslim League in Pakistan, where it was faction-ridden and internally weak, meant

that the APSML could not count on any political support from the politicians in Pakistan either.¹²⁹ The APSML was also faction-ridden and hardly had a coherent political plan above personal politics. An inexperienced party without any central government support or help from the seasoned politicians in Pakistan, and faced with oppressive rulers, the APSML survived longer than the harsh conditions in which it was allowed to operate.

The democratic governments in Bahawalpur and Khairpur did exhibit in their short span of governance that they were up to the task of responsible government. As detailed in the next chapter, the pace of economic and social development in both states was a testament of their success. That said, in both states democracy was permitted only under the close watch of the central government. In Bahawalpur, the adviser to the amir was the ultimate authority and, sensing that the government of Hasan Mahmud would not support the One Unit plan, it was immediately dismissed in November 1954. In Khairpur, democracy did not even mean an elected chief minister, who until the last day of the state remained Mumtaz Kizilbash—still a member of the Pakistan civil service on deputation. The lively nature of politics in both states with good turnouts in elections and some political debate did illustrate that the people of these states had an appetite for democratic rule. However, this appetite was never satisfied.

There is little source material on the semi-elected advisory councils in Amb, Swat, and Chitral and only anecdotal conclusions can be reached about their performance. It is clear that in Swat the Wali, being his own advisor, controlled the advisory council, and that the Amb council was so small that the Nawab must have exerted considerable influence and control over its proceedings. The minutes of the Chitral advisory council show a constant power

struggle between the official, i.e. nominated, and elected members of the council. However, the minutes also illustrate the concerns of the subjects of Chitral where issues relating to communications, irrigation, and education were often repeated.¹³⁰ Nevertheless, it appears that the council was merely a lot of idle discussion with little practical action. In 1957, the regent commented at the inauguration of the Second Advisory Council that, 'during the tenure of the old Advisory Council nothing much was done in the way of utilizing State revenues for the development of the State.'¹³¹ Real political change leading to development was still a long way away for the Frontier states.

Speaking in the Constituent Assembly, Mian Iftikharuddin, who was called the 'permanent opposition,' did, time and again, point out the double standards of the central government towards the states. He pointed out the hypocrisy in the stance of the Government of Pakistan where it was demanding that the decision of the Kashmir ruler to accede to India be referred to his people on the grounds that the rights of the people should not be trampled upon by an autocrat, but was content with the Pakistani rulers nominating the members representing the states in the Constituent Assembly.¹³² The general secretary of the Dir State Muslim League also used the 'Kashmir logic' to press the Government of Pakistan to spearhead some reforms in the princely states. Akhonzada noted: 'If the Government of Pakistan wants the right of self determination in Kashmir ... then it should take concrete steps to improve the conditions of the people in Dir, Chitral and Swat.'¹³³ The Urdu daily *Nawa-i-Waqt* vehemently objected to the delay in implementing democracy in the states and wondered what crime the states' people had done to merit such a dark fate.¹³⁴ These protestations, however, fell on deaf ears in Karachi.

The policy of the Government of Pakistan towards democracy in the states was firmly of gradualism, coupled by a paramount concern towards the security and integrity of the country. Democracy could be tolerated but only when the government in the states was subservient to the central government. Just as the framing of the constitution was being postponed from one year to the next, the introduction of a full democracy was continuously pushed forward. Liaquat explained: 'With sympathy and firmness we will be able to bring the states to the same level of democracy as Pakistan by the time the new constitution was ready.'¹³⁵ This gradualism was not without its supporters. *Dawn* strongly supported this stance in an editorial: 'Most of these states are without even that elementary grounding in procedures and affairs which is essential to an intelligent casting of votes. Democracy without political education has all the potentialities of chaos.' It was perhaps the incessant bickering within the Constituent Assembly and political mud-slinging and back-stabbing in Pakistan which had convinced *Dawn* of the policy of gradualism.¹³⁶ It noted in the same editorial:

We have enough experience by this time of how democracy has become indistinguishable from licence in the recent past at the hands of some properly elected but thoroughly inexperienced politicians ... it is positively risky to try adult suffrage, all at once on an ignorant electorate, which can only be so manipulated as to destroy the ordinary man's faith in its political efficacy.¹³⁷

In the end political instability continued in Pakistan and the long delayed constitution was only promulgated in 1956, but it still did not grant full democratic rights to all the people of all the princely states. The promised general elections would have to wait until 1970.

Notes

1. See, Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, 481–7.
2. *Pakistan Times*, 9 January 1948.
3. *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 5 June 1948, 3.
4. For an example of the Congress' co-option of local political parties in India, see, Sisson, *The Congress Party in Rajasthan*.
5. *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 20 February 1948, 6.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 27 June 1948, 1.
9. *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 30 June 1948, 7.
10. *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 6 October 1948, 3.
11. Lewis to Marshall, 26 November 1948, Box 7, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
12. FNS No. 22, 36/CF/48, NDC, Islamabad.
13. Ibid.
14. Shah to Prime Minister, 13 December 1948, 10 (5) PMS/49, NDC, Islamabad.
15. Shah to Governor NWFP, 19 October 1948, 116-S.St. (1) vol. I, NWFP.
16. Lewis to Marshall, 26 November 1948, Box 7, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
17. Political Resident to Chief Secretary NWFP, 23 June 1948, 116-S.St. (1) vol. I, NWFP.
18. ASML Pamphlet 1948 (Urdu), NWFP.
19. British High Commission dispatch No 303 (198), 31 May 1949, L/PS/12/3284, UKNA.
20. ASML Pamphlet 1948 (Urdu), NWFP.
21. Governor, NWFP to Amb, 21 June 1948, *ibid*.
22. Amb to Governor, NWFP, 26 June 1948, 28-S/48, NWFP.
23. Mohd. Afzal Khan to Political Resident, NWF, 8 August 1948, *ibid*.
24. Amb to Governor, NWFP, 23 December 1948, 117-S. St (1), NWFP.
25. President APSML to Governor, NWFP, 8 August 1948, KW 55.S. Sts (1) 1948, NWFP.
26. Secretary, ASML to Political Resident, NWFP, 27 August 1948, 28-S/48, NWFP.
27. Adviser, Amb to Governor, NWFP, 29 November 1948, 117-S. St (1), NWFP.

28. Proceedings of a special meeting of the Frontier Tanawal Association on 25 July 1948, KW 55. S.Sts (1) 1948, NWFP.
29. Pamphlet in Urdu, 28-S/48, NWFP.
30. Governor, NWFP to President, APSML, 24 August 1948, KW 55. S.Sts (1) 1948, NWFP.
31. Report of Assistant Commissioner, Mansehra to Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, 6 October 1948, 117-S. St (1), NWFP.
32. CSML Memorandum to the Government, no date, probably 1948, 116-S.St. (1) vol. I, NWFP.
33. Ibid.
34. Resolution No. 1 of the CSML, 24 June 1948, *ibid.*
35. Chitral to NWFP Premier, 29 September 1948, *ibid.*
36. Deputy Director Intelligence to Chief Secretary NWFP, 25 September 1948, *ibid.*
37. Governor, NWFP to Prime Minister, 20 October 1948, *ibid.*
38. Ibid.
39. Adviser, Amb to Governor, NWFP, 29 November 1948, 117-S. St (1), NWFP.
40. Frontier Tanawal Association pamphlet (Urdu), 28-S/48, NWFP.
41. Liaquat's Address, 20 February 1949, in Afzal, *Speeches and Statements*, 222.
42. *Dawn*, 5 April 1949.
43. Quoted in Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation*, 100-1.
44. *Dawn*, 4 April 1948.
45. *Dawn*, 6 April 1948.
46. SAFRON Half-Yearly Summary No. 2, 150/CF/48, NDC.
47. See FNS No. 8, 264/CF/49, NDC.
48. See FNS No. 18, *ibid.*
49. FNS No. 20, *ibid.*
50. FNS No. 21, *ibid.*
51. See FNS No. 3, 21/CF/50 vol. III, NDC.
52. See FNS No. 22, *ibid.*
53. See FNS No. 24, *ibid.*
54. Quoted in *Dawn*, 19 June 1951.
55. See FNS No. 11, 23/CF/51 vol. II, NDC.
56. See FNS No. 17, in *ibid.*
57. *Pakistan Times*, 6 February 1952.
58. See *Dawn*, 31 March 1952.

59. The refugee dimension of Bahawalpur politics still needs to be assessed, but suffers from a lack of sources.
60. Government of Bahawalpur (Interim Constitution) Act, 1952. For details see the Act as published by the State Government in BCL, or summary in FNS No. 5, 17/CF/52, NDC, Islamabad.
61. *Pakistan Times*, 23 April 1952.
62. See, Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, 28 April 1952, 105/CF/52, NDC, Islamabad.
63. Dispatch for the week ending 29 May 1952, US Consulate General, Lahore, Box 35, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
64. See Dispatch for the week ending 14 April 1952, *ibid.*
65. Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation*, 131–2.
66. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, 25 January–1 February 1953, Box 35, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
67. For details see, Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation*, 133–5.
68. Resolution No. 2 by BML, 241/CF/53, NDC, Islamabad.
69. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, 27 August–2 September 1953, Box 35, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
70. See FNS Nos. 10, 12 and 15, 33/CF/53 vol. XI, NDC.
71. Baig, *Riyasat-e-Khairpur*, 109.
72. *Sind Observer*, 14 February 1948.
73. Quoted in Amrohvi, *Tarikh-e-Khairpur*, 116.
74. See FNS No. 16, 264/CF/49, NDC, Islamabad.
75. Liaquat's Address to Khairpur Assembly, in Afzal, *Speeches and Statements*, 501–2.
76. Baig, *Riyasat-e-Khairpur*, 133.
77. Speech by Hon. Prime Minister of Pakistan on the occasion of the Investiture Ceremony of His Highness The Mir of Khairpur State on 16th November 1951, KDA.
78. Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation*, 122.
79. See *Ibid.*
80. See FNS No. 12, 33/CF/53, NDC, Islamabad.
81. FNS No. 15, *ibid.*
82. See FNS No. 23, *ibid.*
83. See FNS No. 2, 8/CF/54 vol. XVI, NDC, Islamabad.
84. See FNS No. 4, *ibid.*
85. British High Commission Pakistan Dispatch No. 303 (198), 31 May 1949, L/PS/12/3284, UKNA.

86. For details on the Upper Tanawal decision see, FNS No. 3, 23/CF/51, NDC, Islamabad.
87. The Advocate General, Mohammad Ali, noted: 'The estates of the Khan of Phulera are part of Upper Tanawal and are held by that Chief under the Chief of Amb. Both these tracks are within British India (now Pakistan).' 22 August 1950, 161 S.Sts, NWFP.
88. Pamphlet 'Memorandum from "The Soulless, Down-Trodden Public of Amb and Phulra States",' 3, NWFP.
89. After the merger of Feudal Tanawal with Hazara, Amb State was left with only about fifteen square miles of territory.
90. Pamphlet 'Memorandum from "The Soulless, Down-Trodden Public of Amb and Phulra States",' 12-15, NWFP.
91. See, FNS No. 23, 23/CF/51 vol. II, NDC, Islamabad.
92. Deputy Commissioner, Hazara to Chief Secretary, NWFP, 26 March 1953, 152.S.Sts I vol. II, NWFP.
93. Deputy Commissioner, Hazara to Chief Secretary, NWFP, 19 April 1953, KW 175 S.Sts, NWFP.
94. British High Commissioner to Lord Addison, 8 September 1949, L/PS/12/3284, UKNA.
95. For more details see, KW 175 S.Sts., NWFP.
96. Deputy Commissioner, Hazara to Chief Secretary, NWFP, 9 May 1953, 152.S.Sts I vol. II, NWFP.
97. Pamphlet '*Chitral main Muslim League ki Tanzim*,' by Maulana Mohammad Aqeel, Member League Council Chitral, NWFP.
98. Ibid.
99. Survey of the Pakistan States, 28 May 1951, Box 34, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
100. Quoted in Weekly Report No. 41, British Deputy High Commission Peshawar No. 125/49, 18 October 1949, L/PS/12/3284, UKNA.
101. Statement of Maulana Fazal Ilahi, President, CML, 12 December 1949, 116-S. Sts. (I) vol. I, NWFP.
102. Telegram from Zaffur Ahmed, General Secretary CML, 6 February 1950, ibid.
103. APA, Chitral to PA, Malakand, 16 January 1950, 116-S. Sts. (I) vol. I; NWFP.
104. For details see Secret Memo from APA, Chitral to PA, Malakand, 25 January 1950, ibid.
105. Report on Chitral by PA, Malakand, 6 April 1950, ibid.

106. See FNS No. 2, 17/CF/52, NDC, Islamabad.
107. Qazi Mohammad Jehan Khan, President CSML to Minister SAFRON, 6 April 1952, 116-S. Sts. (I) vol. I, NWFP.
108. British High Commission dispatch No. 303 (198), 31 May 1949, LPS 12/3284, UKNA.
109. *Dawn*, 8 February 1953, 5.
110. See FNS No. 17, 33/CF/53 vol. XI, NDC.
111. FNS No. 18, *ibid*.
112. Political Secretary to the Governor NWFP, 9 September 1954, 116-S.Sts. (I) vol. II, NWFP.
113. Proceedings of the Chitral Advisory Council, February 1954, 190 S.Sts, NWFP.
114. Report of the Director of Intelligence, 4 June 1949, 117-S. Sts (I), NWFP.
115. FNS No. 9, 264/CF/49 vol. III, NDC, Islamabad.
116. FNS No. 7, 17/CF/52, NDC, Islamabad.
117. Weekly Report No. 38, British Deputy High Commission, Peshawar, 28 September 1949, L/PS/12/3284, UKNA.
118. British High Commissioner to Lord Addison, 8 September 1949, *ibid*.
119. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, 23–29 July 1953, Box 35, MLR UD3064A, USNA.
120. See, Letter to Deputy Secretary, SAFRON, 16 February 1953, 162 S.Sts., NWFP.
121. Naseer, *Tarikh-e-Baluchistan*, 580–1, and *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 19 July 1948, 1.
122. Abdul Qadir to Jinnah, 22 December 1947, F 25 (II) GG/153, NAP.
123. FNS No. 15, 264/CF/49, NDC, Islamabad.
124. Cited in Awan, *Baluchistan*, 214.
125. For details see *ibid*. 219.
126. FNS No. 3, 33/CF/53 vol. XI, NDC, Islamabad.
127. FNS No. 18, *ibid*.
128. 6 January 1950, *CAPD*, vol. 6, No. 3, 30.
129. For an assessment of the political parties in Pakistan see, Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan 1947–1958*, and Hussain ‘The Failure of Parliamentary Politics in Pakistan’.
130. See, 190 S.Sts, NWFP.
131. Address by the Regent of Chitral, 171 S.Sts. vol. III, NWFP.
132. See, 6 January 1950, *CAPD*, vol. 6, No. 3, 26–8.
133. *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 25 February 1949, 1.

134. *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 5 June 1948, 3.
135. 6 January 1950, *CAPD*, vol. 6, No. 3, 31.
136. For the failure of parliamentary politics see, Suleri, *Pakistan's Lost Years*.
137. *Dawn*, 10 January 1950, 5.

Chapter Six

Subjects or Citizens?

A Welfare State comes into being when the total population, particularly that section of it which is better placed, contributes substantially to the improvement of living for all.

1955 Budget Speech of Mumtaz Kazilbash
Chief Minister of Khairpur State

INTRODUCTION

The system of indirect rule through paramountcy was the cornerstone of relations between the British and the Indian princely states. The princely states were completely autonomous internally, though the Government of India was not tolerant of gross misrule and interfered if the princes oppressed their people. While a number of princes mingled with British civil servants and even royalty, the populace of the princely states had little contact with the British. The odd civil surgeon, missionary, or school teacher might be the only visible signs for the ordinary princely subjects that their state was under British suzerainty. Since the relations of the states were directly with the Crown and not the Government of India, a sense of loyalty towards the Crown was cultivated in the princely states by the Political Department.¹ With the focus on strengthening official contacts only, no sense of loyalty towards the British Government of India was cultivated, so that the states' subjects remained largely oblivious of the government and events in British India. Furthermore, the means

of communication, railways, metalled roads, etc. were relatively new and had only just begun to be massively utilized towards the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, most princely subjects had little contact with people from other states or provinces of British India. Under paramountcy, the princes could not have official relations with other princes and so only retained family- and clan-based contacts with each other. Development both in terms of the economy, and society were mainly at the behest of the prince and varied widely among the states. So where Baroda had universal free primary education by 1906, slavery was still legal in Kalat in 1930. The distance in terms of ground-level interaction between the people of the states and British India, and the disparity of development meant that there was a very low level of integration between the princely states and British India. There were some basic and general ties, but by the time of the lapse of paramountcy in 1947, broadly speaking, the states remained as unconnected and different from each other (and British India) as they had been a century before.

The princely states which acceded to Pakistan were at different stages of political, social, and economic development. While social indicators are not readily available for all the princely states on the eve of their accession to Pakistan, it is clear that the states lagged far behind the provinces of British India which became a part of Pakistan. At the time of accession, Kalat State, which had a population of about 320,000 had only twenty-eight schools, which were all for boys, and by February 1949 there were only 1,734 students on the rolls.² Similarly, neither Kharan nor Las Bela had any adequate educational facilities and only had one middle school each for boys by 1949.³ In Khairpur, the educational provision was better, but even by 1948 there were only three high schools with only a few hundred students.⁴ Education was completely banned

in Dir and only a middle school was allowed to function in Amb. In Swat and Chitral some educational facilities were permitted, but were of mediocre standard and compared unfavourably with those in neighbouring districts. In Bahawalpur, however, a number of schools existed and the gradual influx of settlers during the Sutlej Valley Project ensured a continued influx of foreign ideas.

The states also lagged far behind in ensuring universal human rights for their subjects. A general understanding of basic human rights was developing in Pakistan proper, especially after Pakistan adopted the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December 1948, but such a concept did not exist in the princely states. The people of the states understood whatever rights they were granted by the prince to be valid during his 'pleasure'. There was no understanding of 'universal rights', which a prince had to accept. Therefore, for example, there was no firm concept of private property in the Frontier and Baluch states, and the only states where women achieved the right to vote were Bahawalpur and Khairpur: all other states obstinately excluded them.

Since the economy was the purview of the prince under the doctrine of paramountcy, the princely states of India differed greatly in terms of economic development. Some states like Travancore and the Maratha states developed favourably when compared to British Indian provinces, while most other states lagged far behind. In the case of the states which acceded to Pakistan, the lack of technical knowledge and the primitive nature of the societies led to a very slow rate of economic development. Concerning Kalat and the other Baluch states in particular, a significant proportion of their population was nomadic and hence, had little interest in the setting-up of modern style factories and industrial units. Agriculture was the mainstay of the economies of these states and

the old models of trade and commerce prevailed. Since Khairpur and Bahawalpur, were adjacent to the great rivers of the Punjab, they benefited from the development of irrigation networks by the British. The Sutlej Valley Project (started in 1922) and the Lloyd Barrage (started 1923) brought about a mini-economic revolution in Bahawalpur and Khairpur respectively and the Second World War saw their agricultural production increase dramatically. Both states also invested carefully in the setting-up of small scale industries to boost local manufacturing. The Frontier states, however, remained mainly agricultural economies with no efforts to introduce new technologies or ideas to reshape their economies.

With such a difference between the princely states which acceded to Pakistan and the British Indian provinces which became a part of it, the pace at which societies in the states developed was extremely slow. As the Government of Pakistan took control of more and more subjects, mostly indirectly, things began to change and slowly the subjects of the princely states became aware of the change brought about by their states' accession to Pakistan.

The idea of a 'subject' was carefully cultivated in the princely states. Subjects were people who owed even their existence in some sense to the prince—everything emanated from him and reached its summit in him. The changes brought about by accession and its aftermath strongly challenged this understanding of being subject to a prince in most of the princely states of Pakistan. Very slowly, the notion of 'citizenship' based on inherent rights and duties began to emerge. This process was by no means immediate or thorough, and by the early 1950s had only just begun to take hold in the progressive states of Khairpur and Bahawalpur. But even in other states it was clear by 1955 that the environment had changed. The prince was no longer the linchpin of the state

machinery and was restricted in his functions. People of the states had gained rights, severely limited in some states, of political participation; the influx of education and better communications was opening up a new world for most of them, and rapid economic development had begun to have an impact on their lives.

This chapter investigates the beginning of the process of change from 'subjects' to 'citizens' in the Pakistani princely states. Since the period under consideration is very limited, it is clear that the transformation had only just begun, but still it had started to transform the lives of people in the states. Through a close analysis of the change in the powers of the prince, the availability of education, integrated system of law and justice, better communications, and general social and economic development led by the central government, this chapter traces the changes the states went through between 1947-48 and 1955. An assessment of these changes and developments certainly had an impact on the outlook of the people in the states and sowed the seed of citizenship in many of them.

I POWERS OF THE RULER

The foundation of the state was the person of the prince—the khan, nawab, amir, wali, etc. It was to him that the people owed their allegiance (or in the case of the tribal kingdoms, the tribe, which then vowed allegiance to the prince) and most state functions either emanated from him directly or were controlled by him. This 'patron-client' system was the backbone of the princely system and ensured that the people remained loyal. The break-up of the actual control of the prince over the affairs of the state in post-accession states was the first major change in the lives of the people of the princely states.

At the time of the lapse of paramountcy, all the princely states which acceded to Pakistan had very few civil servants on deputation from the Government of India. Kalat State had retained the services of Nawabzada Aslam, IPS as Prime Minister, and Douglas Fell, ICS as Foreign Minister, while in Bahawalpur Penderel Moon, ICS had assumed the office of Revenue Minister. In all other states, the administration was overseen either by retired members of the British Indian services or locally recruited individuals. The policy of the Political Department had been to strengthen the hands of the princes and impose its own choice of ministers only if serious mismanagement was taking place. Therefore, as noted in Chapter 3, Ahmed Yar Khan was gradually allowed to assume full responsibilities of the Khan and was thereafter, able to choose Nawabzada Aslam as his prime Minister. Similarly, in Bahawalpur, the Amir was able to appoint Mushtaq Gurmani after the affairs of the state had stabilized under the premiership of Sir Richard Crofton, ICS.

Although the first instruments of accession signed by all the states stipulated the transfer of only defence, foreign affairs, and communications to the central government, soon after the appointment of prime ministers and chief ministers in the states was also made subject to the prior concurrence of the central government. In Kalat, therefore, the Government of Pakistan appointed Mohammad Zarif Khan as the Prime Minister, and dismissed the other ministers and in their place appointed secretaries on deputation from the Pakistan civil service to manage the ministries under the direct supervision of the prime minister.⁵ From then onwards the state was administered under the guidance of the Government of Pakistan, and the Khan stopped having any impact on the day-to-day government of the state. With the creation of the Baluchistan State Union (BSU), this policy further

strengthened and the administration remained in the hands of civil servants directly appointed by the Government of Pakistan.

Similarly, in the other states, SAFRON appointed ministers and secretaries and the day-to-day running of divisions was undertaken not with reference to the prince but the relevant ministries in the central government through the States Ministry. However, differences remained in terms of the extent to which the ruler was relegated to a secondary position. In Bahawalpur, Khairpur, and the Baluch states, the rulers were far removed from the day to day running of the government by 1952-53. In the Frontier states, though, the tribal nature of the society meant that the princes still had considerable influence on the centrally appointed advisor or minister. So in terms of the Federated States, by 1954 it was fair to comment that: 'For all practical purposes in so far as the exercise of the executive and legislature authority of the Federal Government in the Federal and concurrent fields is concerned, the Federated States are at par with the provinces of Pakistan.'⁶ The sole exception to this rule of officially transferring power to the nominees of the central government was Dir, where the nawab adamantly refused to sign any supplementary instruments of accession. However, despite his refusal, the appointment of an Assistant Political Agent (APA) in 1952 as his advisor meant that henceforth the Government of Pakistan had considerable influence in the administration of the state.

The practical result of direct control of modes of administration by the central government was that the person of the prince became a marginal figure in the running of government in some states. Therefore, while numerous telegrams were sent to the central government in 1949 for the return of the Nawab of Mekran to his state, the central government took scant notice

since it was mainly undertaken by elements who were trying to empower the nawab with powers he had already lost to the central governments' appointees in the state. The secretary to the Agent to the Governor-General (AGG) wrote to the Political Agent (PA), '... there has been no change in the policy of the Government of Pakistan towards Mekran State and the administration will continue to be run by our officers in the name of Nawab Bai Khan.'⁷ The attitude of the Khan of Kalat, on his return from his foreign tours in 1949, was also emblematic of how much real powers the rulers had lost. In August 1949, Ahmed Yar Khan realized that he was not going to be allowed by the AGG to call his now dormant houses of parliament, he undertood that he was no longer in a position to strongly influence the politics of the state and decided to proceed on Hajj. The prime minister of Kalat noted: 'From what I read of His Highness's mind (is that) he wants to keep himself aloof for some time from the current politics of Baluchistan.'⁸ Similarly, in Khairpur, the central government was adamant in keeping the administration under the sole control of their appointee, Mumtaz Kizilbash, by keeping the minor prince away in England on account of his studies. It is worthy of note that the Government of Pakistan was so resolute that George Ali Murad be educated in England that it obtained admission for him to the University of Cambridge, even though he was academically unprepared for university study, and found it too rigorous. The senior tutor at Emmanuel College, Cambridge was not impressed, but encouraging, about the prospects of the young prince. He noted in a letter to the Pakistani High Commissioner: 'I am a little concerned about A. M. Talpur. We shall not ask him to take the University examination in June. ... However, I am glad to be told that his intelligence is adequate for the course even if his knowledge is not very great, nor his original education sufficient.'⁹

By 1950, the Amir of Bahawalpur was far removed from the daily business of government. The US Embassy noted that the Amir '... has been losing interest in the state in the past few years, and that he would welcome any developments which would enable him to spend the greater part of his time in Europe.'¹⁰

The lingering Kashmir dispute and worsening relations with Afghanistan and the Pathanistan issue presented a different environment in the Frontier states. The central government ideally wanted to take effective control away from the rulers but it was only able to do so in Chitral where the Mehtar died in a plane crash in January 1949. Regarding Swat and Amb, only in 1953–54 did the central government undertake measures to restrict the powers of the ruler constitutionally through the creation of partially-elected councils overseen by the advisors appointed by the central government (although in Swat the wali was his own advisor). In the case of Dir, as already noted, the nawab steadfastly refused any reform and so at the end of the period under consideration, Sir Shah Jehan Khan remained practically in control.

As soon as the process of accession was completed in 1948, the Government of Pakistan began to treat the princely states as federated units (although legal federation came much later). This meant that representatives of the states were included in all-Pakistan initiatives, federal ministries began to have a greater say in the development of policies in the states, and after legal federation, the states became eligible for federal grants and loans for development projects. Thus, even before the merger of the BSU, Khairpur and Bahawalpur into West Pakistan in 1955, the states were well integrated into the bureaucratic system of the country.

As the states moved from a 'person'-based system to a 'state'-based system, new ideas of governance began to emerge. Previously, the states had been ruled as the ruler wished. Admittedly a number of rulers wanted, and in certain cases needed, to ensure some welfare measures for the people, but it was by no means taken for granted and was seen as a special favour by the prince. As democratic reform filtered into the more advanced states, an understanding of the state as a 'welfare state' began to take shape. The chief minister of Khairpur therefore noted:

A Welfare State ... demands proportionate sacrifice, industry, labour and austerity from each and everyone on the principle of 'to each according to his need, from each according to his capacity.' In a Welfare State there is no place for cultivating the prestige of idleness or conspicuous living. All have to be workers. ... I wish to see the entire resources of the state, in men as in money, pressed into the service of the people. It is the duty of all ... to participate actively in this adventure of economic and social development and not rest until a Welfare State has been achieved.¹¹

The existence of such thinking in a state which not even a decade ago was called *jungly* (primitive) by the Resident of Punjab States was revolutionary. The state indeed had a long way to go, but the recent progress in terms of education and literacy, the economy, healthcare, public works, law and justice, as well as critical political reforms, had introduced winds of change which were to significantly alter the lives of the subjects of the princely states and, in some cases, transform them into citizens of a republic.

II EDUCATION

The most significant social change in the princely states after accession, was education. In Khairpur State the budget for

education increased from about Rs. 500,000 in 1947 to Rs. 2.7 million in 1955–56.¹² During the years of Khairpur's existence as a separate unit of Pakistan, the provision of education increased from just three high schools for boys in 1947 to five in 1955, with one for girls. The state had also established a degree college by 1955, and was investing heavily in technical training through the Sir Ali Murad Technical Institute founded at the turn of the twentieth century. Government pamphlets from the time clearly exhibit that the state was proud that its provision for education far outstripped other units of Pakistan. A resolution of the legislative assembly of Khairpur against the One Unit system in 1954 noted:

The State spends 22 per cent of its revenue on education which comes to nearly Rs. 10 per head of the population ... the highest of any unit in Pakistan. Free education is provided to all the citizens up to the Matric Standard. Books are supplied free and hostel accommodation is also provided free. Elementary education ... is made compulsory for boys. Scholarships are granted liberally for higher education. ...¹³

These provisions demonstrated remarkable progress in a very short span of time and were unmatched in Pakistan. As a result, the



Naz Girls High School Building, Khairpur State

percentage of enrolment in primary schools rose to nearly seventy per cent in 1955. The literacy rate of the state also improved from 4.9 per cent in 1941 to about fifteen per cent in 1961, which was comparable to the improvement in literacy in adjacent districts of Sind.¹⁴

Led by the progressive Chief Minister Mumtaz Hasan Kizilbash, Khairpur also made concerted efforts to integrate itself in the education sector of Pakistan. Not only were charitable contributions to various educational institutions throughout the country continued after accession, the state took an active part in the development of the education policy. In February 1952, an All Pakistan Urdu Conference was convened to promote the use of Urdu as the primary language of government and communication. The federal minister for education addressed the conference and supported the idea. Later that year, due to the success of Khairpur enrolling nearly two-thirds of its children in primary education, an All Sind Primary Education Conference was held in May 1952 under the chairmanship of the chief minister of Khairpur.¹⁵ Subsequently, a Pakistan history conference and a museum-related conference were also held in Khairpur in 1952–53. The effect of all these initiatives was that Khairpur became integrated in the education policy-making framework of Pakistan. Furthermore, the establishment of a degree college in 1955 meant that students no longer had to go to universities in Sind or Karachi and were taught locally in a college affiliated with the Sind University. The initiative of a college was important in the political development of the state, since it allowed student unions to be established for political thinking, and discussions to be carried out within academia at the local level.

Bahawalpur was the only state which had a degree college prior to accession to Pakistan, and educational facilities were greatly enhanced in the state in the years after the accession. A government note stated:

Before partition the State had 363 primary schools, 20 middle schools, one training school, one industrial school, one commercial school, one intermediate college, one degree college and 4 adult schools. After partition the number increased to 413 primary schools, 32 middle schools, and 34 high schools. There are also a number of institutions for Arabic and religious education.¹⁶

This note, which was written in 1949, exhibited how within just two years of accession to Pakistan, education had expanded rapidly in the state and included traditional, religious, and vocational elements. The expenditure on public instruction in Bahawalpur State also increased from Rs. 961,657 in 1945-56, to Rs. 1,358,800 in 1949. Moreover, a fund of Rs. 100,000 was set up in 1949 to make primary education free and compulsory in fifty educational centres in the state.¹⁷ By 1955, enrolment in schools had increased from 35,000 in 1947 to 125,000, with over eight-five per cent of students enjoying free education. The budget for education also increased five-fold between 1947 and 1955.¹⁸ As a result of these initiatives, the literacy rate in the state improved from 14.2 per cent in 1951 to 19.3 per cent in 1961, which compared favourably to the adjoining Multan district of the Punjab where it had improved from 17.4 per cent to 21.3 per cent during the corresponding period.¹⁹

The Baluch states were behind Khairpur and Bahawalpur in the provision of educational establishments, but the notion of education as a necessity and a basic right had begun to filter into the imaginations of the people. While complete information is



His Highness The Amir of Bahawalpur giving a speech after laying the foundation stone of Sadiq Public School on 14 March 1953

not readily available, it can be established that between 1948 and 1952 the number of schools in Kalat State increased from twenty-six to forty-five, with three high schools, six middle schools, and thirty-six primary schools. The expenditure on education also increased from about Rs. 140,000 in 1949 to Rs. 226,500 in 1952. In Las Bela, the number of schools increased from six in 1948 to twenty-two in 1952 of which one was a middle school, six lower middle, and fifteen primary schools. The expenditure on education in Las Bela also increased from a meagre Rs. 9,924 to Rs. 37,659 in 1952. As a result, the Administration Report for the year 1950–51 noted: 'This shows that there is a general intellectual awakening and a keen demand for education.'²⁰ However, all these schools were for boys since in a tribal and mediaeval society the notion of allowing females to go outside the house for education

was not only considered countercultural but also against the local understanding of religious precepts. A Baluchistan provincial report noted (where the situation was very similar): 'Conservatism of the indigenous population towards general education and dearth of trained female teachers, who can work in the peculiar rural conditions ... continued to prove formidable impediments in the spread of female education. ...'²¹ With very few secondary schools and no college level institutions, the Baluch states had just begun the journey towards literacy, yet they were still not very far behind the AGG's province. Between 1951 and 1961, the literacy rate in the Baluch states improved from 5.3 per cent to 6.8 per cent, while the AGG's Baluchistan fared only slightly better with the literacy rate improving from 14.8 per cent to 17.9 per cent.²²

The Frontier states had diverse policies concerning education. The Swat State was the most progressive amongst the Frontier states in terms of education. At its inception in the early twentieth century, the state was virtually illiterate. In his autobiography, the last ruling wali, Miangul Jehanzeb, noted: '... when my father started his career he could not find a single literate person to employ as his scribe in all of Swat.'²³ Some educational initiatives were taken by Miangul Abdul Wadud during his reign, but by the time of his abdication in 1949 in favour of Jehanzeb, Swat could only boast one high school and a few middle schools. Jehanzeb, however, took specific interest in establishing schools throughout the state so that by 1955 marked progress had been made. The official yearbook of the NWFP showered praise on the development in Swat and noted:

This vital need of the nation has been given top priority and a substantial share of the State's income is being spent on education. The State now has one degree college, 5 high, 20 middle, 29 lower

and 76 primary schools. Education is free up to the college standard. ... Religious education too is not neglected and there are two Darul-ul-Ulums imparting knowledge of an advanced standard. There are more than 15,000 thousand students on roll, including about 300 girls. The total annual expenditure on education is nearly Rs. 600,000.²⁴

The establishment of Jahanzeb College in 1952, was a watershed in the history of the Frontier states as none of the states nor those of the adjoining districts had a degree awarding college. This college soon became a regional centre of education and its prestige in being the first ensured, a good standard of education. As noted in the Wali's autobiography, the annual subsidy of Rs. 10,000 given to the state by the Government of India and continued by



The famous Jahanzeb College, Saidu Sharif, Swat State

the Government of Pakistan, was utilized by the Wali solely for providing scholarships.²⁵ Even in mid-1957, the Government's inspector of schools had high regard for the great leap that Swat had made in terms of education. He noted:

... I am glad to remark that the educational progress of the State in all its activities under the able guidance and sympathetic patronage of its talented Wali is really appreciable. ... At present 135 institutions are functioning in the length and breadth of the state for the benefit of the masses.²⁶

The literacy rate of Swat reflected the efforts of the Wali as it increased from an abysmal 1.75 per cent in 1951 to 11.7 per cent in 1961.²⁷

In the other Frontier states, however, the provision of education was not so generous, contributing to their relative social and economic backwardness. By 1955, Chitral State had seventy-one primary, two middle and two high schools for a population of just over a hundred thousand people.²⁸ In 1956, a detailed report by the Assistant Director of Public Instruction made it very clear that Chitral severely lacked adequate facilities, trained staff, and proper funding for its nascent schools.²⁹ The literacy rate, therefore, showed only an improvement from a negligible 0.61 per cent in 1951 to a still insignificant 3.41 per cent in 1961.³⁰ In Amb, which was left with only about fifteen square miles of territory after the merger of Feudal Tanawal with the Hazara District of NWFP, only two primary and one lower middle school were functioning by early 1950.³¹ The protests of the tenants and the severance of territory were the main reasons the nawab was not prepared to invest in the education of the people. A similar situation existed in Dir where the nawab prevented the building of any modern schools in the state.³² Only religious education, and

that too, strictly controlled by the state, was provided in village madrasas. Hence, the literacy rate in Dir remained at a minimal level between 1951 and 1961 improving from 0.91 per cent to only 1.27 per cent.³³ The literacy statistics of the Frontier states, except Swat, therefore compared very unfavourably with the settled districts of the NWFP, where increased educational provisions had led to significant improvements in a number of districts.³⁴

The provision and quality of education available in the princely states was a major marker in assessing the integration of the states into Pakistan and for the development of social and political consciousness in the states. The Government of Pakistan forced through major constitutional reforms in all states, except Dir, in the first half of the 1950s, however, they only took hold in states where the liberal provision of education instilled in the people modern ideas about democracy, rights, and citizenship. Khairpur and Bahawalpur were pivotal in this development, and by 1954 both states had elected governments which had begun to function on broadly democratic lines. In the Baluch and Frontier states (except Swat), the dearth of educational facilities retarded political consciousness and social development for decades to come. Swat boasted an exemplary record in education but the liberal welfare provisions made by the wali deflected any real challenge to his political control for the foreseeable future.

III LAW AND JUSTICE

The present Wali of Swat, Miangul Aurangzeb, remarked in an interview in August 2002 that the main responsibilities of a government were to maintain law and order and ensure justice for the people. These were the two pillars against which the performance of any government, or any country should be judged,

Miangul Aurangzeb remarked.³⁵ The issues of law and order and justice are areas against which the integration of a country can be ascertained also. A country cannot be judged to have been consolidated if the government does not have direct and effective control over all its territory. A country also has to ensure that its people are adjudicated equally and in fairness and are granted their due.

The administration of justice and the maintenance of law and order were issues which varied widely among the princely states. In Khairpur and Bahawalpur, the aim prior to accession to Pakistan was to bring laws and regulations in conformity with British India, but little changed in the Baluch and Frontier states' view of justice and they remained largely directed by local custom and Islamic Sharia law. Since the 1858 Proclamation by Queen Victoria promised to respect the laws and customs of the natives in the empire, the Political Department had been very careful not to interfere in the local laws, and customs of the princely states. The larger states were indeed encouraged to set up courts on the pattern of British India, and absconders from British India were positively extradited, but the Political Department did not take issue with the persistence of tribal law in the states.

In both Khairpur and Bahawalpur the functioning of the judiciary was similar to the states in adjacent British Indian provinces. Both had their separate legislative systems, but a number of statutes from British India were adapted and promulgated in both these states. The judges employed by the states were usually retired judges of provincial courts and therefore provided some linkage between the states and British Indian provinces. In Khairpur, for example, a retired judge of the Allahabad High Court, Justice Choudhri Naimatuallah, headed the Judicial Committee from

1943, when the judiciary was separated from the executive, until August 1947. Afterwards, a local judge was appointed to the Judicial Committee.³⁶ In terms of curbing crime, Khairpur was much better than the neighbouring Sind province and its legislature was proud of the peace and tranquillity that existed in the state. A resolution of the state legislature noted:

The incidence of crime is going down every year. To quote one instance, when food was being smuggled out of Pakistan, Special Police had to be posted by the Central Government in several neighbouring districts to check this anti-social and unpatriotic activities [sic]. But the vigilance of the State authorities was such that no special police had to be stationed in the State.³⁷

In Bahawalpur, the state had already had a system of judiciary based on the system prevalent in the Punjab. In 1949, the integration of the Bahawalpur Forces (regular as well as auxiliary) with the Pakistan Army had linked Bahawalpur with the overall law and order apparatus of Pakistan. After the federation of both Khairpur and Bahawalpur as units within Pakistan, the legal systems of the states automatically blended with the Pakistani system. In the interim constitutions of both states, specific sections stated that any law repugnant to the laws of Pakistan would automatically become void with the promulgation of the new constitution.³⁸ Hence, by 1955 both Khairpur and Bahawalpur had legal systems and judiciary similar to those in the provinces and issues relating to law and order were also coordinated with the centre, along similar lines as the provinces.

The judicial systems in the Baluch states were characterized by their stark difference from the rest of the law prevailing in Pakistan. In these states, local custom in conjunction with the Islamic Sharia law was the law of the land. In the Baluch states,

justice was administered on the basis of jirga decisions. There were: 'local jirgas, provincial jirgas and sardari jirgas which settled most of the criminal cases. In the sardari jirga only sardars participated and cases of a very serious nature (were) referred to it.'³⁹ The *Qazis* also existed alongside these jirgas but were mostly concerned with civil cases and then only on referral from the jirgas.⁴⁰ Thus, while religious law was present in the form of *qazis* in every tehsil, the majority of both criminal and civil cases were resolved through the jirga system which relied heavily on customary law. With a dearth of information on the BSU, it is hard to ascertain to what extent the system of justice changed, but what is clear is that at least in terms of criminal law, the Government of Pakistan had begun to codify laws so that consistency could be established in jirga decisions. The Administration Report for 1951-52 noted:

Customary Laws of the State have been replaced by codified criminal laws with the result that equity and justice is made common to all the inhabitants of the state. This has reduced the number of crimes and murders to a great extent. Further codes of civil and criminal laws are under preparation.⁴¹

Still, the Baluch states were a long way off from fully integrating into the legal system of Pakistan.

In the Frontier states the same mix of local customary law and Islamic Sharia law was exercised. However, in these states, the execution of justice was mostly done through the *qazis* who were appointed by the ruler from the village level upwards. In these states, the ultimate power of adjudication resided more fully with the ruler since he could either easily influence the *qazi* (especially as the ruler appointed the *qazi*) or set aside his judgement and issue his own. Jirgas also existed in the Frontier states but they largely dealt with complicated cases, and especially cases where

whole tribes were involved. Hence, in the Frontier states the legal system differed from the laws prevalent in the provinces of Pakistan and on occasion the whim of the ruler was enough to settle a case. One peculiar feature present in both the Baluch and Frontier states was the imposition of heavy fines rather than long prison sentences on the convicted. While capital punishment was exercised, life imprisonment was virtually unheard of and in its place fines, for crimes from theft to murder, were usually imposed. Miangul Jehanzeb noted about the nature of justice in Swat:

I always had to acknowledge the existence of local custom, and take it into account in judging the consequences of decisions. There were old disputes coming from previous generations; if one person killed another person, then the latter's relatives later used to kill a close relative of the killer. And this same thing would go on for a long time. So I could not give a death sentence for that, as it was a kind of revenge. But we could fine them, and imprison them, or both.⁴²

IV COMMUNICATIONS

One of the major elements in integrating an area into a larger unit is the existence of adequate and accessible modes of communication. If it is very hard for people from one area of the country to interact with the residents of another region, integration remains superficial. Whereas the British Indian Empire prided itself on uniting the Indian subcontinent for the first time, especially through its railway network, the effect of such integration had only just begun to be significant in the princely states, especially in those which acceded to Pakistan. Except for Bahawalpur and Khairpur which lay on the main Karachi—Lahore railway line, and therefore, were linked with rest of India (and later Pakistan), none of the other states which acceded to Pakistan

had a direct railway link. Since local roads were a state issue, the repair of the road network in most states was also not kept up to an acceptable standard. Restriction on political activities in most states also meant a wholesale or partial ban on the print media and so links with the outside world were few in the years before accession to Pakistan.

Improving the road and transport network was an important part of the development programme of the Government of Khairpur during its short lifetime. From an expenditure of a mere Rs. 100,000 in 1947, over Rs. 2.2 million had been spent on improving and expanding the road network in the state by 1955. In 1955, Khairpur further participated in the Karachi-Lahore highway project by building its section of the highway at a cost of nearly Rs. 2 million. A five-year road development programme initiated by the Khairpur government was to construct a further 174 miles of new roads at a cost of Rs. 7.4 million.⁴³ Together with improving the communication links with the rest of the country, Khairpur also established a nationalised local transport system, with a budget of Rs. 3 lakhs (300,000) in 1955.⁴⁴ All these projects not only increased internal interaction, but also integrated Khairpur more fully with Pakistan.

The Baluch states, keeping in view their large size and very small populations, were wanting of better means of communication, as travelling between two points in the states was difficult and hazardous. Most of the main towns in the Baluch states were connected through roads, but these were only fair weather roads. As late as 1952, the local administration was noting that, 'the camel is still used for transport in the interior of the state where no motorable roads exist.'⁴⁵ The governments in the Baluch states maintained a fleet of lorries for travel but they were infrequently



State Transport Bus Stand, Khairpur State

used and did not sufficiently cater to the needs of the people. Even in terms of the sea link with Karachi, no adequate provisions were in place. The local administration lamented that: 'The monthly steamer service which is the main source of contact between Karachi and the ports of Mekran remained unsatisfactory.'⁴⁶ As a result, the Government of Pakistan invested heavily in improving communications in the Union and nine additional fair weather roads were constructed by 1955 at a cost of nearly Rs. 600,000 with an additional equal sum allocated for the future construction of a road connecting Quetta with Karachi which was to cost over Rs. 4.5 million in total.⁴⁷ These steps revolutionized travel between different points in the region, facilitating easier travel for the people as well as aiding the control of the Government of Pakistan over the region.

Consisting of mountainous and remote regions, good communications were indispensable for the Frontier states. Again Swat State was the leader among the Frontier states in establishing a network of roads throughout the state. The founder of Swat, Miangul Abdul Wadud stated: 'I was convinced that no government could run efficiently unless each area was accessible. ... So I set about making roads throughout the length and breadth of my territory.'⁴⁸ By the end of his reign in 1949, there were 350 miles of unmetalled roads in the state and a number of bridges had also been constructed. Miangul Jehanzeb further expanded road building projects and established a separate department for this purpose. Each tehsil's *hakims* (local administrators) were also made responsible for the building of roads in their area and rules were formulated concerning construction near roads. A high level of quality was also demanded in the construction of roads and the Wali himself took a keen interest in maintaining standards. Thus by 1957 there were over 400 miles of roads, with fifteen being metalled.⁴⁹

Swat was also exceptional in the use of telephones. From the time of Miangul Abdul Wadud, the telephone remained the main means of contact between the Wali and the far-flung areas of the state. The use of the telephone made contact easier and facilitated the Wali's control over events especially in distant parts of the state. Miangul Jehanzeb noted about his father, 'For contact with his people, he used the telephone most often. ... Every evening he telephoned most of the people and asked them how things were, what was happening and so on. ... In this way, he kept close contact with everyone and knew what was up all over the State.'⁵⁰

Better communication links were also critical for the development of the Frontier States of Dir, Chitral, and Amb. All these states

were in mountainous regions and had few all-weather links to the rest of the country and so the central government allocated large amounts of development funds for the construction of roads and bridges in the Frontier states. Chitral was cut off from the rest of the country for most of winter due to heavy snowfall. Therefore, the government not only assisted Chitral in building roads, thus connecting it to different parts of the state, but it also helped construct the Lowari Pass road to provide another means of access to the rest of the country.⁵¹ The government also sanctioned a further rupees two million in its five-year plan for the construction of a number of roads and bridges in Chitral.⁵²

The significant expansion of communication infrastructure in the princely states was an important step in the integration of the states into Pakistan. Better, especially all-weather, roads facilitated improved and stronger trade links. As stated in the note on Chitral's progress, economic considerations were top of the priorities which led to the construction of a better communications network.⁵³ The new roads and bridges also made the states more accessible, allowing for greater people-to-people interaction, and especially spear-headed the influx of new ideas, technologies, and ways of life.

V ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT

With accession and later federation of the princely states, the main avenue by which their integration into Pakistan was felt was through the spheres of economy, finance, and development. Earlier, the Political Department had never sought such close fiscal and monetary union with the states or so closely scrutinized their budgets. While the Political Department and the Government of India did extend loans to the states for development purposes, they

were usually given as a result of a larger project or in instances where the state, which had itself come up with the idea, could not afford the project. Initiation of specific projects in the states was considered too much interference by the Political Department.

In Pakistan, even before formal federation, the central government obtained the fiscal and administrative integration of most states. This meant that Pakistani civil servants were directly appointed and were responsible to both the ruler of the state and to the government department they came from. This factor, coupled with concerted efforts in most princely states to focus on development in the years after accession, made economic changes the primary marker of the integration of the princely states in Pakistan.


In the years after the accession, the state of Khairpur made great strides in the field of economic development. Its income rose by over 310 per cent according to government figures, from just over Rs. 5.7 million to over Rs. 16.9 million between 1948 and 1955.⁵⁴ This increase was exceptional in Pakistan and the Khairpur legislature noted:

While increase in the budget income of 1952–53 over that of 1948–49 was 65 per cent in East Bengal, 41 per cent in the Punjab, 13 per cent in Sind, it was nearly 310 per cent in Khairpur State ... which means nearly Rs. 53 per capita, which is higher than the per head income of any provincial government in Pakistan. This is so in spite of the fact that the State has reduced its land revenue by 25 per cent in order to give relief to poor agriculturalists. The next highest per capita budget income of any other unit in Pakistan is Rs. 20 in the Punjab.⁵⁵

Spending on development programmes also increased dramatically during this period, forming about two-thirds of the expenditure in 1955.⁵⁶

With scarcely anything at the time of accession which could qualify as industry, Khairpur rapidly invested in several schemes of industrial development. Its flagship industry was the Khairpur Textile Mill, established in the autumn of 1951, at the cost of over Rs. 10 million. The textile mill was set up as a government venture and made a profit of over Rs. 4.5 million in 1954–55 but was sold in 1955 to a private company.⁵⁷ Commenting on the sale the Chief Minister of Khairpur noted:

This was done in pursuance of the wishes of the members of this House who passed a resolution to this effect in the last session of the Assembly. ... The textile mill has already served the purpose for which the State established it: it was intended to play the part of a pump-primer for further economic and industrial development. It was not meant merely to add to the budgeted income of the State.⁵⁸



Khairpur Textile Mill, Khairpur State

The textile mill brought about an economic boost to the state as it was not only state of the art, but also employed nearly 2,500 people by the end of 1954 with adequate provisions for their housing and welfare. The government also set up a tobacco redrying factory in 1954, which started functioning in 1955 and was expected to make a profit of over Rs. 2.5 million in 1955-56, just before the state was merged into West Pakistan. Building on these examples set by the government, two private textile mills had been set up by 1955 together with one soap and oil factory, and a new saw mill. The chief minister remarked in his budget speech that several new projects, like a sugar mill, woollen textile mill, and cigarette factory had also been proposed in 1955.⁵⁹ From a non-existent industrial base, these developments brought far reaching changes in the state in terms of employment, better wages, and increased technical education.

In addition to projects financed by the state itself, Khairpur also looked towards the Government of Pakistan for development assistance, especially in the years following federation. In mid-1951, both Khairpur and Bahawalpur asked the central government for grants for social uplift, along the same lines as the provinces.⁶⁰ Thereafter, Khairpur submitted several uplift schemes for funding to the central government in 'health, industries and Agriculture and the total amount involved (was) Rs. 3,353,000.'⁶¹ In 1953, Khairpur asked for further assistance especially in relation to the development of irrigation in the Nara area of the state. The state was also granted a further Rs. 500,000 for general uplift schemes by the central government.⁶² These central grants for uplift schemes in various fields supplemented the efforts of the state government in the economic and social development of the state. They also tied the state more closely to the fiscal and

administrative machinery of Pakistan as the state was now treated at par with the provinces.

Bahawalpur State also received a number of grants from the central government for development schemes. In late 1951, the central government approved sixteen projects under the social uplift programme in the fields of education and health in Bahawalpur involving an expenditure of Rs. 3,339,000.⁶³ The money granted under the schemes was closely monitored and projects which did not fulfil the set criteria were turned down by the central government. A SAFRON report noted:

Under the Social Uplift Schemes the Central Government have sanctioned the construction of an orphanage at Bahawalpur provided the State Government can accommodate it within the amount of Rs. 110,699 which is the balance available out of the total allocation of Rs. 3.5 million to Bahawalpur. The scheme for the construction of a stadium at Bahawalpur costing Rs. 419,000 has not been approved on grounds of policy as the expenditure on this scheme was considered to be outside the scope of Social Uplift Schemes.⁶⁴

By 1953–54, it had become fairly common for Bahawalpur State to submit to the central government various development schemes for funding, most of which were implemented at a very local level. For example, in August 1953 schemes for 'construction of roads in refugee colonies, extension of water reservoirs in villages, flood protection funds, open walls, making pucca (brick) wells at suitable places. ...' were submitted to the central government.⁶⁵ As it is evident, these schemes were not large scale projects but initiatives which affected the lives of the common people in the state. Since the money for these projects was coming directly from the central government, it played a key role in establishing

a connection between the people of the state and the central government.

The Baluch and Frontier states were all economically very weak. With a low revenue base, significant expenditure on development was not possible and so the states lagged far behind the larger states of Khairpur and Bahawalpur in terms of development indicators. In 1951, when Khairpur and Bahawalpur asked the central government to be included in the Social Uplift Schemes, the government also decided to extend the schemes to the Baluch and Frontier states. Consequently, both the Agent to the Governor-General (AGG) of Baluchistan and the Chief Secretary of the NWFP were asked to forward proposals submitted by the states in their regions.

The initial attitude of the Frontier states towards the Uplift Scheme funding of the central government was cautious. Dir did not want to accept any interference from the central government, and the volatile situation in Amb prevented the nawab from initiating any development schemes in the state. Only in Swat and Chitral did the local governments show some interest, though in the former it took some time for the state government to formulate some plans. The SAFRON report noted:

... Swat had not yet prepared any suitable scheme, that no scheme was required for the Amb State at present and that the Nawab of Dir had declined to avail any assistance in this connection. Social Uplift Schemes in connection with Chitral have been included in the North West Frontier Province Schemes and a sum of Rs. 1 Lakh has been earmarked for Swat.⁶⁶

While information on later years is scant, it is clear that the central government did continue to provide development funding

to the Frontier states, which was mainly utilized by Swat and Chitral leading to progress, especially in education, health and communications.

The Baluch states, being the most backward of all the states which acceded to Pakistan, were in dire need of development funds. As a result, the central government allocated Rupees One million to the Baluch states in 1951 under the Social Uplift Schemes. This money was divided among the Baluch states with Kalat receiving Rs. 500,000; Mekran, Rs. 250,000; Las Bela Rs. 150,000, and and Kharan receiving Rs. 100,000.⁶⁷ It is however significant to note that in the same year the AGG's province of Baluchistan received Rs. 7 million under the Social Uplift Schemes, even though the states formed about eighty per cent of the total area of the region and contained almost the same population count as the AGG's Baluchistan.⁶⁸

After the creation of the BSU in 1952, the involvement of the central government in the development of the Union increased, since it was a heavily deficit area and could not sustain adequate uplift measures on its own. Even the budget of the Union was scrutinized by the central government, as it had to finance the shortfall through grants and loans. A SAFRON report noted:

The budget estimates of the Baluchistan States Union were received in this Ministry and after examination have been sent to the Ministry of Finance for the sanction of Rs. 2,850,000 for the current financial year. It is suggested that this amount and any amount required for the balancing of future budgets should be treated as an advance of loan to the Union of Baluchistan States, which, it is hoped, will become a self-supporting unit in a few years' time.⁶⁹

In addition, in the same financial year, schemes in health were approved for Las Bela and Mekran by the central government amounting to Rs. 107,000 and Rs. 31,847 respectively.⁷⁰ The central government also ensured that civil servants it deemed fit were appointed to key positions in the Union, who were mainly from outside the Union. Therefore, in addition to the centrally appointed prime minister of the Union, in November 1952, Major Sadullah Khan, Commandant, Central Special Police Force, Karachi was appointed as police commissioner.⁷¹ In the same month, another important post in the Union, that of Revenue and Development Commissioner was taken up by Mohammad Yar Khand, an officer of the Punjab civil service.⁷² These appointments from outside the Union were significant in that on the one hand they created a link between the civil service of the Union and the All-Pakistan services, but on the other hand, created certain tensions in the Union due to the appointment of non-locals to top civil positions.

The official reason for the creation of the BSU was efficiency and better development of the region, and so the central government was aware of the need for careful planning in order to bring the Union at par with the other units of the country. Therefore, a United Nations team was invited under the leadership of E. M. Nicholson, to survey the BSU and recommend schemes for development. In the discussions following the preliminary report of the UN survey team, it was decided that '... the road link between Karachi and Kalat was the most essential project for the development of the northern part of the Union of Baluchistan States. The completion of the road would involve an expenditure of about Rs. 4 crore (forty million).'⁷³ The UN team also envisaged development in terms of manganese and coal mines and the establishment of a cement factory in the Union.

Altogether the UN Survey team recommended schemes involving and expenditure of over Rs. 9 crore (ninety million) over ten years with the UN providing funding for any foreign expenditure.⁷⁴ These schemes were poised to revolutionize the society and the economy of the Union, leading to greater economic development, and better communication networks.

By 1953, the BSU administrative machinery was inextricably tied to the central government. The lack of revenue meant that even petty local matters were being referred to the central government for funding. This factor led to greater integration of the BSU in Pakistan, but also increased the expectations of the people who now saw the central government as the main channel of development. The central government itself was cash strapped and could not afford to spend enough on the development schemes in the Union. Therefore, the BSU still lagged far behind the other provinces in terms of social and economic development and remained at the mercy of funds from the central government. The dependency of the BSU government on the central government was clear when in January 1953 it requested that a few tractors and bulldozers be lent to the BSU authorities to clear up clogged riverine channels.⁷⁵ At the same time, it also asked the central Ministry of Food and SAFRON to help move 11,000 bags of grain from the north of the Union to shortage-stricken regions in Las Bela and Mekran. Both these instances clearly exhibited that the Union government lacked the resources to procure even a few tractors or transport grain within its own territory without the cooperation of central ministries.

In order to coordinate development efforts in the BSU, the central government created a development board under the chairmanship of the prime minister of BSU in May 1953. The board was

supposed to 'act as Planning sub-Commission and submit its proposals to the Planning Commission through the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions. ...'⁷⁶ Henceforth, all development work was to be channelled through the central government and without its approval no projects could be initiated. The central government also gave the BSU a loan of Rs. 3 million for balancing its budget for 1953-54 only on the condition that a nominee of the central government assumed the office of the finance secretary of BSU.⁷⁷ With firm central government control various new schemes were initiated in the BSU. Social Uplift Schemes in health and education were funded to the limit of Rs. 643,500 in 1953, a scheme for the development of fisheries with Swedish aid involving an expenditure of Rs. 500,000 was initiated, and thirty-two irrigation schemes costing Rs. 262,020 were funded.⁷⁸

CONCLUSION

By the time of the creation of West Pakistan and the merger of Khairpur, Bahawalpur, and the BSU into Pakistan in October 1955, a number of changes had taken place in the princely states. Since all the Pakistani states varied greatly in terms of political, social, and economic development, the changes brought about in the first seven or so years after accession also differed between them. The notion of how far the populations of the states began to understand themselves as 'citizens' of a free country, rather than 'subjects' of an autocratic prince is hard to measure precisely in such a small time frame, but what is clear is that the process had begun in all the states. In some states, the process had achieved a great deal, while in others it was just beginning by 1955, though in some places even now the understanding and acceptance of 'citizenship' remains a distant dream.

To a large extent, local conditions dictated how integrated the states were to become by 1955. The eagerness of the state governments in Khairpur and Bahawalpur to develop integrated them into the administrative framework of the country and helped the central government assert more influence through grants of loans for uplift projects. The dire financial situation of the BSU and its lack of personnel meant that the central government had to initiate, plan, finance, and carry out most of the development projects in the Union, making it dependent on the centre for almost everything. On the Frontier, in most states except Chitral where an APA was in charge, the princes preferred to allow the central government to interfere only when they needed specific help for certain large projects. Overall, the Frontier states remained sceptical of the involvement of the central government in the affairs of the states during the period under consideration.

Social, political, and economic development in the states did not automatically mean that people in the states became so integrated into Pakistan that they began to view themselves as citizens of a republic rather than subservient subjects of a prince. Development did allow people to appreciate that they were a part of a larger country, but the attitude of the central government also led to alienation and misperceptions. The tight control that the central government exercised over the BSU, politically as well as economically, meant that many in the Union began to argue that the central government was treating the Union as a colony. The imposition of civil servants from outside the region and the deliberate postponement of political reform led to a backlash from certain sections of the society which argued that the Union was not being treated justly by the central government. Questions over the ownership and use of resources, especially natural resources, in the Union quickly became bones of contention between the

local authorities and the centre. As a result, by 1955 there was a great sense of alienation and mistrust in the BSU, even though bureaucratically the Union was the most integrated princely unit in Pakistan.⁷⁹

The assistance for development from the central government did not mean that the states had lost their sense of identity. Rather, in the more progressive states like Khairpur and Bahawalpur, the success of the state government in terms of development fostered a sense of a separate identity in the states. The states were an integral part of Pakistan, but they did not want their individual identities to be submerged in some quasi-national identity of Pakistan, which had yet to emerge. The Khairpur legislature was very proud of the achievements of the state government, and initially, voted against the merger of the state into the proposed West Pakistan. The resolution of the state legislature read:

The few points enumerated above clearly demonstrate that Khairpur is not only a viable state, but is ahead of even the Governor's provinces in Pakistan in several respects. ... If the people of the State are, therefore, determined to maintain their separate identity, their demand cannot be brushed aside and they cannot be compelled against their will to merge in another unit, where their future would be bleak and where they would lose the benefits which are available to them at present as a separate unit. ... In fact, the *raison d'état* of a federation is that the units (big or small) should have the option of maintaining their separate identity as a provincial unit, while agreeing to join the federation for Central subjects. It would thus appear that the people of Khairpur State have very strong and unassailable grounds to urge that the federal structure of Pakistan should preserve the separate identity of existing viable units in order to encourage local initiative. The existence of progressive units like that of Khairpur will engender a spirit of wholesome competition between different units of Pakistan

and will create healthy rivalry between them to improve the condition of their people. ... Continuance of viable units in accordance with the wishes of the people of the said units can alone create satisfaction and strengthen the unity of Pakistan. Smaller states, with less official paraphernalia, which can give prompt attention to public needs and complaints are better suited to conditions in Pakistan. It is, therefore, submitted that separate identity and existence of Khairpur State as a unit of Pakistan should not be disturbed.⁸⁰

The success of the state government in Bahawalpur had also created similar sentiments in the state, and therefore, the state government vehemently opposed the merger of the state into West Pakistan.

The rapid political, social, and economic development in Khairpur and Bahawalpur in the years following their accession to Pakistan further brought about an increased awareness of the rights of the people. By 1955 both states had progressed from an autocracy to a measured democratic rule, which was revolutionary in a mere seven years. Change was less dramatic in the Baluch and Frontier states, but progress in almost every sphere did mean that the effects of integration were felt by the people. Anthropologist Barth, researching in Swat in 1954, felt a clear change. He noted:

What I observed in 1954, however, was a society in which a centralized state *did* try to monopolize the use of force; where insecurity was swiftly declining, where money was used for most trade (though not for most wages), and prices of most goods were sensitive to a world market; where material and social expectations were massively affected by education and by contact, and communication with Pakistan and the world beyond; and where ready-made ideologies and competing interpretations of identity were being fed in from external sources.⁸¹

Change was coming in Swat, but was tightly controlled by the state. The condition of other Frontier states was not as developed, and change was very slow.

The strengthening of local and regional identities in the states was as much a result of development as it was of a comparative lack of a clear national identity in Pakistan. All these states were ancient compared to Pakistan which had just been established. Only a strong national identity could have created a sense of 'national citizenship' in the subjects of the princely states. Pakistan remained a Dominion under the Crown till 1956, and the bitter disputes over the Islamic nature of the state, tensions between the Bengalis and the rest, and the paucity of national leaders reinforced local and regional loyalties. The people of the states, therefore, owed their loyalty more to their state governments, which were led by effective leaders, than to the central government, which was increasingly unstable and divided during the period under consideration.⁸²

Notes

1. See, e.g. Chamber of Princes, *The British Crown and the Indian States*.
2. BAAR for 1949-50, 52, CQA.
3. Ibid. 52, 55.
4. ARKS, 27-8.
5. BAAR for 1949-50, 49, CQA.
6. *Memorandum CA*, 2.
7. Secretary of AGG to PA Baluch States, 9 July 1949, 369-S-49, BN 27, BSA.
8. Prime Minister, Kalat to PA, Baluch States, 19 August 1949, 24 B.S.A/48, CQA.
9. Senior Tutor, Emmanuel College, Cambridge to Pakistan High Commissioner, 8 May 1951, 10(13)-PMS/50, NDC, Islamabad.
10. Survey of the Pakistan States, 28 May 1951, Box 34, MLR UD3064A, USNA.

11. Kizilbash, *Budget Speech*, KDA.
12. ARKS, 29 and Kizilbash, *Budget Speech*, 4.
13. Memorandum BPC, 5, KDA.
14. See, *Census of Pakistan 1951*, vol. 6, 86, 93, and *Census of Pakistan 1961*, Bulletin 4, XI. In the 1961 census people who only read the Quran were not included, but have been taken into consideration above as they were included in the 1941 and 1951 censuses.
15. Amrohvi, *Tarikh-e-Khairpur*, 124.
16. 'A Note on Acceding States,' 264/CF/49 vol. III, NDC, Islamabad.
17. Ibid.
18. Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation*, 138.
19. *Census of Pakistan 1951*, vol. 5, Table 8-2, and *Census of Pakistan 1961*, vol. 3, Part IV, Table 17. The 1961 percentage includes those who could only read the Quran.
20. BAAR for 1950-51, 52, CQA.
21. BAAR for 1949-50, 31-2. CQA.
22. *Census of Pakistan 1951*, vol. 2, Table 8-2 and *Census of Pakistan 1961*, vol. 3, Part IV, Table 17. The 1961 percentage includes those who could only read the Quran.
23. Jehanzeb, *The Last Wali*, 112.
24. NWFP Yearbook 1955, 260, NWFP.
25. Jehanzeb, *The Last Wali*, 113.
26. Report of Assistant Director of Public Instruction, Frontier Regions, 3 May 1957, 12/306-TA, NWFP.
27. *Census of Pakistan 1951*, vol. 4, Table 8-2 and *Census of Pakistan 1961*, vol. 3, Part VI, Table 7.
28. NWFP Yearbook 1955, 237, NWFP.
29. Report of Assistant Director of Public Instruction, Frontier Regions, 6 October 1956, 12/306-TA, NWFP.
30. *Census of Pakistan 1951*, vol. 4, Table 8-2 and *Census of Pakistan 1961*, vol. 3, Part VI, Table 7.
31. ASML pamphlet, c. 1953, 3, NWFP.
32. Infact, in the 1920s the famous Pakhtun nationalist, Abdul Ghaffar Khan did establish an *Azad Madrasa* in Dir, under the charge of a famous Pashto poet, Fazal Mahmood Makhfi, which quickly became popular and had enrolled over four hundred students in a few weeks. However, the nawab disapproved of such initiatives and expelled Ghaffar Khan and Makhfi, and demolished the school. Ghaffar Khan, *Zama Zhwand*, 178-9.

33. *Census of Pakistan 1951*, vol. 4, Table 8-2 and *Census of Pakistan 1961*, vol. 3, Part VI, Table 7.
34. See *Census of Pakistan 1961*, vol. 3, Part IV, Table 17. For example, Peshawar improved from about 11 per cent to nearly 20 per cent and Hazara from 9 per cent to about 20 per cent.
35. Personal interview in Islamabad, August 2002.
36. ARKS, 38.
37. Memorandum BPC, 7, KDA.
38. See, e.g. Government of Khairpur (Interim Constitution) Act 1952, Section 8.2, KDA.
39. BAAR for 1949-50, 39, CQA.
40. Ibid.
41. BAAR for 1951-52, 56, CQA.
42. Jehanzeb, *The Last Wali*, 125.
43. *Khairpur—On the Road to a Welfare State 1947-55*, 37, KDA.
44. Ibid. 38.
45. BAAR for 1951-52, 58, CQA.
46. Ibid. 66.
47. Annual Summary from April 1954-March 1955, and April 1955-March 1956, 112/CF/55-VI, NDC, Islamabad.
48. Wadud, *The Story of Swat*, 65.
49. Ibid.
50. Jehanzeb, *The Last Wali*, 179.
51. Note on the Progress of Chitral, 159-S.Sts (I), NWFP.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Kizilbash, *Budget Speech*, 2, KDA.
55. Memorandum BPC, 5, KDA.
56. Ibid. 4.
57. Kizilbash, *Budget Speech*, 4, KDA.
58. Ibid. 35.
59. Ibid. 38.
60. FNS No. 9, 23/CF/51 vol. II, NDC, Islamabad.
61. FNS No. 18, 17/CF/52, NDC, Islamabad.
62. FNS No. 12, 33/CF/53 vol. XI, NDC, Islamabad.
63. FNS No. 24, 23/CF/51 vol. II, NDC, Islamabad.
64. FNS No. 3, 17/CF/52 vol. XVI, NDC, Islamabad.
65. FNS No. 16, 33/CF/53 vol. XI, NDC, Islamabad.

66. FNS No. 16, 23/CF/51 vol. II, NDC, Islamabad.
67. FNS No. 17, *ibid.*
68. *Ibid.*
69. FNS No. 19, 17/CF/52 vol. XVI, NDC, Islamabad.
70. *Ibid.*
71. FNS No. 20, *ibid.*
72. FNS No. 21, *ibid.*
73. FNS No. 17, *ibid.*
74. FNS No. 19 and 22, *ibid.*
75. FNS No. 1, 33/CF/53 vol. XI, NDC, Islamabad.
76. FNS No. 9, *ibid.*
77. FNS No. 10, *ibid.*
78. FNS No. 10–13, *ibid.*
79. For details on separatism in Baluchistan, see, Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, and Wirsing, *Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources*.
80. Memorandum BPC, 8–10, KDA.
81. Kuper and Barth, *Features of Person*, 123.
82. For further discussion on Pakistan's identity see, Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil* and Malik, *Islam, Nationalism and the West*.

Conclusion

Just as the British did not create the native/Indian princes, the accession and integration of the princely states into the independent states of India and Pakistan did not cause their rulers to disappear from Indian and Pakistani politics and culture.

Barbara Ramusack

The Princes of India and their States

EPILOGUE

Since the year the 2000, the Indian states of Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan witnessed something peculiar. In that decade all these states had chief ministers with strong princely links: Digvijaya Singh, the son of the ruler of Raghogarh was the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh from 1993–2003, Amrindar Singh, Maharaja of Patiala, was Chief Minister of the Punjab from 2002–07, Virbhadra Singh of Bashahr is still the Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh and Vasundhara Raje, daughter of the Maharaja of Gwalior and once married into the Dholpur family, was Chief Minister of Rajasthan from 2003–08. Somehow all these scions of princely houses managed to score enough electoral success to govern large states, more than half a century after their families had lost ruling powers and nearly forty years after they had been de-recognized—the princes of India are still not ‘relics of the past’, it seems. As a matter of fact, in 1962, at the time of India’s third general election and during the lifetime of the first prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maharani Gayatri Devi, the third wife of the Maharaja of Jaipur, secured 192,909 votes out of

the 246,516 cast against a Congress candidate—a world record.¹ It seemed that a former prince could get more votes and a larger winning margin than even the Prime Minister of India! The princes had lost kingdoms during the accession and integration process, but not power.

Implicitly, the Government of India knew that the charismatic, and in a way, enchanting power of the princes was not going to disappear overnight despite their states being taken over, and several of them served in government for a long time. While several princes continued for the first decade after independence as *rajpramukhs* and *uprajpramukhs*, Maharaja Krishna Kumarsinghji of Bhavnagar was the first to be appointed to a non-princely province—Madras, as governor in 1948. Thereafter, several princes were appointed by the government—Yadavindra Singh of Patiala was a member of India's delegation to the UN, and then became India's ambassador to Italy and later the Netherlands, where he died in 1974; and Man Singh of Jaipur was ambassador to Spain and later a member of the upper house of the Indian parliament, the *Rajya Sabha*. In politics too, the princes have fared relatively well, with Maharaja Karni Singh of Bikaner and Yadavindra Singh of Patiala winning several elections, while Karan Singh of Kashmir became a Union cabinet minister, and Vijayaraje Scindia became a senior vice-president of the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP), while her son (now deceased) and grandson became stalwarts of the Congress Party.²

In Pakistan too, princely influence has remained strong, with the current Nawab of Bahawalpur, Salahuddin Abbasi and the present Nawab of Amb, Salahuddin Saeed, each winning their national assembly seat five times. The princely family of Swat has done even better with Miangul Aurangzeb remaining in the parliament

of Pakistan for over three decades as either an appointed or elected member, and serving as governor of both Baluchistan (1997–99) and the erstwhile NWFP (1999). His son, Adnan Aurangzeb, has also subsequently won national elections.

So why do these princely families still endure, even though they no longer rule? One reason, which William Richter has argued convincingly, is that everywhere in South Asia, a number of princes have showed remarkable foresight in re-imagining themselves in the new state structures.³ Most princely states in India had endured very troubling times, from invasions to famine, civil war, and other disasters, hence their ability to survive in adverse circumstances was well developed. Centuries of their survival tactics had enabled most of them to adjust to changed circumstances and use their former allegiances and honour to modern political use. No wonder then, as soon as the former princes entered politics, they achieved spectacular success. In addition, they have not only made names for themselves in politics, government, and other similar activities, they have also been skilful and successful entrepreneurs. Most princely families of Rajasthan now boast five-star deluxe hotels in their former palaces, and are therefore, able to maintain, to a certain extent, their regal airs. In 2003, the *India Today* magazine named Maharaja Gaj Singh of Jodhpur the forty-fifth most influential person in India due to his princely entrepreneurship. Gaj Singh was influential, 'Because he's the king of royalty. Because none else in the blue-blooded pantheon straddles the feudal and the modern with such aplomb. ... Because he once had Finance Minister Jaswant Singh as private secretary. Because he's tourism's regal face.'⁴ This modern transformation has much to do with their continued survival.

Modern changes aside, it is the ability of the former princes to still retain their princely charisma which remains the hallmark of their success, and thus also informs us about the nature of state-building in South Asia. In both India and Pakistan, former princes were co-opted by the government following independence—the stark difference being that in India they were absorbed into a political party, and in Pakistan, largely directly into government. However, what is clear in both cases is that the princes used their personal charisma and following rather than the party name to garner votes—it was more a personality vote than party vote. This, in effect, supports the argument of Barbara Ramusack when she insists that ‘British imperialists did not create the princely states as states or reduce them to theatre states where ritual was dominant and governmental functions relegated to imperial surrogates.’⁵ The princes were scions of a pre-modern state formation pattern and, to a large extent, remained bridges between the pre-modern and modern state even after independence. Their co-option by political parties and states exhibits the importance of *rajdharmā* and the ‘service’ concept of princely rule, which still permeates politics in South Asia, where the ideal politician is, still, somehow the non-princely embodiment of *rajdharmā*.

In the case of Pakistan, the princes, the princely states, and their relations with the state of Pakistan are even more significant. This study of the accession and integration of the princely states adds further complexity to our understanding of Pakistan. So the early problems of Pakistan were not simply between the centre and former British Indian provinces, nor were they between the politicians on the one hand, and the bureaucracy and the military on the other, but these pre-modern states—the princely states—had a significant impact on the formation and development of the country. A study of the princely states thereby provides us

with greater depth in understanding the state formation and consolidation process in this newly independent (and created) country. No wonder then that Ayesha Jalal stated that '... Pakistan is a fascinating laboratory for studying construction of a state.'⁶

In Chapter 1, the argument that was put forward was that the princely states which became a part of Pakistan do not compare easily with the other princely states of India, and do not fit the broad characterization presented by Ramusack either. This reality, coupled with the fact that almost none of them directly trace themselves to the disintegration of the Mughal Empire, or ever paid tribute to the Mughal court, might suggest that they were simply not 'Indian' in the normative way we understand it. Their tribal nature and lack of a real princely culture (as understood in the Indian context) set them apart. Therefore, when both India and Pakistan embarked on postcolonial state formation following independence and had to integrate a large number of princely states, both countries were dealing with two different kinds of princely states. This could also explain why the process of integration was comparatively smooth in India, when compared with that in Pakistan. This factor could also provide an insight into why state-building has been a much harder process in Pakistan than in India (and this is in addition to all the usual reasons of e.g. weak political parties, ascendancy of military and bureaucracy, Islam, etc.), because while most politicians who were dealing with state formation in Pakistan were 'Indian' (both Jinnah and Liaquat primarily lived in what was and is now India, as did most of the Pakistani cabinet in 1947) and were Indian-trained, they were dealing with societies that had had little to do with the Indian experience. The princely states of India already bore a light imprint of British rule, and the ones which became a part of Pakistan had an even shorter interface with the Raj. Most of

the Frontier states only came under British sway after 1870, and Swat was only recognized as a state in 1926. Since these states were mostly considered tribal and primitive, the British interests in them were minimal and primarily related to security, and law and order issues. Therefore, while the Khan of Kalat was claiming that the average subject of Kalat had little knowledge or links with India, the same could also be said about the subjects of the Frontier states, and even Khairpur. Only Bahawalpur bucked the trend with its contacts with the other Punjab and Indian states. The non-Indian nature of these states has also exhibited itself in the formation of Pakistan's identity and interests, with the Punjab and Sind primarily still connected to the Indian heartland, but the Frontier states looking westwards and north towards Afghanistan and Central Asia, and Baluchistan more at home with Iranian and Gulf affairs (the 'Indian-ness' of the East Bengalis was often given as a discriminatory reason by the West Pakistanis). Hence it can be safely argued that Pakistan's identity crisis is not simply due to it being torn between its Islamic and South Asian roots, but is also related to the integration of the princely states which had little to do with those British Indian provinces that became a part of Pakistan. Being at the 'crossroads' does not simply mean an obsession with security issues, but it also means that identity is formed in several layers, and often have tenuous connections with each other. Analysing Pakistan as a part-South Asian, part-Central Asian, and part-Persian and a Gulf focused state, might give a researcher further depth in understanding the country.

Pakistan was born in August 1947 in rather peculiar circumstances (of course this is also what most countries claim!). Not only had the Cold War started by the time of the inception of the country, the state had no defined borders for a few days, no functioning government machinery, no plans to deal with the millions of

refugees pouring in, no idea what to do about the millions of people and capital leaving the country, and in just over two months after independence had embarked on a major military clash with its much larger neighbour, India, over the princely state of Kashmir. It was in this international and national environment that the Government of Pakistan had to create policy and govern.

Pakistan's relations with the princely states within its ambit were always mired by a lack of policy. As noted earlier, the Muslim League had a very *laissez-faire* policy towards the princely states, and in the run up to independence, Jinnah was confident that he could deal with the princely states personally. This declaration of non-interference in the states and acceptance of their legal independence was to cause Jinnah, and the Government of Pakistan, considerable problems, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. In the case of Bahawalpur, the nawab had to remain content with just a change to a slightly more regal title, while in Kalat it took months of negotiations and cajoling, and even implied threats, to bring about its accession. It is interesting to note that even Pakistan had to finally come around to the Indian interpretation of the Indian Independence Act by accepting the inability of any princely state to remain independent. Obviously, the increasingly weak nature of the state made its leaders concerned about its sovereignty, and any state within its sphere of influence that remained out of its ambit, was considered a threat to the sovereignty of the country.

However, how this 'sovereignty' was negotiated with the princely states by Pakistan remains a fascinating story. Being late in the game, so to speak, of wooing the princes of India, Pakistan adopted the instrument of accession formulated by V. P. Menon of the Indian States Department as the basis of negotiations. The instrument of

accession seemed harmless enough, with its stipulation that the princes could retain their sovereignty and powers, except those over defence, foreign affairs, and communications—the same powers, Menon argued, they had given up to the Government of India under paramountcy. Menon told Mountbatten that the princes ‘would not be losing anything in the result. ...’⁷—but there was nothing stopping the Government of India from re-negotiating these instruments of accession later from a position of power to meet its own ends, which is exactly what it did within a few months!

In the Indian case, policy towards the princely states was formulated on three broad principles and controlled tightly by Sardar Patel. First, the states had to accede to India by ceding authority in defence, foreign affairs, and communications—there was simply no exception to this rule. Secondly, ‘viable’ units of states had to be established. That meant that if a state were considered too small and economically weak to stand on its own feet, it would either have to be combined with neighbouring states to form a union, or merge with neighbouring provinces. The third pillar of India’s policy was that all states had to democratize, with the ruler assuming the role of a constitutional monarch. This objective was carried out in the smaller states at the same time as the unions of states were being established, while political pressure was put upon the larger ones to democratize. With the rulers now occupying largely ceremonial roles and their powers not different from those of centrally appointed governors in provinces, the Government of India had no objection to them continuing in office for the time being.

In Pakistan, because the government had no clear policy on accession, and Jinnah was too preoccupied with other state

matters (and after February 1948 too annoyed to deal with Kalat), policy formulation became the responsibility of the bureaucrats. Therefore, the accession and integration of the princely states was a first for the bureaucrats took control over state policy, much before the 1950s when it is usually claimed, and within the lifetime of both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. In fact, Jinnah himself was the first one to instigate the process of bureaucratic control when he did not turn over negotiations with Kalat to Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar, supposedly the chairman of the States Negotiating Committee, but to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, where the joint secretary, Lt. Col. A. S. B. Shah, later the permanent secretary of the States Ministry, took full control of the accession negotiations, and was, in fact, the most important person in bringing about the accession of Kalat to Pakistan.

In the negotiations for accession what is further fascinating about the Pakistani case is that in keeping with the old colonial model, and unlike modern nation states, it seemed that initially the government was accepting different degrees of sovereignty being retained by the princes. It seemed that the Government of Pakistan wanted the states to officially become a part of Pakistan, at different levels of accession, and thought that it could deal with emerging matters at a later stage. Hence, not all the princely states signed the same document. Junagadh, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, and the Baluch states signed the standard instrument of accession, while the Frontier states of Chitral, Swat, and Amb signed an abridged version which did not specify in detail the areas that 'defence, foreign relations and communications' were to cover. The Nawab of Dir, however, refused to sign any form of the instrument of accession presented to him and only signed an agreement which stated: 'I accede to Pakistan on the same terms and agreements

which existed between me and the British Government, and on the continuance of the same rights and privileges I received from the British Government.'⁸

The lack of a policy further meant that certain individuals became indispensable in their relations with the princely states. Col. Shah has already been mentioned, and with him Mushtaq Gurmani (Prime Minister of Bahawalpur and later States Minister in the federal cabinet), and Major Gen. Iskander Mirza (IPS officer, and later Defence Secretary, Governor-General, and President), became focal persons. Thus, it was A. S. B. Shah who insisted that Kalat sign the common instrument of accession so that it not continue to view itself as different from the other states; and it was Shah again who initially protested the assumption of the title 'Amir' by the Nawab of Bahawalpur. Similarly, the merger of Bahawalpur through first the dismissal of the elected ministry was the brainchild of Gurmani who knew that only by putting pressure on the amir would Bahawalpur join the One Unit. Lastly, as noted earlier, Iskander Mirza's in depth knowledge of the threat posed by Afghan propaganda postponed the issue of the merger of the Frontier states. Conversing with Fell in February 1948, Col. Shah had already elucidated his, and by extension the bureaucracy's, principle that, '... there was no crime which he would not commit if he thought it was for the advantage of Pakistan.'⁹ Clearly, keeping the princes at bay and the states under the control of the bureaucracy was in the 'interests of Pakistan' as Shah saw it, a stratagem which was later extended to the provinces and the centre as well.

The result of the lack of a uniform, coherent, and long-term policy towards the princely states, especially after accession, led to their different levels of state integration into the country. This created

considerable confusion since the states were always in different legal positions. Thus, at any one time there were differing legal rights, obligations, and protection enjoyed by citizens of Pakistan, subjects of Bahawalpur, or subjects of Dir for example. So, while law in Bahawalpur and Khairpur was slowly harmonized with Pakistan's legal system, the Frontier states retained their local laws until 1969, and are still governed under a different system. Similarly, after the abolition of the Baluch states in 1955, the states were governed under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which differed substantially from the normative Pakistani law. In terms of democratic reform, where all the princely states in India had democratized soon after their accession and subsequently participated fully in the 1951 general elections, in Pakistan only Bahawalpur and Khairpur enjoyed some form of democratic government. By 1954, Bahawalpur did have an elected assembly based on universal adult franchise but the amir still had vast reserve powers, including that of dismissing the government—a power he used in late 1954 to dismiss a government which was not supportive of the One Unit plan. Similarly in Khairpur the mir had reserve powers of dismissal on any pretext but here it was not even required that the chief minister be an elected member of the legislature. As it happened, Chief Minister Kizilbash was elected to the assembly, yet there being no constitutional provision for the chief minister to be responsible to the assembly, retarded the democratic progress of the state. Moreover, in Khairpur the chief minister remained the political agent of the Government of Pakistan until the demise of the state, meaning that he had the dual, and sometimes conflicting, role of looking after the interests of the state of Khairpur as well as those of the Government of Pakistan. Regarding both states, the central government had an ambivalent attitude towards the elected governments and wanted

to keep the ruler under the influence of the central government (in Bahawalpur through the office of the adviser whose advice was binding), so that the elected governments could be controlled at any time.

The Frontier states of Chitral, Swat, and Amb all had advisory councils by 1954 with only a slight majority of elected members and obviously only advisory powers. These councils were for the most part a token gesture towards democratic reform since they wielded hardly any power and influence. There was an understanding in official circles that these states were not yet ready for democratization and therefore, no dramatic steps were taken to reform the states. Sir Ambrose Dundas, the governor of the NWFP until 1949, was of the firm opinion that the 'pace and extent of political advancement in the states,' should be left to the rulers and not hurried.¹⁰ The rulers too (and in Chitral effectively the APA) appreciated the nature of these councils and used them at their whim. Miangul Jehanzeb noted: 'The Council had no real power. I collected them twice a year, and always told them what to do.'¹¹ Jehanzeb also curiously noted that if he had undertaken more reforms in the state, the central government would not have looked upon it kindly. He stated:

Now suppose I had changed the constitution of the State without the permission of the Government, giving people more rights and so on, then the Government would have thought that I was encouraging an idea among my people of independence from Pakistan. So I could not dare do that. From the point of view of Pakistan, I became a sort of caretaker administrator ... everybody knew that I could be removed and the State could be merged.¹²

Hence, as long as the real power lay with the ruler, who was at the mercy of the government, the central government was happy with

this arrangement. In Dir, of course, the nawab did not allow any form of democratic reform, and the state was ruled by the nawab under the eye of the APA until its merger in 1969. In Kalat, the government knew that the houses of parliament created by the Khan of Kalat and the politicians in general were hostile to its accession to Pakistan and so did not allow their reconvening, and the elections envisaged under the 1952 BSU constitution never materialized.

These stark differences in the way that the people of the princely states were being ruled, resulted in a very limited understanding among the princely subjects that they were now citizens of a free and democratic country. The subjects of Bahawalpur and Khairpur did have elected governments, but they still had some way to go before achieving the same level of democracy as the provinces and the absence of national elections further prevented national integration. Conditions in most of the Frontier and the Baluch states were hardly different from when they were ruled by the British, and so little impetus was given to national cohesion in these states. The Frontier and Baluch states used to be at the periphery of the British Indian Empire and even in the new Pakistani dispensation they remained at the margins with no voice in the government of the country. The states had acceded to Pakistan and were now constitutionally integrated, but they still were not participating as equals in the governance of the country.

The result of an ad hoc policy towards the integration of the states and the general political and constitutional problems of the country resulted in Pakistan suffering from major structural problems from its inception. The different degrees to which the states, and even the provinces, were treated legally and politically, resulted in major political tensions. From the beginning, relations

between the eastern and western wings of the country were complicated and the dispute over the designation of Bengali as one of the national languages gave rise to linguistic nationalism which ultimately led to the vivisection of the country in 1971.¹³ In the western wing the dominance of the Punjab, in the military, bureaucracy, and other arms of government, led to resentment in other provinces. The significant differences between the provinces in welfare spending, especially on education, health, and other social services, created an impression that national resources were being diverted to the Punjab.¹⁴ While the separate constitutional position of the states meant that states like Bahawalpur, Khairpur, and Swat were excelling in welfare provision for their people, the relative backwardness of other states, and especially Dir where no school or hospital existed till after the 1970s, was seen as a testament of the different positions of parts of the country.

The policies of the Government of Pakistan towards the accession and integration of the states also strengthened regional nationalism in a number of these states and served as a catalyst in creating regional identities. The dispute following the accession of Kalat and the insurgency led by Prince Karim gave way to a further development and radicalization of Baluch nationalism. Ahmed Yar Khan had already imagined himself the leader of all the Baluch by the late 1930s, and the actions of the Government of Pakistan in 1947–48 convinced him that he had to unite all Baluch people under him in an independent country. His autobiography, written in the 1970s, is significant since the first half of the narrative is devoted to proving the differentness of the Baluch. It is also worth noting that after the accession of Kalat in March 1948, Ahmed Yar Khan stopped talking about Kalat and began to argue for the rights of the 'Baluch' in general. As a matter of fact, books written by locals on the region scarcely distinguish between Kalat and the rest

of Baluchistan, and the struggle for equal rights and opportunities is deemed the same in the princely states and the former British Balochistan.¹⁵ The failure in introducing democracy in Baluchistan and the lack of development in the region further strengthened the local tribal leaders. Since the government preferred to work through the sardars, operating under the political authorities, the sardars retained control over the Baluch tribes. The lack of any significant economic, educational, and social development in the region also kept the people dependent on the sardars for their welfare. It was through the sardar that the government distributed subsidies to the tribes and so he controlled the establishment of schools, hospitals, and to a great extent the economic life in the villages. However, while tribal society was maintained, the loss of the state of Kalat and the subsequent lack of development in the province strengthened the sense of ethnic nationalism. As Martin Axmann remarks, 'the death of the state was the birth of the nation.'¹⁶ Hence, from 1955 onwards the Baluch, now without the Khan of Kalat began thinking of themselves as a distinct and separate nation which had been forcibly made a part of Pakistan. The antagonism against outsiders, be it the settlers in Quetta or the Punjabis in general, then became a hallmark of Baluch nationalism.

The creation of the One Unit and the subsequent lack of development in the erstwhile Bahawalpur state led to the creation of a Bahawalpur Province movement in 1969. The government of General Yahya Khan announced the dissolution of the One Unit and merged Bahawalpur with the Punjab, and Khairpur with Sind. The East Pakistan debacle in 1971 fizzled out the province movement based on the former state, but gave rise to a new movement based on the predominant language of the state, Seraiki. This language-based movement led to the establishment

of several political parties in the 1970s in the Bahawalpur region demanding the creation of a separate linguistic province. These parties demanded the creation of 'Seraikistan' based on the former State of Bahawalpur together with the Punjab districts of Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, and Sargodha. They also opposed the large-scale settlement of non-Seraiki people in the region and demanded a greater share in government services in the region.¹⁷ This Seraiki province movement has never garnered enough support to prove a threat to the government, but its existence shows that there are serious grievances among the population of the former Bahawalpur State concerning the slow pace of development in the state in the years after its extinction.¹⁸

Ultimately this study of the accession and integration of the princely states leads us to ponder on the nature of the Pakistani state. Since Pakistan was created, almost singlehandedly as Jalal argues, and by a man who Sikandar Hayat calls the 'charismatic leader'—Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan largely depended on him to provide its direction. Pakistan was created as a homeland for the Muslims of India—beyond that, there was great ambiguity about what shape and form the country would take. Jinnah did not chalk out a clear vision for the country, but from a very few speeches, it seems probable that he wanted a country based on citizenship. His famous 11 August 1947 speech is certainly couched in terms which declare the citizenship of the country as the supreme marker of identity. He noted:

I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community, because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khattris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on, will

vanish. ... You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed, that has nothing to do with the business of the State.¹⁹

Many have wondered about the volte-face of Jinnah in this speech. From a staunch believer and proselytiser of Hindu-Muslim 'difference' and being a proponent of the 'Two Nation' theory, he was now arguing for a state where religion would have 'nothing' to do with the business of the state. Such was the internal outrage in the Government of Pakistan over this statement that initially the full speech was not released to the public. However, from a certain vantage point perhaps Jinnah was right in arguing the above: Pakistan, as was being created, was still supposed to have large non-Muslim minorities (the mass exodus had yet to begin). There would have been about thirty per cent Hindus and other non-Muslims in East Bengal, Punjab, and Sind if the mass exodus had not occurred—not an insignificant number. Therefore, if one were to follow logically the Two Nation theory which claimed that Hindus and Muslims could not live together, then either Pakistan would have again had to be partitioned, or the non-Muslims simply thrown out to make it a fully-Muslim country. The expected presence of a large number of non-Muslims, (and Jinnah knew their importance to trade, industry, education, and the services), meant that Jinnah had to argue for the main identity of the country to be based in citizenship rather than religion. Otherwise, from the inception of the country, any non-Muslim would become a second-class citizen at best.

After Jinnah's death, the state took a clearly religious turn and the Objectives Resolution of March 1949 further solidified the religious element. Significantly, not only did the resolution reflect

a religious bent, it showed how the government was to regulate the lives of the people. It noted: 'Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah.' So the state was now not only the arbiter of religious interpretation but had enforcement powers too—Muslims were not simply 'facilitated' or 'helped' in their endeavour to become better Muslims, but 'enabled'—a much stronger word and with a more decisive meaning. Supporting the resolution Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan clearly stated its need. He said:

Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this subcontinent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea for the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today. ... We, as Pakistanis, are not ashamed of the fact that we are overwhelmingly Muslim and we believe that it is adhering to our faith and ideals that we can make a genuine contribution to the welfare of the world.²⁰

Thus, the state was to have a clear religious role.

Several lawmakers, but unfortunately only the Hindu members of the Constituent Assembly, criticized the resolution and pointed out Jinnah's speech in 1947 where citizenship was to be the primary concern of the state. Sris Chandra Chattopadhyaya, a member from East Bengal, stated:

Will they both call themselves Pakistanis? Then how will the people know who is a Muslim and who is a non-Muslim? I say, give up this division of the people into Muslims and non-Muslims, and let us call ourselves one nation. Let us call ourselves one people of Pakistan. ... Let us eliminate the complexes of majority and minority. ... I do not

consider myself as a member of the minority community. I consider myself as one of the seven crores of Pakistanis.²¹

But these objections fell on deaf ears, and a number of the Muslims members of the Constituent Assembly even claimed that Jinnah would have whole-heartedly supported the resolution. Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar noted:

It is correct that the Quaid-i-Azam had given pledges to the minorities, but Quaid-i-Azam had also given pledges to the majority. Pakistan was demanded with a particular ideology, for a particular purpose and this Resolution, that has been moved, is just in accordance with those solemn pledges which Quaid-i-Azam and the leaders of the Muslim League gave to the majority as well as the minorities.²²

Thus, for Pakistan, even the initial reason of being a Muslim homeland was hard to define. What shape this Muslim homeland would take was still a harder task to decide and while India based its constitution on the principles of equality, democracy, and diversity, Pakistan kept going back and forth in trying to weld together a coherent and principled foundation. It did indeed take Pakistan nine long years to agree on a constitution, as compared to India's two-and-a-half, but it must be remembered that what Pakistan was undertaking was something novel. Pakistan was the first modern religion-based state in the world and the task of understanding democracy, rule of law, and equality through the Islamic lens was not easy.²³

While the Constituent Assembly debated the nature of the state, the erstwhile princely states were firmly under the thumb of the bureaucracy and military, which in the name of security thwarted any moves for change. Concurrently, with no elections and the weakness of the Muslim League, there were no 'national' politics to

become a part of. Bahawalpur and Khairpur had begun to emerge as budding democracies, but there was no national political scene they could become a part of, and therefore politics in these two regions remained regional. In Kalat, repression by the state meant that most political activity went underground and became anti-Pakistan, and in the Frontier states 'security' was paramount and prevented the flourishing of any political movements. Therefore, by the time of the much-lauded inauguration of the One Unit in October 1955, Pakistan had only achieved 'notional' sovereignty in the states, no national discourse had been developed, national identity remained contested, and the state and society remained in a constant state of flux. These issues still haunt Pakistan.

Notes

1. Gayatri Devi, *A Princess Remembers*, 251–75.
2. See Ramusack, *The Princes of India and their States*, Epilogue, for details.
3. See, Richter, 'Traditional Rulers', in Jeffery, *People*, 329–54.
4. *India Today*, 3 February 2003, 46, quoted in Ramusack, *The Princes of India and their States*, 279.
5. Ramusack, *The Princes of India and their States*, 2.
6. Jalal, *State of Martial Rule*, 3.
7. Menon, *Integration*, 98.
8. *Instruments*, 28.
9. Fell Papers, D971/1, 129, IOPP.
10. Retirement Letter of Sir Ambrose Dundas, 2 (8)-PMS/49, NDC, Islamabad.
11. Jehanzeb, *The Last Wali*, 110.
12. *Ibid.* 110–1.
13. For details on the East Pakistan issue, see, Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan*.
14. See for example, Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, chapter 5.
15. See, Syed, 'The Political Development in Baluchistan'.
16. Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 299.
17. Manifesto of Pakistan Seraiki Party, Multan, BCL.

18. See, e.g. Langah, *Poetry as Resistance*.
19. Presidential Address, Constituent Assembly, 11 August 1947, in *Speeches and Statements*, 46–7.
20. 7 March 1949, *CAPD*, vol. 5, 2.
21. 12 March 1949, *CAPD*, vol. 5, 93.
22. Speech of Abdul Rab Nishtar, 10 March 1949, vol. V, 62, *CAPD*.
23. This preceding is just a short discussion of the question of religion in government in Pakistan, and not meant as a full discussion.

Appendix 1: Instrument of Accession, Khairpur State, Sind, 3 October 1947

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION OF ~~PAKISTAN~~ STATE (SIND)...

WHEREAS the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from the fifteenth day of August, 1947, there shall be set up an Independent Dominion known as PAKISTAN, and that the Government of India Act, 1935, shall, with such omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor-General may by order specify, be applicable to the Dominion of Pakistan;

AND WHEREAS the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted by the Governor-General provides that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion of Pakistan by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof;

FOR THEREFORE

*
Chairman
of the Board
of the
Regency &
President
of the
Executive
Council,
Khairpur
State,

I Mr. George, AM, Muzaf Khan Talpur
Ruler of Khairpur State, through Mr. Muzaf Khan Talpur,
in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my said State do
hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession and

1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of Pakistan with the intent that the Governor-General of Pakistan, the Dominion Legislature, the Supreme Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State of ~~PAKISTAN~~..... (hereinafter referred to as "this State") such functions as may be vested in then by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of Pakistan on the 15th day of August 1947 (which Act as so in force is hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

2. I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given to the provisions of the Act within this State so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession.

3. I accept the matters specified in the Schedule hereto as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for this State.

4. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of Pakistan on the assurance that if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the Ruler of this State whereby any functions in relation to the administration in this State of any law of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Ruler of this State, then any such agreement shall be deemed to form part of this Instrument and shall be construed and have effect accordingly.

5. Nothing in this instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to make any law for this State authorising the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion for the purposes of a Dominion law which applies in this State deem it necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense or if the land belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan.

6. The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any amendment of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment is accepted by me by an Instrument supplementary to this Instrument.

7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of Pakistan or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of Pakistan under any such future constitution.

8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State.

9. I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State is to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors.

Given under my hand this third day of October
Nineteen hundred and forty seven.

Faruk Khan
.....
(ON BEHALF OF THE RINOF RULER.)

Chairman of the Board of the Regency & President of the Executive
Council, Khairpur State.

I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession.

Dated this third day of October
Nineteen hundred and forty seven.

M. A. Jinnah
.....
(Governor-General of Pakistan.)

Appendix 2: Instrument of Accession, Kalat State, 27 March 1948

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION OF KALAT STATE

WHEREAS the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from the fifteenth day of August, 1947, there shall be set up an independent Dominion known as PAKISTAN, and that the Government of India Act, 1935, shall, with such omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor-General may by order specify, be applicable to the Dominion of Pakistan;

AND WHEREAS the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted by the Governor-General provides that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion of Pakistan by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof;

NOW THEREFORE

I, His Highness Begla Begi Khan of Kalat
Ruler of Kalat State, in the exercise of my sovereign
in and over my said State DO hereby execute this my Instrument
of Accession and

1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of Pakistan with the intent that the Governor-General of Pakistan, the Dominion Legislature, the Supreme Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State of Kalat (hereinafter referred to as "this State") such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of Pakistan on the 15th day of August 1947 (which Act as so in force is hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

2. I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given to the provisions of the Act within this State so far as they are applicable therein, in virtue of this my Instrument of Accession.

3. I accept the matters specified in the Schedule hereto as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for this State.

4. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of Pakistan on the assurance that if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the Ruler of this State whereby any functions in relation to the administration in this State of any law of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Ruler of this State, then any such agreement shall be deemed to form part of this Instrument and shall be construed and have effect accordingly.

5. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to make any law for this State authorising the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion for the purposes of a Dominion law which applies in this State deem it necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense or if the land belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan.

6. The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any amendment of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment is accepted by me by an Instrument supplementary to this Instrument.

7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of Pakistan or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of Pakistan under any such future constitution.

8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State.

9. I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State is to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors.

Given under my hand this 21st March 1948.
Nineteen hundred and forty eight.



I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession.

Dated this 21st March 1948.
Nineteen hundred and forty eight.

K. A. Jinnah
(Governor-General of Pakistan).

Appendix 3: Bahawalpur State Merger Agreement, 17 December 1954

BAHAWALPUR MERGER AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT MADE THIS seventeenth day of December 1954

between the Governor General of Pakistan and His Highness the
Amir of Bahawalpur State.

WHEREAS in the best interests of the State of
Bahawalpur as well as of the Dominion of Pakistan it is
desirable to provide for the cession of the territories
of the said State to the Dominion of Pakistan and for
the merger of the same in the proposed Unit of the said
Dominion to be known as West Pakistan.

NOW THEREFORE it is hereby agreed as follows:-

Article I.

His Highness the Amir of Bahawalpur hereby cedes
to the Government of the Dominion of Pakistan his sovereignty
and all his rights, authority and powers as Ruler of the
State of Bahawalpur together with all his territories;
and the authority, jurisdiction and powers for the
governance of the said State and territories shall vest
in the Government of the Dominion on and from the day to
be fixed by the Governor General of Pakistan, hereinafter
referred to as "the said day".

As from the said day the Government of the Dominion
shall exercise all powers, authority and jurisdiction for
the governance of the said State and territories in such
manner and through such agency as it may think fit.

Article II.

His Highness the Amir of Bahawalpur shall be
entitled to receive annually from the Government of Pakistan
for his privy purse a sum of Rs. 75 lacs (Rupees thirty two
lacs only) free of all taxes.

The said amount is intended to cover all the expenses

B. M. M. S.

- 3 -

of His Highness the Ameer of Bahawalpur and his family including expenses on account of his personal staff, bodyguard, tours, hospitality, maintenance of his residences, carriages and all family ceremonies.

2. The said amount shall be payable to the Ameer of Bahawalpur in four equal instalments at the beginning of each quarter in advance.

3. The payment of the said amount as herein provided is guaranteed by the Government of Pakistan.

Article III.

His Highness the Ameer shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all the jewels, jewellery, ornaments, shares, securities and other private properties, movable as well as immovable, not being State properties, belonging to him on the date of this agreement.

If any dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the private property of His Highness or State property, it shall be decided by the Governor General of Pakistan whose decision shall be final and binding on all concerned.

Article IV.

His Highness the Ameer, Her Highness and His Highness's children shall be entitled to all the personal privileges, dignities and titles enjoyed by them whether within or outside the territory of the State immediately before the date of this agreement.

Article V.

The Government of Pakistan guarantees the succession according to law and custom of the State of Bahawalpur to the personal rights, privileges,

Signature

P.T.O.

- 1 3 -

dignities and titles of His Highness the Amier of
Baluchistan as specified in Articles II to IV above.

Article VI.

This agreement chronicles all the Instruments of
Accession and agreements between the Governor General of
Pakistan and His Highness the Amier of Baluchistan signed
so far.

In confirmation whereof the Governor General of
Pakistan and His Highness the Amier of Baluchistan have
appended their signatures on this seventeenth day of
December 1964.

Aghulam Mohammed
GOVERNOR GENERAL OF PAKISTAN *Mob*

Said Mirza

AMIER OF BALUCHISTAN.

Glossary

anjuman	An organization
Dar ul Awam	House of the People
Dar ul Umara	House of Lords
Dewan	Prime Minister
Durbar	Court
Farman	Proclamation/Order
Jirga	Gathering of tribal elders
Majlis	Assembly
<i>Mansabdari</i>	System of ranking for nobility used by the Mughals
<i>Nazr/Nazrana</i>	Gift
<i>Praja Mandal</i>	People's Organization (local political party)
<i>Rajdharmā</i>	Code of conduct for princes
<i>Rajpramukh</i>	Governor
Sardar	Tribal leader
Ulema	Religious scholars
<i>Up Rajpramukh</i>	Deputy Governor
Wazir	Minister
Wazir-e-Azam	Prime Minister

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Index

A

Abbas, Huzrat 43
 Abbasi V, Nawab Sadiq Mohammad
 Khan 45, 118, 120
 Abbasi, Nawab Salahuddin 380
 Abell, George 167
 Abolition of Privy Purses 1-3
 Abrahani, Ismail H. M. 109
 Accession, Instrument of 88, 89, 100,
 109, 112, 123, 126, 129, 130-3,
 170-1, 180, 185, 189, 195, 215-
 17, 222-3, 225-6, 233-8, 240,
 248, 298, 318, 322, 385, 387-8
 Afghanistan 7, 32, 52, 126, 129, 130,
 165, 173, 176-7, 180, 188-9,
 191, 235, 261, 263, 266, 312,
 314, 322, 323, 326, 345, 384
 Akbar, Emperor Jalaluddin 31, 42
 Alam, Manzir-i 277, 279, 287, 292,
 295, 324
 Alam, Muzaffar 27
 Alavi, Hamza 11
Al-Baloch (newspaper), 173
 Alexander, A. V. 80
 Ali, Khan Bahadur Ijaz 304
 Ali, Nawab Shaikh Mahbub, 132
 Ali, Shahamat 42-3
 Aligarh Muslim University 40
 All India Radio 189

All India States Peoples Conference
 [AISPC] 93, 174, 273
 Al-Sabah 69
 Alwar State 40, 105
 Amb State 17, 20, 36, 59, 60-1,
 63-64, 126, 128-9, 132-4, 144,
 178, 207, 237-8, 258, 261, 265,
 275-6, 279, 282-9, 292-3, 311-
 14, 320-1, 328, 339, 345, 353,
 361, 367, 380, 387, 390
 Amb State Muslim League 282, 285,
 288, 311
 Aminuddin, AAG Mian 230-2
Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochan Wa
 Baluchistan 172
 Antique States 28-9
 Arab Sheikhdoms 69, 70
 Arcot, Prince of 2
 Attlee, Clement 75, 89
 Aurangzeb, Adnan 381
 Aurangzeb, Emperor 31-2
 Aurangzeb, Miangul, 354-5, 380
 Awami League 243
 Axmann, Martin 15, 20, 175, 393
 Ayub, Baba 55

B

Baba, Akhund 56
 Baba, Saidu 61
 Babariawad 112-13, 115-16

- Baghdad 41-2, 44
 Bahawalpur Muslim League 297
 Bahawalpur State 16, 119, 122, 145, 216, 219, 223, 226, 279, 296, 349, 366, 393-394
 Bahawalpur State Muslim League 279
 Bai Khan (Turbat), Sardar 181
 Bai Khan, Nawab 252, 344
 Baig, Mirza Qaleech 304, 307
 Baloch, Ghulam Mohammad 173
 Baluch-Brahui confederacy 156, 192
 Baluchistan Agency 161, 191, 227
 Baluchistan Muslim League 324
 Baluchistan States Union 233-4, 241, 252, 259, 368
 Barfield, Thomas 33
 Barth, Fredrik 64, 374
 Basic Principles Committee 241, 242, 244, 250
 Bastar State 209
 Benaras Hindu University 40
 Benares, Maharaja of 30
 Berar 164-5
 Bharatpur State 39, 105
 Bhopal State 9, 29, 34, 40-1, 82-4, 211
 Bhopal, Nawab Hamidullah of 82
 Bhutto, Sir Shah Nawaz 108, 110, 117
 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 2, 262
 Biddulph, Major 65, 67, 137
 Bikaner, Maharaja of 30, 76, 83, 380
 Bilaspur State 211
 Bin Saeed, Khalid 10, 12
 Bizinjo, Ghous Baksh 175, 177
 Bogra, Mohammad Ali 207, 246-8, 250-1
 British Baluchistan 22, 165, 174, 207, 393
 British High Commission Pakistan 130, 187-9, 227, 283, 317
 British Indian Empire 5-6, 11, 13, 28, 36, 133, 153, 358, 391
 Brown, Major William 140-1
 Buch, Commissioner 117
 Burnes, Sir Alexander 52
- C**
- Cabinet Mission Plan 75
 Campbell-Johnson, Alan 88-9
 Caroe, Sir Olaf 58, 68-9, 162
 Cartwright, John 9
 Chamber of Princes 77-8, 80, 82-4, 88-9, 142, 210
 Chamber of Princes, Chancellor of the 82
 Chattisgarh 208-09, 210-11
 Chattopadhyaya, Sris Chandra 396
 Chilas 138
 China 7, 67, 138
 Chiriyankandath, James 5
 Chitral 9, 17, 36, 55-8, 61-2, 64, 78, 126-9, 130, 144, 236-8, 260-2, 265, 275-6, 278, 289, 290-2, 312, 314-19, 320-1, 323, 328-9, 339, 345, 353, 361-2, 367-8, 372, 387, 390
 Chitral Advisory Council 260, 328
 Chitral State Muslim League 289, 290, 314-15
 Cochin 211
 Cohen, Benjamin 39
 Congress, Indian National 9, 76, 78-9, 80, 82-3, 86, 88, 90-6,

- 98, 108, 120, 142, 174, 213, 222,
273-4, 277, 279, 291, 297-8,
310, 325, 380
- Conquest States 29, 34, 64
- Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
101, 105, 143, 249, 255
- Copland, Ian 13, 95, 105
- Corfield, Sir Conrad 84-5, 87-9
- Cripps, Sir Stafford 79, 80-1
- Crofton, Sir Richard 119, 120, 342
- Cunningham, Sir George 129, 132
- D**
- Daoodputra 43, 45-6
- Dar-ul-Awam 175, 230, 324-5
- Dar-ul-Umraa 175, 230, 324-5
- Dawn (newspaper) 23, 96, 227-8,
240, 265, 295, 299, 306, 330
- Declaration, 3 June 85
- Dehwar, Malik Mohammad Saeed
15, 253
- Devi, Maharani Gayatri 379
- Dhebar, U.N. 112
- Dir 17, 20, 36, 56-59, 61-4, 78,
126, 129, 130-1, 144, 235, 241,
248-9, 261-2, 266, 275-6, 292,
310, 312, 322-3, 327, 329, 339,
343, 345, 353-4, 361, 367, 387,
389, 391-2
- Dir State Muslim League 292, 322;
329
- Doctrine of Lapse *see also* Paramountcy,
Doctrine of
- Dring, Col. Sir John A. 217-19, 226,
298
- Dujana State 26, 143-4
- Dujana, Nawab of 143-4
- Dundas, Sir Ambrose 169, 194-5,
207, 208, 284, 390
- Durand Line 214
- Durand, Colonel 66, 140
- Durrani, Ahmed Shah 32-4, 43, 50-1
- E**
- East Bengal 7, 29, 80, 143, 243-8,
250-1, 363, 395-6
- East India Company 27, 34, 43, 47,
52
- Eastern States Union 208
- Ernst, Waltraud 13-14
- F**
- Faiz Mahal 48-9
- Fanon, Frantz 1
- Fell, Douglas Y. 170, 176, 179-81,
186, 188, 195, 215, 228-9, 342,
388
- G**
- Gandhi, Indira 2
- Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand 79,
91, 112
- Gandhi, Samaldas 112
- Gardezi, A. N. S. 252
- Ghafur, Abdul 62
- Ghilzai 32, 50
- Ghoris 50
- Gilgit Agency 65-6, 139, 140, 259,
262
- Gilgit *wazarat* 137, 139, 164
- Girkis 65
- Goa 85

Gun Salute system 28, 36, 48-9, 118, 127 191

Gurmani, Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed 119, 120, 123, 217, 253, 279, 317, 342, 388

Guzara-khors (people granted gifts of land) 284, 288

H

Hamid, Agha Abdul 233, 248-9

Hanan, Abdul 62

Hansen, Thomas Blom 6

Haripur 59, 60, 92

Hasan, Mullah Muhammad 52

Hasan, Shah Abdul 319

Herat 32

Himachal Pradesh 211, 379

Hodson, H. V. 86

Holkar, Maharaja of 101, 103

Hunza State 23, 65-7, 133, 135-8, 140-141, 144, 203, 214, 259, 262-3, 266-7, 275-6, 327

Hunza, Mir of 66, 140-1

Hussain, Mir Ghulam 305

Hussein, Abdul Kadir 108

Hyderabad State 26, 29, 34, 36, 40-1, 46, 77, 82, 85, 95, 97, 100, 105, 119, 164-5, 169, 190, 202, 211, 214, 274

I

Ifitikharuddin, Mian 265-6, 329

Ikramullah, Mohammad 106, 123, 169, 170-1, 178-80, 184, 187-8, 206

Indian Independence Act 10, 107, 192, 385

Indian Penal Code 60

Indian Political Service/IPS 37, 107, 171, 203-8, 263, 342, 388

Instrument of Accession *see also* Accession, Instrument of

Integration (of Princely states) 18, 24, 201-2, 208, 263, 363, 382, 384, 387, 394

Isa, Qazi Mohammad 174

Ishkoman 138

Ismay, Lord 85

J

Jabir, Sabah Bin 70

Jagir 42, 59, 60, 138, 154, 319

Jahangir, Emperor Nuruddin 31

Jainism 26

Jaiselmer State 123, 125

Jalal, Ayesha 6, 10, 12-13, 106, 241, 383, 394

Jandul, Khan of 56, 261

Janmahmad 15

Jehanzeb, Miangul 16, 132, 240, 252, 259, 260, 321, 351-2, 358, 361, 390

Jhalawan 154, 156, 175, 178

Jinnah, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali 8, 10, 80, 90, 96-7, 101, 103, 105-6, 108-9, 111, 120, 123, 126-9, 130-133, 142, 144, 164-5, 167, 170-1, 176, 179, 180-3, 185-6, 189, 193, 195, 202, 206, 218, 241, 250, 255, 274, 300, 305, 324, 383, 385-7, 394-7

- Jirga(s)* 22, 32, 61–64, 172, 175, 313, 326, 357
- Jodhpur State 40, 83, 90, 381
- Junagadh State 24, 26, 107–9, 110–118, 144, 387
- Jung, Nawab Bahadur Yar 274, 294
- K**
- Kabul, Amir of 155
- Kacchi 50
- Kalam 130–2
- Kalat Confederacy 51, 154, 187
- Kalat State 15, 50, 53, 78–9, 154–6, 162–3, 166–7, 173, 175, 182–4, 186–9, 192, 194–5, 228, 230, 234, 277, 323–6, 338, 342, 350
- Kalat State National Party/KSNP 173, 195, 277, 323, 326
- Kalhora, Abdun Nabi Khan 46
- Kandahar (or Qandahar) 34
- Karachi 19, 21, 105, 109, 112, 117, 123–4, 133, 170–1, 176, 179, 180–1, 187, 219, 241, 243, 245–7, 256, 279, 298, 324, 329, 348, 358–9, 360, 369
- Karim, Abdul 181, 186, 195, 326, 392
- Kashmir State 24, 26, 33, 36, 40, 56, 58–9, 65–7, 77, 82, 90, 93, 95, 100–01, 105, 116, 125–7, 129, 134–9, 140–1, 144, 165, 190–1, 211, 214, 259, 287, 329, 345, 380, 385
- Kathiawar 107, 111–14, 116, 211–12
- Keen, Caroline 204
- Khairpur Muslim League 305–6, 310
- Khairpur State 17–18, 21, 23, 34, 36, 41, 46–8, 68, 78, 123–6, 144, 191, 207, 214–17, 222–3, 226–7, 235, 237, 241–2, 245–7, 252, 255–9, 261–3, 265, 267, 275–8, 296, 304–10, 327, 328, 338–9, 340, 343–9, 354–6, 358–9, 363–5, 367, 371–4, 384, 387, 389, 391–3, 398
- Khairpur Textile Mill 307, 309, 364
- Khairpur, Mir of 48, 124–5, 257–8, 308
- Khan III, Nawab Bahawal 43, 45
- Khan, Abdur Rahim 206
- Khan, Abdus Samad Khan 180
- Khan, Agha Nasir 175
- Khan, Ahmed Yar 16–17, 153, 156–9, 161–2, 164, 166–7, 172–3, 176, 179, 192–3, 195, 342, 344, 392
- Khan, Alam Zeb 282, 285
- Khan, Ayub 3, 55
- Khan, Cheenee 42–3
- Khan, Ghanzan 137
- Khan, Jahandad 59
- Khan, Khan Bahadur Mohammad Zarif 229, 342
- Khan, Liaquat Ali 12, 104, 110, 114–18, 134, 144, 202, 219, 223, 233, 241–2, 244, 264, 293, 306, 308, 322, 327, 330, 383, 387, 396
- Khan, Major Sadullah 369
- Khan, Mir Faiz Mohammad (II) 123–4
- Khan, Mir Khudadad 156, 159, 160–1, 192
- Khan, Mir Mehrab 52
- Khan, Mir Nasir I 50–51, 53–4, 153
- Khan, Mir Nasir II 52

- Khan, Mir Sir Osman Ali 39
 Khan, Mir Sohrab 46-7
 Khan, Mir Tharo 46
 Khan, Mohammad Afzal 285
 Khan, Mohammad Nazim 66
 Khan, Mohammad Zarif 229, 342
 Khan, Muhammad Sharif 57-8, 62
 Khan, Mullah Abdul Hakim 316
 Khan, Nawab Mahbub Ali 207
 Khan, Nawab Sir Mohammad Farid
 128, 133-4
 Khan, Nawabzada Mohammad Aslam
 168, 170-171, 178-9, 180, 186,
 194, 228, 232, 285, 342
 Khan, Painsa 59
 Khan, Rana Tila Mohammad 133
 Khan, Sangin 55
 Khan, Sardar Azim 59
 Khan, Sardar Bahadur 256
 Khan, Sardar Bai 181
 Khan, Sardar Mahmud 299
 Khan, Sardar Mohammad Zaman 253
 Khan, Sardar Shaikat Hayat 265
 Khan, Shah Nawaz 52
 Khan, Sir Shah Jahan 129-30
 Khan, Sir Zafarullah 108, 120, 186
 Khan, Umra 56-7
 Khan, Uzr 66
 Khan, Wadera Noor Mohammad 253
 Khan, Yasmin 9
 Khan, Zafar Zahid 66
 Kharan State 23, 53, 144, 156-9,
 162-4, 179, 181, 183-8, 192,
 194, 227, 230-4, 258, 338, 368
 Khasi Hill States 143
 Khizilbash, Mumtaz Hasan 218, 222,
 226, 252, 305-6, 328, 337, 344,
 348
 Khuhro, Mohammad Ayub 256
 Kipling, Rudyard 26
 Koh Ghizr 138
 Koh-i-noor 32
 Kohn, Margaret 5
 Kumarsinghji, Maharaja Krishna 380
 Kurd, Abdul Aziz 172-3
 Kutch State 211
 Kuwait 70
- L**
- Lakshminarayan, Lord 30
 Lapse of Paramountcy *see also*
 Paramountcy, Lapse of
 Las Bela State 23, 53, 144, 156-9,
 162-4, 179, 183-8, 192-4, 227,
 230-2, 234, 242, 258, 277, 338,
 350, 368-9, 370
 Las Bela, Jam of 183, 185, 234, 242,
 258
 Leased areas 154, 156, 164-9, 170,
 179, 184, 190, 192, 253-4
 Lee-Warner, Sir William 35
 Leghari, Nawab Jamal Khan 229
 Leghari, Sardar Mohammad Afzal
 Khan 303
 Leys, Colin 11
 Listowel, Lord 85, 89, 99
 Lytton, Lord 56, 160
- M**
- Macnaghten, Sir William 52
 Madhya Bharat Union 211
 Maghlot 65
 Magsi, Mir Yousaf Ali Khan 172-3

- Mahmud, Hasan 256, 297, 299, 300-3, 328
 Mahmud, Mohammad 277, 287
 Malakand Agency 126, 131, 207, 236, 240, 261, 316
 Mamdot, Khan of 297
 Manavadar State 113, 116
 Manavadar, Khan of 113
 Mangrol State 112-113, 115-16
 Mangrol, Sheikh of 113
 Manipur State 143, 211
Mansabdari system 35, 37
 Maratha 29
 Mastunj Agreement 127
 Maulvi Tamizuddin Case 12
 McBride, Keally 5
 McLeod, John 37
 Mekran 42, 156, 186-8, 194, 227, 230-2, 234, 252, 258, 343-4, 360, 368-96, 370
 Memorandum on the States 80, 97
 Menon, V.P. 14, 86, 88, 108, 111-14, 117, 205, 208-9, 210, 212-14, 385-6
 Merger Agreement 210, 254, 256-7
 Mewar State 26
 Mirza, Major General Iskandar 13, 207, 261, 273, 388
 Monckton, Sir Walter 166
 Mongols 26, 42, 50
 Moon, Sir Penderel 16, 118, 120, 342
 Morgan, J. H. 191
 Mosley, Leonard 76, 108
 Mountbatten, Edwina 76
 Mountbatten, Lord Louis 75-6, 78, 84-9, 90, 99, 103, 111, 114-15, 120, 124, 141-2, 165-9, 190, 210, 212, 386
 Mughal Rule 27-9, 31-35, 37, 50, 63, 68-70, 153, 383
 Muhammad, Ghulam 13, 245, 246, 251, 256
 Muhammad, Maulvi Arz 182, 323
 Muslim League, All India 9, 24, 79, 80, 82-3, 86, 90, 93, 95-6, 101, 103-5, 108, 120, 132, 142, 153, 164, 174, 188, 223, 238, 247, 250, 254, 273, 278, 294
 Muslim League, All India States 101, 273-4, 276-8, 294, 324
 Muslim Princely Rule 17, 69, 96, 100, 143, 145, 208, 274

 N
 Nagar State 23, 65-7, 133-8, 140-1, 144, 203, 214, 259, 262-3, 266-7, 275-6, 327
 Naidu, Sarojini 91
 Naimatuallah, Justice Choudhri 355
 Naseer, Agha Gul Khan 15, 253, 323
 Nasir, Mehtar Saif ul Mulk 236, 239
Nawa-i-Waqt (newspaper) 23, 246, 276, 278, 329
 Nawanagar, Jamsaheb of 114
 Nazimuddin, Sir Khawaja 13, 216, 244, 246
 Nehru, Jawaharlal 76, 79, 80, 83, 85, 90, 92-4, 98, 110, 114-18, 142, 189, 190, 263, 274, 379
 Nicholson, E. M. 369
 Nilgiri State 209
 Nisthar, Sardar Abdul Rab 86, 105, 167, 387, 397
 Nkrumah, Kwame 10

- Non-Indian state 154, 156, 159, 170, 191-2
- Nowsherwani, Habibullah Khan 185
- O**
- Objectives Resolution 1949 241, 395
- One Unit 24, 203, 241, 249, 252, 256, 259, 260-263, 267, 326-8, 347, 388-9, 393, 398
- Order of the Crown of India 37
- Order of the Indian Empire 37
- Order of the Star of India 37, 59, 160
- Orissa 208-11
- Oudh 26, 29, 34, 63
- P**
- Pakistan Muslim League 164, 254, 281
- Pakistan Times, The* 23, 276, 315
- Panniker, K. M. 82-3
- Paramountcy, Doctrine of 202, 218, 339
- Paramountcy, Lapse of 78-9, 81, 84-5, 88, 95, 97, 100, 108, 111, 113, 118-19, 124, 127, 130, 133, 142, 154, 156, 169, 183, 190-91, 209, 325, 338, 342
- Pasni 187
- Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai 83, 86-7, 90, 93-4, 112, 114-15, 202, 205, 209, 210, 212, 263, 386
- Pathan 54, 57-58, 61, 68, 253, 261, 394
- Pati, Biswamoy 13-14
- Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) 211
- Patiala, Maharaja of 40, 83, 379, 380
- Patil, S.H. 90
- Peshawar 19, 58, 61, 141, 288, 291, 310, 316
- Pethick-Lawrence, Lord 80
- Phulra, Khan of 60
- Plebiscite 116, 118
- Political Agents 53, 85, 126-7, 227
- Political Department 77, 84, 86, 113, 118, 122, 124, 192-193, 202, 204-6, 208, 213, 215, 273, 304, 337, 342, 355, 362-3
- Porbandar State 115
- Portuguese 85
- Praja Mandal* (people's organization) 92, 277
- Princely Identity 27, 54, 64, 68-9
- Punial, Raja of 141
- Punjab 7, 33, 80, 119, 120, 123, 211, 229, 245-8, 301, 304, 307, 340, 346, 349, 356, 363, 369, 379, 384, 392-5
- Q**
- Qureshi, Ishtiaq H. 22
- R**
- Radcliffe Award 7
- Raedelli, Riccardo 15, 174
- Rahman, Fazlur 22
- Rahman, Mehtar Saif ur 236, 317
- Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur 243
- Raisani, Sardar Ghous Baksh 253
- Rajasthan, United State of 211, 379, 381
- Rajdharna* 30, 40, 69, 382

- Rajputana 29, 119, 211
 Rampur State 26, 29, 34, 40, 103-4, 211
 Ramusack, Barbara 10, 28-9, 30, 35, 40, 68, 379, 382-3
 Red Shirts 310
 Rome, Sultan-i- 16
 Royal Pakistan Air Force 187
 Royal Pakistan Navy 187
 Rudolph, Lloyd 30
 Rudolph, Sussanne 30
- S**
- Saeed, Nawab Salahuddin 381
 Saker, Major R. K. N. 207
 Salam, Chaudhri Abdus 252
 Sandeman System 53
 Sandeman, Sir Robert 53-4, 192
 Sarawan 52, 154, 156
 Saurasthra, Union of 211
 Savidge, Cecil A. V. 207
 Scindia, Vijayaraje 380
 Second World War 1, 4, 75, 79, 80, 138, 340
 Shah Jahan, Emperor 31
 Shah, Abdul Jabbar 62
 Shah, Akbar 61-6, 2
 Shah, Lt Col. A. S. B. 107, 194, 206, 232, 387-8
 Shah, Mohtaram 55
 Shah, Nadir 32-3, 43, 50
 Shah, Sir Shamas 172-3
 Shahabuddin, Khawaja 278
 Shahi Jirga 173
 Shahwani, Nawab Mohammad Khan 253
 Sharif, Saiyid Muhammad 52
 Sheikh, Hafeez-ur-Rehman 141
 Shias 48, 67, 394
 Sibi Durbar 180-1, 193, 253
 Sikhism 26
 Simla 29, 80
 Sind (Sindh) 24, 33, 42-4, 46-8, 60, 245-7, 255-256, 308, 348, 356, 363, 384, 393, 395
 Sind Observer 306
 Singh, Iqbal 91
 Singh, Maharaja Gaj 381
 Singh, Maharaja Karan 380
 Singh, Maharaja Karni 380
 Singh, Maharaja Man 380
 Singh, Maharaja Ranjit 43
 Singh, Maharaja Yadavindra 380
 Singh, Raja Ranbir 65
 Singhji, Maharaja Ghulab 135
 Skrine, P. A. 157
 Soori 67
 States and Frontier Regions Ministry (SAFRON) 143, 206, 201, 206-7, 220, 229, 232, 235, 253, 261, 264, 266, 277, 279, 280-1, 296, 298, 309, 317-18, 321, 324, 366-8, 370
 States Negotiating Committee 78, 105, 242, 264-5, 387
 States Reorganization Act 1956 259
 Stepputat, Finn 6
 Successor States 29, 34
 Suhrawardy, Hussain Shaheed 251
 Swat State 16, 61, 240, 320-1, 351-2, 361
 Swat State Muslim League 320
 Swidler, Nina 15, 51

T

- Talpur, Abdullah Khan 46
 Talpur, George Ali Murad 123-4,
 222, 308, 344
 Talpur, Mir Ali Murad 47-8
 Talpur, Mir Fateh Ali Khan 46
 Talpur, Mir Ghulam Hussain Khan
 126, 305
 Talpur, Mir Rustam 47
 Tanawali Tribe 59
 Timur 34, 55
 Titus, Paul 15
 Transfer of Power 78-9, 81, 84-5, 94,
 96, 101, 105, 119, 120, 139, 140,
 153, 156, 174, 185, 190, 205,
 208, 217, 273
 Travancore State 36, 95, 211, 339
 Tripura State 211
 Turbat 181, 187
 Two Nation theory 8, 395

U

- Ul-Mulk, Hissam 279, 291
 Ul-Mulk, Mehtar Aman 56
 Ul-Mulk, Nasir 127
 Umar, Maulana Mohammad 177,
 182, 323
 Umayyads 42
 United Front (*Jugto Front*) 250, 265
 Usif Patel Case 251
 Utub Tribe 69-70

V

- Victoria, Queen Empress 37, 160,
 355
 Vindhya Pradesh 211

W

- Wadud, Miangul Abdul 16, 62-3,
 131-2, 351, 361
 Wakefield, Sir Edward 16, 153, 215
 Wavell, Lord 75, 80, 142
 Weightman, Sir Hugh 154
 West Pakistan 45, 106, 145, 243, 248,
 256, 258-9, 319, 345, 365, 371,
 373-4, 384
 Wilcox, Wayne A. 14, 108, 261, 301
 Wolpert, Stanley 28

Y

- Yar Khand, Mohammad 369
 Yasin 138
 Yusuf, S. M. 182

Z

- Zamindar* (newspaper) 320
 Zarakzai, Nawab 177
 Ziauddin, M. 165

A Princely Affair

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
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ISBN 978-0-19-906649-0



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